


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form would not be fit for use at any sacrifice.' (IX—ii—40).

The *ūha* of *mantra* again is of various kinds; the *Mīmāmsābālaprakāsha* notes the following ten:—(1) *alteration of the basic noun*,—*e. g.*, the change of '*āgnayē tvā*' into '*sūryāya tvā*';—(2) of the *gender*,—*e. g.* the *mantra* '*Vasiyasí rudrāsi*' (*Vājas. Sam.* IV—21) addressed to the heifer is changed to '*Vasvasi rudrosi*' when addressed to the calf;—(3) of *number*,—*e. g.* the *mantra*, '*Chhāgasya vapāya mēdhasah*, &c.' is changed into '*Chhāgānām*, &c.' at the *Prājāpatya* sacrifice, where there are many goats;—(4) of the *basic noun and gender*,—*e. g.* the change of '*agnayē justam*' into '*adityai justam*';—(5) of the *basic noun* and *number*,—*e. g.* of '*agnayē justam*' into '*vishvebhyo dēvebhyo justam*';—(6) of *number and gender*,—*e. g.* in '*Prāsmai agnim bharata*', the masculine singular '*asmai*' is changed into the feminine-plural '*ābhyah*';—(7) of the *basic noun gender and number*,—*e. g.* for the consecration of water for the washing of the corn we have the *mantra* '*āpodēvīh shuddhāh sthah*' where '*apodēvīh*, &c.' is feminine plural; this same *mantra*, when used for the consecration of ghee, is read as '*Ghritadēva shuddhamasi*';—(8) the alteration in the form of repeating the whole of the original twice over,—*e. g.* in the cutting of the skin, the mantra is '*ēkadhā*' when there are two skins, the same *mantra* is '*ēkadhā-ēkadhā*' (IX—iii 29 to 31);—(9) alteration of a *taddhita* word,—*e. g.* the *mantra*, '*Mitrāvrunaū tvā uttaratah*, &c.' (Vājas-Sam, II-3) is changed into '*Mitrāvarunau tvā purastāt*, &c.'; (10) of *indeclinables*,—*e. g.* the *mantra* '*agnim grihnāmi......shvo yajñyāya ramatam*' is changed into '......*adya*, &c.' where for '*shvah*' in the original we have '*adya*' in the modification.

It has to be noted in this connection that the *mantras* in their *altered* form are no longer regarded as '*mantras*' in

the strict sense, even though they serve the purposes of the *mantra*; they are regarded as mere 'auxiliaries' to the *mantra*; the reason for this is that the learned do not regard the altered *mantra* as 'mantra'; and it is upon the usage of the learned that it depends whether or not a certain passage is to be regarded is '*mantra*.' (*Bṛihaṭī* on II—i...34, page 50 b).

SECTION 9.

Annulment or Suspension of Details.

1. 'Alteration' having been dealt with in the foregoing section, we proceed to consider the question of '*Bāḍha*' or 'Annulment' or 'Suspension'; *i.e.* the question,—'in what cases are the details and accessories of Sacrifices, as indicated by a general rule or by 'transference', to be *suspended* in certain performances, at which they may not be found to be permissible?' There are two kinds of this 'Suspension': * (1) '*Prāpṭabāḍha*' or '*Prarmeyāpakāra*' (as called by Pārṭhasārathi Mishra),—*i.e*, the Suspension of the alteration that is indicated by Transference;—this Suspension being due to the alteration being such as, by its very nature, cannot be allowed. (2) '*Aprāpṭabāḍha*' or '*Mūlochchheḍa*,'—*i.e.* Suspension of an alteration not indicated by any of the valid forms of 'Transference'; which is. by its very nature, not allowable. The '*Prāpṭabāḍha*' is again divided into two kinds:—(a) Suspension or Annulment by the six ordinary 'means of right knowledge,' and (b) Annulment by 'Scripture.' Of these latter again there are many subdivisions. For example,—(1) that which is laid down as to be done always (*niṭya*) is annulled by what is laid down as to be done by reason of some special circumstances (*naimiṭṭika*); *e. g.* fifteen *sāmiḍhēnī* verses are laid down as to be recited at the *Darsha* sacrifice;† but when the sacrifice is performed by a *Vaishya*, the number 'fifteen' is *suspended*

* See *Mīmāmsābālaprakāsha*—p. 131 *et seq.*

† *Shaṭapaṭha.* 1, 3,5,7.

in favour of 'seventeen,' which is the number laid down for the *Vaishya*. (2) That which is enjoined as merely helping in the accomplishment of the sacrifice is annulled by that enjoined as accomplishing something desirable for the agent; *e. g.* with regard to the *sāmiḍhenī* verses, it is laid down that in case the Sacrificer is desirous of acquiring 'fame' or 'honour,' the number of verses should be 21; this number thus *annulling* the 15 and 17 spoken of above. (3) That which goes before is annulled by what comes after it; in connection with the going out of the priests from the *Havirḍhāna*, it is laid down—'if the *Uḍgāṭṛi* priest breaks the line, the Sacrifice must be finished without any sacrificial fee......if the *Praṭihartṛi* breaks it, the Sacrificer should give away all his 'belongings;' now if it so happen that the line is broken by both these priests, the Sacrificer has to give away all his belongings; the later enactment annulling the earlier.

(4) In connection with the corn to be used at the *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices, the Veda lays down certain acts as to be done with a view to remove the chaff from the grain; for the *Prājāpaṭya* sacrifice, which is one of the 'ectypes' of the *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa*, we find that instead of the *vrīhi* corn, *grains of gold** are laid down for use; now in accordance with general law that 'the ectype has to be performed in the same manner as the Archetype,' it would be necessary to go through all the acts laid down for the removing of the chaff of the *vrīhi* corn, in connection with the *golden grains* also; but all these acts are annulled in view of the fact that they would be entirely useless, there being no chaff to be removed; and the only purpose served by those acts is the visible one of removing the chaff,—there being no transcendental *apūrva* spoken of as following from

* Each of these grains of gold—called '*Kṛiṣṇala*'—has to be one third of a *Karṣa* in weight. (*Vyavahārakhaṇḍa* of *Parāsharamāḍhava*, p. 116.)

them. (X—i—1 to 3). But this does not set aside the necessity of the golden grains having to undergo the process of 'cooking' or 'baking': it is directly enjoined that 'the golden grains have to be cooked in ghee'; and this shows that, even though the 'cooking' cannot produce any visible effect in the grains, yet, *as enjoined*, it must serve some other transcendental purpose (X—ii—1, 2); similarly in connection with these grains of gold the 'eating of the remnant' has to be done, as laid down in the Veda (X—ii—13 to 16). In the same manner, when the *charu* is the material offered, all those acts of *kneading the dough*, &c. that were necessary in connection with *Cake*, are *annulled* in favour of those acts that are necessary for the preparation of the *charu* (X—i—45 to 58). (5) Some details that are 'transferable' from the Archetype to the Ectype are found to be annulled by the Direct Assertion of the Veda itself negativing the use of those particular details ; *e. g.* the 'appointment' of the *Hoṭri* priest is negatived in connection with the *Paiṭrī* sacrifice. (6) A substance transferable from the Archetype is set aside by the direct injunction of another substance for the same purpose ; *e. g.* at the *Shyēna* sacrifice, *Kusha* is set aside in favour of the 'reeds'; and for the *Agnyāḍhāna*, the 'fee' prescribed is the *cow*, but at its Ectypes,—all subsequent *Agnyāḍhānas*,—the fee consists of an old cart duly repaired,—the former being set aside by this latter (X—iii—30 to 33). Similarly in a case where the acceptance of both is not possible—one being totally incompatible with the other,—we have the *annulment* of the *ectypal* details in favour of the *archetypal*; but where the two are compatible with each other, we have the 'combination' of both; *i.e.* both are to be used at the Ectype; the third pāḍa of Aḍh. X deals with particular cases of such 'incompatibility.' (7) What is laid down by the general rule is annulled by that laid down by the special rule ; *e.g.* in connection with the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, we find

a substance specially laid down, in the shape of '*Niṣkāsa*' (the water left after the removal of the curdled particles of milk); and this sets aside the use of the 'Cake' which would be the material for the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, only in accordance with the general law that 'the details of the Archetype are transferred to the Ectype.' (VII—iii—16). Another example of this is given under X—viii—16. (8) The *useless* is set aside by the *useful*; *e. g.*, among the *mantras* laid down as to be recited as '*nigadas*,' addressed to others, there are some '*yajuṣ*' also; with regard to the reciting of the '*yajuṣ*' it is laid down that it should be done silently,—not loudly; now if the sentence intended to be addressed to another person were recited *silently*, it would entirely fail in its purpose; for this reason, the 'silent recitation' of the *yajuṣ* is, in this case, annulled by the 'loud recitation,' which would serve a useful purpose when heard by the other person to whom it is addressed. (9) The *smaller* is annulled by the *larger*; *e.g.*, in connection with the *Pañchadasharātra* Sacrifice, when we come to consider the matter of 'names,' we find that the *single* name '*Agniṣtut*,'—which would indicate the reciting of the *Āgnēyī Subrahmaṇyā* verse,—is set aside in favour of the many names '*Jyotiṣ*' and the rest, in virtue of which the *Aindrī Subrahmaṇyā* is recited. (10) That which has room for itself elsewhere is set aside by that which, if not adopted on the occasion in question, would have no place anywhere else; *e. g.*, with reference to the recitations preceding the *Agnīṣomīya* offering (Chap. IV, Sec. 67), it is laid down that they are to be done *silently*; but with regard to the *Dīkṣaṇīyā Iṣṭi* (Chap. IV, Sec. 44), a distinct 'accent' is laid down showing that the *mantras* have to be recited loudly enough to allow of the accentuation being marked; now as regards this latter recitation, the *silent* method is set aside in favour of the *louder*, in view of the fact that the *silent* method, if dropped at the *Dīkṣaṇīyā*, could still be adopted at the recitations on other

occasions, while the particular 'accent,' if dropped at the *Dīkṣaṇīyā* recitation, could not be adopted at any other recitation; and thus it would be dropped out altogether, which cannot be allowed with regard to anything that is directly enjoined.

2. The 'annulment' hitherto described has been that of the details of the *Archetype* as transferable to the *Ectype.* There is yet another kind of 'annulment' which is more general in its character, to which the name '*Prasaṅga*' is given. There are five kinds of this form of 'Annulment':—(1) The annulment of the Principal Sacrifice,—*e.g.* the daily *Agnihotra* is set aside by the *Agnihotra* performed for the attaining of a certain result. The other four are the annulments of subsidiaries :—(2) The annulment of one enjoined subsidiary by another enjoined subsidiary, (for examples see 1 and 2 above);—(3) of the *transferred* subsidiary by the *enjoined* subsidiary,—*e.g.*, the *Prayāja*, &c. for the *Iṣṭi* performed at night are set aside by those performed for the *Ḍarsha*;—(4) of the *transferred* Subsidiary by that which is *transferred,—e.g.*, the *Prayāja* done for the *Puroḍāsha* is set aside by that done for the *Pashu*;—(5) of the *enjoined* by the *transferred,—e. g.*, the recitation of the *Sāmiḍhēnī* verses for one who is desirous of fame sets aside the recitation of the original *Sāmiḍhēnī* verses.

3. The above are instances of *compulsory* annulment. There are cases where it is purely *optional,—e.g.*, when the post is said to be of *Khaḍira* or *Bilva* wood; the one may be set aside, at option, in favour of the other.

4. In all the above cases, we had the 'annulment' of something that was, by some means or other, indicated as fit for being adopted. There are annulments also of such things as do not have their adoption indicated by any means. As there can be no limit to things not so indicated, the number of annulments of this kind cannot be fixed. We

Prabhā. 284.

shall cite a single example of this kind :—When a direct injunction lays down a certain *mantra*,—the *Aindrī* verse for instance,—to be used at the sacrifice to the *Gārhapatya* fire,—this *mantra* annuls or sets aside the possibility of the *mantra* being used at any other sacrifice,—that to Indra for instance,—at which it would have been used in virtue of certain words contained in the *mantra* itself. Though in these cases, what is annulled is something that might be regarded as actually indicated,—*e.g.* by the indirect implication of the words of the *mantra*,—yet it is called '*aprāptabādha*,' the 'annulment of that which is indicated,'—in view of the fact that in face of the Direct Injunction to the contrary, the 'indirect implication' of the word does not possess any indicative force at all; so we have the annulment, not of what is actually indicated, but only of what might be indicated.

Shankara Bhatta* enumerates and exemplifies no less than 556 'annulments' of this class.

5. There are many cases where we have the 'Annulment,' not of *all* the details transferred from the Archetype, but of only a portion of these. This *partial* 'Annulment' forms the subject-matter of the fifth *pāda* of *Adhyāya* X. We shall cite here a few instances :—(1) For the baking of the cake dedicated to Agni, *eight* pans are prescribed in connection with the *Āgnēya* sacrifice; in connection with its *Ectype*, the offering to *Dyāvāprithivī*, only *one* pan is prescribed; hence when transferring the pan from the *Āgnēya* to this latter we shall bring in only *one* pan—and that too only the first of the eight—and set aside the remaining *seven* (X—v—1 to 3).

In some cases, the order of the details in the *Archetype* is changed in the *Ectype*; for instance, at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, there are certain cups dedicated to certain deities; when

* *Mīmāmsābālaprakāsha*, pp. 134—37.

these come to be held up, it is the one dedicated to Indra that is laid down as to be held up first; and so on; at the *Ectype* the same cups are 'transferred'; but the order of the *holding* is changed, in virtue of the direct injunction that at the Ectype the first to be held up is the cup dedicated to Shukra. (X—v—67 to 69). This change of order has been called '*Pratikarṣa*.' In some cases, the details transferred from the Archetype are not sufficient for the Ectype; for instance, at the Archetype only 15 *Sāmans* are sung; while for the Ectype 21 are prescribed; in this case the remaining six *Sāmans* have to be added over and above the 15 at the Archetype; and the number 21 is not to be made up by repeating 6 out of the 15 *Sāmans* of the Archetype. (X—v—15 to 25). Then again, the *Jyotiṣtoma* is laid down as to be performed by only one Sacrificer; the twelve-day *Saṭra* has this *Jyotiṣtoma* for its Archetype; but for the *Saṭra* it is directly enjoined that there should be many (17) *Sacrificers*; hence at this we have seventeen, and not only one, Sacrificer. (X—vi—45 to 50).

SECTION (9)—SUB-SECTION (2).

Samuchchaya or Combination.

1. The subject of '*Bādha*' naturally leads to that of '*Samuchchaya*,' 'Inclusion' or 'Combination' or 'Aggregation'; in virtue of which there is no 'Annulment' of actions and things, but only a 'Combination' of what is laid down for the Ectype specifically, with what comes to it from its Archetype. For instance, in connection with the *Nakṣaṭrēṣṭi*, certain additional libations are laid down as to be poured after the principal offerings,—these offerings being to *Agni*, the *Kriṭṭikās*, *Ambā* and *Dula*; while in its Archetype, the *Nāriṣṭahoma* is not set aside by the offerings to Agni, &c.; but both sets of libations are offered; and the reason for this 'Combination' lies in the fact that the offerings laid down serving a transcendental purpose, there would be no justification for abandoning any of them. (X—iv—1).

Prābha. 286.

2. Pāḍa VI deals with 'Annulment' and 'Combination' as pertaining to the singing of *Sāmans*; and *pāḍa* vii with those pertaining to the Animal Sacrifices.

SECTION (9) SUB-SECTION (3).

Meaning of the Negative Word.

1. In view of the fact that 'Annulment' is, in most cases, expressed by the negative word, Jaimini proceeds, in pāḍa VIII, to explain the various meanings of the negative word. (1) The negative denotes 'annulment,' and hence an *exception*;—*e.g*, the 'appointment' of priests is laid down for the Archetype; this 'appointment' is negatived in connection with the Ectype; and here the negative modifies the Archetypal injunction to this extent that it comes to mean that 'at the Ectype one should make use of all archetypal details, *with the exception of the Appointment.*' (X—VIII—1 to 4). (2) The Negative denotes 'Option,'—in the case of two contradictory declarations;—*e.g.*, in the sentences 'the vessels are to be held at the Atirātra' and 'the vessels are not to be held at the Aṭirāṭra,'—the negative in the latter does not lead to any exception; it only modifies the original injunction to the extent that the holding of the vessel is made to be regarded as optional (X—VIII—6). (3) The Negative expresses praise of something other than what is negatived;—*e. g.* in connection with the *Agnihoṭra*, we meet with the passage 'one should offer the wild seasamum; ......these are *no* offerings'; now, how to reconcile the first part of this passage—where the wild seasamum is laid down as something to be offered,—with the latter part,—where it is spoken of as *not* to be offered? With a view to this reconciliation, we take the negative to mean that 'the *offering of milk* at the *Agnihoṭra* is so praiseworthy, that even such an excellent thing as the wild seasamum is not to be offered in its place,'—the negation of the seasamum indicating the praise of the milk (X—VIII—7). (4) The negative denotes

paryudāsa or Partial Rejection;—*e. g.*, in connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma* we read,—'one who is initiated for the Sacrifice *should not give gifts, should not make offerings, should not cook,*'—which prohibits certain acts; these same acts are also enjoined, in connection with the same sacrifice, as accomplishing certain desirable results; these same acts again are also found to be *transferable* to the same sacrifice from the *Agnihoṭra*,—in which case those acts are meant to help the accomplishment of the Sacrifice. Now the question arises as to which *one* of these two sets of the actions concerned,—or both sets,—are meant to be negatived by the aforesaid prohibition; and the conclusion is that both sets are not negatived; it is only the set calculated to accomplish something desirable for the man that is negatived; as the prohibitive sentence follows closely upon the injunction of this latter set. (X—VIII—12 to 15).

SECTION (10) SUB-SECTION (1).

The Methods of Ascertaining the Extent of the Archetype along with its Ectype.

1. The preceding section has dealt with 'Annulment' and 'Combination'; by means of these we are enabled to ascertain the extent of the ectypal performances alone; and we are led to consider the means of ascertaining the extent of the Archetype along with the Ectype. This subject lends itself to a twofold division:—(1) There are certain subsidiaries which, if performed once, effectually help, by that single performance, more than one action; this help, accorded by a single performance of the subsidiary to many Primaries, has ben called '*Ṭanṭra*'; (2) there are, on the other hand, some subsidiaries which have to be repeated in connection with each Primary to which they are related; to this repetition of the Subsidiary with each Primary has been given the name of '*Āvāpa*.'

Prābhā. 238.

2. As a preliminary to the consideration of the question of *Tanṭra* and *Āvāpa*, it is necessary to consider whether, in the case of a sacrificial performance consisting of a number of Primaries and Subsidiaries, the specified result follows from any one of these, or from all collectively. It is only when the result follows from all collectively, that the question can arise as to whether a certain Subsidiary is to be performed in connection with every one of the Primaries, or not; whereas if the result follows from each of the Primaries, it would be absolutely necessary for the subsidiary to be performed with every one of them, and as such there would be no possibility of '*Tanṭra*'; as each Primary in this case, will have to be treated as a complete whole by itself. Herein lies the use of Aḍhi. (1) of adhyāya XI. The conclusion is that the result follows from all collectively.

3. The second and following Aḍhikaraṇas also deal with the question as to whether the Subsidiaries taken together, help their Primary, or each accords its share of help independently of the rest; the conclusion is in favour of the former view; so that in this case also we have '*tanṭra*' (XI—i—5 to 19). It is for this reason that the *Prayājas*—which are the subsidiaries of the *Ḍarshapurṇamāsa*—are to be performed once only (XI—I—29 to 37).

4. Another general question dealt with in this connection is with regard to the '*Kāmya*' sacrifices; these have to be performed as often as one may desire the result proceeding from it (XI—i—20 to 25). Actions with only visible worldly results have to be repeated as often as it may be necessary for the accomplishment of that result. But in cases where the action is for invisible results, it has to be performed only once (XI—i—27, 28).

SECTION (10) SUB-SECTION (2).

Particular Cases of 'Tanṭra' and Āvāpa.'

1. Bearing upon the *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices we find a number of texts—*e. g.*, (*a*) 'the Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa

should be performed on level ground,' (b) 'the Pūrṇamāsa should be performed on the Full Moon Day,' (c) 'there should be four priests at it,' and so forth. From these passages it would seem that one entire *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa* should be performed on level ground, another on the Full Moon Day, and so forth,—the whole sacrifice to be repeated at each place and time mentioned. But the conclusion on this point is that the whole is to be performed only once; and that this one performance is to be done at the place and time laid down in the texts; and the reason for this is that the numerous actions composing the *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa* are to bring about their result, as combining to make up the single performance of the sacrifice (XI—ii—1, 2). All the Subidiary Sacrifices that go to make up the single Primary Sacrifice are thus to be performed at the same time and place as that laid down for the Primary. This affords an instance of 'Ṭanṭra' (XI—ii—3 to 10). Another case of 'Ṭanṭra' we have in the well-known *Agnyāḍhāna*, which has to be done only once,—the same *consecrated* fire serving for all subsequent sacrifices. (XI—iii —2).

2. This same *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice supplies us with an instance of '*Āvāpa*' also:—The Sacrifice consists of two sets of sacrifices—one group called the '*Ḍarsha*' and another the '*Pūrṇamāsa*' *; though the subsidiaries laid down for each group are nearly the same, yet they have to be repeated with each group; and the reason for this is that though the two groups together form a single sacrifice leading to a single result, yet, inasmuch as the two are to be performed on two different days,—15 days apart from each other,—the subsidiaries performed with one would be performed on the day of that group; and thus they would not be performed on the day prescribed for the other group, which latter would therefore be left incomplete; so in such cases the subsidiaries have to be

* See Chap. IV, § 6.

repeated. (XI—ii—11 to 17). There are however certain subsidiaries which, by their very nature, and also by virtue of direct injunctions, cannot be performed on the same day as the Primary; for instance, the *making of the altar*, as prescribed for the day preceding the *Darsha*, cannot be done on the same day as that sacrifice. (XI—iii—1).

SECTION (11)—SUB-SECTION (1).

Prasanga : an extended Tantra.

1. The subject of our last section is *Prasanga.* It is not the '*Prasanga*' that we have already noticed above (sec. 9, sub-sec. 2) as a particular form of 'Annulment'; it is something entirely different; it may be regarded as a sort of an *extended Tantra* : '*Tantra*' *proper* is the single performance of a subsidiary with a view to helping more than one Primary,—that single performance being prescribed and intended by the Sacrificer to help more than one Primary; a case of '*Prasanga*' however we have where the single performance of the subsidiary,—even though prescribed and intended to help a single Primary,—is accepted as helping another Primary also, when this latter is performed by the same man and at the same time and place as the former Primary. As for instance, the *Prayāja* and other subsidiaries performed in connection with the *Agnīṣomīya* animal-offering, helps the Cake-offering also. Even though we have no such injunction as—'what is done for the animal-offering helps the cake-offering also',—yet the circumstances brought into existence by the performance of the subsidiaries with the intention of helping one action, could not cease to exist and withdraw their help from another action also, which might happen to be performed at that same time and by the same agent (XII—i—1 to 6). Then again, when one has prepared the sacrificial altar, in connection with the *Agniṣtoma*, if he wishes to perform an *Iṣti* also,—

after that *Agniṣṭoma*—it is not necessary for him to erect another altar; the same altar can be used for a number of sacrifices. (XII—ii—8, 9).

2. There are certain exceptions also: *e. g.* the *Ārambhaṇīyā Iṣṭi* is laid down as to be performed at the commencement of the *first Darshapūrṇamāsa* that the person undertakes to perform, as shown under IX—i—34, 35; and though this sacrifice is meant to be simply purificatory in its character,—tending to purify the Sacrificer,—yet, inasmuch as a single performance of this cannot help *all* the sacrifices performed by the man during the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, it has to be repeated along with each of the Ectypes that the man performs; and the reason for this lies in the fact that the qualification 'lifelong' does not pertain to the *Primary Sacrifice*, but to the *Performer* of each Sacrifice (as shown under II—iv—1); and and thus there is no '*Prasaṅga*' in this case—(XII—ii—19 to 21).

SECTION (11)—SUB-SECTION (2).

Vikalpa : *Option*.

1. We now proceed to consider the case of Option or '*Vikalpa*', which may be regarded as an antithesis to the 'Combination' dealt with in Sec. 9, Sub-sec. (2). In a case of 'Combination' we have certain Subsidiaries to be performed together; but in a case of 'Option' only one of the many subsidiaries can be performed; and the choice lies with the Sacrificer. This comes after '*Prasaṅga*', as it is this latter that leads to a number of subsidiary details being accepted as *optional* alternatives.

2. Before taking the particular cases of Option, we shall offer a few general observations on the subject. An 'option' is not permissible exept under strict necessity; because its acceptance gives rise to *eight* undesirable contingencies; this is what is meant by the dictum we so often meet with in Sanskrit works—*vikalpasya aṣṭadoṣa*

Prābhā. 242.

duṣṭatvāt? These eight undesirable contingencies may be thus briefly explained in reference to the case of the '*yava*' and the '*vrīhi*', both of which are prescribed as *optional* alternatives:—(1) If we use the *vrīhi*, and reject the *yava* we reject the authority of the text enjoining this latter; (2) we assume the untrustworthy character of this text; (3) if we use the *yava*, we reject the text prescribing the '*vrīhi*' and (4) assume the untrustworthy character of this text; (5) and in this latter case we again accept the authority of the *yava*-text, which we had rejected before; and (6) we also reject the assumed untrustworthiness of the *yava*-text; (7) in using the *vrīhi* again, we accept the authority of the *vrīhi*-text which we had rejected and (8) we also reject the assumed untrustworthiness of that text.

It may be noted however that none of these objections apply to the *Options* that are *fixed* or *limited*, as shown under II—iv—8 to 32; nor in the case of those *Options* that depend entirely upon the wish of the agent.

3. *Options* have been grouped,* primarily, under three heads:—(1) Indicated by Reasoning; (2) Indicated by Direct Declaration; and (3) Depending upon the wish of the agent. Of the (1), there are eight sub-divisions:—(*a*) Option between two 'kinds',—*e. g.*, between the *kind* of corn called '*Yava*' and that called '*Vrīhi*.' (*b*) Between particular individual Substances,—*e. g.*, at the *Darshapūrṇamāsa*, for the *Agnīṣomiya*, the cake offered may be one baked in eleven or twelve pans,—as mentioned in the texts of two rescensions (Vide II—iv—8 to 32). (*c*) Between Qualities,—*e. g.*, between the *black* and *red* colour of the goat at the *Agnīsomiya*. (*d*) Between Actions,—*e. g.*, at the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, when the priests go out of the *Havirdhāna* forming themselves into a line, if the line happens to be broken by one priest, one set of expiatory rites is prescribed

* *Mīmāṃsābālaprakāsha*, page 152.

if by another priest, another set; if both should happen to break the line simultaneously, there is an 'option' between the two sets. (VI—v—51 to 53). (*e*) Between the use of a *kind* and its entire abandonment,—*e. g.*, for the *Vājasanēyins* it is laid down that they may or may not recite the *Nakṣatra-mantras*; here the recitation of the class '*nakṣatra mantras*' may be done, or it may be omitted altogether. (*f*) Between the use of a particular individual and its abandonment,—*e. g.*, the particular *mantra* '*Sambhāra*' may or not be recited. (*g*) Between a quality and its abandonment,—*e.g.*, for the altar of the *Ḍarsha Sacrifice*, a particular *size* is laid down; but at the same time, there is a declaration to the effect that 'there need be no exact measurement for the altar'; hence the size prescribed in the former may or may not be adopted. (*h*) Between an *action* and its omission,—*e.g.*, the holding and the non-holding of the *Ṣodashin* vessels at the Aṭirāṭra sacrifice.

All these eight 'options' again may be either '*kraṭvarṭha*'—helping in the accomplishment of the sacrifice,—or '*puruṣārṭha*'—accomplishing something desirable for the agent. All the examples cited above belong to the former class. As an example of the latter class, we have the following:—At the *Ḍarshapūrṇamasa* sacrifice, the water is fetched in a vessel which has a handle four inches long, and a cavity eight inches deep, and about 9 inches in diameter;—if one Sacrificer is desirous of acquiring 'brahmic glory', this vessel is, in one text, spoken of as to be made of the wood of a large tree, and in another as to be of *Kānsya* metal; and this gives rise to an 'Option.'

There are thus 8 kinds of '*kraṭvarṭha*' and eleven kinds of '*puruṣārṭha*' options *indicated by reasoning*,—making 19 in all.

Similarly, of *Option indicated by direct declaration* also, there are 19 kinds. As an example of one of these we have

Prābhā. 244.

the one indicated by the text—'One who desires to sacrifice with *corns* or with *animals*, or with *Soma*, should sacrifice either on the New Moon or on the Full Moon Day,'—where we have an 'option' of *time*, as also of *materials*. In this connection we may cite an example from *Smṛiti* literature also; where it is laid down that 'the *Pitṛis* remain satisfied for a month with offerings of seasamum, *yava*, &c.,'—if one is desirous of keeping his *Pitṛis* satisfied for a month, he may offer any one of the materials herein mentioned.

Of the third main kind of *Option* also—that depending on the will of the agent,—we have the same 19 divisions, As an example of this we have the following:—In connection with the *Ashvamēdha* a '*Brahmaṇa*' is laid down as to be sacrificed 'to *Brahman*'; this *Brāhmaṇa* sacrificed may belong to the '*Kauṇḍinya*' or to any other *gotra*,—this depends entirely upon the wish of the agent.

4. Another division of 'Options' is into two: the two classes of—(*a*) *Vyavasthita*—where among the alternatives there is *limit* or *fixity*; and (*b*) *Avyavasthita*,—where there is no such limit or fixity. Each of these again is either *indicated by reason* or *pointed out by direct declaration*. As Options of this latter class, we have the examples already cited above. As an example of the *Fixed* or *Limited* kind *based on reasoning*, we have one from the *Smṛitis*, discussed by Kumārila under the *Smṛiti-pāda*. It has been laid down that the Brāhmaṇa should devote 12 years of his life to the study of each of the four Vedas,—*or as many years as may be necessary*. On the face of it, this appears to indicate an *Unlimited Option*, leaving it entirely at the option of the student whether he will finish the whole in 48 years or in 4 only; but by reasonings it has been shown by Kumārila that we have here an option of the 'limited' kind—the meaning of the text being that, 'if the student

Prābhā. 245.

is not going to take to the life of the Householder, he must devote 48 years to Vedic study; if however he is going to enter that life, then he should devote only 5 years to each Veda, 20 years in all; but if he is not able, under his peculiar circumstances, to devote more than 2 or 3 years, he should adopt this latter course, and so on.' (See *Ṭanṭravārṭika*, p. 112). The *fixity* of Options indicated by Direct Declaration is of seven kinds :—(1) with regard to *place*, —*e.g.* the 'consecration of fire' having been laid down as to be performed during the *Spring*, the question arises as to which of the two methods of counting seasons is to be adopted in this case—Seasons as a rule being counted by the 'lunar' month, and the lunar month being taken by some to begin with the New Moon, and by others with the Full Moon. The fixity of option in this case is due to the text that 'the lunar month should not be counted to begin with the dark half of the month.' (*Ṭrikāṇḍamaṇḍana*). With regard to *Time*;—in connection with the reciting of the *Vārṭraghnī* and the *Vṛiḍhanvaṭī manṭras* at the *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa*, there being no rule as to which of the two is to be recited on the New Moon Day, and which on the Full Moon Day,—we have the decisive rule that the *Vārṭraghnī* is to be recited on the Full Moon and the *Vṛiḍhanvaṭī* on the New Moon Day. (3) With regard to *Agent*;—*e. g.* at the *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa* the Sacrificer has to recite a *manṭra*; and in this connection three *manṭras* are laid down; from among which it would appear that any one may be recited; but we meet with the distinct rule to the effect that the first of the *manṭras* is to be recited by the *Brāhmaṇa*, the second by the *Kṣaṭṭriya*, and the third by the *Vaishya* sacrificer. (4) with regard to *action*;—for the *Varuṇapraghāsa*, two '*vihāras*' are laid down,—one to the right and another to the left; and a further rule lays down that the *māruṭī* material is to be placed to the *right*, and all others on the left. (5) With regard to *result*;—*e. g.* with regard to

the many optional '*nidhanas*' (the additional syllables added to the Sāman, by the exigencies of music) to be adopted at the *Jyotiṣtoma*, we have a rule laying down that—'when the sacrificer desires *rain*, the *nidhana* to be used is *hīṣ*, when he desires *food*, the *nidhana urg*,' and when he desires *heaven*, the *midhana ū*.' (6) With regard to *cause* or *occasion*;—we have an example of this from the *Smṛitis*: We find the text—' in the case of the death of a *Sapiṇḍa*, the period of impurity is to be 10 days; or till after the day of the picking up of the bones (third day), or three days, or one day only;' and as this rule by itself would be a source of confusion, we have the additional rule that, 'when the dead *Sapiṇḍa* is one whose *Upanayana* has been done, the period is to be 10 days; if his *Tonsure* has been done (and not the *Upanayana*) 4 days, and so forth.........one day being the period in the case of the dead being a child who has just cut his teeth.' (7) with regard to the *limit* or *condition*;—*e. g.* the *Vrīhi* and the *Yava* being optional alternatives, we have the conditional rule—'*if one has begun with the Vrīhi*, he must continue with the same.'

5. In regard to *Options*, the following facts are noteworthy:—In many cases where there may be an apparent option, there is no real option at all; *e. g.* in cases where many details are laid down with regard to the same action,—each of these details being intended for a distinct purpose. In such a case, every one of the many details has to be used. (XII—iii—9). But in cases where the details are for the same purpose, we have *option*. (XII—iii—10 to 14). Similarly with regard to the many expiatory rites; if these are laid down in connection with the same *deficiency* or *discrepancy*, then there is *option* (XII—iii—16); but there can be no *option* when they are laid down in connection with distinct deficiencies—in which case all have to be performed (XII—iii—19). So with *mantras*,—it is only when many are laid down for the same purpose that we have *option*

Prābhā. 247.

(XII—iii—29). But when of such *mantras* one is found to be expressive of mere *recitation*, another of *praise*, and another of some *blessing*,—*all* have to be recited (II—iv—1,2). With regard to *gifts*, when several numbers—6,12, &c.,—are laid down, we have *option* (XII—iv—9).

CHAPTER IV.

SACRIFICES.

[*Books consulted*:—(1) Shatapatha Brahmaṇa (Berlin); (2) *Ibid*. Translated by Eggeling (Sacred Books of the East); (3) Shrauta-Sūtras of Kātyāyana with the Bhāsya of Karka (Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series, Benares); (4) Shrautapadārthanirvachana ('Pandit', Benares); (5) Āpastambīya Darsha-Pūrṇamāsā-Paddhati (Manuscript lent by Mahāmahopadhyāya Gaṅgādhara Shāstrin, Benares); (6) Kātyāyanīya Agniṣtoma-Paddhati (Manuscript lent by MM. Gaṅgādhara Shāstrin, Benares); (7) Bhāttabhāskara (Manuscript with the present writer); (8) Mādhavāchāryas's Commentary on the Institutes of Parāshara (Bibliothica Indica); (9) Prakaraṇapañchikā (Chaukhambha S.S.).]

1. All Mīmāmsā discussions are based upon the interpretation of the rules and regulations laid down in the Vedas (pre-eminently in the Brāhmaṇas) bearing upon sacrificial ritual; hence for the due understanding of the reasonings employed, some knowledge of the ritualistic details becomes essential. We shall therefore devote this chapter to that subject.

2. Though as a matter of fact, the term '*dharma*' is applied to all such actions as *Yāga* (offering of Sacrifices); *Homa* (Pouring of libations); *Dāna* (giving of presents); *Snāna* (Bathing); *Dhyāna* (Meditation); *Japa* (Repeating of Mantras), and so forth,—yet the principal forms of *Dharma* that constitute the subject-matter of the Mīmāmsā-Shāstra are *Yāga*, *Dāna* and *Homa* only (Shabara-Bhāṣya, p. 483, l. *Prabhā*. 248.

18). Every one of these consists in the offering of a certain thing to some one else. The 'offering' common to all these has been defined as the 'resolution or making up of the mind to be indifferent to, or lose sight of, or give up, one's own proprietary rights over the thing that is offered' (Shabara-Bhāṣya, p. 484, ll.11-12). Then again, an offering becomes a '*yāga*' when the proprietary right is relinquished by means of words in favour of a Deity, (Mīm. Sū. IV—ii—27, also Bhāṣya p. 484, line 13), a personality who is not near the person making the offering. When it is relinquished and actually made to rest in, and transferred to, another person, who is near at hand, the offering becomes a '*ḍāna*' or 'giving' (Shabara-Bhā. p. 484, line 14). It is called 'Homa' when the thing offered is *thrown into*, and offered at, a particular assigned place (Mīm. Sū. IV—ii—28; *Prakaraṇpañchikā* page 105); it is not necessary for the offering to be thrown into the fire, in order to make it 'Homa' (as has been asserted in the *Bhāttabhāskara*, MS. pp. 92-93); because in many cases, the throwing of substances into water (as during the Avabhṛitha Iṣṭi, at the conclusion of the Agniṣṭoma) is called 'Homa.'

The difference among *Yāga*, *Ḍāna* and *Homa* is thus briefly explained in the *Shabara-Bhāṣya*, p. 484—'The *relinquishing of one's proprietary right* is the factor common to all the three; the difference is only this—in *Yāga*, there is mere verbal relinquishment (the thing offered is not actually taken away by the recipient),—in *Ḍāna*, the thing is actually made over (to the recipient),—and in *Homa*, the thing offered has got to be thrown into some suitable receptacle (water or fire).'

3. The deity to whom sacrifices are offered is, for the Mīmāmsaka, a purely hypothetical entity, posited for the sake of the accomplishment of a Sacrifice. '*Yāga*' having been defined as 'offering to a Deity,' no *yāga* could be accomplished without a 'Deity'; hence the Deity is subordi-

Prābhā. 249.

nate to the Sacrifice; this is very clearly brought out in Mīm. Sū. IX—i—6-10; in which connection the *Bhāṣya* explains that the Deity has no body, it does not eat anything, it cannot be either pleased or displeased; nor can it award prizes or punishments, as results of sacrifices; hence it is that it cannot be regarded as the principal factor in the Sacrifice. Those Vedic passages that speak of certain gods having 'hands,' &c., all these passages must be treated as pure *Arthavāda*, even non-existent properties being attributed, in praise, to the gods.

The 'Deity' of a sacrifice is thus not necessarily a 'person' or 'being'; it is spoken of by means of some word or words in the injunctive sentences as one to whom the offering is to be made; and whose excellences are eulogised in the hymns; *e.g.*, in the sentence '*āgnēyo'ṣṭākapālo bhavati*,' the word '*āgnēyaḥ*' points to Agni to whom the *cake baked on eight pans* is to be offered. There are three sources of information as to the 'Deity' of sacrifices:—(1) Nominal affixes,—as in the instance cited, the nominal affix '*dhak*' added to the noun 'Agni' shows that Agni is the 'Deity'; according to Pāṇini's Sūtra, 4-2-24, which speaks of the '*dhak*' affix as indicative of the deity (see also *Mīmāmsa-Sūtra* (X—iv—25);— 2) The Dative termination,—*e.g.* in the sentence '*Agnīṣomābhyām yajati*,' the dative ending in '*Agnīṣomābhyām*' denotes that the pair 'Agni-Soma' is the 'Deity'; this is weaker in authority than (1), because the deity having no personal existence cannot, in the proper sense of the word, be the 'receiver' of a gift; and hence the '*receivership*' indicated by the Dative can be only figurative;—(3) *Mantras*,—in many cases it is some word or expression in the *mantra* that indicates the Deity, *e.g.* the word '*Kētu*' occurring in the *mantra* '*Ketuṅkṛiṇvannakēṭavē*, &c.' indicates Keṭu as the 'Deity.' (Vide *Bhātta-bhāskara*, pp. 92-93).

4. The main classification of Sacrifices is based upon the

Prābhā. 250.

difference in the substances offered. On this basis they have been classified under the following three heads :—

I. '*Iṣti*' (including also the *Haviryajñas*)—Sacrifices performed by the *Yajamāna* or 'Sacrificer' accompanied by his wife and helped by the four *Ritviks* or Priests—Aḍhvaryu, Brahman, Hoṭṛi and Agnīḍhra,*—consisting of offerings of milk, butter, rice, barley or other grains. The 'Prakṛiṭi' or 'Archetype' of this class is the dual sacrifice of the 'Ḍarsha-Pūrṇamāsa' (described in *Shaṭapaṭha Brahmāṇa*, I and II); and this, with the following six 'Vikṛiṭis,' 'Ectypes', forms the seven 'Samsthās' or 'forms' of the '*Iṣti*' :—(*a*) *Agnyāḍhāna* (described in *Kāṭyāyana's Shrauṭa-Sūtra*, IV. 179, &c.); (*b*) *Agnihoṭra* with its ectype the *Māsāgnihoṭra* (described in *Shaṭapaṭha Br.* I. 7-1, &c., and also *Shrauṭa-Sūṭra* IV); (*c*) *Āgrayaṇeṣti* (*Shaṭapaṭha*, IV. 2-2); (*d*) *Chāṭurmāsya* (Shrauta-Sūtra V); with its four sections, the *Vaisvaḍēva*, the *Varuṅapraghāsa*, the *Shākamēhḍa* and the *Shunāsīrīya*; (*e*) *Pashubanḍha* (*Shrauṭa-Sūṭra* VI and *Shaṭapaṭha* XI. 7·1); and (*f*) *Sauṭrāmaṇi* (Shatapatha XI). † Kaṭyāyana in his *Shrauṭa-sūṭra* deals in detail with the first five only. Even though without Agnyāḍhana, no *Iṣti* can be performed,—as these have to be offered into the fire consecrated by the Agnyāḍhāna (*Shaṭapaṭha*, I. 6, 3, 20)—yet it is the *Ḍarsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, and not the *Agnyāḍhāna*, that is re-

* The *adhvaryu* is the most important among these, chosen before the rest, and operating from the beginning to the end of the performance The *Brahman* is the second to be chosen, he is the general Superintendent or Examiner, well-versed in ritualistic details, and also in the three Vedas, he also performs the expiatory rites The *Hoṭri* remains seated to the north of the altar, and recites all such hymns as the *Sāmidhenīs*, the *Prayājas*, the *Ājyabhāgas*, the *Yājyās*, the *Puronuvākyās*, the *Sūkṭavāka* and the *Shamyuvāka* The *Agnīdhra* or the *Agnīḍ* holds the wooden sword and responses with the word '*asṭu*' to some of the acts done by the *Adhvaryu*.

† In this connection, we may compare the following passage from the Shaṭapaṭha Br. X. 1 5. [illegible]

garded as their 'Archetype;' firstly, because, as remarked by Karka, the *Shaṭapaṭha* itself begins with the *Ḍarsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, and secondly, because the *Agnyāḍhāna* is the consecration of the fire only, and so cannot be regarded as a 'sacrifice,' in the strict sense of the term, on whose model the other ectypal sacrifices could be performed. Other sacrifices of this class mentioned in the *Shaṭapaṭha* are the *Ḍākṣāyaṇa* (Shrauṭa-Suṭra IV, 104) and the *Ṭraiyambaka.*

II. *Pākayajñas*—consisting of the offering of cooked substances, not into the consecrated fire, but in the ordinary domestic fire. The seven principal '*samsṭhās*' of this class are:—(*a*) *Pañchamahāyajñas* (enumerated and described in Shaṭapaṭha X, 5, (6)—the 'Archetype'; (*b*) *Aṣṭakās* (*c*) *Pārvaṇashrāḍḍha*; (*d*) *Shrāvaṇī*; (*e*) *Agrahāyaṇī*; (*f*) *Chaiṭrī*; and (*g*) *Āshvayujī.* (See *Parāsharamāḍhava,—Vyavahāra-Kāṇḍā*, page 157, *Note*). These sacrifices are dealt with by the Gṛihyasūtras, and not by the Shrauṭasūṭras. It is perhaps solely on this ground, and on that of their not being offered in the consecrated fire, that these sacrifices have been placed in a class apart from the *Haviryajñas* described above. Consisting of offerings of milk and grains, these are as much 'Haviryājña' (in the literal signification of the term) as the Ḍarsha-Pūrṇamāsa and the rest.

III. *Somayajñas*—Offerings of Soma-juice, also known under the name of '*Jyotiṣtoma*,' which however is a name that is given to the first of the following seven 'samsṭhās' of the Somayāga:—(*a*) *Agniṣtoma*—the 'Archetype'; (*b*) *Aṭyagniṣtoma*, (*c*) *Ukṭhya*; (*d*) *Sodashin*; (*e*) *Vājapēya* (*Shaṭa-paṭha* V, Shrauṭa-sūṭra XIV); (*f*) *Āṭirāṭra*; and (*g*) *Āpṭor-yamā*. All these are called "Ekāha,' as lasting for one ḍay. There are some Soma-sacrifices that last from two to twelve days; these are called '*Ahīna*'; to this class belongs the *Ḍvāḍashāha* described in *Shaṭapaṭha* IV. 5. 1. Others again, called '*Saṭras*', are not 'sacrifices', but what have been

Prābhā. 252.

called 'sacrificial sessions'; these last for more than twelve days, and are performed by many persons (generally seventeen) in combination (see *Shaṭapaṭha* IV. 4, 2, 12). Under this head, the *Shaṭapaṭha*, and also Kātyāyana, includes such elaborate and complex sacrifices as the *Gavāmayana* (*Shrauṭasūṭra* XIII), the *Rājasūya* (*Shaṭapaṭha*, V, and *Shrauṭasūṭra* XIII), the *Sauṭrāmaṇī* *Shaṭapaṭha* XI; *Shrauṭasūṭra* XIX); the *Ashvamēḍha* (*Shaṭapaṭha* XI—XIII, *Shrauṭasūṭra* XX); and also some minor sacrifices, such as—*Vasorḍhārā*, *Rāṣṭrābhriṭ*, *Vājaprasavīya*, *Payovraṭa*, *&c.* (*Shaṭapaṭha* IV). Almost all Soma-sacrifices involve the killing of an animal; hence older writers have included the 'Pashu' or 'Animal' sacrifices under 'Soma.' Later writers however appear to make some sort of distinction between the 'Soma' and the 'Animal' sacrifices; at least, such distinction is found in the *Shrauṭapaḍārṭhanirvachana*. There is however no authority for this either in the *Shaṭapaṭha* or in the *Shrauṭasūṭras*.

5. We shall describe here, somewhat in detail, the performance of the two Archetypes:—The *Ḍarsha-Pūrṇamāsa* of the '*Iṣṭis*,' and the *Agniṣṭoma* of the Soma sacrifices.

THE ḌARSHA-PŪRNAMĀSA.

6. This is the name given to two sets of sacrifices—the first set called '*Pūrṇamāsa*' consisting of the three sacrifices called the '*Āgneya*,' the '*Upāmshuyāja*' and the '*Agnīṣomīya*'; and the other set called '*Ḍarsha*' consisting of the three, called the '*Āgnēya*' the '*Aniḍradaḍhiyāga*' and the *Payoyāga*—offered on the Full-moon and New-moon days by one who has 'taken the fires.' That the sacrifices are to be performed every fortnight is laid down in the Shaṭapaṭha Brahmāṇa X—1. 5, अर्धमासे अर्धमासे दर्शपूर्णमासयाजी स्यात् 'Fortnight by fortnight one should perform the Ḍarsha-Purṇamāsa sacrifices. (See Bhāttabhāskara, *Ms.* p. 98.)

Prābhā. 253.

7. As these sacrifices can be offered only in the duly consecrated fire, and that also only after the daily Agnihoṭra offerings have been made, we shall preface an account of them by a brief description of the ceremony of '*Agnyāḍhāna*,' 'Fire-Consecration.' The salient features of this ceremony have been summed up by Eggeling (*Shaṭapaṭha Br.*, Sacred Books of the East, pp. 74-76), wherefrom we take the following extracts:—

8. "The Agnyāḍhāna......is performed on the first day "of the waxing moon.........The normal performance requires "two days—the first of which is taken up with preliminary "rites, while the second is devoted to the chief ceremonies, "beginning with the production of the sacred fire by "friction.

"After the Sacrificer has chosen his four officiating "priests,* Brahman, Hoṭṛi, Aḍhvaryu and Agnīḍhra, he "proceeds with them to erect the 'fire houses' for the three "fires—'Gārhapaṭya,' Āhavanīya, and 'Ḍakṣiṇāgni'†........... "The Aḍhvaryu then procures a temporary fire......and after

* These four, with the Sacrificer, are the most important persons at the Sacrifice (Vide. *Shaṭapaṭha*, I. 1·1·15). Another important priest is the Udgāṭṛi, who chants the Sāman hymns. He is not required at the Agnyāḍhāna. We have an enumeration of the several priests in *Shaṭapaṭha* XII—1·1. A brief account of these is also to be found in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1907, Vol. III, 4, 'Some Notes on Vedic Sacrifices.'

† The Agnihoṭra House is built on a flat level piece of ground, a regular square or oblong, with doors on the East and South. In this House, the centre of the Western half is called the 'Abode of the Gārhapaṭya,' which is a circle with a diameter of 27 *Aṅguls*, whereon there is the 'Kuṇḍa,' the receptacle of fire, the hearth surrounded by two raised boundaries, one six *Aṅguls* high and six broad, and the other six *Aṅguls* high and four broad. The fire deposited in this Kuṇḍa is called the 'Gārhapaṭya,' by reason of its special connection with the Sacrificer who is the *Gṛhapaṭi*, Master of the House. From the centre of this Gārhapaṭya Kuṇḍa, a tape called the 'Pṛisthyā-Sūṭra' is drawn towards the eastern half of the house, where they have the 'Abode of the Āhavanīya, mapped out into a perfect square. This being surrounded by two boundaries like those of the Gārhapaṭya Kuṇḍa, forms the 'Āhavnīya Kuṇḍa or Hearth.' The fire deposited in this hearth is called the 'Āhavanīya, on account of all offerings being made into this fire. Towards the South of the Āhavanīya Hearth, a space in the shape of the winnowing

"the four-fold lustration of the Gārhapatya Fire-place, he lays "down the fire thereon. Towards sunset the Sacrificer in-"vokes the Gods and Manes.........He then enters the "Āhavanīya House, passes to the Gārhapatya, and sits down "to the west of the fire; his wife at the same time entering "the Gārhapatya house from the south, and seating herself "south of him......Whereupon the Aḍhvaryu hands to the "Sacrificer two pieces of wood (Araṇī)......to be used next "morning for the production of the sacred fire by one of "them being rapidly drilled in a hole in the other......These "sticks are deposited on a seat. In the house of the "Gārhapatya a he-goat may then be tied up for the "night......to be presented to the Agnīḍhra.

"After sunset the Aḍhvaryu measures out four vessels "of husked rice-grains—each containing three handfulls—on "an ox-hide dyed red. With this rice the *Oḍana Chaṭuḥ-"prāshya* is prepared on the provisional Gārhapatya fire. "When it is ready, the Aḍhvaryu makes a hollow in the pap, "and pours clarified butter into it; he then takes three "kindling sticks, anoints them with some of that ghee, and "puts them on the fire one after another. Thereupon the "Sacrificer having paid due honours to the priests......bids "them eat.

"During the night, the Sacrificer and his wife have to "remain awake and keep up the fire. When the night clears "up, the Aḍhvaryu extinguishes the fire, or......takes it "southwards and keeps it in a safe place, till the Ḍakṣiṇāgni "fire is made up. He them draws with the wooden sword

basket is mapped out; this forms the 'Abode of the Ḍakṣiṇagni' This surrounded by two boundaries forms the 'Ḍakṣiṇāgni-Kuṇḍa or Hearth'; the fire deposited herein is called 'Dakṣiṇāgni,' upon which rice is cooked for the four principal priests. That these names of the fires—'*Gārhapaṭya*' '*Āhavanīya*' and '*Ḍakṣiṇāgni*'—are applicable only to duly consecrated fires, and not to the ordinary fire, is proved by Jaimini in *M·m. Sūtra* XII—ii—1, where it is shown that the name 'vihāra,' which is given collectively to the three consecrated fires, cannot apply to the ordinary fire.

Prābhā. 255.

"three lines across the fire-place and proceeds with the "preparation of the hearth-mounds."

9. Eggeling stops short at these preliminary rites of the first day. An account of the rites of the Agnyāḍhāna proper, we take from the *Paḍḍhati* or manual based upon the Shrauṭa-Sūṭras of Kāṭyāyana (Adh. IV) and Āpasṭamba, wherein we have, in a systematised form, what is described in *Shaṭapaṭha* II, 1·1 *et seq.*

On the hearth-mound, the Aḍhvaryu deposits a piece of gold, sprinkles the earth of the mole-hill, and surrounds it with pebbles (Shr. Sū. IV.210). Before or after sunrise, (Shaṭapaṭha II·1·4·8 and IV·1·2·11) the fire is produced by the drilling of the sticks (215), and after sunrise, is taken from the Gārhapaṭya to the Āhavanīya hearth. He takes a burning stick and deposits it on the Gārhapaṭya hearth,—the Brahman singing the Raṭhanṭara Sāman. From there the fire is taken to the Ḍakṣiṇāgni hearth; and the Aḍhvaryu requests the priests to recite the *Shyaiṭa*, the *Vāravanṭīya* and the *Yajñāyajñīya* hymns. The Sacrificer then makes the Agnihoṭra offering, ending with the final offering, and pays the specified gifts to other Brāhmaṇas.

10. The above is an account of the Consecration of the Fire in which all sacrificial offerings are made. We shall now proceed with the details of the *Ḍarshapūrṇamāsa.*

11. Though both Kāṭyāyana's Shrauṭa-Sūṭra and the Shaṭapaṭha Brāhmaṇa begin with the 'Pūrṇāmāsa' Sacrifices, the later Manuals begin with the 'Ḍarsha.' We shall follow these latter, and note, in passing, all points where the the 'Pūrṇamāsa' differs from the 'Ḍarsha.'

12. On the morning of the day preceding the New Moon, (some of the lunar mansions are specially recommended in Shaṭapaṭha II·2), after the daily Agnihoṭra has been performed, the Sacrificer chooses his Aḍhvaryu, and with his help performs the five-fold lustration of the Āhavanīya

Prābhā. 256.

and Ḍakṣiṇāgni hearths in order to make them fit to receive he consecrated fire from the Gārhapaṭya hearth. This fire s then taken out of the Gārhapaṭya and deposited on the other two hearths by the Aḍhvaryu (this being called the 'Agnyuḍḍharaṇa'), and two logs of fuel are placed upon each of these fires. Into the fire thus supplied with fuels, the Sacrificer makes certain offerings. Drinking a little water, he, along with his wife, imposes upon himself certain fasts and restrictions, preferring requests to Agni, Vāyu and Sūrya to help him in keeping these. The Aḍhvaryu taking up a knife heats it on fire; and with this and the water vessel in his hand, he goes a few steps either to the East or to the North, and picking up *Kusha* grass, throws one or two blades of it as an offering to cows; he holds the rest in his hand, holding the bundle tight on the point where the blades shoot off from the stem, and with the knife cuts the bundle at that point with a single stroke. Another handful is also similarly cut off for purposes of the *Prasṭara*, a bedding of *Kusha* grass upon the Altar, whereupon the Juhū* is kept. Having cut off three more handfulls of *Kusha* (called 'Niḍhanas') he touches his own body. He prepares the *Shulva*,† lays down the stick, and keeps upon it the handfulls of *Kusha*, and upon one of these he deposits the *prasṭara*; he binds up the whole into a bundle, dedicating it to Inḍrāṇī, sprinkling water on the bundle. He takes up another supply of *kusha* and keeps it close to the place of the central *pariḍhi*.‡

13. At this point comes in the performance of the Piṇḍapiṭṛiyajña. At this the Sacrificer makes an offering

* A full list with explanations of this and other things will be found later on at the end of the section.

† A rope of Kusha, with three knots in the middle, and one at the end, for the purpose of binding bundles of fuel.

‡ This is the name given to the three logs of wood that are kept along the Northern, Western and Southern sides of the altar, upon the first *mekhalā* or raised boundary.

of rice-balls to his three immediate ancestors*; and approaching the Gārhapatya hearth, hands over the ball offered to his grand-father to his wife; and throws the other two into the fire.

14. The Aḍhvaryu prepares another *Shulva*, and with this he ties up the three *pariḍhi*-logs into a bundle; and deposits it along with the bundles of fuel. He then prepares the *Veda*† and the *Upaveṣa*;‡ and the Sacrificer, assisted by his wife, sweeps the Sacrificial House and washes it thoroughly.

15. During the day, the Sacrificer shaves his head and chin, abstains from meat and from carnal pleasures (Kāt. Shr. Sū. II. 8-9). In the afternoon he, with his wife, partakes of the rice and barley mixed with ghee, called the '*Vraṭopanīya*' (Shr. Sū. II. 10); whereupon they take the vow of henceforward eating 'nothing but what grows in the, forest, be it forest-herbs, or the fruit of trees' (Shaṭapaṭha, I—1·1·10, Shr. Sū. II·14). In the evening he offers the usual Agnihoṭra libations. The Aḍhvaryu, before retiring, spreads *kusha* on the *pariḍhis* and around the three hearths, puts fuel on the three fires, separates the calves from their dames (this removal of the calves being called '*Vaṭsāpākaraṇa*, Shaṭapaṭha 7-1). The Sacrificer also spreads *kusha* round the fires, and invites the gods to lodge in his house; and then, with his wife, retires to rest, sleeping on the ground, in the Gārhapaṭya House or in the Āhavanīya House.

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* At the '*Pūrṇamāsa*,' in place of this *yajña* they have the *Vraṭopāyana*, wherein the Sacrificer picks up two entire blades of *Kusha*, and sipping water three times, sprinkles water on the Āhavanīya fire into which he puts four pieces of fuel.

† A broomstick for the sweeping of the altar, made of Kusha grass doubled up and tied, with the ends lopped off;—the shape being similar to that of the thigh of a seated calf. ‡A piece of wood six inches long cut off from the root end of the branch of a tree.

Prābhā, 258.

16. This finishes the observances of the Previous Day, called the '*Upavasatha*'; 'because,' says the Shatapatha (I.—1-1-77), 'when the householder enters on his vow, he means to sacrifice to the gods the next morning; therefore, all the gods betake themselves to his house and *abide by* (*upa-vas*) him in his house.'*

17. On the next morning,—the morning of the New Moon—after the morning libations of the daily *Agnihotra* have been offered, the Aḍhvaryu, before the sun rises, † spreads Kusha round the fires, and prepares Kusha-seats for the Sacrificer and the Brahman; and then gets together the vessels, implements and all other articles, necessary for the performance.‡

18. The Sacrificer then proceeds to 'appoint' the Brahman; The priest accepts the post, and promising to perform his duty well, invokes blessings upon the Sacrificer and betakes himself to his assigned seat, called the 'Brahmasaḍana'. He takes from under his seat a blade of *Kusha* and throws it towards the South-East, thereby chasing away all undesirable elementals; and thenceforward, seated near the Āhavanīya, watches the performance. §

19. After the Brahman has taken his seat, the Aḍhvaryu gets in the Prīṇaṭā vessels, and filling them with water, sprinkles that water over his head with the *pavitra* directing the Sacrificer to keep silent during the performance, he deposits the *praṇīṭa* vessels on *kusha* and covers them up with *kusha*. Taking up the *Agnihoṭra-haraṇi* and the

*At the Pūrṇamāsa, the rites of the Previous Day are generally performed on the same day as the main Sacrifice

†After sunrise, at the Pūrṇamāsa

‡A list of these with brief descriptions, is given at the end of this account.

§At the Pūrṇamāsa, when it is being performed for the first time, the *Anvārambhaṇīya* offering is made at this juncture; it consists of oblations of a rice-cake to Agni-Viṣṇu, boiled rice and grains to Sarasvaṭī, and a rice-cake to Sārasvaṭa ; the priest's fee in this case being an one-year old cow.

Shūrpa, he heats them over the Āhavanīya fire; and obtaining the Sacrificer's permission to prepare the offering, he proceeds to the cart which is full of corn, and takes out some corn in the *pātrī*; and ascending the cart, he washes the corn needed for the Sacrificial Cake, from which he removes all foreign substances. Having washed his hands, he puts the corn into the *Shūrpa* with the *Agnihoṭra-havaṇī* The Sacrificer then offers his invitation to the gods to be pleased to come to his house and accept the offerings; whereupon the Aḍhvaryu promises to prepare the cake for Inḍra-Agni *. Looking towards the East, he looks round the *vihāra* (ground mapped out for the Sacrifice), and descends from the cart; and deposits in their assigned places the handfulls of corn intended for the gods; and washes all the vessels. Taking up the skin of the black antelope, he shakes it up three times, and calling it the 'skin of Aḍiti', he spreads it, the hairy side uppermost, to the North of the Gārhapaṭya hearth, with its neck towards the East; on this he places the *ulūkhala*, and putting some corn into it, he takes the *musala*, and calls out loudly for the *Haviṣkriṭ*' or 'preparer of the offering;' whereupon the Lady (the Sacrificer's wife) begins to thump the corn.

20. Then follows the appointment of the *Agnīḍhra* or *Agnīḍ* priest. Having accepted the office and promised to perform his duty, he takes up the *Shamyā*, and strikes with it the *ḍriṣaḍ* and the *upala*. The Aḍhvaryu brings up the *Shūrpa* into which the corn thumped by the lady has been kept, and winnowing with it, removes the husks, upon the *uṭkara* (the appointed place where all bits of grass and such other refuses are to be thrown); and then taking up the husks into the pan intended for the middle cake, throws them beneath the antelope skin, as an offering to the Rākṣasas. Having washed the pan, he cleans the grains

* For Inḍra-Vaimṛiḍha at the Pūrṇamāsa.

Prābhā, 260.

of all the husks, and keeps the cleaned rice in the *pātrī*; and being again thrown into the *ulūkhala* it is again thumped and cleaned by the lady aided by the Aḍhvaryu. The rice is then thoroughly washed, all the refuse being again thrown upon the *uṭkara* as an offering to Rākṣasas. The Aḍhvaryu takes up the *Shamyā* and keeping it on the skin, he places upon it the *driṣad*, and upon this latter the *upala*; taking the handfulls of corn set aside for each of the gods, one by one, into the *driṣad*, he pounds them, once forward once backward and then quickly, a number of times; whereupon he requests the Lady to finish the pounding, after which the flour is boiled eiher upon the Gārhapatya or on the Āhavanīya, fire. Taking a few live coals from the Āhavanīya the Aḍhvaryu puts them over the middle pan, and then over each of the other pans. He heats the *madanṭī* water, and having washed with this the *pātrī*, he puts into it the flour, naming the gods for whom the cakes are intended; and kneads it with the *Mekṣaṇa*; and having made it into a ball, he cuts this up into smaller balls of equal size, labelling each as intended, for such and such a deity. With each of these balls he prepares a cake of the shape of the tortoise, not very high, and of the size of the horse's hoof. He then removes the live coals from the pans, and bakes the cakes upon these,—that intended for Agni upon eight pans, and so on*; repeating in each case the mantra '*uruprathā uruprathasva...uru yajñapatiḥ prathaṭām*' (Shatapatha, I—i-6-8). When the Cakes have been baked, he sprinkles water upon them, and heats them again, by taking a burning

* The number of pans upon which the cake is to be baked, varies with the deity for whom it is intended. We shall note a few of these as mentioned in the *Shaṭapaṭha Brāhmaṇa*:—the cake intended for Agni is baked upon *eight* pans (I.—6-2-5; II—2-1-22, II-5-1-8; V.-2-1-4), that for Varuṇa on one pan (IV —4-5-15); that for Inḍra-Agni on *twelve* (V -2-2), for Agni-Viṣṇu on *eleven* (V.—2-2-6); for Viṣṇu on *three* (V.—2-5); for Agni-Soma on *eleven* (V—2-4); for Vaisuvāhara on *twelve* (V.—2-4-13); for the Maruṭs on *seven* (V.—3-1-6); for Saviṭṛi on *twelve* or *eight* (V.—3-3 2); and for Indra on *eleven* (V.—4-2-10).

fuel round them three times. The cakes being ready, each is kept aside for use, being covered up with hot ashes.

21. Taking up the *sphya*, the Aḍhvaryu draws with it three lines on the ground, and proceeds to prepare an altar or mound 'of the size of the sacrificer.' The sacrificer having washed the altar, the Aḍhvaryu spreads Kusha over it, and directing the sacrificer to bring up the *prokṣaṇī* and other vessels, and to prepare the lady, he washes each vessel as it is brought in. The preparation of the Lady consists in the *Yokṭra* being tied round her waist, and seating her near the Āhavanīya. The ghee is then boiled over the Ḍakṣiṇāgni fire and poured into the Ājyasṭhālī over a *paviṭra*; and all ashes, &c., being removed from the ghee with the manṭra '*iṣē ṭvā*' the ghee is heated again on the Gārhapaṭya fire with the manṭra '*ūrjē ṭvā*' and then handed over to the Lady.* She looks into the ghee carefully, holding her breath (Shaṭapaṭha, I.—3—1-18). The ghee is again heated over the Gārhapaṭya, and is again examined by the Sacrificer and the Aḍhvaryu, who carries it to the altar and keeps it in the *ḍhruvā* and throws a few blades of Kusha towards the South as an offering to the Piṭṛis. Taking up the Kusha intended for the *prasṭara*, he hands it to the Sacrificer, who, in his turn, makes it over to the Brahman who prepares the *prasṭara*. The Sacrificer spreads some Kusha over the altar, taking special care to have the roots of one bundle covered up by the tips of the other. The Aḍhvaryu takes up the *prasṭara*, and, assisted by the Sacrificer, places the *pariḍhis* in their position,—the central one, that to the west of the hearth, having its top-end towards the North, presided over by the Ganḍharvas; the Southern one* with its top-end towards the East, presided over by Inḍra; and

**Iṣē ṭvā* &c., the first mantra of the Yajurveda Samhiṭā appears to have never been used, in its complete form, at any sacrificial performance. It is always spoken of in the Shaṭapaṭha as to be used in sections. See I-1-6-6-I-7-1- 2; IV—3-117.

Prabhā. 262.

the Northern one, also having its top-end towards the East presided over by Miṭra-Varuṇa. Taking up two Kusha-blades, he keeps the *prasṭara* upon them. The *Sruk* having been placed upon the *prasṭara*, the Sacrificer consecrates the Juhū, the Aḍhvaryu doing the same with the *Upabhriṭ*, to the North of which he keeps the *ḍhruvā*, which, along with the *Sruva*, is consecrated by the Sacrificer. The Aḍhvaryu having kept the *Ājyasṭhālī* to the West of the *Sruk*, the Sacrificer consecrates the *Sruk*, takes up the *Veda*, the *ājyasṭhālī*, the *pāṭrī* and the *Sruva*. Taking the cakes out of the coals and reciting the words '*syonanṭē saḍanam kriṇomi*, *ghriṭasya ḍhāraā susēvam kalpayāmi*, he spreads *kusha* on the *pāṭrī*, and having removed the ashes from the cakes, and completing the *manṭra* '*ṭasmin sīḍa* &c,'. he deposits the cakes on the *pāṭrī*, and applies butter to the cakes with the *Sruva*, which are thereupon consecrated by the Sacrificer—each being called by its deific name as '*āgnēyā*' '*aindra*,' &c.

22. The seat of the Hoṭṛi—called the '*Hoṭṛisaḍana*' having been prepared with *kusha*, the priest-elect is called up and duly appointed by the Sacrificer; and wearing the sacrificial thread,* sits facing the East, to the North-East of the Āhavanīya. Being directed by the Aḍhvaryu, he recites the *Upāmshu manṭras* and also the *Sāmiḍhēnī* or 'kindling' verses†, the Sacrificer placing a fuel on the fire at the utterance of 'Om' accompanying each verse. The fire having been kindled, the Aḍhvaryu fans it with the *Veḍa*, and with the *Sruva* taking up ghee out of the *ḍhruvā*, he pours it along the fire, from one end of the hearth to the other,—

* From this it would seem that the 'sacred thread' was worn only during sacrificial performance, and not always; that this may have been the custom is also indicated by the name '*Yajñopavīṭa*' by which the 'sacred thread' is generally known. This view however is contrary to such well known texts as '*Saḍopavīṭinā bhāvyam*, *Saḍā baḍḍhashikhena cha*'.

† The mumber of these verses is variously mentioned in the Shaṭapaṭha; 'Fifteen' is mentioned in I—3-5-7; 'Seventeen' in I—3-5-10 and 6-2-12; and III—1. 3. 6; 'Twenty-one' in III—3-5-11. Eggeling has translated eleven verses in a footnote on page 102,—these eleven becoming fifteen by the first and the eleventh being repeated three times each.

all the while contemplating on Prajāpaṭi. Taking ghee out of the *Ājyasṭhālī* he fills the *ḍhruvā* again, to overflowing. The Aḍhvaryu and the Hoṭri thereupon repeat the names of the *Pravara-Ṛiṣis*, and the Hoṭri offers his invitation to the deities of the Sacrifice. The Sacrificer handing over the *Sruva* to the Aḍhvaryu, the latter pours an offering of ghee to Inḍra; and taking ghee out of the *ḍhruvā* he pours it over the *juhū*, and also round the *ḍhruvā*; and drawing together the bundles of fuel with the *sphya*, he takes his seat behind the Agnīḍhra, and recounts his *pravara-ṛiṣis*; the Hoṭri also doing the same, walks up to the Agnīḍhra and sweeps the ground three times, and then retires to his appointed seat.

23. The Aḍhvaryu takes up the *Juhū* and the *Upabhṛiṭ*, and requests the Hoṭri to make the following five 'Prayājas' or 'Fore-offerings' to the five seasons (*Shaṭapaṭha*, I-5—2 and 3):—(1) To the *Samiḍ*—*i. e.* the Spring, (2) to *Ṭanūnapāṭ*—*i. e.* the Summer, (3) to the *Iḍs*, *i. e.* the rains; (4) to the *Barhis*—*i. e.* the Autumn; and (5) to the *Svāhā*—the Winter. After these offerings, the Aḍhvaryu pours ghee into the *ḍhruvā* and the *upabhṛiṭ*; and cutting out short pieces out of the Kusha contained in the *prasṭara* he anoints these with ghee; and requests the Hoṭri to pour libations of ghee to Agni and Soma; and the Hoṭri pours a libation each to Agni and Soma, and another to the two combined. Whereupon the Sacrificer proceeds to perform the expiatory rites consequent upon the discrepancies that might have occurred during his previous day's fast and observances. This rite consists of the offering of libations to Agni and Prajāpaṭi. The Aḍhvaryu then cuts off five slices—each slice about an inch long—out of the cake dedicated to Agni; and pouring ghee over them, he hands them to the Hoṭri, who offers them to the following five deities:—(1) Agni, (2) Viṣṇu, (3) Agni-Soma, (4) Inḍra-Vaimṛiḍha, and (4) Inḍra-Agni.

Prābhā. 264.

24. After this come the two Pārvaṇa Homas; the Aḍhvaryu taking ghee out of the *Ājyāsthālī*, with the *Sruva*, pours an oblation to the *Pūrṇamāsa* (the Full Moon Day) and one to the *Amāvāsyā* (the New Moon Day).

25. This is followed by the Nāriṣta Homas, at which offerings are made to Agni-Vayu, the Maruts, Brahman, the Ḍēvas, Paramāṭman, Agni-Svıṣtakrıṭ and Agni-Vaishvanara. The Aḍhvaryu then cuts out a slice of the size of a grain of barley, out of the cake dedicated to Agni, and also from each of the other cakes; and puts these pieces into the Prāshiṭra vessel, which is made over to the Brahman priest who eats a little out of it. The Aḍhvaryu brings forward the *Idāpāṭra* and hands it over to the Sacrificer, who consecrates it and makes it over to the Hoṭri. While the Sacrificer recites the *Ḍēvagavī manṭras* (*Chiḍasi* &c. Vājasanēyi Samhıṭā IV.—19), the Aḍhvaryu permits the eating of the *Idā*, whereupon the four Principal Priests, along with the Sacrificer—'*Yajamānapañchamāḥ*'—eat it.

26. Dividing the Āgneya cake into four parts, the Aḍhvaryu keeps them on *Kusha*; and the Sacrificer having assigned the shares of the four priests, has his own share assigned by the Aḍhvaryu. The Agnīḍhra and the Aḍhvaryu eat their shares.

The Aḍhvaryu cooks a large quantity of rice—called the '*Anvāhārya*.' When it is ready he smells it, and taking out a small quantity with his fingers, mixes it with the Brahman's share of the cake. The rest of the rice is then offered to the Brahmaṇas called in by the Sacrificer, who also gives them proper gifts.'

27. The Agnīḍhra selects some fuels and keeps them aside for the *Anuyāja* or the After-offerings (Shaṭapaṭha I—8-2); and the Aḍhvaryu throws the rest of the fuel into the fire, as an offering to Ruḍra.

Prābhā. 265.

28. The Adhvaryu now proceeds with the *Anuyāja* or After-offerings. (1) to the Barhis, (2) to Narāshamsa, and (3) to Agni. The Sacrificer sprinkles ghee on the *paridhis*; and assigning the central one to the Vasus, the Southren one to the Rudras and the Northern one to the Ādityas, he keeps the *juhū* on the *prastara*, out of which Kusha-blades anointed with ghee are offered to Agni, Soma, Viṣṇu, Agni-Soma, Indra-Vaimṛidha, the Dēvas, Agni-Sviṣtakṛiṭ, Indra-Agni and Mahēndra. The *prastara* is then carried to the Āhavanīya hearth by the Agnīdhra, who also carries to the same hearth, the *paridhis* one by one, and also fire in kindled sticks,—the Hoṭṛi all along reciting the *Shamyuvāka mantra* (Shatapaṭha I—9-1-25; and Rigveda Sam 5—47—7). And into this fire, the Adhvaryu throws the *paridhis* as offerings to the Vasus, the Rudras and the Ādityas; and the Priests eat the remnants; and wash the vessels and implements.

29. Now follow the Paṭnīsamyājas (*Shatapaṭha* I—9-2). Led by the Agnīdhra the priests move to the Gārhapatya hearth ; the Adhvaryu sitting on its South and the others on its North. Offerings are then made to Soma, Ṭvaṣṭṛi, Rākā, Sinīvālī, Kuhū, the Dēvapaṭnīs (Wives of the Gods), and lastly to Agni-Gṛihapaṭi. The finger-joints of the Hotri being anointed with ghee, four drops of ghee are poured into his hand, and six drops in the hand of the Agnīdhra. Being touched by the Adhvaryu, the Agnīdhra, the Sacrificer and the Lady, the Hoṭṛi makes an offering of the ghee in his hand to Paramāṭman.

30. Then follow the *Piṣtalēpa* and the *Phalīkaraṇa Homas* : Four drops of ghee being dropped into the *juhū*, the chaffs of the grain out of which the cakes were prepared are thrown into it. This mixture offered into the Āhavanīya constitutes the *Phalīkaraṇa* Homa ('*Phalīkaraṇa*' being the name given to the chaffs removed from the corn by the

Lady). After this comes the *Piṣṭalēpa-Homa*; the Sacrificer having dropped four drops of ghee into the *juhū*, he puts into it the dough that may be found to be attached to the vessels, and offers it into the fire, as an offering to the Vishvēḍēvas. This offering is again repeated three times —(1) to Sarasvaṭī-Vishobhaginā, (2) to Sarasvaṭī-Veshabhaginā, and (3) to Inḍra.

The girdle-zone of the Lady is at this point unfastened and placed in her hands; after which she washes her face.

32. Betaking themselves to the Āhavanīya hearth, they perform the expiatory or Apologetic Homa, called the '*Sarvaprāyashchiṭṭa.*' This consists of the following offerings:—one to Brahman, one to Yajña, one to Varuṇa, two to Agni-Varuṇa, one to Ayas-Agni, one each to Prajāpaṭi, the Iṣtas, the Vaṣadiniṣṭha, Bheṣajanḍuriṣṭī, Niṣkṛiti, Samṛiḍḍhi, the Ḍēvas, Agni-Jāṭavēḍas, Agni-Sviṣṭakṛiṭ, Inḍra, Inḍra-Abhayṅkara, Inḍra-Harivaṭ-Varḍhamana, Agni, Agni-Shraḍḍhā, Varuṇa-Inḍra-Savitṛi-Viṣṇu-Maruṭ, Agni-Ṭanṭumaṭ, Varuṇa, Agni, Vāyu, Sūrya and Prajāpaṭi. After these the Aḍhvaryu and the Brahman pour offerings to Prajāpaṭi, into each of the three fires; and finally the Aḍhvaryu filling the *ḍhruvā* with ghee, pours it as an offering to Yajña-Paramāṭman,—the Brahman reciting the *manṭra* '*Ayāshchāgne, &c.,*' (Maiṭrāyaṇī Samhiṭā I—4-3).

33. The Sacrificer now eats his share of the remnants. The Aḍhvaryu brings the Praṇīṭā vessel on to the altar; this is filled with water, with which the Sacrificer washes his face; and then the Aḍhvaryu pours the water on the altar. The Brahman eats his share of the remnants and retires.

34. The Sacrificer now performs the *Viṣṇukrama* (described in Shaṭapaṭha, I—9-3-8; I—12-13; IV—5-2-10; VI—6-4-1). That is, on the Southern side of the altar, moving his right leg foremost, he moves four steps to the

East, repeating the mantra '*viṣṇoḥ kramosi, &c.*'—Vājasaneya—Samhiṭa XII—5), invoking blessings upon himself and family, and destruction on his enemies. He then walks round the altar; offering salutations to Sūrya and Agni, he proceeds to the Garhapaṭya and salutes it with the *manṭra* '*Agnē gṛihapaṭē, &c.*' (Maiṭrāyaṇī Samhiṭā I—5-11). Proceeding to the Ḍakṣināgni hearth, he salutes it and sits down on the altar. Taking the *Vēḍa* on his lap, he pronounces the text '*Sūryasyāvṛiṭa anvāvarṭē* '*&c.*,' (Vajasanēya Sam II 27); whereupon he invites and feeds ten Brāhmaṇas; and divesting himself of his vow, retires. (Shaṭapaṭha, I—9-23).

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35. List of the articles required at the *Ḍarsha-Pūrṇamāsa*,—arranged alphabetically :—

(*a*) *Anvāhāryasṭhālī*—the dish in which is strained the cooked rice intended for the four priests.

(*b*) *Agnihoṭrahavaṇī*—made of *vikankaṭa* wood—15 inches long,—with one end shaped either like the lip of the elephant, or the beak of the swan, or the tail of the crow,—with a hollow 8, 5 or 4 *anguls* deep respectively,—the rest being kept as handle; this is used in making the Agnihoṭra offerings.

(*c*) *Ājyasṭhālī*—the vessel in which the boiled ghee is kept.

(*d*) *Idā-pāṭra*—a vessel made of Ashvaṭṭha wood,—with handle 4 *anguls* long attached to a hollow 4 *anguls* in circumference; in this is kept the Idā,—the remnants of the offerings.

(*e*) *Upabhriṭ*—a piece of Ashvaṭṭha wood similar to the *juhū*, kept by the Aḍhvaryu in his left hand while in his right hand he holds the *juhū* with which he makes the offerings.

(*f*) *Upala*—the piece of rounded stone with which things are ground upon the stone-slab.

Prābhā. 268.

(*g*) *Upavēṣa*—a two-inch piece cut out from the root-end of the *Palāsha* or *Shamī* branch shorn of its leaves This is used for removing the live coals from the Gārhapaṭya fire.

(*h*) *Ulūkhala*—the mortar made of Palāsha wood, 12 *anguls* high, with a hollow in the lower half; used for the cleaning of the rice and other grains.

(*i*) *Kapāla*—Earthenware pans for the baking of cakes.

(*j*) *Kriṣṇājina*—skin of the black antelope, used as a seat for the mortar upon which rice and other grains are pounded.

(*k*) *Juhū*—a piece of *palāsha* wood similar in form to the *Agnihoṭrahavaṇī*; all principal offerings are made with this.

(*l*) *Ḍarbha*—Kusha grass.

(*m*) *Ḍriṣaṭ*—The stone-slab for grinding corns.

(*n*) *Ḍhruvā*—similar to the *juhū*, but made of *vikaṅkaṭa* wood; ghee is kept in this; and it is kept upon the altar from the beginning to the end of the sacrifice.

(*o*) *Pariḍhi*—Three sticks of fuel exactly of the length of the raised boundary of the *Āhavanīya*; they are placed upon the girdle, on the West, North and South of the hearth. These may be of the following woods—Palāsha, Vikaṅkaṭa, Kārṣmarya, Bilva, Khaḍira, Uḍumbara.

(*p*) *Paviṭra*—a blade of Kusha cut into two equal pieces and consecrated with a manṭra; used for sprinkling water.

(*q*) *Pāṭri*—a wooden dish in which the prepared cake is kept and cut up into slices for offerings and also for distribution among the priests.

(*r*) *Piṣṭalēpaphalīkaraṇapāṭra*—Vessels for keeping the ground corns and the chaff thrown out from the winnowing basket.

Prābhā. 269.

(s) *Praṇīṭā*—Vessels made of *Ashvaṭṭha* wood; 8 *anguls* deep with handles 4 *anguls* long.

(t) *Prāshiṭra*—The remnant of the substance offered, kept aside in a vessel, called, on that account, the '*Prāshiṭra-pāṭra*,' which is made of *Khaḍira* wood, of the shape of the cow's ear.

(u) *Maḍanṭī*—The water heated in a vessel that becomes heated while the frying-pan is being heated.

(v) *Musala*—pestle made of *Khaḍira* wood, one and half times as long as the mortar.

(w) *Mēkṣaṇa*—a piece of *Ashvaṭṭha* wood 15 inches long; with one end flattened; used in mixing together the fried substances with *maḍanṭī* water.

(x) *Yokṭra*—a three-fold rope of Muñja, wound round the waist of the Sacrificer's wife (Shaṭapaṭha I-3—1—13).

(y) *Vēḍi*—a handful of Kusha grass, twisted and doubled up into the shape of the thigh of the seated calf; used in the sweeping of the altar.

(z) *Shamyā*—made of Khaḍira wood; 36 *anguls* long, having at one end eight knots, one *angul* apart from one another; placed under the flat grinding stone, when rice, &c., are ground; also used by the Agnīḍhra priest for striking the stone.

(za) *Shūrpa*—winnowing basket made of bamboo.

(zb) *Sphya*—a sword made of *Khaḍira* wood, 20 *anguls* long, 4 *anguls* broad.

(zc) *Sruk*—is the name given in common to the *Juhū*, the *Ḍhruvā*, the *Upabhṛiṭ* and the *Sruva*—the instruments for making offerings.

(zd) *Sruva*—a piece of Khaḍira wood, 15 inches long, with a hollow at one end, an inch in diameter; with this all offerings of ghee are made. It may be of *palāsha* or *vikaṇkaṭa* wood (Shaṭapaṭha V—2-3-15).

Prābhā. 270.

THE AGNIṢTOMA.

36. Having described the Archetypal *Iṣṭi*, we are now going to describe the Agniṣṭoma (also called Jyoṭiṣṭoma) which is the archetypal *Soma-yāga*. This sacrifice is dealt with in the Shaṭapaṭha Brāhmana, Prap. IV and IV, and in the Shrauṭa-Sūṭra of Kāṭyāyana, Adh. VII—XV. (*Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series*, pp. 417 to 601). It is upon these original texts, and upon the *Paḍḍhaṭi* or manual, by Yājñika Ḍēva—also based upon Kāṭyāyana—that the following account is based.

37. If the Sacrificer is a regular performer of the *Agnihoṭra*, he should perform the daily Agnihoṭra, and also the Ḍarsha-Pūrṇamāsa Sacrifices before he takes up the *Agniṣtoma*. But if he happens to be one who has had no 'Agni' in his family,—*i.e.*, who himself, or his two immediate ancestors have not been regular performers of the Agnihoṭra,—before he can be entitled to the Agniṣṭoma, he has to offer a he-goat to the Ashvins,—this being an expiatory rite for cleansing himself from the character of the 'Bad Brāhmaṇa,' attaching to him on account of the non-performance of the Agnihoṭra, and the neglect of Vedic studies. After this comes the performance of the expiatory rite, if the Soma Sacrifice has not been performed in the family for three generations,—this rite consisting of the offering of a goat to Inḍra-Agni. Both the animals are sacrificed in the same manner as that to Agni-Soma, in course of the Agniṣṭoma (see below).

38. On the day preceding the one on which the Agniṣtoma is to be performed,—which generally is the day following the New or the Full Moon,—the Sacrificer performs the *Nānḍīshrāḍḍha*,—an offering to his ancestors. On the day of the Sacrifice, the Sacrificer and his wife, along with the sixteen priests-elect, have their bath early in the morning;

Prābhā, 271.

after which the priests are duly 'appointed.' Before the appointment of the *human* priests however, the *divine* ones are appointed: Agni being the *Hoṭri*, Āḍitya the *Aḍhvaryu*, Chanḍramas the *Brahman*, Parjanya the *Uḍgāṭri*, Apas the *Hoṭrashamsin*, and Rashmi the *Chamasāḍhvaryu*. The Sacrificer then announces his intention to perform the sacrifice in the following terms:—'I am going to perform the *Jyoṭiṣtoma-Agniṣtoma* in which the sacrificial gift shall consist of a hundred pieces of gold, and 100 cows and clothes and horses,—it will be accompanied by the Raṭhanṭara-pṛiṣtha Sāman, and four *Sṭomas* ; will you, Sir, *so and so*, of such and such a *goṭra*, officiate as the *Brahman* priest.' This same formula is repeated with each priest, who accepts the place, and receives from the Sacrificer the offering of *maḍhuparka*. The sixteen priests are:—(1) the *Brahman*, (2) the *Uḍgāṭri*, (3) the *Hoṭri*, (4) the *Aḍhvaryu*—these four are the principal priests, of the first class, called '*Mahartvik*';—(5) the *Brāhmaṇāchchhamshin*, (6) the *Prasṭoṭri*, (7) the *Maiṭrāvaruṇa*, (8) the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri*,—these four belong to the second class, called *Dviṭīyin*';—(9) the *Poṭri*, (10) the *Praṭihartṛi*, (11) the *Achchhāvāka*, (12) the *Nēṣṭri*—these four belong to the third class, called '*Tṛiṭīyin*';—(13) The *Agnīḍ* (or *Agnīḍhra*); (14) the *Subrahmaṇya*; (15) the *Grāvasṭuṭ*, and (16) the *Unnēṭri*—these four belong to the fourth class called the '*pāḍin*'; the last twelve are also called "*Hoṭrāshamsin*.' The Soma is then handed over to the Sacrificer, who is thereupon anointed with a *ṭilaka* on the forehead, and receives blessings from the Brāhmaṇas.

59. The above having been done at the Sacrificer's house, he proceeds, with the priests, to choose a place for the Sacrificial House. The plot of land chosen should be higher than all the land around, and should be sloping towards the east. Having cleared it of all vegetation, they build thereupon a house 20 *araṭnis* by 10, (an '*araṭni*' being nearly 18 inches), with three doors, on the East, South and

Prabhā, 272.

West. To the North of this house another house—5 *aratnis* by 5,—is built facing the East, for the 'initiation' of the Sacrificer; and to the South, a similar house for the initiation of his wife. Returning home they pour a libation of ghee into the Āhavanīya fire,—this offering being called '*yūpāhuti*'; the remnant of the ghee is kept in a safe place.

40. Having consecrated the ground, they transfer into the *Araṇī* the fire from the Gārhapatya and Āhavanīya hearths of the Agnihotra; and placing the *Araṇī* on the cart, along with all other sacrificial implements and materials, they carry it with propitiatory songs and recitations to the ground chosen for the Sacrificial House. On reaching the place, the Sacrificer washing his hands, takes the *Araṇī* and the *Soma* in his hand and enters the House by the Eastern door; and deposits the *Soma* on a raised platform.

41. The Aḍhvaryu proceeds to the mound (4 *anguls* high, 24 *anguls* long, and 24 *anguls* broad), intended for the *Gārhapatya*, and having performed its lustration, he produces fire by the friction of the *Araṇī*, and keeps it on the mound. About 8 yards removed from this mound, he has the mound for for the *Āhavanīya*; and a little removed from this, the mound of the *Dakṣiṇāgni*. After the lustration of these mounds, he deposits fire on these also. The Sacrificer thereupon makes an offering of vegetables and grains to the Soma; and this finishes the morning functions.

42. In the afternoon, the Sacrificer and his wife may partake of rich food, consisting of rice and cakes and various kinds of meat; after which he makes over all sacrificial materials to a reliable person, requesting him to bring forward each thing at the proper moment.

43. After this comes the Initiation of the Sacrificer and his wife. In the Northern house, a jar full of water having been kept, the Aḍhvaryu, facing the North, pares the Sacrificer's nails, and shaves certain parts of his head.

Prabhā. 272.

proceeding from the right side. The razor is then made over to the barber, who shaves the rest of the head and the chin. The Sacrificer then takes his bath, for the purpose of purifying him of the barber's touch; and betaking himself to the North-east corner of the house, he wears a fresh silk cloth. In the Western house, the *Pratiprasthātri* performs a similar ceremony for the Sacrificer's wife; the shaving of the head in this case bring purely optional; though the nails must be pared. The Lady also wears clothes similar to those put on by her husband. These two Initiations over, the Adhvaryu leads the Sacrificer by the hand to the Sacrificial House, by the eastern door, the Pratiprasthātri leading the Lady by the other door. The Sacrificer and the Lady then repair to their appointed seats.

44. Then follows the *Dīkṣaṇīyā Iṣṭi.* A cake baked upon eleven pans is offered to Agni-Viṣṇu; and also an offering of *charu* is made to the *Ādityas.* At this *Iṣṭi* no *mantras* are recited loudly; nor is there any sacrificial gift. The remnants of the cake, &c., attaching to the *Sruva* are ultimately offered to the Vishvēdēvas. The Ahdvaryu spreads *kusha* grass on the eastern side of the Sacrificial House. The Sacrificer seated upon this receives *ghee* from the *Adhvaryu,* which he rubs all over his body, the parts he cannot himself reach being rubbed by the priest. With the pointed end of an arrow he applies collyrium to his eyes; the Adhvaryu sprinkles water over him; whereupon the Sacrificer closing his fist takes the vow of silence, and is led by the *Adhvaryu* into the House by the eastern door, and seated between the *Gārhapatya* and the *Āhavanyīa* hearths. The *Pratiprasthātri* helps the Lady to go through the above procedure; and she is led into the House by the western door. Thus ends the Dīkṣaṇīyā Iṣṭi.

45. Next follows the *Odgrabhaṇa Homa.* With the *Sruva,* the *Adhvaryu* pours offerings of ghee to—(1) Ākūti—

Prābhā. 274.

Prayuj—Agni, (2) to Meḍhā—Manas—Agni, (3) to Sarasvaṭī —Pūṣan—Agni, (4) to Apas—Ḍyāvāpṛiṭhivī—Antarikṣa—Bṛihaspaṭi, and (5) lastly to Vishvēḍēva—Saviṭṛi—Miṭra—Bṛihaspaṭi—Pūṣan.

46. To the south of the Āhavanīya hearth, the Aḍhvaryu spreads two skins of the black antelope. The Sacrificer kneels to the west of the skin, facing the east. Pronouncing the words '*Sharmāsi*' he places his right knee upon the skin; and binds round his waist a *muñja* rope twisted three-fold, pronouncing the words '*ūrgasi*'; and then he binds up the knot of his waist-cloth; covers his head with the upper garment, which, according to Āpastamba, he wraps round his head in the form of a turban; and to the free end of this turban, he ties the black horn, 6 inches long.* The *Aḍhvaryu* then hands over to the Sacrificer a stick of *uḍumbara* wood long enough to reach his face from the ground; and the Sacrificer raises it over his head, and finally places it on his right shoulder. While the *Aḍhvaryu* is doing this to the Sacrificer, the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭṛi* does the same to the Lady; with this difference that instead of the horn, a piece of wood is tied to the end of her upper garment, and in place of the turban, three folds of net are wrapped round her head; and in place of the *muñja* rope, the *yokṭra* is wound round her waist. With this ends the Initiation with all its details.

47. At sunset, the *Aḍhvarya* permits the Sacrificer and his wife to renounce the vow of silence; this is done by the Sacrificer uttering '*bhūḥ, bhuvaḥ, svaḥ*' while seated upon the black antelope skin. The *Aḍhvaryu* then milking the milk of two cows, gets some *yava* cooked in the milk; and with this the Sacrificer and his wife break their fast; the food intended for the Sacrificer is cooked over the *Gārhapaṭya* fire, and that for the Lady on the *Ḍakṣiṇāgni*.

* This horn is intended for scratching the itching parts of his body; this should not be done with the finger-nails. See *Shaṭapaṭha*, III—2-1-31.

Prabhā. 275.

Having partaken of the food, the Sacrificer requests the Fire to keep awake, and himself retires to sleep, on a bedding spread to the south of the Āhavanīya hearth; taking care not to lie upon his back or stomach; his wife sleeps in similar fashion to the South of the Gārhapaṭya hearth. The two cows are kept carefully guarded within an enclosure.

48. Towards the latter part of the night, the Sacrificer and his wife wash their faces and hands; whereupon the *Aḍhvaryu* offers to him milk in a *Kāṁsya* cup; and this milk he drinks, sitting upon the skin. The Lady also receiving the milk from the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri* in a copper vessel drinks it. After this they ease themselves and go to sleep again if necessary.

49. At the break of dawn, the *Aḍhvaryu* makes the Sacrificer and the Lady to resume the vow of silence. The milk is then boiled and kept away. After this comes the Initiation; after which, if the Sacrificer happen to get angry, or to do any such improper thing as talking to a *Shūḍra*, telling a lie, uttering non-Sanskrit words, and so forth,—he has to recite the *manṭra*—'*agnē vraṭaḍā asi*, &c.' (Shaṭapaṭha, III.—4-3-9). From this point forward, till the concluding Bath, the Sacrificer has to observe certain restrictions. Some of these are as follows:—(1) not to mix with Shūḍras; (2) not to talk to the Shūḍras; (3) not to admit a Shūḍra into the house; (4) if it becomes necessary to talk to a Shūḍra, this should be done through some person of the higher castes; (5) not to rise from the seat even on the approach of respected persons; (6) not to salute any person; (7) not to go into a tank; (8) not to touch rain water; (9) to talk sweetly and not harshly; (10) to talk Sanskrit only; (11) to observe strict veracity; (12) not to spit; (13) nor to laugh loudly, (14) not to show his teeth; (15) not to ascend trees; (16) nor to wander out of the Sacrificial House; (17) not to cleanse the teeth; (18) not to bathe; (19) not to

make any such offerings as those of the *Agnihoṭra*, the *Vaiśhvadēva*, and so forth. Authorities are divided as to the number of Initiations to be adopted—they may be 12, 4, 3, or even one.

50. After the Initiation they proceed to do the *paochchēḍana*—the cutting of the Sacrificial Post. Taking with them the remnant of the ghee and the fire-stick, they go to the place where they have kept the log of *khaḍira* wood intended for the Post. It is perfectly smooth and of even thickness all over. They produce fire by the friction of the sticks, into which they pour a libation of ghee, called the '*yūpāhuṭi*'; after which they cut out a piece of the wood, which may be 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13 or 15 *araṭnis* long; and the piece of wood left behind is called tho '*Svaru*', and kept aside for purposes of the *Svaruhoma*.

51. After this follows the *Mahāvīrasambharaṇa*: The Brahman and the Sacrificer get together clay, anthill dust, the mud thrown up by the wild boar, the *puṭikā* herbs, red flowers, goat's milk and the *gavēḍhuka* grass. Spreading the skin of the black antelope, they keep near it the scraper made of *uḍumbara* or *vikaṅkaṭa* wood, about 15 inches long. The Adhvarya takes up this scraper, and taking up in his hand the clod of earth, keeps it on the skin, whereupon he heaps, one by one, all the aforesaid things. To the North of the skin, the Adhvaryu chooses a square level spot; and covering it with a piece of cloth, keeping an opening to the east, he cleans the place and sprinkles sand over it; and accompanied by the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri* the *Nēṣṭri*, and the *Unnēṭri*, he picks up the skin along with the things put upon it; and while the Brahman and the Sacrificer are reciting the *manṭra* '*praiṭu brahmaṇaspaṭiḥ* &c.' (Ṛigveḍa—I.—40-3) he carries the skin along with the things into the covered spot. Keeping the *gavēḍhuka* and the goat's milk aside, the Aḍhvarya mixes up the other things; and out of the lump

Prabhā. 277.

of clay produced by this mixture, he prepares three *mahāviras*. The *mahāvīra* is 6 inches long, with a cavity in the middle and a hole at the top, having a belt three inches below the upper end. Then he prepares the two *pinvanas* —which are similar in shape to the lotus on the *Sruk*,— and also two circular pans of the size of the palm of the hand, which are called '*Rauhiṇakapāla*'. The clay left behind, called the '*upashayā*' is kept away in a safe place, for future use. The *mahāviras*, the *pinvanas* and the *rauhiṇakapālas* are then smoothed by being rubbed with the *gavēḍhuka*. Fire having been brought out of the *Ḍakṣiṇāgni* hearth, the priest throws it into horse-dung; and over the smoke thus raised, he smokes the *Mahāvira*, &c. Removing the antelope-skin, he digs a square pit, and spreading *Kusha* in it, and placing the three things over the *kusha*, he lights it with fire. After they have been thoroughly baked, he sprinkles goat's milk over them, and keeps them aside carefully in a safe place:—the breaking of these articles being considered inauspicious.

52. Next comes the *Prāyaṇīyā Iṣti*. At this there is no regular 'appointment' of priests; nor is there any distinct sacrificial fee. The priest cooks rice; and out of this cooked rice offerings are made to Agni, Soma, and Paṭhyā Svasṭi, and again to Agni, Soma, Saviṭṛi, Aḍiṭi and the Ḍēvas. These are followed by offerings of ghee to Paṭhyā Svasṭi; Agni, Soma and Saviṭṛi; all the *manṭras* being recited in a subdued voice.

With the same cooked rice, they next perform the *Aḍiṭi-yāga*; which consists of an offering to Aḍiṭi, and a concluding offering to *Sviṣṭakṛiṭ*; after which the remnant is distributed among the priests. The *prasṭara* is thereupon thrown into the fire, as an offering to Paṭhyā Svasṭi, Agni, Soma, Aḍiṭi and Saviṭṛi.

Prābhā. 378.

At this stage of the *Prāyaṇīyā*, the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri* fetches the *Soma* from the House and deposits it on the reddish-brown calf-skin spread with its neck-end towards the east. The person who is to sell the *Soma*,—who must be either a *Shūḍra*, or a low-born person of the higher castes —then cuts the *Soma* into as many parts as there are joints in it. The *Aḍhvaryu* closes the door of the House, pours ghee four times into the *juhū*, and pours it as a libation, along with some fuels, into the *Āhavanīya*. Then he ties a blade of grass round a gold piece, and having tied it to a string, he puts it into the *juhū*. After which the remaining rites of the Prāyaṇīyā are performed.

53. After this comes the 'purchasing of the Soma.' The doors of the House are opened, and the *Aḍhvaryu* and the Sacrificer go out by the eastern door, and move towards the heifer that is to be given as the price of the *Soma*. This heifer is of tawny reddish-brown colour throughout, without any kind of mark on the body, without any ornamentations, not deficient in any limbs, nor with a distorted limb; and it is to be accompanied by a bull; and she must have tawny eyes; and must be one year old. The Aḍhvaryu having touched her body, she is led up to the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri* and the other priests, the *Aḍhvaryu* and the Sacrificer following her. On the spot where the heifer puts her front right foot, in her seventh step, they all sit down, in the following order:—the *Brahman* and the Sacrificer on the South, the *Aḍhvaryu* on the West, the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri* and the *Nēṣṭri* on the north, and the Lady further to the South. The *Aḍhvaryu* places the gold-piece that had been tied up in a string, on the exact spot where the heifer had put her foot; and makes an offering of ghee to Aḍiṭi. Upon the spot he draws three lines with the *sphya*, and taking up the gold-piece in his hand he puts it in the *Sṭhālī*. Having poured ghee upon the three lines he has drawn, he picks up the earth

Prābhā. 279.

bearing the foot-mark of the heifer, and hands it over to the Sacrificer, from whom it is again transferred to the Lady, who keeps it in a safe place: and ties the gold-piece to her ring-finger. The Sacrificer thereupon orders a servant to bring up piece of cloth for wrapping round the *Soma*, another as a 'bedding' for it, and a third as its 'turban.' One of these pieces is taken up either by the Sacrificer or the *Aḍhvaryu*, and the other two by the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭṛi*; and they go to the place where the *Soma* had been kept; and the Sacrificer and the Brahman seating themselves to the South of it, the Aḍhvaryu takes his seat on the North, and facing the east, touches the *Soma*; after which the 'seller' also is not permitted to touch it. All foreign substances having been removed from the *Somā*, the Aḍhvaryu folds up a piece of cloth four-fold, and spreading it on the skin, measures out, on to the cloth, ten handfuls of the Soma-chips; and then takes up the whole of it into the folded cloth; in which he wraps up the *Soma*, and ties up the knot on the top with the cloth intended for the 'turban'; and hands over this bundle to the 'seller.' Then proceeds the bartering for the *Soma*:—

Aḍhvaryu:—"Is your *Soma* for sale?"

Seller:—"Yes; it is for sale."

A.:—"I shall buy it."

Seller:—"You may do so."

A.:—"I shall pay for it the sixteenth part of a gold-piece."

Seller:—"My *Soma* is worth much more than that."

This goes on until the Aḍhvaryu offers a 'cow' as the price. This is accepted by the seller, who says—"The *Soma* has been bought by you." Directed by the *Aḍhvaryu*, the Sacrificer offers to the vendor a gold-piece and a she-goat which the Aḍhvaryu hands over to the vendor, with the

right hand, receiving the *Soma* with the left. He then ties the *Ṣoma*-bundle to the right thigh of the Sacrificer, who thereupon gives the cow to the vendor, also gold and some other things. The Sacrificer and his wife thereupon uncover their heads, and belabouring the vendor with a bamboo-stick, wrest away from him the gold-piece that he had received. This bamboo-stick is thrown into the fire by the *Aḍhvaryu*, as an offering to Miṭra-Varuṇa. The Sacrificer takes up the Soma-bundle and goes towards the cart intended for the carrying of the *Ṣoma*. On this cart the *Aḍhvaryu* spreads the black antelope skin, and places the *Soma* upon it, and covers it up with the second piece of cloth. The skin on which the Sacrificer has been sitting is then fixed to a bamboo-pole and stuck into the ground in front of the cart. Two calves are then yoked to the cart; and they are driven with a *palāsha*-stick by the *Ṣubrahmaṇya*. The Aḍhvaryu goes round the cart, and takes up a position behind it; and takes hold of the rope attached thereto; the Sacrificer and the rest proceed behind him. The cart is taken to the House.

54. The Aḍhvaryu on nearing the House, calls the Subrahmaṇya, who thereupon calls the Brāhmaṇas to come forward. The *Praṭiprasṭhāṭṛi* brings the animal dedicated to Agni-Soma to the east of the House, and stands near the cart, holding the animal by the ear. This animal should be a deer either of black colour with spots, or of reddish-brown colour. The Sacrificer touches this animal; and it is moved away. The Aḍhvaryu, helped by the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭṛi*, the *Nēṣṭṛi* and the *Unnēṭṛi*, carry to the cart, the *āsanḍī* (a stool made of *Uḍumbara* wood, high enough to reach the navel of the Sacrificer, but only about 15 inches square at the top, intended as a repository for the *Soma*); and spreading the black antelope skin on this the *Aḍhvaryu* places the Soma-bundle upon it; and the four priests taking

Prabhā. 281.

up the stool carry it into the House by the eastern door, and keep it to the south of the Āhavanīya hearth.

55. Next comes the *Ātithyēṣṭi*:—They bake a cake upon nine pans, intended as an offering to Viṣṇu; after which the *madantī* water for the Sacrificer is boiled upon the *Gārhapatya*, and that for the Lady on the *Dakṣiṇāgni* fire; and from this point onwards for all purposes they use water out of these two *madantīs* only. The fire being churned out of the *araṇī* sticks, offerings of ghee are made to Agni, Soma, Viṣṇu and the Dēvas; after which the cake is offered to Viṣṇu,—all the *mantras* being repeated in a low voice. The Sacrificer and the priests then take out ghee with the *Sruva* out of the *dhruvā* and the *sthālī* twice over, and keep it in a vessel hidden away in a safe place.* The Sacrificer puts fuel into the *Āhavanīya* fire, and the Lady into the *Dakṣiṇāgni*; and they bind up the *muṣṭi* and the *mekhalā*. The *Brahman*, the *Udgātri*, the *Hotri*, the *Adhvaryu*, the *Agnīdhra*, and the Sacrificer tie gold-pieces to their ring-fingers; and repairing to the east of the Āhavanīya hearth, untie the *Soma* bundle. Returning to their places they put their hands on the *prastara*, and repair to their seats. This is followed by the apportioning of the shares of the Brahman and the Sacrificer, the sweeping of the fire-places, the washing of the *juhū*, and the besmearing of the *paridhis* with ghee. Carrying the *prastara* along with the *paridhis*, to the Āhavanīya hearth, and sprinkling over these the water of the *Madantī*, the *Adhvaryu* hands them over to the *Agnīdhra* for safe custody. The *Vēda*, the *Yoktra* and the *Praṇītā* being removed, a blade of *kusha* is thrown to the South-West as an offering to the *Rākṣasas*; and the *Subrahmaṇya* having called the Brāhmaṇas, they receive their dues from the Sacrificer and the Lady.

* This is called the *Tānūnaptra ājya*; and those taking part in this should remain friendly to one another throughout their lives.

Prābhā. 282.

56. The *Āṭiṭhyēṣṭi* is followed by the *Pravargyacharaṇa*:—The three doors of the House are closed, the Lady also being kept out, by reason of the law that the performance of the *Pravargya* should not be witnessed by persons not learned in the Veda. The *Brahman*, the Sacrificer, the *Hoṭṛi*, the *Aḍhvaryu*, the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭṛi*, the *Prasṭoṭṛi* and the *Agnīḍhra* recite the whole chapter of the Veda, beginning with the words '*ṛicham vācham prapaḍyē*' (Vajas-Samh. 36). The Brahman thereupon takes his seat either to the West of the *Ḍakṣiṇāgni* or to the South of the *Āhavanīya* hearth; spreading *kusha* behind the *Gārhapaṭya* the Aḍhvaryu collects the articles needed for the sacrifice—all the vessels being of *Uḍumbara* wood, and all strings and ropes being of *muñja* twisted three-fold (for the list, see end of section) He prepares the *paviṭras*, and having set up the *prokṣaṇī* vessels, he assigns to the *Hoṭṛi*, the business of reciting the hymns, and to the *Prasṭoṭṛi* that of singing the *Sāmans*. He washes one of the *Mahāvīras* (see above), as also all the vessels got together. The *Praṭiprasṭhāṭṛi* then takes the peg and post out of the eastern door, and sticks them on the ground on the southern side of the House, in such a position as to be within view of the *Hoṭṛi* who sits near the *Gārhapaṭya* hearth; the post is intended for the tying of the cow and the peg for that of the goat. Coming into the House again, he prepares, to the North of the *Gārhapaṭya* hearth, a mound 15 inches square and 4 inches high, smears it with cowdung, and consecrates it; a similar mound is prepared to the North of the *Āhavanīya* hearth, and a third also to the south of this latter hearth, close to the wall of the House. On each of these mounds he sprinkles the sand kept in each of the three cups. Between the *Āhavanīya* hearth and the stool of the *Soma*, he places another stool, high enough to reach the neck; and spreading the black antelope skin upon this, he keeps upon it the *Abhri*, the *Upashayā* and the other two *mahāviras*; and covers up the

whole with a piece of cloth. Taking ghee with the *Sruva* the *Aḍhvaryu* smears with it the *mahāvīra* that has been washed; and taking the silver 'hundred-pieces' (*Shaṭamāna*) he hides it within the sand on the mound to the North of the *Gārhapaṭya* hearth. The Prastoṭṛi singing the *Shukra Sāman*, the *Aḍhvaryu* spreads *muñja* grass along side of the mounds and keeps the *mahāvīra* filled with ghee on that grass; and sprinkling ash over it, he covers it up with live coals from out of the *Gārhapaṭya* hearth, and surrounding it with 13 pieces of *vikaṅkaṭa* wood, places on the top of it 100-carat-pieces of gold. While the *Chanḍra-Sāman* is being sung, he fans the fire with three fans prepared out of the pieces of antelope skin with handles attached to them; after having fanned the fire himself, he hands one fan each to the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭṛi* and the *Agnīḍhra*, whereupon all three fan the fire. When the fire blazes, he removes the gold-pieces and keeps them away; and taking ghee with the *Sruva*, he sprinkles it on the *mahāvīra*. The *Praṭiprasṭhāṭṛi* then prepares the *Rauhiṇa* cakes; he takes up the *Shūrpa* and the *Agnihoṭra-havaṇī*, and warms them on fire. Looking into the dough that has been prepared, he removes all foreign substances from it, and kneading it thoroughly, divides it into equal parts, spreads out each part into the form of a cake; placing *pariḍhis* of *Uḍumbara* wood round the Āhavanīya hearth, he smears the pans with ghee, and bakes the cakes on them. The Aḍhvaryu thereupon takes up the cake on the right; and while the Prastoṭṛi is singing the *Soma-niḍhana*, he throws it into the fire, as an offering either to Ḍharma or to Ahan. After this he takes up the *Rajjusan-ḍāna* and the two *pinvanas*; and accompanied by the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭṛi* goes out and milks the cow tethered to the post,—receiving the milk in the *pinvanas*; the priests milking the she-goat. Both return to the House and keep the milk in a safe place. The *Aḍhvaryu* picks out the *mahāvīras* with a pair of tongs, and taking them out of the house

Prābhā. 284.

deposits them in a large vessel which is then covered with a stone-slab. After a short time, he brings them in and sprinkling goat's milk on them, he dips them in the cow's milk, and keeps them on the mound near the Gārhapatya hearth. Bringing up *ghee* in the *gharma* vessel, he pours it as libation, with the *Sruk*, to the Ashvins, and another to Agni; and then keeps the vessel on the mound to the North of the *Āhavanīya* hearth. He takes up seven bits (of wood or cake) and offers one each to Pūṣan-Sharās, Grāvan and Pratirava; the fourth, after being hidden in a bundle of *kusha*, is offered to the Pitṛs; the fifth is offered to Ḍyavā-Pṛithivī, the sixth to the Vishvēdēvas; and the seventh is handed over to the *Pratiprasthātṛi*, who throws it to the North of the House. The Adhvaryu then offers the second *Rauhiṇa* cake into the *gharma*, and throws into the *Āhavanīya* the five pieces of wood kept on the *paridhis*. Libations of ghee are then poured to Sūrya and Prajāpati; and the remnants are eaten by the Sacrificer and the priests; and the *Upayamanī* is kept on the third mound. Propitiatory *mantras* being recited by the Sacrificer and the priests, the door of the House is flung open.

57. This is followed by the *Upasad-Iṣti*:—The *Agnīdhra* having boiled the ghee, and the Adhvaryu having lighted the fire, the latter goes to the altar, and takes up the *Vēda* along with some *Kusha*, and throws it aside. The *Kusha* having been got together, the *sphya*, the *juhū*, the *sruva* and the *upabhṛit* are washed; and the Lady having the *yoktra* tied round her waist, examines the ghee and having removed all foreign substances, keeps it on the altar. All Homa-materials are then brought up to the Āhavanīya hearth, and libations are poured to Agni, Soma and Viṣṇu. The *Brahman*, the *Udgātṛi*, the *Hotṛi*, the *Adhvaryu*, the *Agnīdhra* and the Sacrificer putting gold on their ring-finger, go up to the *soma* and touch it. Returning to the hearth, they take up ghee and pour a libation to Agni. The

Prabhā. 285.

prastara having its top-end dipped in the *juhū*, its middle in the *upabhṛit*, and the lower end in the *Ājyasthālī*, is made over to the *Agnīdhra* for safe custody. The remnants of the materials are then offered up to the fire; and this closes the *Upasad Iṣti*.

58. Towards evening they offer to the Sacrificer a drink of milk in the same vessel in which they had kept the *Tānūnaptra* ghee (§ 55); whereupon the *Pravargya* (§ 56) and the *Upasad* (§ 57) sacrifices are again performed with some changes. In the *Pravargya* the *Rauhiṇa* cake is offered to *Rātri* (and not to *Ahan* as on the previous occasion); and in the *Upasad* the libation is poured into the fire with the *mantra* '*yā tē agnē harāshayā*' (instead of '*ayāshayā*' as on the previous occasion). Before the sun sets, the sacrificer is permitted to give up silence and also to break his fast. Milk being drawn out of the three teats of the cow, it is boiled over the *Gārhapatya* for the Sacrificer and on the *Dakṣiṇāgni* for the Lady; and they retire to rest. Towards the latter part of the night they partake of the milk; and before the sun rises, the Sacrificer is required to resume his silence till sunrise. The *Pravargya* (§ 56) and the *Upasad* (§ 57) sacrifices are again performed,—in the former the offering being again to Ahan, and in the latter the *mantra* employed being '*yā tē agnē rajaḥshayā*, &c.'


59. They then proceed to map out the *Vēdi*. Beginning from the centre of the eastern door of the house, the priest takes three steps forward, and there sticks the first peg—called the '*Antaḥpātya shanku*'; taking up a *two-foot* measure (a *prakrama* being equal to two *padas*) they measure out 15 *prakramas* from the aforesaid peg to the south, and there put another peg,—this forming the southern boundary of the Vēdi; similarly moving 15 *prakramas* to the north of the central peg, they drive in another peg—which forms the northern boundary; moving 36 *prakramas* from the central

Prābhā. 286.

peg towards the east they put in a peg—the eastern boundary, where also the post is set up. From this last peg to the south, at a distance of ten *prakramas*, a peg is put in; and one also at the distance of 12 *prakramas* towards the North. Having set up these pegs, they prepare the *Vēḍī*; and towards the North of it they make the *ukara* (place for the throwing of all waste matter). The *aḍhvaryu* then measures out the *chātvala*, three *prakramas* to the west of the northernmost peg of the *Vēḍī*. Beside the *Vēḍī* they prepare the *uṭṭaravēḍī*, which is 10 ft. square.*

60. In the afternoon, they again perform the *Pravargya*, the cake being offered to *Rāṭri*; and also the *Upasad*, with the *mantra*, '*yā ṭē agnē rajaḥshayā &c.*' The Sacrificer, having drunk the milk in the evening, retires to sleep as on the previous night.—Next morning, they again perform the *Pravargya* and the *Upasaḍ*.

61. The *Brahman* and the Sacrificer seating themselves near the southern door of the House, the *Aḍhvaryu* prepares the ghee and goes to the Āhavanīya hearth. The *Agnīḍhra* throws one piece of fuel into the *Āhavanīya*; and the fire having blazed up, the *Aḍhvaryu* pours into it the fourth part of the ghee as an offering to '*Gharmasya Divyā Shuk*'. The *Agnīḍhra* lights another piece of fuel in the fire and holds it in his hand, while the *Aḍhvaryu* pours into the fire another



Prābhā. 287.

fourth part of the ghee as an offering to '*Gharmasya Antarikṣa Shuk.*' Similarly over the fire in the third stick, the third quarter of the ghee is offered to '*Gharmasya Pārthiva Shuk.*' Then placing the Lady before them, they go out of the House by the eastern door; and re-entering the House they go towards the *Uttara Vēḍī*, on which they deposit the two *mahāvīras*, the two *parishās* being kept to the North and South of the third *mahāvīra*. While the *Prastotṛi* is singing the Vārṣāhara Sāman, the *Aḍhvaryu* sprinkles water upon the *Uttaravēḍī*; the same being done by the other priests and also by the Sacrificer and the Lady, while the *Iṣṭāhotriya Sāman* is being sung. The Sacrificer puts some fuel into the *Āhavanīya*, and the Lady in the *Gārhapatya*; when the Sacrificer gives 100 carats of gold and silver to the *Brahman*, to the *Aḍhvaryu* he gives the cow that had supplied the milk for the *Gharma*; that which has given milk for the Sacrificer, he gives to the *Hotṛi*; to the *Udgātṛi* that which had given milk for the Lady; and lastly to the *Agnīḍhra* he gives a she-goat. This finishes the *Pravargyasādana*.

62. Next follows the *Agnipraṇayana*—*i.e.*, the fetching of burning sticks from the *Vēḍi* to the *Uttaravēḍī*; and this is followed by the rigging up, close to the Vēḍi, of the '*Havirḍhāna*'—a room made up of cloth-pieces, in which the *Soma-juice* is kept. The *Aḍhvaryu* and the *Pratiprasthātṛi* carrying two vessels of ghee to the *Vēḍi*, covers them up with straw mats. Getting together the articles necessary for the *Havirḍhāna-maṇḍapa*, the *Aḍhvaryu* prepares ghee on the *Āhavanīya* fire and makes an offering at the door to Savitṛi. The *Aḍhvaryu*, the *Brahman* and the Sacrificer going out by the eastern and the Lady by the southern door, the *Aḍhvaryu* pours two libations of ghee to Viṣṇu; and to the west of the *Vēḍī* he sets up four sticks; and having wrapped cloth round these four sticks, he has a 'room', a '*maṇḍapa*', 10 aratnis square, which is called the '*Havirḍhāna*',

Prabhā. 288.

—which he dedicates to Viṣṇu. Generally two such rooms are rigged up—called the 'Northern' and the 'Southern' *Havirḍhāna*.

63. They now proceed to dig the *Uparava*, which on being dug, is examined by the *Aḍhvaryu* and the Sacrificer, who thoroughly wash it, and spread *kusha* over it. Spreading a circular piece of skin on the ground the Aḍhvaryu places 5 pieces of stone over it, and to the east of the *Uparava*, he prepares a mound.

64. After this they build the *Saḍas*—or place for some of the priests—and for those who come to witness the sacrifice. This place is six *prakramas* to the East of the *Antaḥpāṭya* peg of the *Vēḍī*,—measured out by means of a stick of the *Uḍumbara* wood, which is put into the ground, with its fifth part under the ground. Kusha being spread around this stick, the *Aḍhvaryu* takes up ghee with the *Sruva* and pours a libation over the stick, as an offering to *Ḍyāvā-prithivī*,—the quantity of ghee being large enough to smear the whole of the stick. The space for the *Saḍas* is mapped out 18 *araṭnis* by 9,—the *Uḍumbara* stick being at the centre; there are doors to the East and to the West; there are four pillars at the four corners; it is covered with a roof consisting of nine mats. It is guarded on all sides by six men.

65. This is followed by the *Agnīḍhraniṣpāḍana*—*i. e.* the preparation of the place called the '*Agnīḍhra*.' It is located to the North of the *Havirḍhāna*; it is 5 *araṭnis* square, with doors on the South and the East; it is built in such a manner as to make the inner end coincide with that of the *Havirḍhāna*. Half of it is to fall within the limits of the *Vēḍī*; it is dedicated to the Vishvēḍēvas.

66. After this comes the *Ḍhiṣṇyānivāsa*; that is to say, the preparation of the platforms for the sitting of the priests. At the centre of the *Agnīḍhra*, they make a flat platform 18 inches square; this is for the seat of the *Agnīḍhra* priest.

Prābhā. 289.

There are six other such platforms in the *Sadas*—(1) one near the eastern door for the *Hotri*; (2) one at the central *Udumbara* stick, for the *Maitrāvaruṇa*; (3) one eighteen inches to the north of the Hotṛi's seat, for the *Brāhmaṇāchchhaṅsin*; (4) one to the north of this for the *Potri*; (5) next to this, one for the *Nēṣtri*; and (6) the northernmost, for the *Achchhāvāka*. Every one of these platforms is besmeared with cowdung and has sand sprinkled over it. To the South of the *Agnīdhra's* seat they prepare another called the '*Mārjalīya Dhiṣṇya*,' which is at one end of the *Vēdi*.

67. All the above preparations having been made they proceed with the *Agnīṣomīya* offering :—

In the morning after the *Upasad Iṣti* has been performed, the *Agnīdhra* separates the calves from the cows *; and keeps the *praṇītā* vessels on the *Vēdi*. The *Adhvaryu* picks up the *sphya*, and directs the *Agnīdhra* to bring up *kusha* and fuels; and having washed the *Vēdi*, he sprinkles water over the *kusha*. In the afternoon the *Adhvaryu* enters the House, and the *Agnīdhra* brings up the fuel necessary for the *Agnipraṇayana* (§ 62), and sits down to the south of the Brahman and the Sacrificer. The *Adhvaryu* taking up the *sphya* ties the *yoktra* to the Lady's waist. The Lady then examines the ghee and removes all foreign substances. The Sacrificer takes the *Soma* on his lap and sits at the door of the House. The *Adhvaryu* divides into four parts the clod of clay bearing the foot-prints of the cow given in exchange for the *Soma* (see above, § 53), throws one part over the *upayamanī* near the *Āhvanīya* hearth; another part being powdered and scattered at the door The ghee having been got ready, the Sacrificer and his whole family—sons, brothers, grandsons, &c.—are seated together and covered with a piece of cloth; and the fire having blazed up, the *Adhvaryu* pours libations to Asu and to Soma·

* This is what is called the '*Vatsāpākaraṇa*,' mentioned in the *Shatapatha Br.* 1-7-1-1, and 2-5-3-4, as to be done with a *palāsha* stick.

Prābhā. 290.

All of them then follow the *Adhvaryu* to the *Āhavanīya* hearth, the Sacrificer repeating the *mantra*, '*Agnē naya*, &c'. (*Vājas. Samh.* 40.). All the articles being taken to the *Agnīdhra* room, the priests enter the room by the southern door; and the *Adhvaryu* pours a libation of ghee to Agni; and then keeps the 5 pieces of stone and the stool of the Soma on the *Āgnīdhra* mound; and all other things, except the Soma and ghee are then taken away to the *Āhavanīya* hearth; and all the preliminaries having been gone through, a libation of ghee is poured into the *Āhavanīya*, as an offering to Viṣṇu. Having washed his hands, the Adhvaryu receives the Soma from the hands of the Sacrificer, and accompanied by him enters the *Havirdhāna*. Spreading the black antelope skin in the centre of the southern *Havirdhāna*, he deposits the Soma upon this. The Sacrificer saluting the Soma, goes out and places fuel on the *Āhavanīya*, the Lady doing the same on the *Gārhapatya* At this point ceases the restriction imposed on the Brāhmaṇas, not to eat anything at the house of the Sacrificer.

68. Having performed the '*upākaraṇa*' of the goat *—that is putting *kusha* between its horns,—they tie it up with a doubly-twisted rope, and tether it to the post, consecrating it to *Agni-Soma*, in virtue of which it is called the '*Agnīṣomīya Pashu*.' Making the goat lie down on a bedding of *kusha*, with its legs towards the North, and the head towards the West, the *Shamitris* (slaughterers) kill it,—this being called the '*sanjñapana*',—and recite over the body the *mantra* '*aditiḥ pāsham*, &c' The Lady pours water over the animal, and is taken away from the place. The *Adhvaryu* putting a bundle of *kusha* on the back of the dead body, cuts through the *kusha* into the skin; cutting out a piece of the skin, he throws it to the South-west, as an offering to the Rākṣasas

* That the *Agnīṣomīya* animal must be a *goat* is shown in *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* VI—viii—30 to 42.

Enlarging the rent in the body, he draws out fat from about the regions of the heart, and makes a lump of it. Two offerings of this lump of fat are then made to Agni-Soma, with the *Juhū*. Fetching water from a flowing current, the priests and the Sacrificer sprinkle it over themselves. This finishes the *Vapāyāga*—the 'Fat-offering.'

69. After this comes the *Pashupurodāsha* Offering:—Having directed the *Prashamitri* to prepare the *Pashupurodāsha*, the *Adhvaryu* offers the *Shviṣtakrit* offerings. The *Pashupurodāsha*—*i.e.* offerings consisting of slices of the cake mixed up with certain parts of the body of the goat—having been got ready, they are offered to Agni-Soma; and the remnants are placed between the fire and the post. The hind-part of the goat is then carried into the *Sadas*, and the thighs are kept near the *Agnīdhra* mound, for use in the *Patnīsaṁyāja*, for doing which the *Adhvaryu* goes to the East of the House-door, and placing the Lady before him, pours libations, on her behalf, into the *Gārhapatya*, for Soma, Tvaṣtri, Devapatnis, Rākā, Kuhū, Sinīvālī and and Anumati. All the priests going out of the House, the Lady sits at the door facing the East. The Sacrificer, sitting behind the *Uttaravedi*, takes the Soma in his lap, having brought it out of the *Havirdhāna*. The *Adhvaryu* takes two jars full of water and keeps one on each side of the *Uttaravedi*, dedicating them to Indra-Agni. Taking the Soma from the Sacrificer, he keeps it on the stool, previously placed upon the *Agnīdhra* mound; and during the night the Sacrificer keeps guard over the Soma there deposited. The milk-vessels are washed; the calves are separated from their dames; the Adhvaryu receives the gift of a house for sleeping, and all retire to rest.

70. Next morning comes the *Sutyahā*—the Day for the extracting of the Soma-juice. Towards the latter end of the night, the servants of the Sacrificer wake up the priests.

Prābhā. 292.

They wash their faces and wearing washed clothes, proceed to their assigned duties. The Sacrificer resumes his vow of silence. The *Agnīḍhra* boils the ghee, and ties the *yokṭra* to the waist of the Lady, who thereupon examines the ghee and removes all foreign substances. The *prishaḍājya* mixture is then got ready; and all the things, except the ghee and the Soma, are kept near the *Āhavanīya*. The *Aḍhvaryu* accompanied by the Sacrificer enters the *Havirḍhāna*, and taking up the Soma-bundle loosens its knot; and placing five pieces of stone upon the skin, throws the pieces of Soma upon these stone pieces. The Hoṭri is then called up, and seated near the eastern door of the *Havirḍhāna*, recites the *Prāṭaranuvāka* or the Morning Hymn,—and then either retires to sleep again, or sits there watching the performance. The *Savanīya* cake having been prepared, of *Vrhi* or *Yava* corns, upon eleven pans, for Indra, offerings of it are made to him. The Lady's share of the milk is boiled, and while it is hot, they put into it a little curd. They clean the barley grains, and pound them on the stone-slab; the dough is placed upon the *Pāṭrī*, kneaded, made into the shape of a cake, and baked and ornamented. The dishes for the various deities are then washed and kept in their proper positions by the *Unnēṭri* Inside the *Havirḍhāna* they alos keep the cups made of *vikaṅkaṭa* wood,—each four *anguls* deep, supplied with a handle;—that intended for the *Hoṭri* being circular, for the *Brahman*, square-shaped, and so on, different shapes being laid down for the several priests. In the *Havirḍhana*, they also keep an odd number of jars filled with water. By the time that the *Hoṭri* finishes the recitation of the Morning Hymn, the *Aḍhvaryu* takes ghee in the *Pracharaṇī*, and pours a libation into the *Āhavanīya* as an offering to Agni—Aḍhishuvana—Ḍēva and Saviṭri. Taking up ghee again, he asks the other priests to bring up the Lady; and then accompanied by her, the Sacrificer and the Brahman, he goes to the water-reservoir and pours an

Prabhā. 293.

offering to Apas. He then fills one jar with water. Returning to the House, they request the *Hoṭṛi* to repeat the Morning Hymn. The cup of the *Hoṭṛi* is then filled with water and handed over to the Sacrificer. Going over to the *Āhavanīya*, the *Ādhvaryu* pours a libation to Agni.

71. The Sacrificer and the *Aḍhvaryu* seat themselves inside the *Havirḍhāna* upon the skin on which the Soma-juice is to be extracted, the other priests seating themselves all round. They collect all the articles needed for the 'extraction' ceremony; and each of the five priests takes up a stone piece in his hand. The Aḍhvaryu puts gold on his ring-finger and measures out five handfulls of Soma and puts each handful upon the stone-slab; and keeps aside one handfull for purposes of the *Kṣullakā*. The *Pratiprasthāṭṛi* then picks up six shoots of the Soma. Then begins the *First* or the *Great* '*Savana*' or '*Juice-Extraction*.' The *Aḍhvaryu*, the *Pratiprasthaṭṛi*, the *Nēṣṭṛi* and the *Unnēṭṛi* wash their hands; and the *Aḍhvaryu* wets the Soma with water out of the *Hoṭṛi* cup. Dividing the wetted Soma into four parts distributed among themselves, the four priests proceed to 'extract' the juice by pounding it upon the stone-slab,—thinking all the time that each stroke of the stone-pounder is inflicted, not upon the Soma, but upon the enemy (on a blade of grass, in case the priest happens to have no enemy); this pounding is continued until the *Soma-bits* are reduced to a pulp; having rested a little, they make all the Soma-pulp into a lump, from which they extract the juice by pressure. This is the first 'round' of the extracting process. They collect all stray particles of Soma, and begin pounding again; when the whole is reduced to a pulp, they press out the juice again. The same proces is repeated once more. The three rounds of 'extraction' having been finished, they pour water over the squeezed pulp, in order to make it swell again with the soaking water; after

Prābhā. 294.

which they pound it again, going through the three rounds as before. Soaking the lump with water again, they go through the third 'three rounds' of the 'extraction'. This finishes the First Extraction, called '*Mahābhiṣava*'.

72. This is followed by *Kṣullakābhiṣava*. This is done by the *Adhvaryu* alone. He takes up the sixth handfull of Soma that had been kept aside, and puts it on the pounding slab, and strikes it eight times with the pounding stone. Having pressed out the juice, he picks out three shoots from the squeezed pulp and puts them into the *Hoṭṛi*-cup; and putting the *pavitra* over it, he presses the shoots and extracts a little juice into the cup.—He pounds the pulp again with eleven strokes, and extracts the juice. The third time, he extracts the juice after twelve strokes. He then covers up the mouth of the cup, thereby closing up the life of his enemy whom he names. The *Adhvaryu* comes out of the *Havirdhāna*, and is followed by the Sacrificer who gives to him any present that he asks for. They both go to the Sacrificial place, and standing at the middle of the Southern *paridhi*, they pour into the fire the Soma-juice in the cup, as a libation to Sūrya.

73. After this they go through their morning prayers, and await sunrise; in the meantime, the Sacrificer and his wife finish all their necessary ablutions, &c. The *Udgāṭṛi* priest takes up the *Droṇakalasha*, and keeps it upon the stonepieces on the skin on which Soma has been pounded; over this jar a *pavitra* is kept, and upon this a gold-piece. The *Unnēṭṛi* brings up the Soma, and the Sacrificer fills a number of cups with Soma-juice. At sunrise, they take up one of these cups, called the '*Antaryāma*' and pour the juice as a libation to Sūrya. The *Adhvaryu* takes up the cups dedicated to Indra-Vāyu, to Shukra, and to Manthin,—and fills them with Soma-juice. Bringing up the *Āgrayaṇasthālī*, the Adhvaryu fills this also.

Prābhā. 295.

with Soma-juice, and covering it up with the *pavitra*, offers it to the Vishvēḍēvas. He then brings up the *Ukṭhyasṭhālī* and filling it with *Soma-juice*, offers it to Inḍra; similarly filling the *Ḍhruvasṭhālī*, he offers it to Vaishvānara. The *Ḍroṇakalasha* is then half-filled with Soma-juice; and the *Aḍhvaryu* pours a libation of ghee to Soma; similar libations being poured by others also. They then go out of the *Havirḍhāna*,—the Aḍhvaryu leading, and being followed by the others in the following order—the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri*, the *Prasṭoṭri*, the *Uḍgāṭri*, the *Praṭihartṛi*, the *Brahman* and the Sacrificer; each touching the one in front of himself. They take their assigned seats; and the *Uḍgāṭri* sings the prescribed hymns,—the Sacrificer leading. When two hymns have been sung, the *Aḍhvaryu* directs the *Agnīḍhra* priest to bring up the cakes and adorn them; and also the *Praṭipasṭhaṭri* to come up with the animal. The former brings out the cakes from under the ashes and keeps them on the mound; to the East of the fried barley, and to the South of the *Karambha* (a preparation of *Sakṭu* mixed with ghee) to the North of the milk and the *Vājina* (the water passed off from curdled milk); after which the cake is dedicated to Inḍra, the fried barley to Inḍra-Harivaṭ, the *Karambha* to Inḍra-Puṣanvaṭ, the curd to Inḍra-Sarasvaṭīvaṭ, the *Payasyā* to Inḍra-Miṭrāvaruṇa, and the *Vājina* to the Vājins. The *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri* brings up the *Savanīya* animal and stands near the *Uṭṭaravēḍi*. The *Aḍhvaryu* enters the *Havirḍhāna*, takes up the *Āshvina* cup, and having washed it, keeps it in its place; and points out each of of the other cups to the Sacrificer. Going up to the post, he puts some *Kusha* between the horns of the *Savanīya* goat tethers it to the post, and dedicates it to Agni. The seat of the *Hoṭri* is then placed in the *Saḍas*, and the *Hoṭri* priest duly appointed to his task; the other priests and the Sacrificer having their duties duly assigned, each of them pours libations into the *Āhavanīya*, in the same order in

Prābhā. 296.

which they had come out of the *Havirḍhāna*;—these libations being offered to Vāk, Vāchaspaṭi and Sarasvaṭī. The animal is then killed and its fat extracted in the same manner as in the case of the *Agnīṣomīya* animal (see above § 68); and this fat is offered to Agni; after which the Priests take their usual dinner.

74. Then follows the *Savanīyapurodāshaprachāra*. The *Savanīyas* having been brought up near the *Uṭṭaravēḍi*, and the *Vājina* placed upon the *uṭkara*,—the first halves of the five cakes are then cut up into five slices, which are offered to the five deities just mentioned—and a slice offered also to Agni-Sviṣṭakṛit; a portion of the remnants of these offerings being thrown into the *prāshiṭra* and made over to the Brahman, and the rest of the remnants is then distributed betwee. the Brahman and the Sacrificer. The *Aḍhvaryu* now proceeds to make the *Dvidēvaṭya* offerings. He enters the *Havirḍhāna* by the Eastern door, and picking up the Inḍra-Vayu cup, and requesting the Miṭrāvaruṇa priest to sing the appropriate hymns, offers small quantities of the juice in the cup to Inḍra-Vayu, in two instalments, handing over the cup to the *Hoṭṛi*. Going into the *Havirḍhāna* again, he comes out with the Miṭrāvaruṇa cup, and pours a libation to Miṭra-Varuṇa. Similarly bringing up the *Āhsvina* cup, he pours a libation to the Ashvins. The remnants of these three offerings are kept carefully in the *Āḍiṭyasṭhālī*. The cups of the Sacrificer and the priests except those of the *Achchhāvāka* and the *Unnēṭri*,—are filled by the *Aḍhvaryu* with Soma-juice, in three instalments—first from out of the *Droṇakalasha*, then out of *Upabhṛiṭ*, and then again out of the *Droṇakalasha*. The *Aḍhvaryu* and the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭṛi* take up the *Shukra* (a cup of *bilva* wood) and the *Manṭhin* (a cup of *Vikaṅkaṭa* wood) respectively, and cover them up with pieces of the post. They bring out these from the *Havirḍhāna* and keep them on the *Shroṇi* of

Prābhā. 297.

the *Uttaravēdi*; whereupon the pieces of wood with which the cups had been covered are thrown into the *Āhavanīya* fire. The nine priests whose cups have been filled with Soma-juice,—and who are on that account called '*Chamasādhvaryus*',—come forward holding in their hands their own cups, and take their seats near the *Adhvaryu* hearth, facing the East. The *Adhvaryu* and the *Pratiprasthātri*, standing to the North and South of the post, pour out the juice in their cups as libations to Indra, whereupon the other nine also pour out libations to the same deity. The *Adhvaryu* then calls for the cup of the *Hotri* and pours into it the remnants of the *Shukhra* and *Manthin* cups; and the *Hotri* with three priests retires into the *Sadas*. The other priests fill up their cups with Soma-juice out of the *Dronakalasha*, and the *Adhvaryu* pours libations, out of the *Prashastri* cup to Mitra-Varuna and Agni, out of the *Brāhmanāchchhansin* cup to Indra and Agni, out of the *Potri* cup to the Maruts and Agni, out of the *Nēstri* cup to Tvastri and Agni, out of the *Āgnīdhra* cup to Agni, and then again to Agni. Retaining in his hand this last cup, the *Adhvaryu* goes into the *Sadas*, sits before the *Hotri*, and with him eats the remnants of the *Dvidēvatya* offerings *

75. After this, the priests proceed to drink the remnants out of the Soma-cups. The Adhvaryu drinks the remnant of the *Shukra* cup, out of the *Hotri* cup; out of which also the *Pratiprasthātri* drinks the remnant of the *Manthin* cup; the Hotri drinks the remnants of both the *Shukra* and the *Manthin*, and also out of the *Brahman*-cup; out of which also the *Brahman* himself drinks; the *Udgātris* drink out of their own cup; the Hotri having drunk a little out of the

* With regard to this *eating* there is a difference of opinion among the *Mīmāmsakas* and the *Yājñikas*. According to the former, who rely upon the text '*Vaṣatkartuḥ prathamo bhakṣaḥ*' (see *Mīm-Sū.* III—V—31 to 35), it being the *Hotri*, who being the pronouncer of the syllable '*Vaṣat*' with each libation, eats first; while according to the latter, precedence is given to the *Adhvaryu*. The *Paddhatis* naturally adopt the latter order.

Prābhā. 298.

Sacrificer's cup, the Sacrificer himself drinks out of it; similarly the *Hotri* having partaken of the cups of the other priests, each of them drinks of his own cup;—the *Hotri* being entitled to a share in every cup, by reason of his having helped in all libations, with the uttering of the 'syllable '*vaṣat*' (Mīm. Sū. III-v-31). This finishes the 'drinking' in connection with the first set of offerings.*

76. The *Unnetri* takes up Soma-juice with the *udañcana* out of the *Upabhrit*, and enters the Sadas; whereupon the nine *Chamasādhvaryus*, having poured out into the cup brought by the *Unnetri*, all the juice left in their cups, keep their cups within the *Havirdhāna*. (These cups are henceforward called the *Nārāshaṁsa* cups). The *Adhvaryu* takes up the cake-slices that had been kept aside, and approaching the *Achchhāvāka* in the *Sadas*, makes over the slices to him. The cup of the *Achchhāvāka* is then filled with Soma-juice out of the *Dronakalasha*; and the *Adhvaryu* takes up the cup and pours a libation to Indra-Agni; and after having drunk a little of the remnant, he hands it over to the *Achchhāvāka* who then drinks his own share. The *Brahman*, the *Hotri*, the *Agnīdhra* and the *Mitrāvaruṇa* entering the Agnīdhra room, eat of the remnants of the cakes; and the Sacrificer also partakes of the remnants of the *Dvidevatya* offerings; and the Lady in her own room partakes of sweet cakes and pastries cooked on the ordinary *smārta* fire (she apparently being not entitled to the 'remnants').

77. This is followed by the offerings of the *vājina*, and also of the dough, &c. attached to the several vessels and implements. The *Achchhāvāka* having seated himself in the *Sadas*, the *Adhvaryu* and the *Pratiprasthātri* take up the *Ritu-cups* and fill them with Soma-juice out of the

* In this connection, it may be noted that the priests drink out of each other's cups, and no difficulties are raised in regard to the '*Uchchhiṣṭa*' which occupies a very prominent place in the bearing of individuals towards one another, in modern Hindu society.

Droṇakalasha; whereupon going to the Sacrificial House, the *Adhvaryu* pours the juice as a libation to Indra; and enters the *Havirdhāna* for bringing up another cup; and the *Pratiprasthatri* coming up with another cup, libation out this is poured by the *Potri* to the Maruts; then comes the *Adhvaryu* with another cup of juice which is poured as a libation to *Tvaṣṭri* by the *Neṣṭri*; the *Pratiprasthātri* bringing up another cup of juice, this is offered by the *Agnīdhra* to Agni. Thus alternately, the *Adhvaryu* and the *Pratiprasthātri* bringing up the cups one by one, libations are poured to Indra by the *Brāhmaṇāchchhaṁsin* and to Indra-Varuṇa by the *Prashāstri*, and so on; and lastly the *Adhvaryu* and the *Pratiprasthatri* bringing up the two original cups, libations are poured to the Ashvins and to Agni-Gṛihapati. Finally the *Adhvaryu* brings up the thirteenth *Ṛitu-cup* and pours a libation to Indra-Gṛihapati; and collecting the drippings of the cups into a vessel, goes to the *Sadas*; and the *Pratiprastāthri* enters the *Havirdhāna* with another *Ṛitu-cup*, and placing into this the cup originally dedicated to Indra-Agni, keeps it on the mound near the *Āgrayaṇasthālī*, and goes out to the *Sadas*; where they thereupon drink the remnants of the *Ṛitu-cup* offerings. While the *Shastra* hymns are being recited, the *Adhvaryu* enters the *Havirdhāna*, and taking up the Indra-Agni cup, and accompanied by the *Chamasādhvaryus*, who hold their own cups in their hands, pours libations to Indra-Agni; whereupon they go to the *Sadas* and partake of the remnants. The Adhvaryu again fills the *Shukra* with Soma-juice out of the *Droṇakalasha*, and keeps the Vishvēdēva cup on the spot where the *Shukra* was. Pouring out all the Soma-juice out of the *Droṇakalasha* into the *Upabhṛit*, he sets aside the former.

The *Agnīdhra* now prepares the four *Pashupuroḍāshas*—*i.e.*, cakes prepared of flour mixed with the lard of the animal. The first of these is for Agni, the second for Indra, the third for Indra-Harivat, and the fourth for Indra-Puṣaṇvat. The

Prābhā. 300.

Aḍhvaryu cuts up the body of the goat, and with certain preliminary rites, slices the cakes; which are thereupon offered to the aforesaid four deities. The *Aḍhvaryu* picks up the Vishvēḍēva cup and pours libations to the Vishvēḍēvas and to Agni; and the other priests holding their cups in their hands shake them over the fire twice. They retire to the Saḍas and partake of the remnants.

78. After this come the three *Ukṭhyavigrahas*; the first performed by the *Aḍhvaryu* and the other two by the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri*:—The *Aḍhvaryu* takes up the *Ukṭhya* vessel, and pours into it the third part of the Soma-juice contained in the *Ukṭhyasṭhālī*, and dedicates it to Miṭra-Varuṇa. The *Unnēṭri* takes up the cups of the priests and keeps them on the *Uṭṭaravēḍī*; and pours into each of them the Soma-juice out of the *Upabhriṭ*. While the *Udgāṭris* are singing hymns, the *Aḍhvaryu* takes up the *Ukṭhya* vessel, whereupon the other priests also take up theirs. The *Aḍhvaryu*,—and after him all the priests—pour libations,—one to Miṭra-Varuṇa, and another to Agni. They repair to the *Saḍas* and drink the remnants. The above process is repeated twice by the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri*,—the libations in this case being to Indra, and Indra-Agni respectively. After this all the priests are permitted to go out and rest.

This finishes the *Prāṭaḥ-savana*.

79. Next comes the *Māḍhyanḍina*, or Midday *Savana*:—The Sacrificer seated to the west of the *Agnīḍhra* mound sings the *Lokadvārīya Sāman*. The *Aḍhvaryu* pours water into the *Hoṭri* cup and hands it over to the Sacrificer and removing the covering of the Soma, he hands it to the *Grāvasṭuṭ*; whereupon the *Aḍhvaryu* and the other priests, as in the Morning Savana, extract juice from the Somabits; and puts these in water to soak and swell. The *Unnēṭri* pours the juice into the *Hoṭri* cup in the Sacrificer's hand, through which it is made to flow to the *Shukra*

Prābhā. 301.

and the *Manthin* cups, as also into the *Āgrayanasthālī*, the *Ritupātra* and the *Ukthyasthālī*. The remaining juice is thereupon poured into the *Dronakalasha*. After this they all go out of the *Havirdhāna* in the same order as in the Morning *Savana*. The *Udgātris* having suing the *Pavamāna* hymns, the *Agnīdhra* is requested to bring out the cakes and bedeck them. The cakes having been brought up, the first offering out of them is made to Agni-Svistakrit; and then the cake is cut up into slices, which are offered to Agni, Indra, Indra-Harimat, &c., as in the Morning *Savana*. Libations out of the *Shukra* and *Manthin* cups are made to Indra and Agni, and the remnants are drunk by the priests The dough, &c. attaching to the vessels are offered into the fire.

80. Then follows the paying of the Sacrificial Fee—*Daksinā* :—The *Brahman* and the Sacrificer enter the house; the *Adhvaryu* taking ghee in the *Pracharanī*, and tying to it the cloth and the gold intended for the Fee, pours the ghee as a libation to Sūrya,—repeating it three times; finally offering up the gold bound up in the cloth into the fire; out of which it is picked up by the Sacrificer who thereupon takes his stand on the East of the Vēdi. A hundred cows are collected in the space between the House and the *Sadas*, where also are brought certain grains. Advancing towards the *Sadas*, the Sacrificer looks upon the persons therein seated, and goes to the *Agnīdhra* mound, whereupon seated, he pronounces the formal words of the 'gifts'—promising to divide among the priests in accordance with the shares prescribed in the scriptures, gifts of gold, 100 cows and clothes,—all for the fulfilment of the sacrifice he has performed; the Lady adding the words—'this is given by me also'; when each thing is offered, the priests receive the gold as for Agni, the cow as for Rudra, and the clothes as for Brihaspati. The shares have been assigned as follows :—12 cows and 12 gold pieces, each, to the *Brahman*, the *Udgātri*,

the *Hoṭri* and the *Aḍhvaryu*; 6 cows and 6 pieces of Gold each, to the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri*, the *Prasṭoṭri*, the *Maiṭrāvaruṇa*. and the *Brāhmaṇāchchhamsin*; 4 cows and 4 pieces of gold each, to the *Poṭri*, the *Nēṣṭri*, the *Achchhāvāka*, and the *Agniḍhra*; and 3 cows and 3 gold pieces each, to the *Unnē'ri*, the *Grāvasṭuṭ*, the *Subrahmaṇya* and the *Praṭiharṭri*. Some more gold pieces are distributed among the *Upagāṭṛis*. Nothing is to be given to those *Brāhmaṇas* who may be there, simply clamouring for gifts.

81. After the *Praṭiharṭri* has received his fee, the *Aḍhvaryu* enters the *Haviṛḍhāna*; and taking up the *Maruṭvaṭ-cups* pours libations to Inḍra-Maruṭvaṭ and to Agni. Entering the *Haviṛḍhāna* again, he takes up the *Mahāmaruṭvaṭ* cup and filling it with Soma-juice, keeps it near the *Āgrayaṇa* vessel. After a little time he takes up this cup, and pours libations again to Inḍra-Maruṭvaṭ and Agni. They retire to the *Saḍas* and drink the remnants. Taking up the *Māhēnḍra* cup, they fill it with Soma-juice, while the *Priṣṭha-Sāman* is being sung; and hands over the cup to the Sacrificer.

82. The *Aḍhvaryu*, accompanied by the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri* the *Unnēṭri* and the *Nēṣṭri*, proceeds to perform the *Third Extraction—Ṭriṭīya-Savana* As before they extract the juice out of the Soma-bits in three instalments. The *Agniḍhra* in the meantime prepares the other offerings —*i.e.*, the *Charu* or cooked rice for Soma, a cake for Varuṇa baked upon one pan, as also those that were baked in the other *Savanas*. Taking the Māhēnḍra cup from the Sacrificer's hands, the *Aḍhvaryu* pours a libation to Mahēnḍra and to Agni; and accompanied by the *Hoṭri*, drinks the remnant; the other priests drinking out of their cups as usual. After this follow the three *Ūkṭhyavigrahas*. (see above, § 78) as in the morning *Savana*; after which the priests retire to rest. This finishes the Second—the *Māḍhyanḍina—Savana*.

Prābhā. 30[illegible]

83. Then comes the *Third Savana*: The Sacrificer and the four chief priests enter the *Havirḍhāna* by the eastern door, the Lady entering by the western door. The two doors are closed. The *Aḍhvaryu* takes up the *Āḍiṭya Sṭhālī* and filling it with Soma-juice, hands it to the *Praṭiprasṭhāṭri*, who mixes up curd and *kusha* with the juice, and hands it to the *Unnēṭri*, who keeps it on the skin, and covers it up with his hand. The doors are now opened; and the Sacrificer and the *Aḍhvaryu* going out with the vessel pour libations to the Āḍiṭyas; the Sacrificer also singing the *Lokaḍvārīya Sāman* and also pouring the libations. The *Aḍhvaryu* takes up the Soma in the *Āgrayaṇa-sṭhālī* and keeps it in its appointed place. Coming out of the *Havirḍhāna*, they go to the *Saḍas*, and request the *Uḍgāṭri* to sing the *Pavamāna* hymns. Offerings of cakes are then made to Soma, Inḍra, Varuṇa, Inḍra-Harimaṭ, &c. as in the previous *Savanas*;—the *Pashupuroḍāsha* in this case being made up of the dough mixed with the heart of the goat. After this the Soma-juice in the cups is offered to Mitra-Varuna Agni, Inḍra-Agni, Maruṭs-Agni, Ṭvaṣṭri-Agni, Inḍra-Viṣṇu-Agni, and Agni. Retiring to the *Saḍas*, they partake of the Soma remnants. The Sacrificer and the Priests take the remnants of the cakes, and make offerings of *piṇḍas* to the father, grandfather and great-grandfather of the Sacrificer,—the *piṇḍas* being offered upon the cups. The four chief priests then eat the remnants of the cake, the Sacrificer eating the remnant of the ghee instead. Bringing up the *Saviṭri-cup*, and the *Vaiṣvaḍēva cup*, the *Aḍhvaryu* pours libations to Ḍēva-Saviṭri and Vishvēḍēvas-Agni respectively; and accompanied with the other priests eats the remnants in these cups.

84. Then follows the *Sauryacharuyāga*:—The *Charu* having been brought up, offerings are made to Agni and Soma; a libation of ghee is poured to Viṣṇu or to Viṣṇu-Agni. Pouring ghee into the *Charu*, the *Aḍhvaryu* takes

Prābhā. 304.

it to the *Sadas* and gives it to the *Hotri*. Coming back he takes up ghee in the *pracharaṇī*, and pours libations in eight places :—

(1) On the *Agnīdhra* mound, to Vibhu-Pravahaṇa, (2) on the *Hotri's* seat, to Vahni-Havyavāhana, (3) on the post to Shvātra-Prachētas, (4) on the *Brāhmaṇāchchhamsin's* seat to Tīrtha-Vishvēdēvas, (5) on the *Potri's* seat to Ushitri—Kavi; (6) on the *Nēṣtri's* seat, to Aṅghāri—Vambhāri, (7) on the *Achchhāvāka's* seat to Ambasyu-Ḍuvasyu ; and (8) at the centre of the *Sadas*, to Shundhyu-Mārjalīya. The *Pratiprasthātri* brings up the *Pātnīvata* cup and pours a libation to Agni-Patnīvat. The *Agnīdhra* taking up the cup and going to the *Sadas*, sits upon the lap of the *Nēṣtri*, where he and the *Adhvaryu* drink the remnant of the *Pātnīvata* The *Unnētri* goes to the *Uttaravēdī* and pours all the Soma-juice into the cups of the priests ; and while the *Yajñāyajñīya Sāman* is being sung, the Lady is led by the hand to the Sadas, where she uncovers her right thigh and sprinkles water over it, after which, with the *Udgātri's* permission, she retires to her own room. Thereupon the *Adhvaryu* and the other priests take up the Soma cups and pour libations to Agni-Maruts, and to Agni ; and returning to the *Sadas*, drink the remnants.

85. All the articles are then washed and set aside ; the *prastara* is thrown into the fire as an offering to Agni, Vanaspati, &c. The *Adhvaryu* enters the *Haviḥdhāna* and pours all the Soma-juice he can find into the *Droṇakalasha* ; and mixing up some grains with it, pours it as a libation to Indra-Hariamt and to Agni ; and keeps the *kalasha* in the *Sadas*. The Sacrificer and the sixteen priests each pick up three grains out of the *kalasha*, and having smelt them, throw them, away upon the *Vēdī*. Each of them throws six pieces of fuel into the *Āhavanīya* fire. Having filled the cups with water, and covering them with green grass, they touch their own, or

their neighbour's, cups; and retiring to the *Agnīḍhra* mound eat curd.

86. Then follows the *Paṭnīsamyāja*, at which after the offerings have been made, the *Vēḍa* and the *Yokṭra* are removed. The *Aḍhvaryu* takes up nine pieces of fuel and offers them respectively to Vishvēḍēvas, Ṭvaṣṭri, Ḍhāṭṛin, Saviṭṛi, Prajāpaṭi, Agni, Tvaṣṭri (again), Viṣṇu, Ḍēvas, Agni, Agni, Vāṭa, Yajña, and Yajñapaṭi. Taking up the Stool and the Post, all the vessels and implements that may be smeared with Soma-juice, the black horn and the *mekhalā*, the *Yokṭrā* (removed from the Lady's waist),—and while the Prastoṭṛi is singing a Sāman, the closing notes of which are taken up by the Sacrificer, --all of them go to the riverside, or to a lake, for the *Avabhṛiṭha* or Final Bath. When gone halfway on the road, Sāman hymns are sung, all of them joining in the chorus. Reaching the river, the *Aḍhvaryu* leads the Sacrificer by the arm into the water; after which follows the *Avabhṛiṭha Iṣṭi*:—Standing in the water, the Sacrificer and the priests take up their assigned places, holding in their hands the ghee, cake and other things. The *Aḍhvaryu* takes ghee and pours into the water oblations to *Agni, Varuṇa, Ḍēvas* and *Ājyapās*. Taking up the cake, he offers it to Varuṇa and Agni-Varuṇa; after which he sets the jar afloat on the water. Having washed the black antelope skin and handed it over to their son, the Sacrificer and the Lady take their bath,—the Sacrificer washing the Lady's back, and the Lady doing the same to her husband. The *Aḍhvaryu* throws into the water all the things smeared with Soma-juice, whereupon all take their baths. The *Unnēṭṛi* leads by the arm the Sacrificer and his wife out of the water. Returning to the Sacrificial House, the Sacrificer puts fuel on the *Āhavanīya* and the Lady on the *Gārhapaṭya* fire. An offering of *kusha* having been made, the Sacrificer enters the Lady's Room, and sits down taking the antelope skin on his lap. The *Aḍhvaryu* pours a libation of ghee to Agni.

Prābhā, 206.

87. Then comes the *Uḍayanīyēṣti*:—All the minor details having been performed, rice is cooked, out which an offering is made to Aḍiṭi.

88. This is followed by the *Anubanḍhyā*:—at which offerings of ghee are made to Miṭra-Varuṇa; and the *Pashupurodāsha* having been got ready, it is offered to Miṭra-Varuṇa.

89. Then comes the *Payavyēṣti*:—the *Payasyā* and the *Vājina* being prepared, the former is offered to Miṭra-Varuṇa and the latter to Agni-Soma, Miṭra-Varuṇa-Agni-Hoṭra —Vājin.

90. After this comes the *Uḍavasānīyēṣti*:—A cake having been baked upon five pans, it is offered to Agni.

91. One thousand Brāhmaṇas are now fed; and the performance concludes with appropriate rejoicings; after which the Sacrificer performs the daily rites of the *Agnihoṭra* and makes the other necessary offerings.

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF THINGS REQUIRED AT THE AGNIṢṬOMA, IN ADDITION TO THOSE NEEDED AT THE ḌARSHA-PŪRNAMĀSA.

Abhri—Wooden scraper.

Abhyupashaya—Name given to two Mahāvīras.

Anṭarḍhānakata—Wooden partitions to screen off the wives of the gods.

Āsanḍi—Wooden stool.

Upayamanī—An earthenware vessel.

Ukhā—Boiling pot.

Uḍumbara—Fuel.

Chamasas—Earthenware cups.

Ḍhaviṭra—Fan made of deer-skin.

Parishāsa—Tongs.

Pānnējani—Jars filled with water for the washing of feet.

Pinvana—Made of clay.

Rajjusanḍāna—Rope-noose.

Prābhā. 307.

CHAPTER V.

THE BEARING OF THE MĪMĀMSĀ-SHĀSTRA ON HINDU LEGAL LITERATURE.

1. The Mīmāmsa Sūtras, as we have seen, have evolved a set of principles of interpretation of texts. They have based their discussions upon texts dealing with the details of sacrificial ritual; and this for the reason that at the time that the *sūtras* were written, and the principles of Mīmāṁsā systematised, the performance of elaborate sacrifices was regarded as the *summum bonum* of life for the ordinary Hindu. At a later age, when these sacrifices dropped into disuse, the study of Mīmāṁsā proper fell in popular estimation; but it was soon discovered that though the examples chosen in Mīmaṁsā literature, for the application of the general Principles, did not appeal to the scholar, the Principles themselves were as useful as ever; specially in the study of Law. This branch of study had to deal with a number of original texts; whose range extended from the Vedas down to the most recent *Smṛti* compilations; and as there were several discrepancies in these texts, on many points in regard to the practices of men,—the only reasonable basis for the explaining away of these discrepancies lay in the Principles of interpretation that had been worked out by the old *Mimāmsā* writers, in reference to similar discrepancies in regard to Vedic texts bearing upon the details of sacrificial ritual. We accordingly find all writers of Legal Digests making free use of the said Principles of interpretation.

2. The Legal Digests are as a rule divided into three sections:—*viz.*, (1) *Āchāra'*, Religious Practices; (2) Vyavahāra', 'Law' in the modern sense of the term, dealing with *worldly* 'business;' (3) '*Prāyashchitta*,' Expiatory Rites. The first and the last of these are likely to be as uninteresting

* *Prābhā*. 308.

to the modern reader as the Sacrificial Ritual itself. Therefore we shall confine our present study to the '*Vyavahāra*' section of the Legal Digests; though, it has to be admitted, this limits the scope of our study to a great extent; specially as we have chosen for our study only the *Mitākṣarā* (Vijñāneshvara's 'Comment' on the *Smṛiti* of Yayñavalkya) and the *Vyavahāramayūkha* of Shrīkantha,—the two digests that are still recognised as 'authoritative' in the greater part of India.

3. The cases of application of Mīmāṁsā Principles in the *Mitākṣarā* may be roughly grouped under the heads of—(a) *Evidence*, (b) *Joint Concern*, and (c) *Inheritance*.

(*a*) *Evidence*.

(1). 'In a criminal case against any person belonging to the four castes, when one is called to give evidence for the prosecution,—if his evidence is likely to bring about such conviction as would lead to capital sentence being pronounced on the accused,—the witness should either not give evidence at all, or should give false evidence.' (*Yājñavalkya*, II. 83). Though the ordinary rule (*Ibid* II. 82) is that a witness giving false evidence intentionally should be punished with fine or banishment, yet, in the particular case, the suppression of evidence, or the giving of false evidence, is permissible. * But even thus the 'sin' of the act remains; and in expiation of this, the witness has to perform the *Sārasvata Iṣṭi*, laid down in Mīm. Sū. III—vi—18, 19. (*Mitākṣarā*, Bombay, pp. 159-60).

(2) When a party has produced witnesses whose evidence goes against his case,—then, if at a later stage, he can produce other witnesses who are more reliable than the former batch, the evidence of the previous witnesses must be discredited. The mere fact of the later appearance of the witness does not militate against his reliability; because 'a person has to be regarded a *unreliable* only when either his

* *Prābhā*. 309.

assertions are actually found to be false, or his means of knowing the facts of the case are not sufficiently valid'; as has been declared in Shabaras's *Bhāṣya*, page 8, line 15. In the case in question, until there is something to show that the later witness is unreliable, his deposition must be believed to be true; but if it can be shown by proofs adduced by the other party that what he said was actually *untrue*, or that he had no means at his command whereby he could have any true knowledge of the facts in question, his evidence would fail to be accepted; but until that is done, his evidence has to be reckoned with. In the case taken by the *Mimāṁsaka*, the fact is found to be that what is declared in the Veda must be accepted as true; because statements can be regarded as false only when the person making the statement is found to be *untrustworthy* on the above mentioned grounds; and in the case of the Veda, there being no 'person' making the statements, there can be no grounds for unreliability, (Mitā. p. 156).

(b) *Joint Concern.*

In all joint concerns,—such as Trading and Theatrical Companies and Agricultural Bands,—the earnings are to be divided in accordance with the amount of capital invested by each partner; just as at the Jyotiṣtoma sacrifice, the hundred cows that are prescribed as the 'sacrificial fee' for the priests employed, are to be distributed among the sixteen priests, in accordance with the amount of work done by each; for instance, the four principal priests get 12 cows each, and so on, as laid down in *Mīm. Sū.* X—iii -53 to 55. (See above, Chap. IV, § 80). The general principle involved in this case is one of equity: 'Each person according to his dessert', 'the gains are to be in accordance with the pains'; the *Aḍhvaryu* gets more than the *Uḍgāṭṛi*, because he does more work in connection with the Sacrificial performance than the other; similarly in all joint concerns,

the greater profit goes to the partner that works more and invests the larger amount of capital.

(c) *Inheritance.*

(1) '*Dāya*' or Inheritance has been defined as that wealth or possession which comes to a person simply by virtue of his relationship to its previous owner; the '*bhāga*' or 'division' of wealth is its distribution among a number of persons entitled to the ownership. This leads to the question—what is the 'title' or 'right' to a possession? Is the 'right' based purely upon *scriptural* authority or upon other, worldly, authorities also? It is argued that if it depended upon scriptural authority, then the ownership acquired under that 'right' would also be purely 'scriptural'; and as such could out be utilised in such purely *worldly* concerns as *buying, selling* and the like; hence the 'right' under which ownership is to be acquired must be one that depends, not solely upon scriptural authority, but upon other authorities also. This line of argument has been borrowed from *Mimāmsā-Sūtra* IV—i—2 [*Vyāyamālāvistāra*, page 219, 'fourth *varṇaka*' according to Kumārila, and 'third *varṇaka*' according to Prabhākara],—where in regard to the rules laid down in connection with the acquiring of wealth for the performance of Sacrifices,—the question having been raised as to whether an infringement of those rules would cause a discrepancy in the sacrifice performed with the wealth thus wrongly acquired, or it would only produce some *blemish* or *sinfulness* in the Sacrificer—the *prima facie* argument of the Opponent propounded by Kumārila is that if the rules of acquisition pertained to the Sacrifice only, then the Sacrificer would have no *ownership* at all; inasmuch as *ownership* is something supernatural (based upon scriptures only). This statement of the *prima facie* argument however has been rejected by Prabhākara, as impossible, on the ground that, as a matter of fact, *ownership* is not something superna-

Prābhā. 311.

tural or spiritual, it is purely worldly or temporal; and the wealth acquired by temporal means can certainly be used in the performance of sacrifices. In delivering their final conclusion also, the writers have admitted the discussion on the understarding that *ownership* is something purely temporal; and hence if there has been anything wrong in the method of acquiring that ownership, it affects only the *man*, and not the *sacrifice*, which latter would be complete all the same; though the man will have to perform some expiatory rites for the employment of questionable methods. (*Miṭākṣarā*, page 181.) *

2. Yājñavalkya (II. 126) has laid down that after the regular partition is finished, if something is discovered to have been taken away surreptitiously by any partner, it should be recovered from him and divided among the partners in equal shares. In this connection the question is raised as to whether this surreptitious possession is reprehensible or not;—the argument for non-reprehensibility being that the partner who is in wrongful possession has also some right over the thing, and hence as he has been retaining the thing under the misconception that it is his own, his conduct is not blameworthy. The final conclusion however is that the wrongful possession has to be regarded as reprehensible. This conclusion is based upon the *Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra* VI—iii—20, where the question being raised as to the changing of the *mudga* corn (that had been kept for the *charu*, and has become unfit for use) the opponent has argued that, if the Sacrificer substitutes an equal quantity of the *māṣa* corn, under the misapprehension that it is *mudga*, his action cannot be regarded as a contravention of the rule that prohibits the use of the *māṣa*; because he has used the *māṣa* it is true, but he has used it *as mudga*; and this view is rejected, the final conclusion being that even though done under a misapprehen-

*It is interesting to note that in this connection, the *Miṭākṣarā* quotes the very words of Prabhākara's *Bṛihaṭī* (Ms. p. 64b).

sion, the action must be regarded as an infringement of the rule wherely *māṣa, koḍravā*, and *chaṇaka* cannot be substituted for *mudga*, at sacrifices. The principle underlying this is the maxim that Ignorance of the law is no excuse. (*Miṭākṣara*, page 193).

3. In regard to the rights of inheritance of widows, some writers have argued that, inasmuch as all property is primarily intended for sacrificial performances, to which the woman is not entitled, she can have no business to inherit any property; that women, apart from their husbands, are not entitled to sacrificial performances has been shown under *Mimāṁsā-sūtrā* VI—i—17 to 21; though in the preceding *adhikaraṇa* it has been shown that she cannot be said to be absolutely *non-entitled* to such performances; as in the company of her husband she has her place at all sacrifices (see above).

This argument against the rights of women is met by another reasoning based upon Mīmāmsā-sutras III—iv—26 to 30, where it is shown, that the *wearing of gold* and such other things by the priests and the Sacrificer have no bearing on the sacrificial performance; on the basis of this principle it has been argued that, if *all* property were intended for sacrificial performances, from where could the gold be got? It is certainly 'property', and yet to does not have any bearing upon sacrificial performances. (*Miṭākṣarā*, pp. 200—1).

(4) With reference to the share to which the wife is entitled, we have the following texts :—

(*a*) यदि कुर्यात् समानंशान् पत्न्यः कार्याः समांशिकाः ।

(*b*) पितुरूर्ध्वं विभजताम् माता प्यंशं समं हरेत् ॥

(*a*) 'If the proprietor effects the division of his property during his lifetime, he should award to his wives shares equal to that of his sons.

Prābhā. 313.

(b) If the partition is effected after the death of the father, the mother should have a share equal to that of her sons.'

This text declares that the wife's share in the property of her husband is equal to that of each of her sons. Some writers,—who have held that the wife is entitled to a mere subsistance allowance,—interpret the texts to mean that, if the property is extensive, the wife is to have just enough to keep her; but in case the property is not much, she shares it equally with her sons. Against this it is argued that this interpretation would cause an incongruity in the above texts; as in that case, the first half of it would mean that she is to receive mere subsistence allowance; while the other half would give her an equal share with her sons; that such an incongruous interpretation of injunctive texts is not allowable has been shown under *Mīmāmsā-sūtra* VII—iii—19 to 25; wherein we have the following argument:——In connection with the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifice, the Veda enjoins '*Agni-Praṇayana*'; there are two such '*praṇayanas*'—that connected with the *Agniṣṭoma*, which is accompanied by many other details, and the other related to the *Darsha—Pūrṇamāsa*, which is simple and without accessory details; the question arising as to which of these two '*praṇayanas*' is to be employed at the *Chāturmāsya*, the conclusion is that it must be the latter. Upon this there arises a further question,—On which of the four sections of the *Chāturmāsya*—the '*Vaishvadēva*', the '*Varuṇapraghāsa*', the *Shākamēḍhīya* and the '*Sunāsīrīya*'—is this '*praṇayana*' to be done? The conclusion is that it should be done in connection with the *second* and *third* sections; though the *prima facie* argument is that is has to be done in connection with the *first* and *the fourth*, on the ground that the '*praṇayana*' has to be done on the *Uttaravēḍi* and the use of this *Vēḍi* is implied in connection with the *first* and the *fourth* sections only,—this implication being deduced from the text which prohibits such use on the

Prābhā. 314.

ground that it is only what is possible that can be *prohibited*; and hence the prohibition of the use of the *Uttaravēḍī* for the *first* and *fourth* sections implies the possibility of such use. In answer to this argument it has been shown that such an interpretation of the texts concerned leads to an incongruity in the text enjoining the use of the *Uttaravēḍī*;—viz: with regard to the *first* and *fourth* sections its use is implied by the prohibition, and hence could be intended for *partial* acceptance only; while with regard to the *second* and *third* sections it is pointed out as to be used *permanently*; thus the same text laying down two entirely divergent courses of action. The principle of interpretation involved in this is that so long as a text affords one coherent meaning, there is no justification for breaking up its meaning into two incoherent parts. (*Miṭākṣarā*, pp. 201—2).

(5 In connection with the rights of the parents over the property left by their childless son, the question arises as to which of the two parents—the mother or the father—has the prior claim. The texts bearing on the question mention the word '*piṭarau*', 'parents'; and would therefore appear to leave the matter doubtful; but it has been argued that, inasmuch as the word '*piṭarau*' has been etymologically explained in authoritative grammatical works as equivalent to '*Māṭāpiṭarau*',—and as in this the 'Māṭā (mother) is mentioned first—hers should be the prior claim. This reasoning is based upon the *Mīmāmsā-sūṭra* V—i—4 to 7—where it has been shown that the *Prayājas—Samiḍ, Tanūnapāṭ*, &c.——are to be performed in the order in which they are mentioned in the injunctive texts,—in accordance with the accepted principle that the priority of mention gives the priority in action. (Miṭāksarā, p. 203).

4. The cases of application of Mimāmsā principles to law, in the *Vyavahāramayūkha** may be grouped under the following heads :—

* Lithographed Edition—Benares.

(a) Sources of Proprietory Right.

All proprietory right has its origin in the ways of the world, and has nothing to do with scriptures. It proceeds only from such sources as *purchase*, *gift* and the like. If it proceeded from the Scriptures, there would be nothing to establish one's right over the calf born of the cow that he may have purchased; as such right is established by ordinary usage only. Then again, the analogy of the said right over the calf cannot be extended to the case of the child born of one's own wife; because no person has any proprietory right over his child,—indicated either by usage or by the scripture; it is for this reason that in the *Vishvajiṭ* sacrifice, whereat the Sacrificer has to give away *all his belongings*, the children are *not* given away; this has been shown under *Mīmāṁsā-Sūṭra* VI—vii—1 (*Vya-ma*. p. 38, line 20) where it is shown that, the son, father, sister and such other persons do not come within the category of one's 'belongings', which word must be taken to be restricted to what is called '*ḍhana*', 'property.'

(b) Adoption.

* (1) In regard to adoption we have the text '*ḍauhiṭro bhāgineyashcha Shūḍrasyāpi cha ḍīyaṭē*', *i. e.*, 'the *Shūḍra* can also adopt the son of his daughter or the son of his sister'—following upon the general rule that the *Brāhmaṇa* can adopt a child only from among his '*Sapiṇḍas*'; the *Kṣaṭṭriya* from among *Kṣaṭṭriyas* in general, or from among his own '*Sagoṭras*', the *Vaishya* only from among *Vaishyas*, and the *Shūḍra* only from among *Shūḍras*. In view of these two texts read together, the conclusion with regard to *Shūḍras* is that for them the best form of adoption is that of the daughter's or the sister's son. This conclusion is in accordance with the principle embodied in *Mim-Sūṭras* IV—ii—16. *

(2) † The adoption, even by the *Shūḍra*, has always to be done with full Vedic rites and ceremonies;—in this partic-

* *Vyavahāramayūkha*, p. 47, l. 1. † *Vyavahāramayūkha*, p. 47, l. 11.

ular case the *Shūdra* being entitled to the *Vedic* rites in accordance with the principle of the '*Niṣādasthapati*' laid down in *Mīm. Sū.* VI—i—51, where it is shown that the *Niṣāda* chief, even though a *Shūdra*, is entitled to some Vedic sacrifices,—the only difference being that the *Vedic mantras* (which he, as a *Shūdra*, can not pronounce) have to be recited for him by a *Dvija* proxy. These exceptional cases are not touched by the general law that the *Shūdra* is not *entitled to Vedic rites* as propounded in *Mīm. Sū.* VI,—i—25.

(3) In regard to the woman, it is laid down that she can adopt only in the company of her husband, or when permitted by him; as she, alone by herself, is not entitled to the performance of Vedic rites and ceremonies; and such rites and ceremonies are inseparable from all regular adoption. The preclusion of woman from sacrificial performances on her own account is discussed under *Mīm. Sū.* VI—i—6 (*Vide* above, chap. III §2).

(4) * With regard to a child that has been adopted in another family, Manu has laid down that he cannot *inherit the property* of his progenitor, nor *perform his Shrāddha*; and though the text directly prohibits these two things only, —yet it has been accepted to imply the prohibition of all cognate things, —*e. g.*, all relationships and connections due to the progenitor and so forth. This is in accordance with the principles laid down in *Mīm. Sū.* III—vii—13, and also I—iii—3 (*Shabara-Bhāṣya*, page 71, line 15),—wherein it is shown that the texts '*antarvēdi minoti* and '*jātaputraḥ kriṣṇakēsho*'-*gnīnādadhīta*'—even though making specific mention of only certain definite characteristics, are to be regarded as implying any place within the Vēdi (and not the exact centre of it), or a particular point in the man's age (and not exactly meaning that his hairs should be black, &c.).

THE END.

* Ibid. p. 49, l. 5.

Prābhā. 317.

[and hence the cognition of the minor premiss cannot be regarded as being due to the *two* perceptions of *smoke* as urged above]. "What you say may be the case with the cognition of things that are always dependent upon something else (as in the case of the negation of an object); the case of the negation of the smoke however is different, inasmuch as the notion of 'smoke' is not always dependent upon the notion of its concomitance; because as a matter of fact we find that the first conception that we have of the smoke is of it alone, independently of any other concomitance relating to it." But you cannot put forward any sound evidence in proof of the assertion that the 'necessary dependence' is not present in the case in question,—especially in face of the fact that we have already shown above in what manner the cognition of the minor premiss is obtained.* "But as a matter of fact, in the case of the inference in question, we find that what leads to the conclusion is the cognition of smoke *in the mountain*, and any previous cognition of it that we may have had has no efficacy towards the inferential conclusion; and hence any such cognition cannot be regarded as in any way helping towards the conclusion [at any rate without the intervening perception of the smoke on the mountain; and thus the much-discussed definition of 'operation' becomes applicable]." But this would be all right only after you had conclusively proved that the character of the 'Instrument' can belong to that only which is 'operative.'

(316) [*Page* 275.] "Certainly in the case in question also that which is 'instrumental' in bringing about the cognition of the smoke as concomitant with Fire is the *nirvikalpaka*, abstract, or non-determinate, idea that one has of the

* The cognition of the smoke as concomitant with fire is obtained even before we perceive it in the mountain; hence it will be extremely difficult for you to prove that the notion of smoke is not always accompanied by that of its concomitance with fire.

smoke by itself (of the kind which invariably precedes all determinate cognition of things)." This again we cannot accept. For in the case of things that are in permanent union with one another (as in the case of Negation), the cognition of one of them does not necessarily depend upon any non-determinate cognition of it (but is brought about by the cognition of its companion or correlative); and as thus the determinate cognition of things is possible even without their non-determinate cognition,—there is no evidence in support of what you say with regard to the process of cognitions. "In the case of the cognition of permanent correlates we shall postulate a preceding non-determinate cognition." This is not right, we reply; for as the cognition of such correlates can be easily explained, as due to other causes (as *e. g.* the cognition of their correlatives) there can be no ground for assuming the non-determinate cognition In fact, you yourself also admit that it is the peculiar characteristic of permanent correlates that the cognition of one is brought about by the cognition of the other.

(317)—'In any case that which brings about the *cognition of the minor premiss* (which will constitute the instrumental 'operation') may be regarded as the 'Instrument' of the inferential conclusion (and thus the definition of 'Instrument' or its 'operation' remains intact)." This again is not possible, we reply. For if this principle were admitted, even the sense-organs would have to be regarded as 'Instruments' of Inference in some cases (*viz.*, when the minor premiss is the result of direct Sense-perception). [And thus there would be no difference between Inferential and Perceptive Cognition, both of which would have Sense-organs for their 'instrument'.] We need not pursue this matter any further.

(318) There is yet another objection to the above-mentioned definition (in para. 310) of 'Vyāpāra' or 'Opera-

Kh. 184.

involves absurdities and incongruities.) ? If the objection which we have urged against you is not sound, what then tion':—By this definition the *contact* of the Ear with the Sound heard cannot be regarded as the 'operation' of the ear; and thereby the ear cannot be regarded as the 'instrument' in the perception of sound; while as a matter of fact (in all sense-perception) it is the *contact* (with the perceived object) that constitutes the 'operation' of the sense-organ concerned. No other 'operation' is possible in this case. For any such operation would have to be either momentary or permanent; but any momentary operation of the sense-organs other than 'Contact' is not known of; and if the operation were a permanent one, there would arise the same objection that we have pointed out on a previous occasion (*viz.*, that being permanent the operation could not be *produced* by anything). It may be asked—"Why cannot we regard the sound itself—to be the 'operation' (of the Ear)?" We reply—this is not possible; for as the Sound is the *object* of hearing, it can never be regarded as the *instrument.*

(319) *Page* 277. "What harm would there be if in certain cases one and the same thing were both *object* and *instrument*?" In the case of Hearing, we reply, we find that the Cognition of Sound is the *effect* or result of the whole process, and the *Sound* forms an integral qualifying factor of it; and when it thus forms a factor of the Effect, if it were also made a factor in the Instrument (of the same Effect), there would arise the partial incongruity of one and the same thing (sound) having the two mutually contradictory characters of the *cause* and the *effect.* "But this same incongruity *is* found in the case of the *contact of the Eye and* the *Jar* being regarded as the 'operation' of the Eye towards the (visual) cognition of the Jar (where the Jar forms a factor of the causal operation)." It may be so, we reply; but what is that to us (who hold that the explanation and definition *of everything* in the world

is the purpose in your quoting another parallel case? If on the other hand, the objection is sound, it will serve to invalidate the other parallel case also. We, who aim at final Release only, and hold all things to be inexplicable, have no love for anything of ordinary experience. It was for this reason that Janaka, the King of the Mithilā, being free from all attachment, and desirous of final Release only, said—'Let the whole of Mithilā be burned; nothing will be burned that is mine.' *

(320) Nor can 'Operation' be defined as *that which has the Instrument for its substratum* (the second alternative put forward in para 313). For by this definition the Cognition of the Minor Term as concomitant with the inferential indicative (*i. e.*, the minor premiss) will not be the 'instrument' of the inferential conclusion (as there is no *operation* subsisting in that cognition). Even if we were to accept the view that there is a non-determinate cognition of the inferential indicative (preceding its determinate cognition as concomitant with the Minor Term),—that nondeterminate cognition would not be the substratum of the latter cognition (and thus too the definition of 'operation' not being applicable, the instrumental character cannot belong to the minor premiss). † If the Operation, which subsists in (has for its substratum) something which is not the cause or instrument of the Inferential Conclusion, were regarded as the operation of that which is the instrument of that conclusion,—then this principle would lead to most undesirable consequences.

* This refers to the well-known verse in the Mahābhārata-*Mithilāyām pradīptāyām na mē kiñchana dahyatē*

† This anticipates the objection that though the cognition of the minor premiss subsists in the Cognising Self, yet it could be regarded as the *operation* of the non-determinate cognition of smoke, which would thus become the 'Instrument' of the Inference of Fire The answer is that in this manner anything might be the Instrument of anything.

(321) [*Page* 279]. It has been explained by the opponent (in para. 312) that the true Instrument (or Cause) is that which never fails in producing result (literally, which is never non-concomitant with the result). Now what does this mean? (1) Does it mean that the Result is sure to exist at the time when the cause exists? (2) Or it is sure to exist at the time subsequent to that at which the cause exists? The former is not possible; because it must be held that the cause must have an existence prior to the effect (it having been defined as the *invariable antecedent*). Nor can the second alternative be accepted; because if by this *sequence* (of the effect) be meant *immediate* sequence, then in that case, * if the character of 'Instrument' were attributed to a thing operating in some sort of way towards the result, such wellknown instruments as the Hand and the like would cease to be 'instruments'; while if the instrumental character were attributed to a thing on the ground of its continuing operative until the appearance of the result, it would have to be attributed to the nominative and such other agents also. If then you include the sequence to even such things as are not necessarily *immediate* antecedents (in view of the instrumental character of the Hand, for instance),—then also, your definition fails to include such intruments as the Hand and the like; because there are cases where after the Hand has carried on certain operations, obstacles appear and the result is not achieved (and thus the instrumentality of the Hand *fails to produce the Result*, and hence cannot be spoken of as '*phalāvyabhichāri*'). If, on the other hand, you *intend* all the operations extending up to the appearance of this Result, then, inasmuch as no interruption would be possible, your theory would come to this that every agency tending towards the result is 'instrumental.'

* The Hand is regarded as the 'Instrument' of cooking, because it operates towards that end inasmuch as collecting fuel, placing the pot, and so forth. None of these operations however is followed by the result *immediately*; and so the definition of 'Instrument' fails to apply in this case.

Kh. 187.

(322) Further, when you say that there should be *non-failure to produce the result* of *that which is operative*,—(1) is it the operation that does not fail to produce the result? or the instrument accompanied by the operation? If the former, then the hand would cease to be an 'instrument'; (especially in the case where, though certain operations have been gone through by the hand, the result fails to appear on account of impediments after those operations). For the same reason, the second alternative also cannot be accepted; and moreover in this latter case, the sacrificial performance could not be regarded as 'instrumental' in bringing about the attainment of Heaven [as the performance has ceased long before the result appears; and what precedes the result is not the *performance along with its operation, the Apūrva*, but the *Apūrva* only.]; specially as even Prabhākara—who holds that the 'Instrument' towards the attainment of Heaven is the * *Apūrva* which is what is meant by the sentence ('*yāgēna svargam bhāvayēt*'), and not the *sacrificial performance* which has long ceased to exist,—admits that the *final act* in the sacrificial performance is instrumental towards the final result. [And thus according to this view also the sacrifice is an *instrument*; so it is not right that this should not be included in the definition of the instrument.]

[Another definition of 'instrument' is next taken up.]

* The Mīmāmsakas hold that between the Sacrifice and the final appearance of the result, there persists an active force set going by the sacrifice. Without this it cannot be explained how the sacrifice, which has ceased to exist long ago, can be the cause of the result. So the sacrifice sets into motion the *apūrva*, and this finally brings about the result. Prabhākara's view is that in this manner it is the *apūrva* and not the sacrifice that is the Instrument of the result. Though he lays down this as the general rule, yet in certain cases, for instance in the case of the *Ḍarsha-pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice, which is made up of a number of minor sacrifices,—he holds that each of the minor sacrifices has its own *apūrva*, and this apūrva helps the next sacrifice in producing its own apūrva; and so on and on, the last of the series not having any further sacrifice to help, helps, and is thus instrumental in, the bringing about of the final result.

(323) "The instrument is that, being equipped with which alone, the Agent accomplishes the act; and hence the *Pramāṇa*, means or Instrument of Right Cognition, is that being equipped with which alone the agent has the right cognition." *This definition also, we reply, is not tenable. For it would imply that we would have to regard as 'Instruments of Right Cognition', even such well-known non-instruments as the 'destruction of the (momentary) qualities of the Cognising Self' (with which 'destruction' the Self is equipped at the time of the Cognition).

(324) If the definition be amended to read—"The Instrument of Right Cognition is *that cause of the action of cognition* equipped with which alone the agent has the right cognition",—this also cannot be accepted; as by this definition, in the case of the *right cognition of happiness*, we should have to regard as an 'instrument' of that cognition, also the operation of that which is its real instrument.† You may say—"Certainly, it is"; but this is not right; because the operation in question (*i.e.*, the Mind-Self contact) has no operation of its own; and as thus it does not operate in any way towards the action, it cannot be regarded as an 'agency' towards that action; and as the 'Instrument' is only a particular kind of 'agency,' the said operation can never be regarded as an 'Instrument.' You may add the qualification 'which is operative' (to the phrase 'cause of action' in the above definition). But this also will not be right; as in that case *that which is operative* could

*The Self has many such qualities as are appearing and disappearing at every moment,—according to the Logician; at each time that the Self has a cognition, it is sure to be equipped with the *absence* or destruction of many of these momentary qualities. Thus these qualities would fulfil the conditions of the definition of 'Instrument.'

† The Mind is the instrument of the cognition of happiness. Its operation consists in its coming into contact with the Cognising Self. This contact is the *cause* of the *cognition*, and without it the Self cannot have the cognition. Hence the definition would include this 'Contact' also.

not be regarded as the 'Instrument'; * because by this definition it will be the 'cause of action' *along with its operaion* that should have to be regarded as the 'Instrument'; and as *the cause along with its operation* would not have any further operation, it would not have the character of the Instrument (which, according to you, must be something that is operative).

(*Page* 281) You may add the explanation that—"the instrumental character belongs to the *operative thing* as apart from the factor of *operation*; and certainly, the definition of Instrument does apply to that thing; that which has the *instrumental character* is also *operative*; and hence it is only the *operative* thing that is called the 'Instrument." This also we cannot admit; because according to this definition when a person is washing a piece of cloth by alternately lifting and dropping it, the cloth, which in reality is the *object*, would be the *Instrument*.†

‡ (325) Then again, it is necessary for you to explain what is the *instrumentality* of that which you seek to define. If you explain it as consisting in the characteristics pointed out in your definition, then you fall into the vicious circle (the knowledge of the Definition depending upon the comprehension of instrumentality, and *vice versa*). If in order to avoid this, you were to explain that the *instrumentality* of the instrument consists in its own *specific form* (apart from the characteristics mentioned in definitions),—then, inasmuch as the 'specific form' of each individaul Instrument is distinct, any general definition of the Instrument would

* The sense is that by adding the qualification, you make the *operation* a constitnent factor of the Instrument; and as such, in order to be an Instrument it must have some other operation towards the final act.

† The cloth is a 'c[illegible]of action'; and it has an operation; and it is only when the washerman is equipped with this operative cloth that he can do the *washing* Hence the Cloth, by your definition, is an 'Instrument.'

‡ Unless we understand what is meant by the instrumentality of the Instrument,—*i.e.*, until we know the 'Instrument—we can have no interest in its definition.

invariably include instruments other than the one (the 'specific form' of which would be present to the mind of the enquirer); and thus the definition would become 'too wide'; as certainly the 'specific form' of the Eye (the instrument of vision) is not the same as that of the Ear (the instrument of audition).

(326) [Nor again can we accept the definition of the 'Means of Right Cognition,' as that, being equipped with which alone can the agent have the right cognition mentioned in para. 323]. For in that case, the Sense-organs would not be the 'Means of Right Cognition'; as it is found possible to have right cognition (*inferential* and the rest) by persons *not* equipped with sense-organs (which are necessary only in one particular kind of cognitions, the *sensuous*). You might say—"but that inferential cognition is not *Sensuous Perception.*" True; but it is not with reference to *Sensuous* Cognition alone that you are seeking to put forward the definition (of the 'Means of Right Cognition). It might be argued that, "in the case of *inferential* cognition, even though the same *particular* Instruments, in the form of a Sense-organ and the like, are absent, yet inasmuch as all Instruments belong to the same class ('Instrument') as the Sense-organ, there cannot be the absence of all Instruments of that class; for certainly even inferential cognitions one cannot have until he is equipped with things which are as much 'Instruments' as the Sense-organs." But this also does not solve the difficulty; as it is up till now impossible to ascertain what is the generic character of the 'Instrument' (to which the Sense-organs and other instruments belong).

(327) If then, you were to explain that, that thing being equipped with which alone the agent accomplishes *that right cognition*, is the *Instrument of that cognition*,—* we cannot

* This answer proceeds on the basis of two alternatives—(1) are we to regard as instrument that thing with which the cogniser may be equipped at the time the he has *some* right cognition? (2) or that with which he is equipped *at every time* that he has that particular kind of right cognition? The former is not possible.

accept this either ; because in that case even such things as the small loin-cloth or the clothing that the person is wearing at the time will have to be regarded as the 'Instrument.' [As there may be some right cognitions which a man will have when wearing such clothing, &c.] * If in order to meet this you were to add the qualification that—the Instrument of a right cognition is that thing equipped with which the agent accomplishes *all cognitions of the same kind as that cognition,*—this also cannot be accepted ; because as a matter of fact we find that all *inferential* and *verbal* cognitions belong to the same class of 'Indirect or Non-immediate Cognitions' ; and yet while *inferential* cognitions are accomplished when the agent is equipped with the knowledge of the Premisses, *verbal* cognitions are obtained when he is equipped with the knowledge of words : and under the circumstances, there can be no certainty as to *all Indirect Cognitions* being accomplished with the aid of one knowledge or the other ; and hence neither of the two can be rightly regarded as an 'Instrument of Right Cognition' ?. You might urge that the 'kinds' of Cognition you mean are' Sensuous Cognition', 'Inferential Cognition' and the like (and not any such as 'Indirect Cognition'). This also will not be right ; because †*firstly,* if you include any one of these 'kinds' of Cognition in your definition of the 'Instrument of Right Cognition,' then it would not include the Instruments of other Kinds of Cognition ; thus there would be a partial failure of the definition ; *secondly,* if you include *all kinds* of cognition, then it would not include any Instruments at all ; [as there is no Instrument that accomplishes *all kinds* of cognition] ; *thirdly,* if there be no restriction (as to whether one or all *Kinds* of cognition are meant), then you would not have one all-comprehensive definition (which ought to be the first condition fulfilled by all definitions).

* This meets the second alternative.

† If your definition be *that* equipped with which the agent accomplishes *all sensuous* cognitions,—then this will not include the means of *inferential* cognition.

(328) [Page 283] Another definition of the Instrument is put forward:—"The Instrument is that in the absence of which (without which) the *Nominative* Agent and the Object do not bring about the action; thus the Instrument of Right Cognition is that without which the cognition and the cognised do not bring about the right cognition." This also, we reply, is not right: * Do you mean (1) that the cognition is not brought about by the *cogniser* and the *cognised* which latter are themselves *existent*? (2) or that it is not produced by these, also when they themselves are *non-existent*? If you mean the former, then the definition fails to include the Instruments of inferential and such other cognitions of things past and future (in which case the *cognised* things do not exist). Nor is the second alternative tenable, since in that case, the definition would apply to the cognisor and the cognised also. For just as in the absence of the Eye and such other means of cognition, right cognition does not appear, in the same manner, in the absence of the cogniser and the cognised also, it would not appear; otherwise these two could not be regarded as having any causal efficiency towards the cognition. This last reasoning also serves to refute the view that it does not need to be specified whether the agent and the object are existent or non-existent (all that is meant being that without the Instrument these two cannot bring about the Cognition). Specially as by this definition, the character of 'Instrument' would become applicable to ourselves also, who in reality are only *Nominative* agents, in regard to our own cognitions which are brought about by God *through ourselves* (and thus as without ourselves, God, the agent, could not bring about our cognition, we would be 'instruments'

* The author takes up the application of the general definition of 'Instrument' to the special case of the Instrument of right knowledge. The general definition is open to the patent objection that it is *too wide*; including as it does the Dative also; as without the *receiver* of the gift, the action of *giving* cannot be accomplished by the *giver* and the thing *given*.

of that cognition). * Under the above circumstances it would be impossible to justify the definition by asserting that (in the case of our own cognitions) it is possible for ourselves to have, from different points of view, the character of the '*Nominative* agent', as well as the 'Instrument' of cognition. This, we say is not possible; because it is in a certain character—of the '*Nominative* agent' for instance,—that we are related to our cognitions, and it is when we are absent *in exactly the same character*, that the cognition is not produced [so our character remaining the same in both cases, we cannot, in the case of our *presence*, when the cognition is produced, be regarded as '*nominative* agents', and in the case of our *absence*, when the cognition is not produced, as the 'instruments.']

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(329) Nor again can we accept the definition that the Instrument is that to which belongs the final operation or activity (leading to the accomplishment of the action). For, in that case, the *instrumental* character would not belong to the minor premiss of an inferential reasoning; for the simple reason that that premiss itself has no operation or activity at all. It might be urged that in the case in question the character of the 'instrument of cognition' belongs to the *non-determinate* cognition of the minor premiss which has an *operation* in the shape of the *determinate* cognition of the same. But this would not apply to those cases where the things cognised are such as admit of only *determinate* cognitions. † If, then, you were to rest upon the *mental impression* (produced by the cognition of the minor premiss, to be the *operation* of this premiss towards the inferential

* The view combated here is that there would be nothing wrong in holding that when we regard our cognitions as brought about by God, we are 'instruments,' while when we regard them as brought about by oursevles we are the '*nominative* agents.'

† *Samavāya* or Inherent Relationship, *Abhāva* or Negation, and such other things are held to be such as can be cognised only *determinately*, admitting of no non-determinate cognition.

cognition),—then, inasmuch as the inferential cognition would, in this case, be brought about directly by this *mental impression*, it would not be a *valid* cognition. [For if the cognitions produced by mental impressions were valid, then remembrances would have to be regarded as valid, which the Logician denies]; if on the other hand, the *mental impression* were not effective in bringing about the inferential cognition then it could not be regarded as an *operation* of the agencies bringing about that cognition. And further, (if the *mental impression* is the operation towards the inferential cognition, then) the inferential cognition becomes one whose instrument (*i.e.* the minor premiss) is not cognised [because the *mental impression* is not perceptible by the senses, that of which that impression is an operation must also be imperceptible]. * Nor again would it be right to assert that what is the Instrument of inferential cognition is the Inferential Indicative or Middle Term, of which the *minor premiss* itself is the *operation* (conducing to the cognition). For in cases where we have an inference of something as having been inferentially cognised, the minor premiss is not produced by the inferential indicative, and as such cannot be regarded as the 'operation' of this latter. And further, in a case where we learn from a trustworthy person that there was 'Smoke' in some place, and thence we at once infer that in that case 'Fire' also existed there,—as the 'Smoke' (which is the inferential indicative in this latter inference) does not exist

* And thus the character of having its Instruments not perceived, which is regarded by the Logician as the distinctive feature of sensuous cognitions alone would be present in inferential cognitions also.

† We infer the existence of the organ of vision from the fact of there being visual cognitions, and from the fact of the organ of vision being on *organ* we infer that it is superintended by a guiding intelligence. Now the organ of vision cannot be regarded as productive of any cognition of a minor premiss with regard to itself; as the only cognition that the organ can produce is a sensuous perception. And yet it is *instrumental* in bringing about the second inference. Thus the definition of 'Instrument' not applying to this case becomes 'too narrow.'

at all at the time of the inferential cognition,—any chance of its being regarded as having the *minor premiss* (of this inference) for its 'operation' and thus being an 'instrument' (in the bringing about of the inference), is wholly cast away.

(330) Then again, if the 'finality' of the operation (that you introduce into your definition) be held to be in comparison with the operation, of anything, then as the operation of all agencies would be 'final' with reference to some operation or the other, the character of having the 'final operation' (towards the action) would belong to all, and not to the Instrument only Whereas if the 'finality' be in comparison with the operation of *all agencies* towards the action, then, inasmuch as the operation of the Instrument would not be 'final' in comparison with the operation of itself (which is one of the *agencies*), this Instrument also would fail to fulfil the conditions of the definition (its operation not being *final* in comparison with the operation of '*all* agencies'). If it be asserted that the 'finality' meant is in comparison with the operation of the Nominative agent,—then, this also is not possible, we reply; because if the 'finality' were in comparison with the 'Nominative agent' taken by itself (independently of its operation &c.), then the definition would include that agent itself [as 'operation' of the agent would appear after, and hence be 'final' in comparison with, the appearance of the agent]; if, on the other hand, the 'finality' were in comparison with the '*operative* agent' (the agent along with its operation),—then also we would find the definition applying to the Nominative agent, as in comparison with each one of the operations of the agent another operation of his would be 'final'; lastly, if the 'finality' meant were in comparison with the Nominative agent *along with all his operations*,—then, the definition would not apply even to that which you accept as 'Instrument'; as the operations of the Nominative agent, in some form or other, do not cease till the desired result is accomplished (and hence there is nothing that can be

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1911.

hand, experiences a state of consciousness which expresses itself as—'I am affected by the pleasures or pains of my son.'

"But why not hold that this peculiar state of consciousness is due to excess of paternal love rather than an *adhyāsa* of identity?" This is impossible, we reply; since love itself rests on an *adhyāsa*. Were this not so, how could it be that after having entered towards the close of his life on the state of a houseless mendicant and attained to full discriminative insight, the man no longer feels the same love towards his children and their relations? *Real* love (not due to an erroneous identification of one's self with the beloved person) would not depart merely in consequence of discriminative knowledge; for it is a generally valid truth that knowledge puts an end to non-knowledge only. "But if the identification of a man's self with his son, &c., which directly is due to love, rests on an *adhyāsa* only, how is it that the author of the Vedānta-Bhāṣya (under the Sūtra 'an account of seeing', Ved. Sū. I. 1. 5) quotes the case of a king whose estimate of a well-beloved servant, who is constantly active in his master's interest, expresses itself in the form 'Bhadrasēna is my Self', as an instance of merely metaphorical identification?*" In this case also, we reply, you over-look a difference. The king's affection for his servant is not really due to Bhadrasēna himself, but to all the excellent work that Bhadrasēna does in his master's service; this is proved by the fact that the king's love turns to hatred as soon as Bhadrasēna begins to do things harmful to his master. On the other hand, the love of a father for his son does not depend on any conditions: it does not depart when the son is unable to do anything for his father or even does him positive harm.

* How is it that this identification also is not treated by Shankarāchārya as one of erroneous complete identification due to adhyāsa, but is admitted by him to be a metaphorical one only, the king being all the time fully conscious of not being one with his servant?

"But," our Opponent resumes, "at any rate, we may maintain that the love entertained towards such objects as fine clothes, ornaments and the like, does not rest on aḍhyāsa; for nobody identifies himself with things of that kind!" The aḍhyāsa of 'I,' 'we reply, no doubt is absent in those cases; but there is present the aḍhyāsa of 'mine'. That the aḍhyāsa of identity should assume those two different forms, so that of some beloved objects we think as being *ourselves*, while others we only view as *ours*—explains itself from the greater or lesser degree of love we feel. The different degrees of which love is capable are noticed by Vishvarūpāchārya (Surēshvarāchārya) when commenting on the text 'dearer than a son.':—

'A son is dearer than wealth; one's own body is dearer than a son; the sense-organs are dearer than the gross body; dearer than the sense-organs is life; and dearer than life is the Self.'

In accordance herewith we observe that the aḍhyāsa of a person's connection with wealth—which is simply *dear*—expresses itself throughout in the form 'this is *mine*.' In the case of children—who are *dearer*—the aḍhyāsa *sometimes* assumes the form of oneness. With regard to the body—which is *dearest*—the aḍhyāsa is prevailingly one of identity. And the internal organ, finally,—which is something dearer than the body even—is invariably thought and spoken of as one with the Self. "But, if the conception of one's identity with a son rests on aḍhyāsa, how is it that in the Commentary, towards the end of the section dealing with the first four Sūtras, such identity is referred to as of a merely metaphorical character?" What that passage means to intimate, we reply, is no more than that children are not so invariably treated as identical with one's Self as one's body is; not that they are never viewed in that light. It otherwise would be hardly possible to account for the scriptural text 'Thou art my Self, called son' (*Bṛihaḍ. Upa.* 6-4-26) which refers to the identity of a father with his children as something familiar to all from ordinary experi-

Viv. 218.

ence. The conclusion thus is that a man really, though erroneously, identifies himself with external objects such as wife, children and so on.

However, we will assume that you do not fully agree with us as to this identification of a person with his children, &c. But on the other hand, you must admit that parents refer to themselves attributes belonging to their children. For when a baby son is 'honoured' by a gift of fine clothes, ornaments and the like, the father thinks '*I* am honoured.'—In the same way a man by pointing to his body and saying 'This is me' intimates that he identifies *himself* with his body. Such every-day expressions, again, as '*I* am lean,' '*I* am dark-complexioned,' clearly show that men commonly ascribe to *themselves* qualities belonging to the gross body. Similarly qualities of the sense-organs (or, in this context rather 'of the sensory powers') are constantly ascribed to the Self: men say '*I* am dumb,' '*I* am a fluent speaker,' '*I* am blind,' '*I* have eye-sight.' In these latter cases, it is not that to which these attributes belong—*viz.* the sensory powers,—which is superimposed upon the Self; for as those powers are not objects of direct knowledge, but of permanent inference only, they are incapable of direct *adhyāsa*. In the same way, finally, attributes of the internal organ are superimposed upon the Self: '*I* am desirous,' '*I* am angry,' and so on. Nor may you maintain that desire, anger and the like are attributes *not* of the internal organ, but of the Self itself; for they originate only when the internal organ is present. And against this it must not be urged that the Self may after all be the real material cause of desire, anger and the rest (all these belonging to the Self as real conditions of it), while the internal organ is no more than their instrumental cause,—and that this theory sufficiently accounts for the fact that all those affections arise only when the internal organ is present, and are absent in its absence. For the absence of the inter-

nal organ—if no more than a mere instrumental cause—would not explain why in the state of deep sleep desire and all such affections cease completely (their material cause, the Self being present all the while, some trace of them should certainly remain). "But can we not say that the absence of those affections explains itself from the absence of conjunction between the internal organ and the Self—which conjunction in this case constitutes the (third kind of cause which has to be present if an effect is to be produced, *viz.*, the) so-called non-inherent cause?" You may not, we reply; for as you represent the case you should at once conclude that the internal organ is the material cause of those affections, since this appears, from what you say, to be the principal factor in the causal agency bringing them into existence. "But, the instrumental cause also is the principal factor in the causal agency, since in the absence of that cause no effects are produced!" Not so, we reply. There are present other operative causes, *viz.*, the sense of sight and so on; and hence there is no need to assume that the internal organ is the principal cause. On the other hand, there exists in that case no other *material* cause, and it hence cannot be argued that there is no need of the assumption that the internal organ is the material cause required. If—as you argue—the Self were the material cause, our consciousness would co-ordinate the 'I' and the 'desire' in the form '*I* am desire'; while as a matter of fact our consciousness testifies to a connexion expressing itself as 'I am desirous' ('affected with desire'), analogous to such judgments as 'Dēvadatta *has* a stick' (not '*is* a stick'). On the other hand, Scripture actually speaks of the internal organ and certain mental states in forms of co-ordination, as *e. g.* in the passage 'Desire is volition' (*Bri. Upa.* 1-5-3). We thus claim it as a well-settled conclusion that attributes of the internal organ are superimposed (erroneously attributed to) the Self; while that organ itself is, by adhyāsa erroneously

Viv. 220.

identified with the Self which merely 'witnesses' it. Were this not so, we should not (as we actually do) *view* pure witnessing Consiousness as having the attribute of limited 'I-Consciousness.'

"But," our opponent resumes, "the internal organ is not something of which witnessing Consciousnss has an immediate, intuitive knowledge. The fact rather is that the existence of the internal organ is postulated for the reason that the successive origination of actual cognitions as it is observed to take place, when the Self, the sense-organs and objects are in contact, cannot be otherwise accounted for." Not so, we reply. The process *can* be accounted for otherwise; for we may assume that the Self, by itself, possesses the capacity of originating cognitions in succession. Nor may you argue that, as necessarily *some* factor determining the whole process must be assumed, we must assume the existence of the internal organ. For it is simpler to assume that the Self—the existence of which is something independently and absolutely certain—possesses the capacity of originating the actual succession of cognitions, than to postulate an altogether new entity endowed with that capacity. "Well," our opponent resumes, "we then prove the existence of the internal organ by the following inference: 'The succession under discussion (*i. e.* the successive origination of cognitions, in the presence of several objects) requires some common cause by which the successive order, due to the Agent, is effected; for the case is one of the class of successive production of effects on the part of the agent who finds himself in the presence of several objects; such as *e. g.* the successive order of the acts of cutting—on the part of Ḍēvaḍaṭṭa, to whom several things to be cut present themselves—which requires an axe as its common cause." The inference is not sound, we reply; for the reason put forward is not conclusive; as we find that there is an actual order of the successive conjunctions of the

internal organ with the several senses (on which the actual order of succession of the several cognitions depends) For there is no common cause for the order of succession of the conjunctions of the internal organ with the sense-organs. "Well, let us say, that common cause is to be found in the unseen (retributive) principle." Then we meet you by another instance (of absence of a common cause determining the order of succession of a series of effects): in the order of succession of the series of momentary contacts, on the part of a fruit that drops from a tree, with the several points of space. "Here also there is a common cause," our opponent replies., "viz, the heaviness of the fruit." Very well, we reply; we then must point out that, as regards the matter under discussion, you have failed to assign the common cause for the actual order of succession of the contacts of some one particular sense-organ, such as the eye, with its several objects. You may not say that the unseen principle determines that order also; for what you are bound to prove in this case is the existence of a common cause other than that Unseen Principle! And for this same reason, the first objection that we put forward against your inference remains unshaken (as you sought to escape this by putting forward the Unseen Principle).

"Let us then," our Opponent resumes, "give a different form to our inferential argument:—'The origination of special qualities such as cognitions and the like, requires that in the substrate—in which that origination takes place—there should reside a non-inherent cause constituted by the conjunction of the substrate with another substance; for it is an origination of special qualities in a permanent substance—as *e. g.* the origination of red colour in an atom—which requires the contact of the atom with fire.' And in the case under discussion, that other entity (through conjunction with which there arise cognitions, etc., in the Self) is nothing else but the internal organ." This inference also, we rejoin, is not valid, for it establishes only what is

Viv. 222.

established already; inasmuch as that non-inherent cause of cognitions (which you declare to be necessary, and to supply which you assume the existence of an internal organ) is already given in the conjunction of the Self with the body and the sense-organs. "But does not the fact of dream-cognitions prove the existence of the internal organ? (considering that in the state of dream the connexion between Self and sense-organs is suspended)." Not so, we reply; the connexion between the Self and the (gross) body which does *not* cease in the state of dream, constitutes a sufficient cause of the rise of dream-cognitions (so that, on that ground, the assumption of an internal organ is not justified). "Well then," our Opponent resumes, "(if these inferential arguments are not valid) let us assume that the internal organ is known through Perception (*pratyakṣa*)!" This also, we reply, is inadmissible. For the internal organ is either of atomic size,—in which case it is no more cognizable by the senses than other atoms;—or it is of infinite extension,—in that case its conjunction with the Self would have the consequence of the whole world presenting itself to consciousness at once;—and if it were of medium size, even then we could not allow that it is apprehended through the senses; for the simple reason that in the state of dream where the senses are admittedly non-operative, we yet are conscious of the presence of the internal organ (the Mind) We thus see that all attempts to prove the existence of the *manas* by the so-called recognised means of proof are unsuccessful. On the other hand, it can not be maintained that we have no consciousness at all of the existence of such an entity; for we actually experience states of consciousness expressing itself in the form—'my mind was somewhere else'; 'my mind was absent.' No other alternative remaining, we are thus driven to the conclusion that the internal organ is the object of direct cognition on the part of 'witnessing Consciousness.'

Viv. 223

"But," a further objection is raised, "if in the case of the Self and the Not-self there is mutual superimposition (*i.e.* if the two are identified in that way that either may be said to be identified with the other), then—both being superimposed equally—it will follow that *both* are false; and moreover if both are, equally, the substrate of the Superimposition, then both would appear to consciousness as equal, and not as different (one being known as the *imposed* and another *the imposed upon*)."

Not so, we reply : what proves the mutual Superimposition is the fact that one (the Self) is actually recognised as *intelligent* and the other (the Not-Self) as *non-intelligent*, the two thus being quite distinct from each other; for in all *Adhyāsa*, when one thing is known as superimposed upon another, this presupposes the fact that the two are actually known as entirely distinct. If there were Superimposition of only one of the two (and not of both upon both), then that would presuppose the recognition of the particular form of only one (not of both). Nor does our view imply the falseness of both (the Self and the Not-self). For as the intelligent principle (*chēṭna*) can not itself be superimposed upon the non-intelligent, the superimposition is of that kind only which is called *samsarga-adhyāsa*. Nor is the fact that both are known in their particular characters (and as distinct from each other) incompatible with both being the substrate (of the Superimposition); because the particular distinctive character is not cognised as belonging to the substrate; in fact what is actually cognised is that the Body is intelligent and the Self non-intelligent, there being only a reversal of the particular characters (which fact does not affect the characters of the substrate of the Superimposition).

Nor must it be said that, as the two present themselves with individual differences, the case cannot be one

Viv. 224.

of superimposition ; and the co-ordination in which their relation in expressed ('the Body is the Self' etc.) is to be explained in a secondary, metaphorical, sense. For as a matter of fact ordinary people do not transfer the idea of the Self to the internal organ and the rest in a merely meta phorical sense, but in its full primary meaning ; and certainly no exception can be taken to what is a well-known fact.

[*Page* 95] " But ", a new objection is raised, " the phrase 'and the rest' (see above) at any rate is not justified. For the pure Self is superimposed on the internal organ only ; while as to the senses (which are meant to be included by the phrase 'and the rest') no more can be said than that they are connected with the internal organ which is qualified by that superimposition of the Self."

This is so, we reply. But all the same it is the Self, *not* the internal organ, which *appears* as determined by the sense-organs ; and it is with reference to this *appearing* to Consciousness that the phrase 'and the rest' has been used. It is on account of this appearance—which is due to Consciousness being interwoven with the sense-organs and the gross body—that materialists and the like erroneously identify the Self with the senses, and the gross Body. Did no such appearance exist all people alike would identify the Self, not with the body but, with the internal organ only, on which the Self is directly superimposed.

We thus have fully shown that the mutual superimposition of Self and Not-self is something which can be satisfactorily defined; which presents no impossibility; which actually exists ; and for the cognition of which there are valid means. We hence claim that this our *adhyāsa* theory is fully sound and cannot be controverted by anyone.

XLVII.

[The removal of the *Aḍhyāsa* constitutes the purpose (aim; *prayojana*) of the *Vēḍānṭa-shāsṭra.*]

Our opponent now raises a new difficulty. "You have", he says, "demonstrated the existence of *aḍhyāsa* in order to be able to formulate the following inference—'the *Veḍānṭa-Shāsṭra* has a possible object and purpose (aim); because it is antagonistic to bondage which is a thing of *aḍhyāsa*; just as waking consciousness is antagonistic to illusory dream-cognitions'. But now as to this purpose or aim (*prayojana*). Is it the cessation of all that is unprofitable or evil, such as action and enjoyment of any kind? Or is it the cessation of that which is the cause of all evil,—*viz.*, of the *aḍhyāsa* of nescience and all its effects?—It can not be the former; for as long as its cause persists, evil, although having been stopped for a time, originates afresh. Nor can it be the latter; for there can be no cessation of *aḍhyāsa* which is held to be beginningless. You may not say that such cessation must be allowed on the ground that Scripture teaches it; for it is contradicted by Perception. For we do not observe that when through Reasoning we have taught ourselves to discriminate between the Self and the body, the *aḍhāysa* of the identity of the two comes to an end."

To this we reply as follows:—You yourself hold that the *beginningless antecedent non-existence* * which is the cause of the world, comes to an end. Why then should not the beginningless *aḍhyāsa* also come to an end? And if to exclude the analogous instance quoted by us, you should argue—'There can be no cessation of the *aḍhyāsa*; for it is a beginningless *positive* entity, just as the Self is';—

*The logician holds that antecedent non-existence is without beginning,—continuing to exist till the origination of the thing to which the non-existence pertains. Up to the time when the Jar is made we have its antecedent non-existence, which had no beginning in time. So with the entire world also.

we ask whether by a *positive entity* you understand something that is *real*, or merely something which differs in character from non-being. If the former, we point out that those who hold the *adhyāsa* to possess that kind of being which is called 'inexplicable' do not accept the reason in your argument as valid. And if the latter, we oppose to your argument the following of ours—' The *adhyāsa* is put an end to by knowledge because it is of the nature of non-knowledge (Nescience), just as the *adhyāsa* of silver on the shell'. You will perhaps say that this inference of ours is refuted by yours as set forth above. But this we deny; the fact is that our inference sublates yours. In the same way as a general rule is sublated by a special one, a general inference is sublated by a special one. " But", our opponent resumes, " by the cessation of a thing we understand a subsequent condition of its material cause; a jar *e. g.* is said to 'cease' when it comes to pieces—these pieces representing a different condition of the clay of which the jar was made. But the *adhyāsa* of Nescience has no material cause; hence there can be no cessation of it." We, our reply is, do not accept your definition. Cessation must rather be defined as a subsequent condition of the *abode* (*āshraya*) of that which ceases to exist. On your definition there could be no cessation of the original, beginningless, blackness and other qualities of atoms (which blackness *e.g.* does cease when that in which it abides is baked in fire). That recognition of the Self as distinct from the body which rests on mere argumentation is not indeed observed to put an end to the *adhyāsa*; but there is no reason to deny that when the true nature of Brahman has once been apprehended through sacred texts such as 'Thou art that', all that is opposed to Brahman, *viz.*, Nescience and *adhyāsa* which is its effect, cease to be. For Nescience, which conceals Brahman, and its effects, are clearly opposed in nature to the knowledge of Brahman. The apprehension, on the other hand, of a Self

distinct from the body is opposed to the view of the identity of the two, and therefore puts an end to that view only. It no doubt is a fact that the Self of the nature of Intelligence, which is presented in the 'I-consciousness,' is nothing else but Brahman but, it does not present itself *as* Brahman; and the 'I-consciousness' therefore does not constitute knowledge of Brahman. And for the reason that knowledge founded on argumentative reasoning (*yukti*)—although, in a way, having Brahman for its object—is not an authoritative source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), or else for the reason that it is not intuitive, it does not possess the power of putting an end to *adhyāsa* which is an object of intuitive cognition. There thus is no other means to put an end to *adhyāsa* than that intuitive apprehension of Brahman to which the *Vedānta* texts give rise.

"But", a new objection is raised, "the purpose of the *Shāstra* is not merely to put an end to *adhyāsa*, but to help us to attain to blessedness!" True, we reply. But if it is declared that the object of the *Shāstra* is the oneness of Brahman and the individual soul, it will at once be understood that the attainment of bliss on the part of the individual soul falls within that object and is realized with it. For the text 'Bliss is Brahman' shows that what constitutes blessedness is nothing else but just Brahman. And that the attainment of bliss is the aim of man is of course proved by the fact that it is what man desires. There hence is no need of making a separate statement as to the attainment of bliss being the purpose of the *Shāstra*.

"Well then", our Opponent resumes, "the cessation of *adhyāsa* also should not be separately stated; for it is an object (*viṣaya*) of the *Shāstra* in the same way as the attainment of bliss!" Not so, we reply. Do you mean that cessation of *adhyāsa* is an object of the *Shāstra*, independently? or that it is contained within that object which is constituted by the soul's oneness with Brahman? The

Viv. 228.

former alternative is inadmissible; since the *Shāstra* undoubtedly has to establish nothing else than the Soul's oneness with Brahman. Texts such as 'in the end there is the cessation of all Māyā (Shvēt,) 1-10, and 'the knot of the heart is broken' (Mund 2-2-8) refer to the cessation of *adhyāsa* as something to be attained, only through the apprehension of the Soul's oneness with Brahman. Nor can the second alternative be accepted. For of those texts which establish the unity of Brahman and the Soul—'That art thou' and the rest—the object is not the cessation of *adhyāsa.* "But without the cessation of plurality (*saprapañchatva*) in Brahman, and of Nescience and its effects in the individual soul, the oneness which these texts declare is not capable of realization!" Well, we reply, this comes exactly to what we said above;—viz., that the cessation of Nescience is effected through the cognition of oneness. Nor do we allow you to plead that, although the cessation of *adhyāsa* is merely implied in texts such as the *mahāvākya,* it is stated directly in texts such as 'it is not big, it is not small,' etc. For these latter texts set forth, not the cessation of bondage, which, in the state of Final Release, is accomplished through the intuitive realization of Brahman, but rather the fact that Brahman, which in itself is totally non-related, is also in all time essentially 'worldless' (*nisprapañcha*). For only after having grasped this truth, can the individual soul later on realise the oneness of the Self and Brahman, on the basis of texts such as 'Thou art that'; for the term 'Brahman' is one the meaning of which cannot be apprehended on the basis of ordinary life and thought. Nor can it be said that the teaching as to Brahman's 'worldless' nature is contradicted by those means of knowledge which make us apprehend Brahman as associated with a multiple world. For the fact is that there are no such means. Perception and the rest no doubt have for their object the multiple phenomenal world; but on the other hand, they do not make us apprehend

Brahman and, hence do not intimate any connexion of the two. And texts such as 'All this (world) is that Self' do not aim at teaching that Brahman is the Self of the phenomenal world—for this is already established by its being the material cause of all—; but connect themselves into a whole with those texts which set forth the 'worldless' nature of Brahman, in that way that they suggest matter to be *negatived* by those latter texts: this indeed is the meaning which they must have; how otherwise could they set forth the view that Brahman is associated with a world—a view which is in opposition to the supremely salutary view of Brahman being worldless, and hence is evil. That the absence of all relation to a multiple world is blissful, while connexion with such a world is an evil, is proved by the experiences of deep sleep and the waking state respectively, and moreover is vouched for by Scripture. Nor must it be thought that the true cognition that rests on a text teaching Brahman's worldlessness is sublated by the fact that such texts imply a reference to Brahman's association with a world as something known or settled; for a reference of this kind has no force; firstly because it is a mere reference (and as such has no power independently to establish truth), and secondly, because it merely subserves the cognition of Brahman as non-related to a world. "But is it not an unmeaning procedure, on the part of Scripture, first, by means of certain texts, to establish the notion that Brahman is related to a world, and after that to negative that very view by other texts? Is it not a common, and well-founded, saying that better than washing off the mud from one's body is to keep at a good distance from it?*" The case lies as follows, we reply:—The phenomenal world is *prima facie* suggested by those very texts which aim at setting forth the non-duality of Brahman, inasmuch as they imply that Brahman is the material cause of evertyhing: if, then, there were no

* A quotation from the *Mahābhārata*.

other texts to take up and deny the existence of the world, the non-duality of Brahman could not be established. The implied meaning of certain texts does not establish Brahman's connexion with a world as a final truth; it only suggests it *prima facie*; and when such implied meaning comes into conflict with a directly negativing text, it is the weaker of the two and has to give way. That a means of knowledge of a comparatively weaker kind should possess this *prima facie* establishing power until it is sublated by a stronger means, is in no way contrary to reason, and is illustrated by the cognition of silver in the shell and such other cognitions. Were it not so, there indeed would be no room for subsequent sublation or refutation; for in all cases that only admits of being sublated, by a stronger means of proof, which is established *prima facie*—not either that which is not so established or that which is *ab initio* proved by a valid means of knowledge. Nor must it be supposed that texts, such as 'All this indeed is Brahman,' which enjoin certain types of devout meditation, establish Brahman's connexion with a world as a final truth. For Brahman may be meditated upon (not in its true character only, but also) under merely superimposed aspects: those texts therefore may be understood as merely enjoining a meditation of that kind, and as ultimately sublated by those texts which intimate Brahman's absolute freedom from all relation as final truth. Nor, again may you object that there can be no superimposition (on Brahman or any substrate) of what is absolutely non-established. For Brahman's relation to a world *is* established by the texts speaking of the creation of the world—which, to the end that Brahman's non-duality may be firmly established, suggest that relation as something to be ultimately negatived. There thus is nothing irrational in the conclusion that Brahman is not related to a world.

"But", a new objection is raised, "how can a Brahman of that kind be the Self of the individual soul, which

manifestly is related to a world in which it functions as an agent and so forth?" To this we reply as follows: That the world with all it implies—agency and the rest—is related to the individual soul is, in the first place, not to be known through an inference and the subsequent means of proof; for the fact is one immediately cognised. Nor is it to be known through the eye or other sense-organs; for as the individual soul itself is not an object of the external senses, its attributes—such as being an agent—likewise are not. Nor is the fact to be known through the internal organ; since there is no proof whatever for this. The presence and absence of the internal organ may be explained to have their function (not therein that they make us know the connexion of the individual soul with a world implying agency and such other characters, but) therein that they constitute the material cause of that world. Even on the supposition of the Self (and not the internal organ) constituting that material cause, it cannot, on the basis of its presence and absence, be shown that it is the internal organ which makes us know the individual soul's agency, &c., since that part of the argument which is based on the absence of the internal organ, is invalidated by a doubt. For the argument could have the following form only:—where the internal organ is absent, there is no presentation to consciousness of one's being an agent, &c., as in the condition of deep dreamless sleep. But this argumentation is vitiated by a doubt, inasmuch as there is no means to decide whether this special non-presentation to consciousness in deep sleep results from the non-existence, at the time, of the internal organ itself, or from the fact that the soul itself, at the time, is *not* an agent, and so forth. And there is no reason to raise the objection that, in these circumstances, there would be no means to bring about the knowledge of one's being an Agent, &c., for this knowledge is afforded by the witnessing Self.

Viv. 232.

said to operate after *all* operations of the nominative agent have ceased). If, in order to avoid this difficulty, it were asserted that the operations of the nominative agent cease (before the appearance of the result),—then that agent could not be regarded as the 'Cause' of that result [as his operation would have ceased after having produced the operation of another agency, the Instrument for instance, it would be the cause of that operation, and not of the result].

(331) [*Page* 286]. It might be urged that by 'final operation' is meant that operation after which no other agency operates (towards the accomplishment of the result).

But this also cannot be accepted; because according to the view that there is a God, there can be no cessation, at any point of time, of the operation of the 'Nominative agent' (in the shape of God); and hence as there could be no operation appearing after the operation of God, it would be the God that would, by your definition, have to be regarded as the Instrument. If however, the existence of God be not admitted, then (there are other objections—*viz.*): (1) the *object* also (in the case of sensuous cognition for instance) has such an operation in the shape of its *contact with the sense-organ* (after which contact there is no operation of any other agency towards the cognition); and thus the definition of 'Instrument' would include the *Object* also; (2) and in the case of the action of *cutting*, the operation of the Object cut is the final operation, consisting in its contact with the instrument with which it is cut (thus the operation of the *object* appearing *after* that of the Instrument); and under the circumstances how would you exclude this *object* from your definition? (3) and lastly, the definition would fail to include such well-known *Instruments* as the Hand and the like (in the case of the *cutting*, where the operation of the hand is by no means the last and 'final' operation).

(332) Nor can the Instrument be defined as that after which the Result appears. Because, if the sequence intended

Kh. 197.

were mere sequence in general, not qualified in any way, then the definition would apply equally to all the Causes that tend to bring about that result; while if *immediate sequence* were meant, then if the immediate sequence were with reference to the *operative thing* (intended to be the instrument), the definition would not apply to such well-known instruments as the sacrificial performance (whose result appears long after the sacrifice has ceased to exist);—if on the other hand the sequence were with reference to the *operation* (of that which is intended to be the Instrument), the definition would fail to include the Hand and such other Instruments (in whose case the result, *cutting* for instance, does not follow *immediately* after the *operation of the Hand*, which consists in the raising and letting fall of the axe, which is followed by the *coming into contact with the axe*, which is an operation of the object that is cut);—lastly if the sequence meant were with reference to the whole *series* of operations (tending towards the result), then the definition would apply to all the *agencies* (and not to the *Instrument* alone).

(333) [The last definition of Instrument is open to yet another objection.] If by the 'operation of the Instrument' be meant *that cause of action (final result) which is the effect of (proceeds from) that instrument*, then, inasmuch as the cause that brings about the action of inferential cognition is the minor premiss (cognition of the inferential probans) which proceeds from (is brought about by) the sense-organs, the inferential cognition would come to have for its 'instrument' that sense-organ (and thus there would be no difference between sensuous and inferential cognitions). In answer to this it might be urged that—"The operation meant is that cause of action which proceeds from something *which is actually the cause of that action*, and thus as the sense-organ is not actually the cause of inferential cognition, how could it be the 'Instrument' of that cognition?"

Kh. 198.

But this is not right; because what is that *causal character* which is not present in the sense-organ as leading to inferential cognition? If it be said that it is the character of being the necessary invariable antecedent (to inferential cognition), then we reply, that the character of being an antecedent does belong to the sense-organ (which certainly exists before the cognition appears); then as regards the *necessary* character of this antecedence, if you regard this also as a necessary condition in the 'Cause', then it is for you to put forth all the effort you can for proving this *necessary antecedence* of the sense-organ; as otherwise (*i. e.* if the sense-organ did not exist before the appearance of the inferential cognition), the sense-organ and the probans not existing at the same time, (we would have no cognition of the Inferential Indicative or Probans which is cognised only by the sense-organs, and) there would be no 'instrument' for the inferential cognition (as it is the sensuous cognition of the probans that is held to be that 'instrument'). If the 'Contact of the Mind' were held to be the necessary 'instrument' for right cognition,—then, in the first place, inasmuch as this 'contact' is present in all kinds of cognitions, there would be no distinction between *Right* and *Wrong* Cognition; and secondly, the Sense-organ and other Means of Cognition would, in this case, cease to be 'instruments' (of Cognition,—the contact of the Mind being the only 'instrument of cognition'); specially as it is a rule that when a certain generic entity is the necessary condition in another generic entity, it is only a particular form of the former that can be the necessary condition in the particular form of the latter hence inasmuch as the particular Sense-organs are universally recognised as the instruments of sensuous cognitions, which are only a particular kind of 'cognition,' the 'Sense-organ' *in general* must also be regarded as the instrument of *cognition in general*). And thus in some way or other, it has to be proved that the Sense-organ is a necessary

antecedent of 'Right Cognition'; and hence the objection that we put forward above becomes fully established. It might be urged that,—"The *necessary antecedence of the sense-organ* may be a necessary condition in 'Right Cognition' *in general*; but it cannot be so in the particular cognitions, Inferential and the like." But this is not possible; because, inasmuch as you do not add any qualifications (to Right Cognition and Inferential Cognition, etc.), what you say here does not go any further than what has already been said above; and thus if you admit the fact of the necessary antecedence of the sense-organ being a necessary condition in 'Right Cognition' in general, you have no loophole (unless you add some qualifying conditions) for denying the same with regard to the particular Right Cognitions. Otherwise there would be no instrument for any individual cognition (as such an instrument is inferred only from the fact of its being instrumental in bringing about cognitions of the same kind).

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(334) The Opponent gives up the task of establishing a general definition of 'Instrument,' and adds:—"In other cases the Instrument may be whatever it is; but the 'Instrument of Right Cognition' (which alone is what we undertake to define) is that which distinguishes (lends its name to) each of the intended particular kinds of 'Right Cognition'; there are four kinds of right cognition, *the sensuous* &c., which bear (and are characterised by) distinct names, and are recognised as distinct from one another; neither the person who cognises nor the thing cognised can be the basis or means of this distinction; it is only each of the four 'Instruments of Right Cognition' (*Pramāṇas*) which pertain specifically to each of those four kinds of cognition, each to each; and hence it is these Instruments that are the basis or means of the distinct conceptions (that we have of the four kinds of cognition) as well as of the four distinct names."

Kh. 200.

(335) This is not right. Because the introduction of the word '*vivakṣita*,' 'intended', in the above definition is like the writing of the deceitful astrologer,* and may, like it, be made to mean anything and everything ; specially as there is no limit as to what may or may not be 'intended' by different men at different times. Then again, inasmuch as *the character of being brought about by the perceived object* belongs to Direct Perception as distinctively as *that of being brought about by the sense-organ*, the *object* also would, by your definition, have to be regarded as the 'Instrument' of that perception. And lastly, in the case of the assertion of the trustworthy person, the speaker also would be something that distinguishes that particular kind of right cognition, and as such, he also will have to be regarded as the 'instrument' of that cognition. If, in answer to the last objection, you were to say—" Yes, certainly so (the trustworthy person is certainly the instrument of right verbal cognition),"—then we repeat the answer that we gave to a similar assertion of yours on a previous occasion (para. 307).

(336) For the same reasons that have been detailed above, we also reject the following definition of the 'Instrument of Right Cognition.'—"It is that which distinguishes the *non-material cause of Right Cognition—viz*: the contact of mind and soul—with a view to the distinction of the intended kinds of Right Cognition." [This definition also contains the word 'intended' and hence is open to the above objections].

Thus have been shown the objections against all explanations of the *Instrument of Right Cognition.*

* The deceitful astrologer, on being asked as to whether a man will get a son or daughter, gives his opinion in the words '*putro na putrī*,' which may mean *putro na* (not a son), *putrī* (but a daughter).; or '*putraḥ*' (a son), *na putrī* (and not a daughter). In the same manner, what one may *intend* to call 'Right Cognition,' at one time, may not be so *intended* at another time ; and thus there would be no finality to the definition of *Pramāṇa*.

Section (18).

A [Having refuted the definitions of the Instrument of Right Cognition, the author proceeds to refute the definitions of the different kinds of Right Cognition, and begins with the refutation of the definition of Sensuous Perception].

[*The first definition taken up for criticism is that propounded in the Nyāya-sūtra I-i-4.*]

I (337) In the above manner the definitions of all the particular 'Instruments of Right Cognition' also are to be refuted. And first as to Sense-perception (*Pratyakṣa*).—It has been said (by Gautama in his *Nyāya-sūtra* I, i—4) that *Sense-perception is that valid cognition which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object.* Now with regard to this, we ask—For what purpose do you give this definition? (*a*) Is it for the purpose of cognising Sense-perception as distinguished from everything else, whether homogeneous (as the other means of valid knowledge), or heterogeneous (as the object of knowledge)? (*b*) Or are the characteristic features indicated in the definition set forth to make us apprehend *Pratyakṣa* as that which gives rise to *direct* cognition? (*c*) Or is the purpose of the definition only to make it possible for people to make use of the word? (*d*) Or is it for ascertaining the signification of the word '*Pratyakṣa*'? (*e*) Or, is it for some other purpose?

(338) The *first* of these alternatives cannot be maintained. For what, we ask, do you understand by 'homogeneous'? Do you mean (*a*) such homogeneity as is based on the class-character 'sense-perception'? or (*b*) homogeneity resting on something else? The former alternative is inadmissible; for if the characteristic mark indicated by the definition is not excluded from the homogeneous things, for the differentiation of which from sense-perception the definition is intended, the definition fails to serve the purpose of differentiation; and if, on the other hand, (to escape the above difficulty) we assume that the

characteristic mark is excluded from those things, then the definition shows itself to be too narrow (inasmuch as it does not take in those *homogeneous* things which, ex-hypothesi, are also classed as 'sense-perception)'. Nor is the latter alternative (*b*) tenable; for in that case the introduction into the definition, of the word 'heterogeneous' would be purposeless; since all things are homogeneous inasmuch as they share the quality of being objects of cognition and so on. It now might be said that the homogeneity meant is that which depends on the class-character 'means of right cognition' (*i.e.* that by *distinction from homogeneous things* there is meant the distinction of Sense-perception from Inference, Upamāna, etc., all of which are 'means of right cognition'). But in that case, as that which is the thing to be defined, *viz.*, Sense-perception, is itself a 'means of right cognition,' and hence has the character of 'homogeneous,' and thus falls within the category of things meant to be excluded by the definition, there will be nothing left to be included in the definition. In answer to this it might be argued that what it is intended to exclude by the definition is that which, on the ground of the class-character of 'means of right knowledge' is homogeneous with (with regard to) the thing to be defined (*viz.* Sense-perception); and truly that which is defined can not be said to be homogeneous *with itself*; since the genitive-case (*lakṣyasya sajātiyam*) indicates difference. In that case, we reply, you might as well say only that the definition is meant to distinguish the thing to be defined from whatever is *different* from it; without mentioning 'homogeneousness' based upon the class-character of 'means of right cognition'. And in that case, if the other party (for whose benefit you propound your definition) knows what is different from the thing to be defined, it follows that he also knows the thing to be defined as different from the other things; and thus as the purpose of your definition is accomplished before the definition is given, the enunciation of the definition serves no purpose.

Kh. 208.

(339) However, let us grant that the purpose to be served by the enunciation of the definition may be stated in diverse ways, in accordance with the diversity of the aims of the persons propounding the definition. But another difficulty arises. For what the definition aims at, *viz.*, the cognition of what is different from the thing to be defined, cannot, in the first place, be accomplished unless the definition be comprehended; for if this were possible, very undesirable conclusions would have to be accepted *. Nor, in the second place, can that end be accomplished by the definition, even if comprehended; for the reason that it is extremely difficult satisfactorily to establish the definition. Let us test the definition, under discussion, of Sense-perception. Can the origination of the contact of thing and sense-organ be said to be known by Perception?—No; for in that process there is a factor (*viz.*, the sense-organ, or, sense-power) which is absolutely imperceptible. Can that origination be said to be known by an Inference based on the effects which it produces, (these effects constituting the middle term of the Inference)? or by 'Presumptive Reasoning' (*viz.*, that certain effects could not be accounted for unless we assume the aforesaid contact)?—The answer again is 'No'. For Inference and Presumption indicate only that the effect in question has *some* cause, but do not intimate the specific character of the cause; and hence, no uniform definition can be based on them. But, it may be argued, a specific kind of cause may be concluded from the fact that the effect is of a specific kind (*viz.* direct, immediate, cognition). Well, we reply, then you admit that the fact of the effect being of a specific nature has to be previously cognized;—and why then not accept this at once as a sufficient basis for the distinction of the thing to be defined from other things, both homogeneous

* If the mere *existence* of definitions were capable to effect the desired differentiations, all things would be differentiated by all definitions, each acting in its own way.

and heterogeneous? There truly is no need of your ill-conceived series of assumptions.*

(340) "With all this," our opponent resumes, "our original definition remains unrefuted; since it has not been shown to be either too wide or too narrow." But we refuse to admit this. We have clearly shown that your procedure is faulty, inasmuch as you, while it was open to you to accomplish your end by a simpler means,—*viz.*, by basing the definition of *Pratyakṣa* directly on the cognition of the specific nature of actual sense-cognition, which cognition appears first, and must necessarily be accomplished before any further step,—you have had recourse to a means which are more difficult and complicated; inasmuch as the idea on which your definition is based appears at a later stage only, and must not be formed necessarily. The mistake you have committed is analogous to that of a man who has a lamp burning already, but, in order to dispel darkness, puts himself to the needless trouble of lighting a second lamp. The man who acts thus is justly found fault with, although no fault is to be found with the second lamp (just as no fault may possibly be found with your definition viewed in itself). The fact is that the presence of a simpler means, which might have been employed, imparts to the employment of other, less simple means, the character of a *fault*; just as the presence of 'inherent absurdity' (*svarūpāsiddhi*; a certain logical fallacy) vitiates every means of right knowledge. Therefore, although your definition may not have the faults of being too wide, etc., it yet is vitiated by the general defect pointed out.

(341) [PAGE 295] This also serves for the rejection of the second alternative (stated in para. 337). For it is impossible

* The reasoning objected to is as follows: (1) The peculiar character of certain cognitions,—*viz.*, their being direct, intuitive—is used to establish the inference that they are due to the contact of sense-organs and objects. (2). The inferred circumstance thereupon is employed as the basis of the definition of *Pratyakṣa*.

to comprehend that definition unless we already know what is meant by 'directness' ('immediacy', of Perception); and if the comprehension of the definition were reached on the basis of that knowledge, there would be an objectionable 'inter-dependence.' Even if there were something other than 'directness' (as *e.g.* the character of *being produced by the object*), which would indicate the fact of *Pratyakṣa* being produced by the senses, that *something*, as being invariably, concomitant with 'directness', should itself be put forward as the definition of Sense-perception; for the reason that the apprehension of it would be nearer at hand (earlier to appear, than what you put forward as your definition). The Opponent will perhaps argue that this 'something else' need not necessarily be of such a kind that the character of *being produced by the senses* is invariably concomitant with it; since even if it were lesser in extension than this latter character, it might serve as the inferential mark which indicates that character.* But this does not remove your difficulties; as this 'mark, being of lesser extension than the character of *being produced by the senses*, which is sought to be defined, there would be instances of this latter where the said 'mark' would be absent; and as in these instances, there would be no means of knowing the character of *being produced by the senses*, it would be impossible for you to form an adequate idea of that character; and under the circumstances, how could you have any idea of 'directness' which can proceed only from the cognition of the character of *being produced by the senses*?

* The characteristic feature in the definition of a thing must be such that it includes all special cases; *i. e.*, wherever the characteristic is, there the thing defined also is. The 'something else'—let us say 'being produced by the object'—however is not such a characteristic; for there may be '*arthajatva*' where no Perception is, as in the case of a wayfarer who, while the herbs, flowers, etc., by the roadside make an impression on his sense, may not *perceive* them because his mind is otherwise engaged. The Vedāntin therefore is wrong in suggesting that this 'something else' should be introduced into the definition of Perception.

Moreover, when you accept 'being produced by the senses' as the characteristic feature of the definition of Perception although in some cases of Perception such 'being produced by the senses' cannot be ascertained, since there are no valid means to do so, and hence their 'being produced by the senses' cannot be cognised as invariably accompanying the character of 'directness of cognition';—what fault then, we ask, has been committed by other indicative things which do not invariably accompany 'directness of cognition,' (that they should be denied the honour of figuring in the definition as characteristic features)? "But" the opponent says, "in a case where we have not that particular feature to indicate the 'being produced by the senses' of *Pratyakṣha*, the required cognition may be attained through some other indicative feature." Then, we reply, this latter should be accepted as the feature at once indicating 'Directness'; and then there will be no need of the round-about method of inferring this directness from the feature of 'being produced by the senses,' which latter is, in its turn, 'inferred from some other indicative feature.' "But," the Opponent rejoins, "neither of these two indicative features is such that 'directness' is invariably concomitant with it; and hence neither of them is accepted as the characteristic element in the definition of Perception. 'Being produced by the senses', on the other hand, is such that 'directness' is invariably concomitant with it; and for this reason we employ it for the purpose of definition." But this also we reject. For, as a matter of fact, both those indicative features equally are capable to bring about the inferential cognition of 'Directness'—which is the aim of the definition; and hence there is no use of the 'being produced by the senses,' although this may be invariably accompanied by 'Directness.'

(342) Nor can we accept the third alternative proposed in para. 337. For this would mean that 'that which is produced by the contact of the sense-organs and the objects

is to be regarded and spoken of as Sense-perception'; and this meaning of the definition cannot be maintained, for the reason that the distinguishing feature referred to (*viz.* 'being produced by the contact, etc.') is something that cannot be comprehended. If that feature were to be understood through the character of 'directness' (*i. e.* if a cognition were to be regarded as produced by the said contact because of its being of the nature of direct apprehension), then this 'directness' itself should be taken as the basis of the usage of the word 'sense-perception'; since that cognition of 'directness' is a primary, non-mediated one.

(343) For the same reason, the fourth alternative (stated in para 337) cannot be accepted (*i.e.* we cannot allow that the definition, under discussion, of ***Pratyakṣa***, serves the purpose of settling the meaning of the term '*Pratyakṣa*.' Moreover, this alternative is open to a further charge, *viz.*, needless complication.* Nor, finally, can we admit the fifth alternative, *viz.*, that the statement of the definition is 'for some other purpose.' For no such purpose can be pointed out.

(344) The above stated reason† also serves to set aside another definition of Sense-Perception; *viz.*, that it is what is produced by the contact of the sense-organ with that form, or character, (of the object) which manifests itself (in the cognition) to Consciousness.—This definition moreover is open to yet another objection. The definition of course is meant to be of one special kind of the Means of Right Cognition, and hence it must be pointed out what part of the cases included in your definition of 'Means of Right Knowledge' is included

* It is very much simpler to regard the word 'Sense-perception' as denoting *direct application* than to make it signify *that which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object.*

† *Viz.*, that the fact of a cognition being produced by the contact of the sense-organ with an object cannot be ascertained; or else that the statement of the definition cannot be shown to have a purpose.

in the definition under consideration, and what part is excluded. Now your definition of the 'Means of Right Cognition shows that all wrong cognition is excluded from it. But from this it follows that the above definition of Perception, as it stands, is not a correct definition, inasmuch as even *wrong* perceptions (such as of silver in the shell) are produced by the contact of the sense-organ with that form (of the object) which, in the cognition, manifests itself to consciousness; for what does so manifest itself is the character of *being* (and of *being a substance* and so on). And if, in defence of the definition, it should be said that the definition understands by 'the form which manifests itself' the particular character of the object (so that the definition would exclude the perception of shell-silver (where the particular character of 'being silver' does not exist, and therefore is not in contact with the sense-organ), we must demur to this also. For, we ask, does the definition mean that Sense-perception is cognition produced by the contact of the sense-organ,—(*a*) with some only of the forms or aspects manifesting themselves ?—or (*b*) with all such aspects ? On the former alternative (*a*) the definition would, in the first place, fail to exclude wrong cognitions (such as that of shell-silver, in which *some* particular forms at any rate manifest themselves); and it would in the second place, fail to exclude non-determinate (*nirvikalpaka*) cognition (in which no particular character whatever manifests itself, the object being realized only as *something*).

(345) Nor again is the second alternative (*b*) possible; since none of the alternatives springing from it can be admitted. For, we ask, when you say that the sense-organ is in contact with all the forms (aspects, features) which manifest themselves, do you mean that the organ is in contact with that which has the character of 'manifesting itself' as a permanent qualification ? or with that which possesses

that character as a mere temporary mark?* The former alternative cannot be accepted: for before actual Perception takes place, those aspects do not possess the quality of 'manifesting themselves' and if this quality is to be viewed as a necessary factor of the *cause* of Perception, it must be in existence before the Perception takes place (it must possess the antecedent existence required in all Causes). Then, as to the second alternative, let us examine the further alternatives springing from that. Do you, we ask, mean to attach significance to the *present* tense implied in 'manifesting itself' (*bhāsamāna*; which is a Present Participal)? or do you not? You cannot do the latter; for the cognition 'this is a jar' is one that is produced by the contact of the sense-organ with all the aspects which manifest themselves, and yet it cannot be regarded as a valid Sense-perception with regard to the Self† ' for the reason that the Self does not form an object of that cognition, while yet the validity of a cognition depends on its having a definite object. For it has to be acknowledged as a rule that *Praṭyakṣaṭva* (*i.e.*, being of the nature of Perception), which is a special class of *prāmāṇya* (*i.e.*, being of the nature of Valid Knowledge) can refer to those objects only with regard to which it possesses validity. Were this not so, what answer could you give to the person who would bring forward the perception 'this is a jar' as a valid proof for the existence of a piece of cloth?

(346) "Well," our opponent says, "I give the following reply—The cognition of the jar is not the perception of the

* Is 'manifesting itself' to be viewed as a permanent intrinsic feature (*Visheṣaṇa*) of those aspects which manifest themselves; or as a mere *upalakasaṇa*, i.e., a temporary adventitious (extrinsic) character?

† If the 'manifesting itself' of the definition were not limited to aspects manifesting themselves at the time of Perception, it might be said that when a jar is perceived the Self also is perceived; for all Perception is produced by the contact of the Self also with the sense-organ; and the Self, although not manifesting itself at the time of the perception of a jar, certainly does manifest itself, in Perception, at other times; as in the inward perception 'I am.'

cloth, for the simple reason that it is not produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the latter (*i.e.*, the cloth)." But we ask, in return, is then the cognition of the jar by the contact of the sense-organ with the Self, the perception of the Self? "How could this possibly be?'—the opponent will perhaps reply,—" considering that, as a matter of fact, the Self does not manifest itself in the cognition of the jar, although this cognition be produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the Self?" But have you then forgotten that you are at present arguing on the basis of the supposition that the implication of *present* time, contained in the participle '*bhāsamāna*, is not to be attended to (and that hence it does not matter whether or no the Self manifest itself together with the cognition of the jar)? For certainly, the Self *does* manifest itself at some times, and to some persons; were this not so, it would have to be regarded as *unknowable* (which the Logician does not admit).

(347). The Opponent attempts a further explanation "The Sense-perception as defined above means perception with regard to *its own* object, not with regard to other objects also." But this also does not advance us. For if the 'its own' refers to Perception in general (to 'any Perception'), the objection urged above remains in force (*i.e.*, the perception of the jar would be the perception of the Self also, the latter also being the object of some inward, perceptional cognition). If, on the other hand, an individual cognition were referred to by the 'its own,' then the definition as it stands would be too wide; inasmuch as neglecting that unique character which belongs to the thing to be defined, it extends to Perceptions other also than that one particular Perception; for it is clear that other individual cognitions which also fulfil the condition of the definition do not possess the unique character of that particular cognition which it is intended to define. The Opponent will perhaps

Kh. 211.

plead that the intention is to define other particular cognitions *also*, and that a definition in reality is too wide only when it extends to things not intended to be defined. But this also we cannot admit. For that particular unique character which you hold to be that which it is intended to define cannot be the character of other Perceptions ; and how therefore can you attempt, by means of the word *also* (in 'other particular cognitions also') to include more than one perception, reducing all of them to one common category (and thus renouncing that very uniqueness with which you started) ? The fact is that whatever of *common character* (pertaining to all perceptions) there may have been in your original definition, has been reduced by you to one individual unique character, when you introduced into the definition the words 'its own object'. The objection to making the phrase 'its own' refer to any Perception in general, has already been stated. Moreover the phrase 'its own' cannot possibly be made to denote a character present in all perceptional cognitions. And in the absence of this a Perception having one thing for its object would have to be regarded as valid with regard to another object !

(348) Nor can the former alternative (mentioned in para. 345) be accepted; that is to say, it will not be right to assert that significance *is* intended to be attached to the Present tense in '*bhāsamāna*'. For none of the alternatives that this would give rise to can be maintained. With reference to what would the *manifestation* be in the 'present'? (1) Would it be with reference to the 'contact'? (2) Or to anything? If the former, this view would in no way differ from the view that the 'contact of the sense-organ' is with the object as *qualified* (*vishiṣṭa*) *by the* character *of being manifested* (which also presupposes the fact of the *manifestation* being *present* at the time of the 'Contact'); and as such it would be open to the same objections that we have pointed out against this last view (in paras. 345-

Kh. 212.

48). And as regards the second alternative, it would simply mean that no significance whatever is intended to be attached to the Present Tense; as in this case the *character of being manifested* (*bhāsamānatva*) would have to be regarded as belonging to objects that *have been manifested* in the past, and also those that *will be manifested* in the future (as these also would be 'present' with reference to something or the other),—both of which are intended to be excluded (by making the Present Tense significant).

(349) It might be urged that what is meant is that the object is manifested *after the contact of the sense-organ*; and hence this *present character* of the manifestation is certainly intended to be signified. But this is not right, we reply, because the Self also becomes manifested *after the sense-contact*; for certainly it cannot be denied that the time at which the Self is cognised by the Mind is *after-sense-contact* *. "What we mean," says the opponent, "is not any *sense-contact* in general, but that *particular* sense-contact *after which the manifestation of the object comes about.*" This again is not right, we reply; because in many cases (where the cognition of the jar is followed by the idea of the Self) it does actually happen that the *manifestation* of the Self comes about immediately after the sense-contact of the Jar (and so, according to you, the perception in this case would be a *valid sense-perception of the Self*). In answer to this it might be urged that "this manifestation of the Self is a totally different manifestation, and not *that* (particular) manifestation (of the jar, which is what is intended)." But (you thus limit the 'manifestation' of your definition to the particular manifestation of some particular thing), in that case, your definition would become too narrow; inasmuch as it would be applicable to the case of the manifestation of that one thing only (and not to all *Sense-perception*).

* As certainly some sense-contact must have occurred at some point of time previous to the Cognition of the Self.

(350) *The Opponent adds a further explanation:—"There would be no incongruity if we were to assert that the *Valid Sense-perception* of a certain thing is that manifestation of this thing which comes about from the sense-contact of the thing." But this also we cannot accept. For the manifestation (cognition) *of the jar*, according to the logician, proceeds from the contact of the (cognising) Self with the sense-organ; and hence by your definition, the manifestation of the jar would be the *valid sense-perception* of the Self! You might retort—"As the Self is not the object of that manifestation, how could it be as you say?" But then, in your explanation, you do not say that the thing with which the sense-organ is in contact is that same thing which forms the object of the cognition in question; you only say, in general terms, 'the sense-contact of *the thing*;' and it is for this reason that we have put forward the above objection. If, however, you do not add the specifying qualification of the contact being with *that thing* which is the object of cognition,—then, if by 'cognition' you mean all cognitions in general then the aforesaid objection remains in force (as the Self also is an object of some cognition); if, on the other hand, you take it to refer to a particular individual cognition,—then the definition fails to include *all* Sense-perception. For in that case the word 'that' would be different for each individual cognition; since there is no such generic (comprehensive) concept as 'this' or 'that' (which would include all things that can be referred to by those words).

(351) Even for Prabhākara, who holds that every cognition consists of three factors (the *cognition*, the thing *cognised*, and the *cogniser*) [and who, for this reason, will readily admit that the Sense-perception of the cognised jar implies the Sense-perception of the cognising Self],—the objection would remain that, by the aforesaid definition, the cognition of the

* The reasoning in this paragraph is based to a great extent on verbal quibbling; hence the real drift can hardly be grasped in the English version.

Cloth would be the valid sense-perception of the Jar,—just in the same manner as we have shown above that the cognition of the jar would be the valid Sense-perception of the Self. If with a view to avoid this incongruity, you were to add the qualification 'that which is produced by the sense-contact of *that* thing',—then inasmuch as the words 'that' and 'which' would refer only to individual things, the definition would fail to include *all* Sense-perception. If then the denotations of the words 'that' and 'which' consisted of all-comprehensive concepts (including all things), then the cognition of the jar would have to be regarded as the valid Sense-perception of other things also (the words 'that' and 'which' of the definition referring equally to *all things*).

(352) If now (with a view to avoid the objection that the cognition of the jar would have to be regarded as the Sense-perception of the Self) * you were to add the *qualifying* clause 'other than the Self,' then, in that case, there would be no Sense-perception of the Self† (which is regarded by the Logician to be *perceptible*). And further, if the word 'that' were to be taken as including *all things*, then, there being no specification available, the cognition of the jar would have to be regarded, as the Sense-perception of the Cloth as well!

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(353) The objections that we have put forward against the last (second) definition of Sense-perception are found to be applicable to the first definition also (mentioned in para. 337) —viz. that 'Sense-perception is that valid cognition which is produced by the contact of the sense-organ and the object.

* The definition being—"the cognition proceeding from the sense-contact of a thing *other than the self*, is the Sense-perception of that thing. Or 'the cognition that proceeds from the sense-contact of a thing is the Sense-perception of that thing (which is *other than that self*).'

† As the first objection would be accepted by the Prābhākara, the author puts forward another objection which is valid against the Prābhākara as well as the Naiyāyika.'

For by this definition also, the Sense-perception of one object will have to be regarded as the valid cognition of another object. And if, in order to avoid this difficulty, you were to add the explanation that—"that cognition (which proceeds from the contact of a certain object is to be regarded as the Valid Sense-perception *of that object*,"—then you lay yourself open to the objections which we have shown above to hold good in both cases—*i. e.*, both when you regard the words 'this' and 'that' as pertaining to particular individual things, as well as when these are regarded as referring to all things (see paras. 350-51).

(354) Then again, the word 'Valid' (*'avyabhichāri'*) in your definition is absolutely useless. For the cognition of *silver* in the *shell* is not produced by the contact of the sense-organ with the *silver*.* It might be urged that in this case also there is *with the silver* also, a *contact*, in the form of (and through) the impression that is present in the mind (having been left there by some previous perception of real silver).† But this we refuse to admit, on the ground that the 'impression' that is present is not that of the 'silver-ness' (generic character of 'silver') *as residing in what is before the eye*, (*i. e.*, the shell)‡; and the *invalidity* too of the cognition is only in reference to such *silver-ness*, and not to *silverness in general*, which latter does really exist elsewhere (and a cognition of which would not be *invalid*).

(355) §If 'Sense-perception' be defined as 'direct or immediate cognition,'—then it would include also those direct or

* And hence this invalid cognition would be precluded by the qualification 'brought about by the contact of the *object* and the sense-organ'; and the word *'avyabhichāri'*, meant to exclude such invalid cognitions, would be useless.

† And that hence this would not be excluded unless we add the qualification *avyabhichāri*.

‡ The impression is that of real silver; whereas what is cognised is the character of silver as residing in the object before the eye; and with regard to this latter then, there being no impression, there can be no *contact* in the form of the impression either.

§A third definition of 'Sense-perception' is now taken up.

immediate cognitions *which are wrong.* It might be urged that,—"we may add to the definition the qualification *valid* or *not incorrect* (from the standpoint of the Logician); or we may (from the standpoint of the Prābhākara*) absolutely deny the existence of any *wrong cognition*—which, according to him, is nothing else than the *non-perception of the difference* between the two things concerned." But this view, we reply, cannot be maintained; as none of the alternatives of which it is capable is tenable. (*a*) Does the definition serve its purpose (of differentiating, and of ordinary usage in speech and action) when it has been itself comprehended? (*b*) or does it serve it while it is itself uncomprehended? The latter view cannot be accepted; because in that case, there would be no need for stating the definition; as the only purpose served by the statement of the definition is that it tends to bring about the comprehension of that definition,—and according to the view in question, the purposes of the definition are served while it is itself uncomprehended (so that its comprehension is not required for any useful purpose). Then as regards the first of the two alternatives mentioned, we ask—is the comprehension of the definition brought about by something else? or by your own statement? If by something else, then there is no necessity for the trouble that you take in stating the definition; as the only purpose served by the statement of the definition is the bringing about of its comprehension, and this comprehension is brought about by something else. If, on the other hand the comprehension is brought about by your own statement of it, then, we ask,—does your statement afford the comprehension of the 'directness of perception' by reason of its being the assertion of a trustworthy person (yourself)? or by reason of its having

* According to Prabhākara, when we have the idea of silver in the shell, we have simply the *absence* of the cognition of the difference between the two substances,—and not any *positively wrong cognition.* So according to this view, there is no such thing as 'Wrong Cognition,' which would be included in the above definition.

the character of an 'inferential indicative' (and thereby affording an *inferential* cognition of that *directness* ? The latter view is not possible, because it can not be shown that your *statement* is 'invariably concomitant' with the *directness of perception* (and without concomitance, the former cannot be a true *inferential indicative*). Nor is the former view tenable ; because your *trustworthiness* is not accepted by your disputant ; if it were accepted by him, then all that you seek to prove would be established by your merely asserting it, and there would be absolutely no need for you, in any case, to put forward reasons (in support of your views).

(356) The Logician now adds the following explanation: —" In stating the definition of Sense-perception what we do is to point out the fact of the character of 'directness' being the basis or reason of a certain cognition being spoken of as 'Sense-perception', to a person who knows what 'directness' is, but does not know that it is the basis or ground of a cognition being called 'Sense-perception.' And this pointing out is done only by way of inference, and not by a trustworthy assertion. Hence in stating the definition we are only putting forward the following inferential reasoning based upon universal negative premises :—*All Auditory and other Valid Cognitions,—or All Direct or Immediate Cognitions*—should be recognised or viewed as 'Sense-perception',—as they are Direct Cognitions,—*because every cognition that is not called 'Sense-perception' is not immediate*—as we find in the case of inferential cognitions';—the cognitions in question however are *immediate*,—hence they must be called 'Sense-perception.' The sentences too that put forward this reasoning are put forward, by the disputant, not as 'trustworthy assertion', but only as recalling to the mind the 'invariable concomitance' which is already known and accepted ; or even when the invariable concomitance is not already known, the statement of the reasoning serves, at the time that the reasoning is put forward, to produce, in the mind of the opponent to whom it

Kh. 218.

is addressed, a desire to comprehend that concomitance, and thereby to bring about the knowledge of the invariable concomitance needed for the Valid Cognition (afforded by that concomitance); and thus there is no room for the objections urged in the preceding paragraph."

(357) The above explanation cannot be accepted. What do you mean by saying that "the cognitions should be recognised as *Sense-perception* (*pratyakṣatayā vyavahartavyāḥ*)?* Does the peculiarity of this recognition, or *vyavahāra*, consist in the peculiarity of its object (in the shape of the *character of Sense-perception*)? or in the peculiarity of the word to be employed in the *recognition*?

(358) In the former case, [does the person, to whom the above inferential reasoning is addressed, already know, by some other means, the *recognition* or *vyavahāra* of the particular object,—*i. e., the character of Sense-perception*? or does he not know it at all?] if he did not already know it, then, how could he have any idea,—even by the help of the statement of your definition—that with regard to the Direct Cognition, he † *should* bring about that *recognition* (*i. e.* that he *should* recognise Direct Cognitionas 'Sense-perception')? As certainly a person who does not know *fire* can never be made, even by means of inferential reasonings, to understand

* The assertion 'they should be recognised as Sense-perception' cannot be regarded as declaring mere recognition in general; as in that case the additional words 'as sense-perception' would be absolutely redundant. So it must mean that the Cognitions in question are the objects of a *particular* recognition. Now, what is this particular recognition? Recognition or usage is of two kinds—(1) in the form of mere ideas, and (2) in the form of speech. Does then the assertion mean that the Cognitions in question are the objects of a *recognition* in the form of an *idea* of which the object is the *character of Sense-perception*? or does it mean that they are the objects of recognition in the form of being spoken of as 'Sense-perception'? That is to say, do you mean that they are to be *known* as 'Sense-perception or that they are to be *spoken* of as 'Sense-perception'?

† And it is this idea that is expressed in the word '*vyavahartayāḥ*'; the sense is that until one already knows what a certain thing is, he cannot have the idea that *he should do that thing*.

the *relationship of fire.* If, on the other hand, he already knew it, then, inasmuch as it is absolutely unnecessary to make known what is already known, the statement of its definition, in the form of an inference, would be entirely useless. "But," the opponent rejoins, "One may have some sort of a vague notion in general terms that there is *some object* of the *Recognition of Sense-perception*, but he may not know the particular thing that should be recognised as 'sense-perception;' and it is to such persons that the definition is stated in the above mentioned inferential form." This also, we reply, is not possible. For what does such a man know? Does he know, merely in a vague and general manner, that *a recognition* has a basis (or object)? or that any *particular* recognition has such a basis? In the former case, the knowledge would be of no use in the case in question; as what we are considering is the case of a particular Recognition or usage (of 'Sense-perception,' and not of mere *usage in general*). In the latter case, to what would this *particular character* of the Recognition be due? (*i. e.*, is it due to the peculiarity of the *object* or to that of the *word* ?). Thus you are forced back upon the dilemma put forward by us in para. 357 (the former of which two alternatives we have already shown to be untenable, and the latter also, we are going to show in para. 360, cannot be accepted).

(359) [*Page* 308] In the above manner the acceptance of all definition has to be rejected. For instance, things* cannot be accepted simply because there is a mere valid cognition (pure and simple) [produced by their definition]; as in that case, the rule of acceptance would be too wide (and confusing). If on the other hand, the thing has to

* Shall we accept the Jar as existing simply because its definition provides us with some vague valid cognition, in a general way? or, because its definitions afford a valid cognition *of the Jar*? In the former case, the valid cognition with regard to one thing might be the ground for the accepting of another thing. In the latter case, there is a vicious circle: the idea of the Jar afforded by the definition depending upon the Valid Cognition of that same Jar.

be accepted on account of the Valid Cognition *of that thing* (afforded by the definition), then who could avoid the inevitable vicious circle? If, in order to avoid this, the 'cognitive character' were held to be a peculiar characteristic (of the *Cognition* of that thing, and not of the thing itself, as in the latter case alone could there be the aforesaid 'vicious circle'), —then that would be a strong footing acceded to the theory that the Cognition has the shape or form (of its object).* Then again, just as the inferential and other characters ('*anumānaṭva, āgamaṭva &c.*) do not proceed, or arise, from any *objects* (but from the Premisses, Words, &c.),—so, in the same manner, the *character of the Cognition of the thing* also would proceed, not from the thing, (but from something else), [as by the view under consideration this character belongs to the *Cognition, and not to the thing*]; and thus the *object* would become a non-entity; [the Cognition pertaining to *Cognition, and not to things*]. †

And further, the particular cognition of a certain thing could not be accepted without a cognition of that cognition; and so on and on, for each cognition,—there being no end to this running after the series of cognitions! The Opponent might ask—"Under the circumstances, what would be the refuge for all the usage (of Speech and Action) with regard to things and their cognitions,—the usage which is always

* The Logician's standpoint is that the cognition differs from its object simply because, while the latter has a form, the former is formless. This view will not be compatible with the theory that the 'cognitive character' is a peculiar characteristic of the *cognition*, and not of the *thing*. Because this latter view would be possible only if there were an absolute identity between the Cognition and the thing Cognised; and this would mean that both are with form. And further, this identification of the Thing with its Cognition would be accepting the Idealistic position of the Bauddha.

† This is meant to combat the view that 'cognitive character' belongs to the Cognition, not by its own nature, but by reason of its relationship to the object cognised, and thus the necessity of the external object, as apart from the Cognition, remains. What the author means is that even so, the character would proceed from the Cognition, and not from the Object; just like other characters of cognitions—*inferential, verbal* and the like.

Kh. 221.

appearing before us, on the strength of the unanimity found with regard to it among all men and Scriptures?" To this we reply—These usages being found absolutely incapable of being established by the various theories propounded (by the Logician and his allies),—their sole refuge lies in surrendering themselves to the feet of the Philosophy of Indescribability. *

(360) Nor can we accept the second alternative mentioned in para. 357—That is, the peculiarity of the Recognition or *Vyavahāra* consists in the peculiarity of the word to be employed in the Recognition. Because, according to this view, the meaning of the inferential reasoning put forward in para. 356 would be as follows:—'The Auditory and other cognitions should be spoken of as (called) *Sense-perception* because they are direct or immediate cognitions, and so forth' And this also would not be right. As if you apply the word 'Sense-perception' to Immediate Cognition, simply because the word is not applied to the Non-immediate Cognitions,—*inferential* and the like,—then, for exactly the same reason, you should apply, with regard to the Immediate Cognition, all such words as '*hares horn*,' '*ja-va-ga-da-ḍa-sha*'† and the like (which latter also are not applied to non-immediate cognition)! In answer to this, you might urge that, "as a matter of fact, such words as '*ja-va-ga-da-ḍa-sha*' and the like are not known to have any meaning at all (being absolutely meaningless), for the simple reason that they are never used for expressing any thing; then, as regards such words as 'hare's horn' and the like, these also are known as pertaining to (denoting) things that have absolutely no existence; on the other hand, such words as 'sense-perception' and the like are universally known as pertaining to things that are really existent, as we often meet with such

* That is, the whole usage must be regarded as 'indescribable.'

† This is one of the '*praṭyāhāra-sūṭras*' of Pāṇini, where we have a combination of all the letters of the alphabet.

expressions as 'such and such a thing is quite perceptible by the senses' and so forth; and certainly, this makes a great difference (between the case of the word 'Sense-perception' and that of such words as 'hare's horn' and '*ja-va-ga-da-ḍa-sha*,' &c.)." This again will not serve your purpose, we reply. Because even this distinction cannot exclude such words as 'visual' and the like (which also are not applied to *inferential* and other cognitions); and hence, by your reasoning, these words would be applicable to each and every *Immediate* Cognition (and not to those obtained through the eye alone). "But," the Opponent rejoins, "as a matter of fact we find that even though the Auditory Cognition is *immediate*, the word 'visual' is not applied to it; which is not the case with the word 'Sense-perception' (which is found to be applied to all immediate Cognitions); and this makes a difference (between the cases of the words 'visual' and 'Sense-perception')." Well, in that case, the statement of the definition would be addressed to that person who already knows that 'the word *Sense-perception* is not applied to that cognition which is not immediate, and is applied to all those cognitions that are immediate'; and as such a person will have already ascertained the denotation of the word 'Sense-perception', just like the denotation of any ordinary word, by means of positive and negative induction (implied in the above two propositions),—the statement of the definition would be absolutely useless.

(361) The same reasonings should also be taken as refuting the theory that what is sought to be proved by the inferential reasoning put forward in para. 356, is that the Cognitions in question should be spoken of as *distinguished from inferential and other cognitions*; [as this differentiation also would be learnt by positive and negative induction from usage, and no statement of the definition would be needed for that purpose]. It might be urged that, "the statement of the definition serves the purpose of reminding the person

Kh. 223.

of the denotation of the word which he knows already." But this also cannot be admitted. Because for one who knows the conventional meaning of the word 'Sense-perception,' all that would be needed for reminding him of that meaning would be simply the mention of the word 'Sense-perception,' and the statement of the definition would remain as useless as ever. In fact, if a person already knowing the meaning of a certain word, while remembering that meaning by the help of the word only, were to stand in need of being reminded of it by means of the statement of its definition,—then it would be necessary to put forward definitions again in order to remind him of the meanings of the words contained in that definition; as the two cases would be exactly analogous; and so also with regard to the meanings of words contained in this latter definition; and so on and on, there would be no end to such definitions!

(362) The Opponent proceeds——"The statement of the definition has certainly no use when addressed to the opponent in a discussion, as he does not acknowledge the trustworthy character of his disputant; in fact in all scientific works, definitions are stated for the purposes of the pupil; he regards the author of the work as trustworthy and authoritative; consequently when the teacher puts forward to him the definition in the form—'what you already know to be expressed by the word 'Immediate-Cognition' is also what is meant by the word 'Sense-perception,'—this statement of the definition convinces the pupil as regards the meaning of the word, simply by reason of its being *a trustworthy assertion* for him." This is not right, we reply; as if scientific works are addressed only to pupils, and not to opponents, then, inasmuch as the pupil would be convinced of the truth of the theories by a mere categorical statement of these, there would be absolutely no need for the putting forward of any reasonings, &c.

Kh. 224.

(363) In answer to this, if you hold that, "that sentence in scientific works which contains the statement of reasonings, &c., may be regarded as addressed to the Opponent, while the statement of the definition is of use to the pupil only, who is convinced of the trustworthy character of the author of the work,"——even then, your position will not be tenable; as the purpose for which the teacher would propound the definition would, according to you, be the mere pointing out of the meaning of a certain word; and this purpose is served by other works, which have been composed by the sages with the professed purpose of pointing out the conventional meanings of words,——such works, for instance, as those dealing with the meanings and genders of words, grammar, and so forth. Then if the subject-matter of your scientific work were only such as is already dealt with and accomplished by other works, then why do you not make it your business to ascertain the etymology of words, pointing out the roots from which they are derived and the affixes by which they are formed? Why too do you not proceed to mention the genders of words? For certainly ignorance on these points also is conducive to defeat in a discussion (just as much as the ignorance of the meanings of such words as 'Sense-perception' and the like). Or it may be that you do not deal in your works with the subject-matter of grammar, but restrict yourself to the expressing of the meanings of words. But even then, your work remains extremely deficient on that point; as there are many other words explained in other dictionaries,—why have not these words been explained by you? If you reply that you explain, in your works, not all words, but only those that are of use in your own books,—then too, just as you have to state the definition of a word occurring in a certain sentence in your book, in the same manner, it would be necessary for you to state the definitions of words appearing in the statement of the former definitions; and so on and on, there would be no end to the definitions of words occurring in those

Kh. 225.

definitions; as each one of these words will have been used in your books, (and as such calling for definitions from you)! If you say that you point out the meanings of such words as 'Sense-perception' and the like, because as regards the meanings of these words, there is a difference of opinion among various disputants putting forward diverse definitions; while with regard to other words, there being no such difference of opinion, you do not explain these latter,—then too we reply, there is a deficiency in your works. As there are many words (not explained by you) with regard to the meanings of which there is a clear difference of opinion; for instance (1) with regard to the indeclinables *vā* (or) and the like, some people hold that they have independent denotations of their own, while others hold them to be merely illuminative (of the meanings of other words); (2) such words as '*chhiḍura*' and the like are regarded by some to have an active and by others a passive signification; (3) the word '*bhāva*' is regarded by some as meaning 'the individual form of a thing' and by others as denoting the genus of 'being'; (4) the word '*aḍhikaraṇa*' is held by some to denote *something that prevents a thing from falling*, and by others as expressing that *in which something else inheres*; and so forth. Why then have you not put forward definitions of these? We desist from further prolongation of discussion on this subject.

[It is not possible to define what the 'immediateness' of the cognition is]

(364). Further, we ask—what do you mean by the 'immediateness' of the Cognition? It cannot be defined as consisting in the fact of the Cognition being the manifestation (in consciousness) of the object with specific qualifications.* Because, if the character of *being with specific qualifica-*

* The qualification 'with specific qualifications' has been added for the purpose of excluding Inferential Cognition etc, where though the object is manifested, it is so only in its general form and not as endowed with its specific qualifications.

tions were a mere extrinsic or * *accidental feature* of the object cognised, then the said 'immediateness' would apply to *inferential* and other cognitions also.† If, on the other hand, the character be an intrinsic and permanent attribute of the object, then for the sake of the cognition of that attribute also, we should have to have another attribute; and so on and on, a whole series of attributes would be necessary; and if there were to be any end to this series, then of the *last* 'attribute' of this series, if there could be a cognition without a further attribute,—then, inasmuch as the cognition of that attribute would not have the character of 'Sense-perception', the whole series, down to the very first cognition, would have to be regarded as '*Non-sensuous*'. If, on the other hand, there were to be no end to the series [i.e., if every attribute were to be perceived by the senses along with all its attributes], ‡ then the Sense-perception embodied in the minor premiss (wherein the concomitance of the minor term and the inferential probans is asserted) also would be one that would include within itself the Sensuous perception of *all its attributes*; and as the inferential conclusion following from that premiss would also pertain to the same object (the

* The distinction between *upalakṣana*, an accidental feature or character, and *Vishēṣana*, permanent attribute, has been explained in a footnote under para 345.

† Even though in the inferential cognition of fire in the mountain, the fire that is cognised is only in the vague generic form of *fire in general*, and not as fire with certain definite properties of *colour* &c,—yet there can be no doubt that the fire is cognised along with such accidental peculiarities, as *existing in the mountain, giving out smoke*, and so forth, which even though not its intrinsic permanent attributes, are yet its specific qualifications for the time being.

‡ In the inferential cognition, the mountain contains fire because it is smoking, the minor premiss is in the form 'wherever smoke is, there is fire.' This being a fact of *sense-perception* would mean that the *smoke* as well as the *fire* are cognised by the senses, *along with all their attributes*. And from this it should follow that the conclusion drawn from this premiss involves the cognition of *fire with all its attributes*, as the *fire* that forms the predicate of the inferential conclusion must be of the same character as that appearing in the premiss. Hence there would be no difference between the fire as cognised by Sense-perception and that cognised by Inference, and thus this latter would fulfil all the conditions of 'immediateness.'

minor term with all its attributes), the inferential cognition would have to be regarded as 'immediate.'

(365). In reply to this it might be urged that,—"inasmuch as the premiss does not provide a comprehensive cognition (of all *attributes*, of *fire*, for instance), there could be no inferential cognition of these." But in that case, in the first place, there would be no possibility of any comprehensive cognition of all those attributes; and secondly, there would be no possibility of any *inferential* cognition of any *individuals*.* [It might be argued that no generic entity can be cognised without a cognition of the individuals constituting it. But] just as the generic entity cannot be cognised without the individuals constituting it, so the individual also can never be cognised without its endless attributes. If you think that—"in the case of the inferential cognition it is not necessary to have the idea of all the endless attributes† of the object of that cognition, for the simple reason that in this case the cognition does not remain incomplete without that idea (while in the case of the cognition of the generic *class*, it is incomplete until there is some idea of the innumerable individuals constituting it,)"—then‡ we would meet that by the counter-argument that, as a matter of fact, the cognition of the

* Because, just as the inferential conclusion cannot pertain to the fire with its endless attributes, in the same manner it could not pertain to the endless *individual* fires;—the object of inferential cognition being only the *fire* as a generic entity.

† We cannot have any cognition of the class unless we have an idea of the individuals constituting it. But the inferential cognition of fire in the mountain is found to be accomplished even without our having any knowledge of its endless attributes.

‡ The idea underlying this rather obscure passage is that we cannot accept the categorical denial that the cognition of fire does *not* need for its completion, the cognition of its endless attributes. As a matter of fact, we have as much reason to regard the cognition of attributes as indispensable for the cognition of the object to which they belong as the cognition of the individuals is in that of the class containing them. And under the circumstances, if you do not regard as indispensable, the cognition of the attributes as an integral part of the inferential cognition, then, inasmuch as it cannot be denied that we have their cognition, it will have to be taken as Sense-perception.

Kh. 228.

individual thing (fire, for instance) is not found to be complete without some idea of its endless attributes; and hence [if this necessary idea of the attributes of the object of inferential cognition were not regarded as forming an integral part of that object] that idea of the attributes would have to be regarded as 'sensuous'!

(366) And further [inasmuch as under this alternative it would be absolutely necessary to postulate the cognition of an endless series of specific attributes], rather than assume the cognition (manifestation) of an *endless* series of attributes, which are never found to be actually cognised, it would certainly be much simpler to assume the presence of a *single* attribute in the shape of 'immediateness'! Specially as the only ground that you have for making the assumption of the endless attributes is the necessity of finding a basis for the well-recognised fact of certain cognitions being universally regarded as 'immediate'! And certainly this fact could be easily explained on the basis of the single attribute of 'immediateness' (which obviates the necessity of assuming an endless series of attributes). Nor, on this ground, would it be right to assume the single attribute of 'immediateness' (as serving the purposes of the required definitions of 'Sense-perception); because of the same reason that has been shown above.* This matter (of the definition of 'immediateness') we shall deal with in greater detail later on (when we shall examine the nature of the generic character of 'immediateness.')

* This reason has been variously explained by the commentators—(1) The *Shāṅkarī* explains the reason as 'because such an immediateness would apply also to the *inferential* cognition of the immediateness of the object cognised.' (2) The *Chitsukhī*—"Because no such character as 'immediateness' is found to be actually cognised in any case; and because the well-known fact of certain cognitions being universally regarded as *immediate* can be explained on the basis of the *immediateness* which, according to the Vedantin, is as *incapable* of definition or explanation *anirvachanīya*) as everything else. The *Vidyāsāgarī* favours this latter interpretation.

Kh. 229.

(367) [Page 317] What again do you mean by the word '*vishēṣa*' ('specific qualifications,' as occurring in your definition of 'immediateness')? If it means 'that which differentiates or distinguishes,' then your definition will fail to include the *non-determinate* Perception.* If on the other hand the '*vishēṣa*' be held to be the specific individual form of the object as apart from everything else in the world, and 'Sense-perception' to be the manifestation of this individual form,—which can be said of *non-determinate* perception also,—then this character of 'Sense-perception' would not apply to the *sensuous* cognition, from a distance, of a thing in its vague, generic form†. Because if even in this vague generic cognition the thing were to be cognised as 'apart from all the rest of the universe,' then there would be no possibility of Doubt, etc., in any case.‡ It might be argued that in the case of the vague generic cognition also, there is a 'manifestation of specific qualifications,' inasmuch as there are present (even in such cases) such distinctions as those due to the *cogniser* and so forth.§ But in that case, the same being true of the *inferential* and other kinds of cognition also, these also would become included in 'sensuous perception.'

* As in this there is no notion of any kind of differentation or distinction; and yet it is regarded by the logician to be 'sense-perception' *par excellence*, which has been defined by the *Nyāyasūtra* as something that is 'non-determinate' (*anirdēshya*).

† When from a distance we see a tree, we perceive it simply, in a general way as a 'tree,' and not as having certain properties that go to individualise it and show it to be 'apart from all other trees, and all other things in the world.'

‡ We have a doubt only when we have a vague perception of the thing, and do not perceive exactly whether the thing we see is a post or a human figure. If in all cognitions, we were to perceive the thing as apart from everything else, then the post would be perceived *as post*; and hence there would be no possibility of our ever regarding it as a human figure.

§ The sense of this is that the perception need not be the manifestation of the thing as distinguished from all other things, etc.; if there is the manifestation of some sort of distinction, that is enough. And even though in a generic cognition we may not perceive any other distinguishing feature of the thing, yet the fact is always present in our mind that we, as the cogniser of that cognition, are distinct from the cogniser of other cognitions. And thus the vague generic cognition also fulfils the necessary conditions of 'immediateness.'

Kh. 280.

(368) "The 'immediateness' of Perception may be explained as consisting in its being *an apprehension brought about by the instrumentality of the sense-organs.*" Against this some people put forward the objection that, inasmuch the 'sense-organ' also is defined as that which is the instrument of 'immediate cognition', there is a mutual inter-dependence (between the two definitions). But this objection is not quite right; because it is quite possible to define 'sense-organ' as* *that which, while itself unknown, is the instrument of valid cognition, and is qualified by the positive character.* There is however another and a much sounder objection against the above definition of 'immediateness,'; *viz.*, that unless we fully recognise the special features of the effect (*i.e.*, the cognition) with regard to what would the sense-organ be regarded as 'instrumental'?†

(369) This same reasoning—*viz.* the impossibility of ascertaining the 'instrumental' character—serves to reject the view that "there is (in the case of sensuous Perception) a *cognisedness of things* which is of a peculiar character ‡; and it is in the productiveness of that *cognisedness* that the 'immediateness' of the cognition consists;"—specially § because so long as we do not ascertain (hit upon)

* Inferential and other kinds of cognition have their instruments also duly cognised. The sense-organs however are not themselves known. The *positive character* is added in order to preclude 'non-apprehension' which is recognised by the Bhātta-Mimāmsakas to be a distinct means of valid cognition (of negation). And as this definition of the sense organ does not contain the words 'immediate cognition,' there need be no 'mutual interdependence' in the definition of 'immediateness' just put forward.

† Until we have fully grasped the distinctive character of the cognition, we cannot recognise the instrumental character of the sense-organs. Thus the recognition of this latter cannot be necessary for grasping the real character of the cognition; consequently there arises a 'vicious circle'; the knowledge of 'immediateness' depending upon the cognition of the instrumentality of sense-organs, and *vice versa.*

‡ This 'peculiar character' is that whereby the object is spoken of as 'directly perceived.'

§ Unless we have some basis for a comprehensive idea *of all* sensuous cognitions, we cannot form any such notion as that 'all sensuous cognitions are the cause of the appearance of *cognisedness.*' The sense is that if the opponent succeeds in pointing out any such basis of uniformity among all sensuous cognitions, that uniformity might be regarded as constituting the true definition of sensuous Perception.

some uniformity (among all sensuous cognitions which could enable us to speak of them *all* as bringing about *cognisedness*), we cannot very well know what their causal efficiency is (with regard to that *cognisedness*). Nor could that uniformity be regarded as established simply by the fact that without such uniformity the peculiar character of the *cognisedness* cannot be explained. Because that peculiar character can very well be explained by the peculiar character of other causes *(*i.e.*, causes other than the sensuous cognition).

(370) Nor can the 'immediateness' of cognitions be explained as *the character of being produced by the cognisable object.* Because this definition would be too wide. † If (in order to avoid this) it be defined as the character of being produced by the object cognisable *by itself* (*i.e.*, *by that same cognition*)—then, we reply, that this cannot be accepted as a comprehensive definition (including all sensuous cognitions), as the denotation of the word '*sva*', 'itself', is distinct with each individual cognition; and also because this definition also is not free from the faults noticed before. ‡

(371) If again, *Immediate Cognition* be defined as that cognition by which, when the object has been cognised, there is no further desire to cognise it §—then, we reject this also. Because in the case of such dear things as one's child, &c., we find that even after the child has

* Such as, *e. g.*, the circumstantial details under which the cognition appears.

† The cognition of the jar may be regarded as the 'Sensuous Immediate Cognition *of the cloth*.' As this cognition would certainly be produced *by a cognisable object*,—though not necessarily by the object that is actually cognised. And as the self is a cognisable object and *all* cognitions—sensuous, inferential, &c.—are equally produced by the self, all cognitions would be Immediate and Sensuous.

‡ The fault referred to is the one explained in the second foot-note to para. 369.—Or it may be the very patent objection that all cognitions—inferential, &c. also—may be regarded as *produced by objects cognisable by them.*

§ The idea underlying this definition is that even when we have cognised an object by Inference or Word, &c., we desire to *perceive* it directly by our senses; which is not the case when we have once perceived it directly.

been directly perceived, the desire to see it still continues.* If, in order to avoid this, 'Immediateness' were defined as that character by reason of which, when the cognition has appeared, there is no desire for any such further cognition as is not of the same kind, †—This also cannot be accepted: because in the first place, it is not known yet (*i.e.* until you have provided a correct definition) what cognition is *of the same kind* (as any particular Sensuous Cognition); and under the circumstances, it cannot be ascertained what is *not of the same kind*;—secondly, ‡ in the case of *inferential* or *verbal* cognition of the prosperity of our enemy, we have no desire to have any *sensuous* cognition of that prosperity (and thus your definition of Immediate cognition will include that inferential cognition also, as the *sensuous cognition* that we do not desire would be *not of the same* kind as that);—and thirdly, some people urge the objection that in the case where we *see* fire, if we have a doubt as to whether it is *fire* or the red Ashoka-blossom, then we desire and do have the *inferential* cognition that it is *fire*, following from our perception of smoke.§

(372) Another definition is now put forward:— ‖ "The 'immediateness' of the cognition consists in its being *a direct*

* Even when the child has been seen, one wishes to see it again. So under the present definition the first *seeing* of the child would not be 'immediate' cognition.

† That is to say, when the thing has been cognised by Sensuous Preception, there is no desire to have any inferential or verbal cognition of the same thing,—even though there may be a desire for further *sensuous* cognitions, as in the case just mentioned.

‡ When we have heard of something good happening to our enemy, we do not wish to go and see it; and thus the verbal cognition of the prosperity would be one of which there would be no desire for a cognition which is *not of the same kind* (i.e., which is *sensuous*).

§ Here then even after the Sensuous Perception of fire we have the desire *for* its *inferential* cognition; and thus this sensuous perception would not be included in your definition.

‖ The sense-organ, or sense-power, itself is regarded by the Logician as *imperceptible*; hence the direct apprehension brought about by an unperceived instrument would be sense-perception; but 'mind' also is unperceived and it is the instrument of

Kh. 233.

apprehension which has its specific cause unknown ;—or this same with the further qualification 'positive' added to the 'cause (*i.e.*, that direct apprehension which has its positive specific cause unknown)." But this also cannot be accepted; as it would fail to include the sensuous perception of 'long' ('short', 'similar') and such other characters, * which stand in need of (and are to that extent brought about by) the cognition of the correlative (basis or standard of comparison). It might be argued that in this case the *basis* or *standard* that is *known* is not the *cause* of the other cognition; it is only the *cognition* of that basis or standard that is its cause; specially as we find that we can have the cognition of something that we see as being *longer* than another thing which may not exist at the time (and which we might have seen sometime before) [and which, being nonexistent at the time, could not be the *cause* of the cognition]. † But exactly similar is the case with *inferential indicatives*, like 'smoke', &c., ‡ [where also all inferential cognitions, of fire for instance, are brought about by the *cognition of the inferential indicative* which cognition constitutes the minor premiss]; specially as

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inferential cognition;—hence in order to exclude this, the word 'specific' is added,—Mind being the *general* or *common* instrument of *all* cognitions. The subsequent addition of 'positive' is with a view to the Mimāmsaka, who holds the cognition of 'negation' to be due to *non-perception* ; and as this would be the *unknown specific* cause of the cognition of negation, the definition would apply to this also. As however this cause would be a *negative* one, the addition of the qualification 'positive' would exclude it.

* A thing is known as 'long' only in comparison with a shorter thing; the shorter thing therefore may be regarded as a *cause* of the cognition of 'long'; and thus this latter cognition will have its cause (at least one of its causes) 'known'. Similarly with the cognition of all characters based upon correlatives.

† And thus in this case also, the cause is the *cognition* of that other thing; and as the cognition cannot be 'known,' the cognition of 'long' &c. having an *unknown* cause, will fulfil *the conditions of the definition*.

‡ All inferential cognitions are brought about by the *cognition of the inferential indicative*, contained in the minor premiss,—which cognition also, like your 'cognition of the past thing' being *unknown*, inferential cognitions would fulfil the conditions of your definition.

even with reference to the past we have an inferential cognition 'there was fire at that place,—because I had seen smoke issuing from it'.* Then as regards the view that the object cognized is regarded as the *cause* of the cognition only in so far as it is a qualification† (determining factor) of the cognition,——the same may be said with regard to the aforesaid 'basis' (or correlative also,—which is a determining factor in the cognition, and as such may be regarded as its *cause*).

(373) "In the above definition," the opponent explains, "what the adjective *specific* shows is that the cause meant is the *Instrument* (and not any and every cause.)‡" But this also we cannot accept. For in a case where some future event is inferred from an *inferential indicative*, which also is *inferred* as *something to come in the future*,§—this inferential indicative being yet in the future, and hence non-existing, could not be regarded as the *Instrument*; and hence this inferential cognition would not be one *that has its Instrument known* (and would thus become included in the definition).

* This special case is put forward in answer to the view that it is the inferential indicative (smoke) that is the cause of Inference, and not its cognition. We see smoke in the morning, but owing to certain pressing circumstances we fail to deduce the conclusion at the time. In the evening however, some circumstances happening to remind us of our having seen smoke, we *infer in the evening* that 'fire existed at the place, because smoke had been seen there'; in this case it cannot be denied that it is the *cognition of smoke* that is the *cause* of the inferential cognition.

† And hence there need be nothing very incongruous in regarding the Inferential indicative as the *cause* of Inferential Cognition.

‡ What is meant by this explanation is that in the case of Inferential cognitions, it is the inferential indicative that is the *Instrument*; the cognition of this being only a *process* tending towards the same end; and as such capable of being regarded as a *cause*, though not an *Instrument*; and as the inferential indicative must be *known*, no inferential cognition could be such as would have its *Instrument unknown*.

§ As when preceiving certain atmospheric conditions, we infer that 'clouds will come,' and from that again we infer 'there will be rain.'

Kh. 235.

(374) "In all cases of inferential cognition," the opponent adds, "the cognition of the Inferential Indicative* may be accepted to be the 'Instrument'; and as according to me all cognitions are *self-illumined*, the cognition of the Inferential Indicative also would be 'known'; and hence all Inferential cognitions would have their Instruments *known*." This can not be, we reply; as we have no proof for the view that it is the *known* 'cognition of the inferential Indicative' that is a factor in the 'Instrument' of Inferential Cognitions;* specially as the cognitions pointed out above (viz. those of the inferential Indicatives yet to come) can not be regarded as 'instruments' [as if these also were so regarded, then an inferential cognition would have two 'Instruments'—the 'Inferential Indicative' and the 'Cognition of this indicative,' and this would be opposed to the very idea of 'Instrument.'] In fact, if the character of *being known* (as belonging to the cognition of the Inferential Indicative),—even though a mere circumstantial non-essential accident—were accepted as an essential factor in the Instrument, then the definition of 'Sense-perception' would not apply to the *perception of the jar*, which might by mere chance appear immediately after the *inferential cognition* of the eye (where the inferential cognition, though a mere accidental circumstance, would be regarded as a factor in the 'Instrument' of the succeeding Perception); and as thus that Instrument would be *known*, the Perception would not have its Instrument *unknown*.

(375) If it be added that in the case of Inferential cognitions, the instrument is *always* 'known' (while it is only in very few cases of sensuous Cognition that the instru-

* And hence we have no authority for accepting the view that the Instrument of Inferential Cognitions is *known*. The reason for this denial of proof is that the character of *being known* is what the logician calls *anyaṭhāsiddha*, by which is meant all that is *non-essential*, those merely accidental circumstances which are found to be, by chance, concomitant with the cause.

Kh. 236.

ment is *known*),—this also can not be admitted; as in the first place, if the qualification 'always' were meant to be added to the affirmative assertion (viz. that Inferential cognition is that which has its instrument *always known*), then it would be absolutely superfluous; (as this idea of *invariableness* is present in the very conception of the 'Instrument,' which is a kind of 'cause,' and all causes are '*invariable* antecedents')*; on the other hand, if it were added to the negative assertion (that 'sensuous perception' has its instrument *always* 'not known')—then the definition would fail entirely; inasmuch as it is possible to have sensuous Cognitions proceeding immediately after the sense-organ concerned may by chance have become known.† Nor may it be urged that the 'invariableness' spoken of is one that is regarded as an integral part of the 'Instrument' itself. Because even then, the aforesaid 'superfluousness' remains :—'invariableness' entering into the very conception of the 'Cause', there can be no need of stating it. It might be argued that—"the addition of the qualification 'always' is not altogether superfluous; as without the qualification, the definition becomes faulty (becoming 'too wide')." But the faultiness or discrepancy in the definition remains all the same, even after the addition of the qualification [because 'invariableness' being involved in the conception of the 'instrument' itself, if the presence of this word does not suffice to save the definition from becoming 'too wide', then the actual addition of the word 'always' or 'invariably' also cannot save it from that contingency, specially as that which is not an *invariable* antecedent is never regarded as 'cause'; for instance] Colour is not a 'cause' in the sensuous perception of Taste. It might be argued that Colour is not a 'cause' because it is merely an

* And thus to say that inferential cognition has a 'known *Instrument*' is the same as to say that it has an instrument that is *always* known.

† For instance, in the example quoted above, the perception of the jar appearing after the eye has been cognised by means of inference; thus the defienition becomes 'too narrow.

accidental (non-essential) concomitant. Then, we reply, the same may be said with regard to Inferential Cognitions also (as shown in para. 374).

(376). [Page 322] Then again, when you make the denial (of the knowledge of 'instrument' in the case of Sensuous Perception), it is incumbent upon you to fix upon some uniform character (that would apply to *all* Sensuous Perceptions); as in the absence of such a uniform character, to what would the 'invariableness' pertain? [The very idea of 'invariableness' involving the necessity of a conception of *all* individual cases]. Thus there is no escape for you unless you point out the uniform character of the effect under consideration (i.e. Sensuous Perception). In fact, even if you omit the word 'always' in your definition, there is no escape for you until you have pointed out the aforesaid 'uniform character.' * If, in order to avoid having to point out of this *uniform character* (of all sensuous cognitions), you were to assert your definition *with regard to each individual sensuous cognition in the form*—'the instrument of *this* particular cognition is *not known*',—then we would say that it would be extremely difficult for you to prove that even that individual cognition has not for its instrument things (the eye, for instance) known before that cognition. Hence it is necessary for you to prove that the *general* character (of *having the instrument known*) is absent in *all cognitions* of the same kind, *i.e*,, *sensuous* [as the assertion of the character with regard to each particular individual would, as shown above, fail to include *all sensuous* cognitions'].

* *I. E.* Even if you define sensuous cognition as that which has its Instrument not known, and not as that which has its Instrument *always* not known, it will be necessary to find some uniform character which could enable us to form a single conception of *all* sensuous Cognitions. The sense of these objections is that, until the uniform character (pertaining to *all* sensuous Cognitions) is pointed out, there can be no escape from the above difficulties;—and if such a uniform character is pointed out then that would suffice for a definition of 'sensuous cognition', and there would be no need for any other.

(377). Another definition of Sensuous Perception and Immediate Cognition is next taken up :—If Perception be defined as that valid cognition of an object which is not intervened by anything else,—then it should be explained with reference to what would this 'intervention' be ? and also what is that 'intervention' ? "The intervention is with reference to the sense-organ (*i.e.* between the object perceived and the sense-organ perceiving),—and it is *non-proximity* (or non-contact)." But then, it comes to be only another and a round-about way of saying that *immediate cognition is the manifestation of an object in contact with the sense-organ*; and we have already shown that this definition is not tenable ; specially as it would include the *inferential* cognition that we may have of our own *eye-ball* (which is in contact with the organ of vision, eye) !

(378). If then Sensuous Perception or Immediate Cognition be defined as* *the cognition that does not proceed from a cognition*,—then it would not apply to many determinate Cognitions (which, according to the Logician, follow from the corresponding Non-Determinate Cognitions).†

(379) [Page 324]. The above reasoning also serves to refute the definition of Immediate Cognition as 'that which does not proceed from the cognition of any other thing.'‡ Because the Determinate Cognition has for its

* Inferential Cognition proceeds from the cognition of invariable concomitance; Verbal Cognition from the cognition of words; and Analogical Cognition from the cognition of similarity. Hence it is only Sensuous Cognition that does not proceed from any cognition.

† According to the Logican, when we see the jar, the first cognition that we have is purely non-determinate, or vague ; and from this the determinate or definite cognition of the jar follows. Thus this latter cognition proceeds from the preceding cognition ; and as such cannot be included in the definition.

‡ This definition is put forward with the view that Inferential and other cognitions are brought about by the cognitions of something other than the object of those cognitions, while the Non-determinate cognition has the same object as that of the following determinate cognition; and as such both of these become included in this new definition. The author however contends that this definition also fails to include the Determinate Cognition. Because the object of this latter cannot be regarded to be exactly the same as that of the non-determinate cognition; as the latter does not cognise the

object also the determining or differentiating characters, which are something more than that which forms the object of the non-determinate Cognition, specially as for the bringing about of the Determinate Cognition *it would be necessary to have the cognition of that (something totally different from the object of the cognition itself) from which that object would be differentiated.

(380) The Opponent propounds another definition:—"Immediate Cognition is that which does not proceed from the cognition of anything that is not included in its own objective. Nor does this definition fail to include the Sensuous Perception of an object which (as in the Determinate Cognition) is perceived along with something else from which it is distinguished—*i.e.* its correlative. Because this something else also, being virtually included in the objective of the Perception, is accepted as being the Object of that Perception; just as in the case of Recognition† the idea of 'that' is regarded as included in the Sensuous Perception. Or (in view of such cognition) we may add to the definition a further qualifying clause, 'apart from its correlative' (Immediate Cognition thus being that which does not proceed from the cognition of anything that is not included in its own objective, with the exception of its own correlative." But this definition also cannot be accepted. For in the first place, it is corroded (rendered unacceptable) by the word

determining characters which appear in the determinate Cognition. And hence this also, as proceeding from the non-determinate cognition, would be one that proceeds from the cognition of something other than its own object.

* The opponent might argue that even though a few additional characters enter into the objective of the determinate cognition, its object proper remains the same as that of the Non-determinate Cognition. In reply to this it is argued that the determinate cognition has for its object something as possessed of definite characteristics and thereby *differentiated from other things*. And thus that cognition would depend upon the cognition of these other things also.

† When we see a certain thing and recognise it as being *the same as that* which we had seen elsewhere, the notion of 'that' entering into this recognition is accepted as forming part of the recognition.

'*sva*' ('its own').* Secondly, if we took each individual cognition by itself, then we could not ascertain the fact of its *not proceeding* (from the cognition of something else, &c.) † ; and if in order to avoid this, you were to have recourse to the remedy that all cognitions *of the kind* of the individual in question are found to be such as cannot rightly be regarded as proceeding from any cognitions of the other kind,—then it becomes necessary for you to postulate a definite comprehensive *kind* or *class* of cognitions (whose cause or source no other cognition would be, and which would be your immediate Sensuous Cognition); ‡ and thus you fall into the same pit as before.

(381) Another definition of 'Immediateness' is now put forward :—" The *Immediateness* of a cognition consists in its presenting to consciousness something that is characterised or determined by its own time (*i.e.* the point of time at which the cognition itself appears)." This also we cannot accept. Because in the first place, in this case also it is not easy to ascertain the meaning of the word '*sva*' (*its own*) § ; and secondly, in what way could

* If the word '*sva*' refers to all cognitions, then the definition includes all kinds of cognitions,—sensuous, inferential, and the like. If however, it refer to only an individual cognition, then it cannot apply to *all* sensuous cognitions.

† For ascertaining any causal relationship, it is necessary for us to have comprehensive notions of *all* individual effects as proceeding from a certain cause. And conversely the absence of causal relationship also cannot be ascertained without a similar comprehensive notion. This comprehensive notion we could not have, if we took every individual cognition by itself, and as such we could not be sure of it not proceeding from the cognition of something else.

‡ That is to say, you cannot have any idea of a comprehensive class, without the idea of some character that is common to all individuals included in the class Thus then, before you have a definition of 'sensuous cognition'you must have the idea of some character that subsists in all sensuous cognitions, and not in any other kind of cognition. Well in that case, this same common character will serve as the definition applying to all sensuous cognitions, and there would be no necessity for propounding another definition.

§ As shown in the second *note* on the preceding para.

this definition exclude the inferential and other kinds of cognition? The Opponent might answer as follows—* "In the case of Inferential Cognition, the object cognised is determined or characterised by the time that enters into the notion of invariable concomitance (and not by that of the cognition itself). Even in the case of the inference of the rise of the ocean-tide from the perception of the full-moon,—where the object inferred (the tidal rise) is determined by the time at which the inference appears (and as such this would appear to be included in the above definition of Immediate Cognition),—what makes the object to be determined by the time of the inferential cognition is the fact of its entering into (forming an object of) the idea of invariable concomitance (*whenever there is full-moon, there is a rise in the ocean-tide*, where the *tidal rise* is determined by all points of time where the Full Moon appears)." This explanation cannot be accepted. Because even though it may be possible to show that the object is determined by all points of time—yet the fact remains that in the case of inferential cognitions of the kind you mention (*viz.* of the tidal rise from the full moon), the object *is* determined by the time of the cognition (and as such comes within the pale of your definition of immediate Cognition). Nor will it serve your purpose if you add the qualifying clause that "that cognition is to be regarded as *immediate* which has *all cognitions of its kind* such as have their objects determined by their times" †; because if you already know what forms the distinguishing characteristic of the *kind or class* to which all immediate Cognitions belong, then what

* The sense of this is that in the case of inferring fire from smoke, the fire that is cognised, is cognised as something that exists *wherever* smoke exists,—and thus the fire is not determined only by the time of the Inference but by all times at which smoke exists.

† The sense of this qualifying clause is that in the case of Inferential Cognitions only a few stray instances can be found where the object is determined by the time of the cognition; and it is not so with *all* inferential cognitions. As regards Immediate cognitions, they are all such as have their object determined by their times.

is the use of putting forward another definition at all? In reality however we shall show later on* that it is not possible to have any such *kind* or *class*. The opponent might add a further qualification—*viz* : " with the exception of what is brought about by the notion of invariable concomitance &c."† This also we cannot accept; as the qualifying clause itself being enough to exclude all Cognitions (that are not Immediate), it would be useless for you to introduce the qualification *of time*. Though we shall show later on‡ that even that qualifying clause cannot serve to exclude the other cognitions.

(382) Some people have urged against the above definition of 'Immediateness' the following objection :—§ "As the Logician denies the self-apprehension of Cognitions, it is not possible for any cognition to have for its object something determined by its own time." But this is not right. Because the *time* meant (as the determinant of the object) is that which actually, by chance, happens to be the time of the particular cognition ‖ ; and what the definition really comes to mean is that the Immediate Cognition is that which manifests or discloses (presents to consciousness) something existing at the present time ; and as to what is this 'something existing at the present time,' everyone can explain that; as has been thus declared (in the *Shlokavārṭika*) :—'That

* Page 330, 'Pandit' edition, where it is shown that *Immediateness* cannot be regarded as a particular jāṭi or kind of Sensuous Cognition.

† That is to say " Immediate cognition is that cognition which, *not being brought about by the notions of invariable concomitance, &c.* has its object determined by its own time."

‡ Page 335, 'Pandit' edition.

§ The sense of the objection is that the *time of the Cognition* is that point of time which is qualified (and hence accompanied) by the Cognition ; and hence if a cognition had for its object something determined by its time, then the cognition itself would form a factor in its own objective ; and this would involve the *self-apprehension* of the Cognition.

‖ The time thus is not something inherent in the Cognition—whereby its apprehension would involve self-apprehending by the Cognition—but an accidental adjunct.

which exists at the present time and is in contact with the eye and the other sense-organs, is apprehended by these.' [4-84] Hence the only valid objection against the definition is what we have shown above (in para. 381).

(383) Nor can Immediate Cognition be defined as* "that which proceeds from such indication of the object as is not due to any agency except the six kinds of 'Contact.'" Because this would not be possible in the case of those immediate cognitions which are brought about by certain discrepancies (in the perceiving organ).† If in order to avoid this difficulty you were to assert that your definition would apply to *valid* immediate cognitions (and not the invalid ones brought about by discrepancies),—we cannot accept this; as both *valid* and *invalid* cognitions being equally *immediate or direct,* the 'immediateness' that you have got to define is that which should apply to both valid and invalid immediate cognitions; (while this definition can apply to valid ones only). [The above objection may serve to silence the Logician who holds that in the case of all erroneous cognitions, there is actually a cognition which is erroneous] The ‡Mīmāmsaka however holds that there is no such actual cognition as *Erroneous Cognition* (all Misconceptions being only cases of *absence of cognition*); and in this view also, the definition in question would be open to the objection that it will not be right to take the 'six kinds of contact' either one by one, or all together.§

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* According to the Logician Sensuous Perception is brought about in six different ways of contact. *Vide-Nyāyamuktāvalī*.

† For instance, where the conch is *seen* as yellow, on account of an excess of bile, though there is an immediate cognition of the yellowness, there is no kind of contact with it and the eye.

‡ Holding what is technically called the 'Akhyāti' view of Misconception

§ If in the definition we take the contacts one by one,—that is, if we take the contact to be the one with something that is inherent in the object perceived—then the definition would fail to include the Immediate Cognitions got at by other kinds of contact (which are equally regarded as immediate cognition). If then you take all the *contacts* together, then each one of the contacts themselves would

(384) Another definition is now put forward :—"Immediate Cognition is the cognition of the specific form of the object,—that is to say, the appearance or manifestation of the object in its own specific (individual) form." This definition also cannot be accepted; as it includes the *Inferential* and other kinds of cognition also. "There is certainly this difference that Inferential and other Mediate Cognitions, are dependent upon (the cognition of) the Reason (Inferential Indicative or Probans) and such other extraneous things; and as such these are cognitions of such things as are related to the time determined by those extraneous things; whereas in the case Immediate Cognition such is not the case." We cannot accept this; because the principle that you lay down with regard to the Inferential Cognition is not true; for instance, in the case of those inferential cognitions in which the Probans brings about the apprehension of things to come,—the inferential cognition cannot be said to have for its object a thing that is determined by the time of that Probans. (As the Probans apprehended is at the *present* time, while the Subject of the Inferential Cognition is in the future.) This also meets the following reasoning of the Opponent :—* "If the Inferential Cognition is not the manifestation (presentation to consciousness)

individually become excluded; as each individual contact would also be an agency that is not 'all the six kinds of contact' collectively. And so the definition would not apply to any Immediate Cognition.

* The sense of this objection is as follows :—"If the determination by the time of the Probans were not made a necessary condition of valid Inferential Cognition, then we would have to regard as valid the inference that we would have of Fire, from the mistaken idea of smoke in regard to mist; when it happens that by chance fire is actually present there. Here we have the fire cognised as determined by the time of the cognition of the invariable concomitance of fire with smoke; and in so far the cognition will have to be regarded as valid. If however the determination by the time of the Probans be made a necessary condition, then as in this case, the time is not one at which the real Reason, smoke, is cognised, the resulting cognition of fire, even though by chance correct, cannot be regarded as *valid* Hence it is necessary to accept this latter determination as a necessary condition of validity in Inferential Cognitions."

Kh. 245.

of the more extensive term (the Major Term) *as determined by the time of the Probans* (*Middle Term*)—then, in a case where the Major Term is inferred by means of a false Probans or Middle Term, if by chance it so happens that what is cognised is that which is actually accompanied by that Probans, this cognition would have to be regarded as valid to that extent, inasmuch as the Major Term cognised is determined by the time at which the invariable concomitance (between the Major Term and the Probans is cognised); and this valid cognition would be one that could not be classed under one of the four kinds of valid cognition." This reasoning we say is not right; specially as, in the first place, in the case of the inference of past objects, it is not possible for the objects to be *determined by the time of the Probans*; and secondly, because we have already shown (in para. 259) that, even with your necessary condition (of determination by the time of the Probans), it is impossible for you to avoid the contingency of having to accept the validity of the cognition (that you have brought forward) in so far as it pertains to the Fire (which is really present at the place).

(385) Nor can Immediate Cognition be defined as *unmixed apprehension*. Because this definition will not apply to the *sensuous perception** of a thing which is perceived along with a certain qualification (the perception of the thing in this case being mixed up with the perception of the qualification). If it be urged that "what is meant is that there should be no mixing up in the *instrument*,"—† then we reply that, in that case the definition would not apply to that Sensuous-perception (of the *Man with the stick*, for instance) wherein there is apprehended something (for instance, the *stick*) which is an 'Instrument' of something other than

* For instance, when we have the perception of the *man with the stick*, the perception of the man is mixed up with that of the stick.

† As the qualification will not be the Instrument, the definition would include the sensuous perception of the thing along with its qualification.

Kh. 246.

the Perception itself (the *stick* being an 'instrument' in the making of the jar). If in order to avoid this you were to add that there should be no mixing up of the instrument *of the cognition itself*, then, this will be open to all the objections that we have shown above (para. 380) in connection with the insertion in the definition, of the word '*svā*,' *itself*.

(386) [Page 329] Another definition in put forward—" Immediate Cognition is that wherein there is a congregation of the absence of all such interventions as those of the *invariable concomitance* and the like (which are necessary in the inferential and other kinds of cognition)". This also we cannot accept. Because, in the first place, this definition will not apply to the *sensuous perception* that we often have of the invariable concomitance itself (of fire and smoke for instance); and secondly, the definition is 'impossible' [*i.e.* it fails to exclude non-sensuous cognitions]; inasmuch as the *inferential* cognition that we have of the fire in the mountain is in the form 'the mountain is fiery' [and in this we *have* the absence of all cognitions of the invariable concomitance of fire and smoke]; then again, in verbal cognition, the cognition that the word affords is not that of itself [and thus here also we have a cognition wherein there is an absence of the cognition of the word]; and thus *inferential* and *verbal* cognitions would become 'sensuous' (by your definition).

(387) If then, Immediate Cognition be defined as *unintervened appprehension*,—this also we cannot accept. Because not one of the many possible (alternative) interventions can be maintained (as being the one whose absence is intended). For instance, if the 'intervention' intended be the *presence of some other particular substance*, then all the cognitions that we have of such omnipresent substances as are imperceptible would have to be regarded as 'immediate' (as in the case of omnipresent things the presence of no other thing is ever possible). If again by 'intervention' is meant **the previous*

* In the case of inferential cognition it is necessary that it should be preceded by the apprehension of the probans; and so forth in all non-sensuous cognitions.

existence of the apprehension of that which brings about the cognition in question,—then the Cognition of Priority and Posteriority would have to be regarded as always *Non-sensuous* (as these cognitions are always preceded by the apprehension of something with reference to which the Priority &c., would be cognised).* Then again, if 'intervention' be explained as consisting in the *qualification of the qualified*,†—then we ask, does the *qualification by Fire* come into existence, in its own form, only in something, the mountain, that is *qualified by the smoke*? Or is it that the cognition of the *qualification by Fire* appears only in that which is *qualified* by the smoke? The former alternative would be contrary to the well-known relationship of cause and effect (between fire and smoke; as on this supposition *Fire* would come into existence after the *smoke*; of which latter therefore it could not be the *cause*). In the case of the latter alternative, if in cognition, the *qualification by smoke* would appear as the *qualification of the 'subject'* (the Mountain), then you would have the absurdity of the Probans (Smoke) residing partially in itself‡; if, on the other hand, *the qualification by smoke* were cognised as *the qualification* of the 'Predicate' (Fire),—then, this 'intervention' would be present in the case of the sensuous Cognition of the invariable concomitance (of Fire and Smoke) also; and hence there would be no immediateness in the case of this perception!§

* When we apprehend a thing as prior, or posterior, it is always in its relation to something else. Thus the cognition of priority would necessarily be preceded by the cognition of that something; and thus there would be an 'intervention' of the kind proposed by you.

† In an Inference we cognise the object *Fire* as qualifying the *Mountain*, which again is qualified by the *Smokey*; In sensuous Cognition, on the other hand, there is no such qualification.

‡ As in this case the form of the inference would be—'*The Mountain qualified by smoke is fiery because it is smoky*; and here *smokiness* being spoken of as residing in the *mountain qualified by smoke*,—this would mean that the smoke, in part, resides in itself.

§ The whole of this series of reasonings may be thus explained :—Inferential Cognition you hold to be *intervened*; why? (1) Is it because it apprehends the *qualification*

(388) *Immediate Cognition* may again be defined as a particular kind or species of cognition. To this definition some people object on the ground that it cannot be ascertained if this *class* of cognition is more or less extensive than the class 'Direct Apprehension';* specially as Remembrance also is (in one way) *immediate.* But this objection cannot stand; as Remembrance is not regarded (by the logician) as 'immediate cognition;' specially as in the first place, Dream-Cognition (which alone appears in the form of *immediate* Remembrance) is not regarded as Remembrance; and secondly, even if it be regarded as 'Remembrance',† *immediateness* is held to be merely *imposed* upon it (and not really belonging to it); and as regards those cases where, by the power of thought, people imagine the presence before their eyes of the qualities belonging to the object of their love (and such other things as have impressed their minds) [which imagination is regarded as *immediate cognition*],—these cases must be held to be similar to the ordinary view regarding conception of silver in the piece of shell (which misconception also has the form of *immediate* cognition); and lastly, as regards the cognition of the presence of the loved person that one has when he

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fire, which actually appears after the mountain qualified by smoke? (2) or because it apprehends the *qualification by fire*, which is cognised as existing in the Mountain qualified by smoke? (3) or because it apprehends the qualification of the mountain by the fire which is qualified by smoke, the form of the inference in this case being 'this mountain which is smoky is fiery'? In (1) Fire ceases to be the cause of smoke; in (2) the smoke is made to rest partially itself; and in (3) inasmuch as the Sensuous cognition of the invariable concomitance of Fire and Smoke also apprehend Fire as qualified by smoke, the cognition being in the form 'that which is smoky is fiery', which is similar to the inferential cognition according to (3),—this cognition would have to be regarded as non-sensuous.

* If 'Immediate Cognition' were more extensive than 'Direct Apprehension', then 'immediateness' would also belong to cognitions other than the Sensuous, which latter alone are regarded as 'direct apprehension'. If, on the other hand, 'Immediate cognition' were less extensive than 'Direct Apprehension', then Remembrance also, which is *immediate* Cognition (inasmuch as brought about by an instrument which is not cognised), would have to be regarded as 'Direct Apprehension'.

† As it is by Prabhākara.

Kh. 249.

closes his eyes,—this must be considered as similar to the cognition that one has during a dream.

(389) [Page 331]. The following objection however might be reasonably urged against the above definition of 'Immediateness':—when we have the *anuvyavasāya* (representative) cognition of the cognition of the atom (in the form 'I have the cognition of the atom),—[we would have in this a mixture * of the two class-characters of 'immediateness' and 'mediateness', the *anuvyavasāya* being 'immediate', and the cognition of the atom being 'mediate]; nor can we agree to the view that the cognition of the atom also is 'immediate' (and hence there is no *mixture*); because if this cognition were accepted as 'immediate' (on the ground of the atom being *immediately* cognised by the Mind), your opponent might, with equal reasonableness, assert that the cognition of fire (that we have in the case of the inference 'the mountain is fiery because it has smoke') is not *inferential*, but *sensuous*, as brought about by the instrumentality of the mind, on the ground of its having been produced by a *mind-soul* contact, which is of an entirely different kind from that which leads to the cognition of the 'Probans' (*i.e.* Smoke). †Similarly too in the case of Recognition ('this is the same object that I had seen yesterday'), has any one any such direct apprehension as that 'I *see* the existence of this object at a particular place and at a particular point of time yesterday'? And it would be only on the basis of such direct apprehension that we could regard the

* The sense of the reasoning is that if 'immediate cognition' is a *class*, 'mediate cognition' also would be a *class*; and as there are cases where the two are found to co-exist neither can be regarded as a *class*,—'*Sankara*', Mixture, being regarded by the logician himself as a ground for not accepting a *jāti*.

† The Vedantin urges that in Recognition also we have the *mixture* of the two characters of *immediateness* and *mediateness*, 'this' being the object of *immediate* cognition, and 'that which I saw yesterday' that of Mediate Cognition. The whole of this Recognition could be regarded as *immediate* only if we ever had any such idea as that I *see with my eyes* the fact of this object having existed yesterday. As a matter of fact no such idea is ever present in our mind, in the case of any Recognition.

Recognition to be *wholly* immediate. For these reasons it must be admitted that in both these cases (of Recognition and of the Anuvyavasaya of the cognition of atoms) the view that the cognition is wholly *immediate* is entirely opposed to actual experience.

(390) If the class 'Immediate Cognition' were based upon the authority of our Sensuous Perception, then with regard to any cognition, there could be no difference of opinion as to whether or not it was *immediate*; as certainly people do not quarrel over the character of the perception of such things as the jar and the like (which are based upon the authority of Sensuous Perception.) "But", the Opponent urges, "in some cases, where the thing is not distinctly apprehended, there is certainly a difference of opinion as regards the character of the cognition." But, we ask—*what do you mean by the apprehension of *distinctness* in regard to that which is not made of constituent parts? If you mean by it, *the apprehension of (distinctness) along with other generic characters inhering in the same thing*,—then, inasmuch as this would be applicable to the generic character of '*jñānatva*', to the same extent as to that of '*sākṣāttva*',—it would be necessary for you to point out a difference between the two cases, by reason of which there is a diversity of opinion (among philosophers) as to the 'directness' of cognitions, and not as to their generic character of *jñānatva*†. As a diversity of opinion among propounders of philosophical systems must not be due to mere jealousy; nor must it be merely

* It is only when a thing is made up of parts that its appearance is indistinct or distinct, according as some only or all its parts are manifested; Cognition however is something that has no parts. The reading of the Vidyāsāgarī 'sphuṭāvabhāsa' does not appear to be satisfactory. The next sentence explains the expression as, the *apprehension* (apparently, *of distinctness*) along with a number of other properties. Hence the translation follows the reading of the *Shāṅkarī*.

† That it to say, while we are all agreed that "there is *jñānatva* in cognitions we are divided as to its possessing '*sākṣāttva*'.

for the sake of a wordy wrangle ; it must be for the sake of truth.

(391). Then again, it will not be possible for you to escape from the contingency that by your definition both *directness*, and its opposite *indirectness*, will be found to inhere in such inferential cognitions as have their Probans or Middle Term perceptible by the senses.* In answer to this it might be argued that, "it is not *indirectness*, but only *Directness* that is a generic entity,—the former being merely a negation of the latter." But it would be necessary for you to prove that such (and not the converse) is the case (before it can be accepted);—you would have the further incongruity that, in accordance with you, who hold God to be directly cognisant of all things, both *directness* and *indirectness* would belong to the inferential cognitions appearing in the mind of God, who (according to you) would also have the direct perception of the 'Probans' leading to those cognitions.† In answer to this, it might be urged that what makes a cognition called 'inferential' or 'verbal' &c. is the fact of *its being brought about by the cognition of the Probans and by that of Word*, and so forth (and hence God's cognitions cannot be called 'inferential' because all His cognitions, being eternal, are not *brought about* by anything). But in the same manner, it could be argued with equal reasonableness that what makes a cognition called 'direct' is the fact of *its being brought about by sense-contact*; and so (as God's cognition is not *brought about* by any thing) that cognition cannot be called 'direct.'

(392) Then again, as a rule, every generic entity or conception is based upon a certain character which

* This is levelled against the view that 'directness' or '*sākṣāṭṭva*' is a generic entity or *jāṭi*. By a rule of the Logicians whenever there is a cross division due to two characters being found to be mixed up, these characters cannot be accepted as *generic* in their character. In the case of the inference of fire from smoke, the cognition, so far as the smoke is concerned, is *direct*, and in regard to the fire, *indirect*.

† The cognition being *direct* in view of this sensuous perception, and *indirect* in view of its being *inferential*.

(inhering in a number of things) is indicative of the generic or universal, comprehensive) nature of that entity or conception; and as a matter of fact, in view of the objections shown above, we find no such indicative character as would form the basis of the generic entity 'Directness' '*Sākṣāttva*'. Nor may it be argued, in answer to this, that inasmuch as the Opponent does not accept the rule with regard to the presence of the said indicative character, its presence need not be necessary in the case in question. This, we say, cannot be rightly put forward; because in that case (in the absence of some such character indicative of 'directness') *there would be no possibility of any such doubt arising in our minds as—'did I see this, or was it told to me by some one?' (a doubt that arises in our mind when we remember a certain thing);—specially as according to you, when we remember a certain past direct cognition, what appears is that there is a direct cognition of that cognition brought about by the peculiar agency of what you call 'Cognitional Contact'; and if there were no character indicative of 'directness,' how would you explain the fact that *at the time of remembrance* we do not regard the previous cognition as 'direct.'

(393) †As regards the view that 'directness' is a property belonging to the thing cognised (and not to the cognition),—this we shall refute under the section on the *Self-Apprehension of Cognition* (in the author's other work, the *Īshvarābbhisandhi.*) ‡

* If *directness* belonged to the cognition itself,—and was not a character based upon some other circumstances, then whenever anything would be remembered which had been directly perceived, its *directness* would also be cognised; and there could be no such doubt as to whether the thing had been directly perceived, or only indirectly heard of.

† This takes up another definition of 'Direct Apprehension'—Directness being the property of the thing, the apprehension of such a thing is Direct Apprehension.

‡ On a former occasion (para. 80) the author refers to his 'Svaprakāshavāḍa' as forming part of his other work the *Ishvarābhisandhi*; so it seems that he refers to the same here also; specially as in the section of the present work where he has dealt

(394) "With all this, however", says the Opponent, "it cannot be denied that there is a universally accepted usage and idea of 'Directness'; and on the strength of this usage, you cannot after all escape from admitting that there is such a thing as 'Directness', even though it be necessary, on that account, to postulate a category over and above those ordinarily accepted. Even if you regard this universal usage as a 'mistake,' you will have to admit that every object of mistaken cognition has a real existence somewhere (so even though the universal idea of *directness* be a mistake, *directness* cannot be a non-entity)." But this also we cannot accept; because (even granting that such a thing as *directness* really exists) if this *directness* itself were directly apprehended, then there would be no difference between us; and so on and on, all the objections we have urged above become equally applicable in the present case also. If, on the other hand, *directness* be held to be cognisable by Inference and other means of cognition (and not by Direct Apprehension),—then in that case, we would point out that you can have no such Probans (or Word), &c. as would bring about the inferential (or verbal) and other cognitions of Directness; where too, in this case, would there be any comprehension of the *invariable concomitance*, and such other factors (necessary for those kinds of cognition)? Thus your view would be open to quite a series of unanswerable objections. And over and above all this, how would you escape from the opposition of all those arguments whereby you yourself seek to prove that there can be no more than *seven* categories?

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(395) Another definition of Direct Apprehension may be put forward as *that cognition wherein there is a congregation of the absence of all such characters as are produced by*

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with the self-apprehension of Cognitions, he has not taken up the question referred to here. Though the Vidyāsāgarī commentary takes the present passage to mean that the view referred to has been refuted by the refutation (in para 80) of the definition of the objective.

'*Probans*' ('*Word*' '*Similarity*.') But this also we cannot accept; as this would apply to all *Doubts* that we have with regard to imperceptible things (as these doubtful cognitions are not produced either by Probans or by Word, or by Similarity). You might amend your definition by adding that a Direct Apprehension is that *right cognition* which &c., &c. (Doubtful Cognitions not being *right* cognitions). But in that case, it would fail to include Mistaken Perceptions (which are *direct* apprehensions, even though not right).

(396) Nor again can Direct Apprehension be defined as *that cognition which is not produced by those specific agencies which bring about the inferential and all other kinds of cognition that are meant to be excluded (from the Category of 'Direct Apprehension')*. Because, in that case, what would there be to prevent us from adopting the converse course, and defining Inferential Cognition itself as *that which is other than the Sensuous and other kinds of Cognition* *? And further, just as, according to you, we have a comprehensive notion of the 'directness' of cognitions on the basis of their not being produced by the causes of inferential and other kinds of cognitions,—so, in the same manner,† even from among those cognitions that you seek to exclude (*viz.*, the inferential and other

* The sense of the Objection is that in this manner, there would be a vicious circle :—Each cognition being defined as the negation of all other kinds of cognition.

† Just as you have the comprehensive notion of all sensuous cognitions as those that are not brought about by the causes of inferential and other kinds of cognition, so, in the same manner, it would be possible for us to form a comprehensive notion of two kinds of cognition,—for instance, the inferential and the verbal *combined*—as those that are not brought about by the causes of sensuous and analogical cognitions; of Sensuous and Verbal cognitions as those not brought about by the causes of inferential and analogical cognitions, and so forth. The absurdity meant to be brought home by this reasoning is that if it were possible to form a comprehensive notion of all Sensuous cognitions on the basis of its definition as that which is produced by the causes of those cognitions that are meant to be excluded from it,—then in the same manner, on the basis of the condition of not being produced by the causes of the cognitions meant to be excluded from Verbal and Inferential cognitions, it would be possible for us to form a comprehensive notion inclusive of, and common to, all Verbal and Inferential cognitions; and this would be an absurdity.

cognitions), it would be possible for us to form comprehensive notions common to more than one kind of cognition on the basis of their being not brought about by the causes of the one or the two (or the three) kinds of cognitions, which we would intend to exclude. To this it might be objected that "we seek for the basis of such ideas and notions as we already have; and we do not proceed to form notions and ideas on supposed bases." But this cannot be right; because as a matter of fact, in all cases, we postulate such causes or bases as are found to be not over extensive.* Lastly (if the negative character of not being produced by the causes of other cognitions were the ground for all sensuous cognitions being regarded as 'direct,' then) the required comprehensive notion of all Sensuous cognitions would come to be formed on the basis of that negative character itself, and not on the basis of any thing else (in the shape of the positive character of 'directness'); and in that case we would form all our comprehensive notions—of the 'cow' and such other things—on the basis of the negative character of being different from all other things that we see (*i.e.* the cow would be defined as that which is not any-thing that is not-cow), and this would remove the necessity for our postulating any such generic characteristic as '*gotva*' and the like (which we postulate simply with a view to explain, and find a basis for, the comprehensive notion of all *cows*).

'Under the circumtances, if you can have no positive conception having a basis other than a mere negation,—then what would be the fault of the upholders of 'Apoha?'† (41.)

* That is to say, just as the character of being not produced by the causes of inference &c., is accepted as the basis for the comprehensive notion of all sensuous cognitions, because the said character does not apply to any thing else except sensuous cognition; so in the same manner the character of not being brought about by the causes of verbal and analogical cognitions, would not apply to any cognition except the inferential and sensuous cognitions; and thus that character could be regarded as the basis for the cognition of sensuous and inferential cognitions *combined*.

† According to the Bauddha, the denotation of the word 'go' (cow) does not consist in 'gotva' the generic entity 'cow'), but in the *negation of the not-cow.* This

Kh, 256.

(397) There may be some people who would define Sensuous Perception as *that cognition which is valid, while being other than the valid cognitions brought about by words, inferences or analogies.* If these people are not themselves ashamed of putting forward this definition, then they should be asked the following questions:—* Is each factor of this definition to be taken as the required definition? or all the factors together? In the former case, the definition would become 'too wide.' If they accept the second alternative, then we ask —do you take the three factors (Inference, Word and Analogy) conjointly, of which there should be a negation (or absence) [in the case of Sensuous Perception]? or do you take the negations themselves conjointly? It cannot be the former; as in that case also the definition becomes too wide,—the definition becoming applicable to each of the three kinds of cognition (inferential, verbal and analogical); inasmuch as none of these is such as is brought about by Word, Inference and Analogy conjointly (and hence the negation of all the *three combined* would be present in the case of each of these cognitions). Nor is the latter alternative possible; because even though † the conjunction or combination of the (mutual) negation of the three kinds of cognition is present in the three kinds of cognition taken conjointly,—yet those three are not regarded (by you) as 'Sensuous Perception' (as they should have to be by your definition).

comes to the same thing as to say that the comprehensive notion of positive things is based upon negation.

* *I. E.* do you mean that sense-perception is (1) the valid cognition not brought about by words, and (2) the valid cognition not brought about by inference; and also, (3) the valid cognition not brought about by analogy? Or that it is the valid cognition that is not brought about by any of these? In the former case, if we accept (1), then the definition applies to inferential and analogical cognitions also, and so on with (2) and (3).

† The three cognitions together are neither inferential cognition, nor verbal cognition nor analogical cognition. Hence the combined negation of the three would be present in the three taken conjointly, which would therefore fulfil the conditions of the definition.

(398) In answer to this it might be urged that the 'negations' meant (by the definition) to be the defining characteristic are those inhering in one substratum, and not those subsisting in more than one (and hence the three kinds of cognition taken conjointly being *more than one*, they cannot become included in the definition). But this also is not right; because, as we shall show later on* though the constituent members of the *group* (of the three cognitions) are more than one, yet the *group* itself can be regarded as 'one'—just as even though the number of inferential cognitions is very large, yet the group or class 'Inferential Cognition' is *one* only. [And thus even with the qualifying explanation the definition remains 'too wide']. In order to avoid this you may seek to add a further qualification to your definition :—*viz.*, 'that which is not a group' (thereby seeking to exclude the group formed of the three kinds of cognition, *verbal*, *inferential* and *analogical*). But this also will not serve your purpose ;† because even then, as a matter of fact, the 'inferential and other cognitions' would be something *qualified by the character of being a group* ; and as such these cognitions themselves would certainly have to be regarded as 'that which is not a group'; otherwise [if you do not admit this, and assert those cognitions to be the *group*, then inasmuch as they are also *qualified by the character of being a group*, your assertion would come to this that the *group* is qualified by the character of being a group; and] there would be a partial operation (*i e.*, of qualification) by the *group* upon itself, which is highly objectionable. You may urge that, the character intended by the definition is that belonging to *cognitions* [that is you define Sensuous Perception as *the cognition* which has the said character,—and certainly the

* Page 339 ('Pandit' Edition).

† The meaning of this is that what is qualified by something cannot be that thing; hence the cognitions (inferentia', etc) being qualified by the *group character* cannot be regarded as identical with this latter. Hence they also become, 'that which is not a group,' and thus fulfil the conditions of the definition

group of inferential and other cognitions is not a cognition, and as such they do not fall within the definition]. But this also does not save you; as the inferential and other cognitions, even through qualified by the character of being a group, do not cease to be *cognitions* (and as such they cannot fail to be included in your definition).

(390) [Page 339] Then again, [you have asserted at the beginning of the last paragraph that the negation meant to be the defining characteristic is that inhering in *one* substratum only; by this], do you mean—(1) that the substratum of the negation is one non-differenced individual? (2) or that all the substrata of the negation are of the same class or kind? (3) or that all the substrata have one and the same character? (4) or that the substratum is qualified by the number *one*? (5) or that it is not qualified by *two* and the other higher numbers? If you mean the *first*, then, in the first place, the definition having such a qualification would be too narrow (failing to apply to any sense-perception except the *one* particular perception), as the 'non-difference' of the individual cognition would be that cognition itself (and no other cognition), and as such it would be wholly exclusive (of all other sensuous cognitions); *secondly* the incongruity involved in the definition in this case would be that the *thing to be defined* (*i.e.*, Sense-perception) would be a qualification of the *definition*, and as such the definition could not be regarded as belonging or pertaining to the *thing to be defined**; because a thing cannot qualify itself. If (in order to avoid this incongruity) it be asserted that the *non-difference of the individual cognition* is not intended to be a necessary and inseparable qualification (or condition) of the definition, but only an adventitious or temporary mark, - then the definition becomes open to the objection urged above (as to its being 'too wide'

* The sense of this is that the definition containing the term to be defined cannot be accepted as *correct*.

and including each of the three kinds of cognition meant to be excluded).*

(400) If you accept the second of the alternatives mentioned above, then, *the belonging to that same class* might well be regarded as the definition,—as it would certainly be necessary to know what this *class* is before we grasp the meaning of your definition (and when we once understand what the class 'Sensuous Cognition' is, there would be no further need for a definition). Nor is the third of the alternatives acceptable; because the inferential and other two kinds of cognition also have one and the same common character of being *indirect* (and as such would become included in the definition). Nor again is the fourth alternative tenable; as in the first place, according to the Vaishēṣikas all Valid Cognitions are 'Qualities,' and as such cannot be possessed of another quality (in the shape of the *number* 'one'); and secondly, even if the number 'one' could subsist therein as quality, it would be possible for the *three* negations of the three kinds of cognition (inferential, verbal and analogical) to be co-ordinate or co-existent with the number 'one,'—the *three together* forming *a group*, and thus being capable of being regarded as 'one' [and thus those cognitions also become included in the definition]. Nor lastly is the fifth of the above alternatives tenable; as according to the theory of the Vaishēṣikas (that cognitions are qualities) the absence of 'two' and the other higher numbers (all of which are qualities) would be found in the inferential and other two kinds of cognition also (which latter therefore would become included in the definition); but even if you do not accept the Vaishēṣika theory,—as a matter of fact, 'two' and the higher numbers are found to be present in individual

* The non-difference of the individual not being regarded as a necessary factor of the definition, the real definition becomes reduced to the mere *negation of the three kinds of cognition*,—and the negation of all these conjointly is absent from each of the three taken individually, which therefore become included in the definition.

Sensuous Cognitions also (as certainly it cannot be denied that there are two, three, or more Sensuous Cognitions). [And hence your definition would fail to apply to Sensuous Cognition also !]

(401) In answer to this it might be urged that—" even then, it cannot be denied, that the numbers, *two* and the rest, do not subsist in their entirety in any one Sensuous Cognition ;—and it is the absence of such numbers *in their entirety* that is meant by us,"—then, this also is not possible, we reply ; because what is that 'entirety' which, you say, is not present in a single individual ? If you mean by it that—" the numbers *two* and the rest must subsist wholly *in that thing alone,* and certainly this they do not do in any single individual," then, we reply, the number 'one' would, in that case, not subsist anywhere *in its entirety* ; as the number 'one' cannot be said to subsist in any *one thing only,* as in that case the number 'one' would not be found anywhere else. For these reasons, it must be admitted that the numbers 'two' and the rest also subsist, *in their entirety,* only in that individual which is possessed of the number 'one'; and hence your explanation does not make any difference at all (the objection urged at the close of the last paragraph remaining in force).

(402) [Page 341] " There is certainly this difference between the two cases that the number 'one' subsists in one individual only, and not in any other (while *two* and all other numbers subsist in one thing and also in others)." This is not right, we reply ; for, in the first place, if such were the case with 'Unity' (the number 'one'), then the same might be said with regard to the individual entity of 'Being'*; and secondly, in that case your definition would not be comprehensive (being applicable to the *one* particular cognition only, and not to *all* Sensuous Cognitions). " But the

* That is to say, 'Being' also, like 'Unity,' would be different in each individual thing.

case of *Being* is not similar to that of *Unity* : 'Being' is one only, and it is a *class* (including many individuals), while 'Unity' is different in each individual (being as many as there are individual things), and it is a *Quality*." You are clearly deceived (by the Vaishēṣikas): Otherwise, how is it that you are uttering these incoherent words,* even though, as a matter of fact, in ordinary experience and usage, you do not perceive any difference in the characters of the ideas of 'Being' and 'Unity'? "But if both *Being* and *Unity* were classes, it would not be possible to ascertain which of the two is the 'higher' and which the 'lower' (*i.e.*, which is the more and which the less extensive, a distinction which is found to be possible in the case of any two classes that we may take up)." †This argument, we reply, would apply equally to both. And the very fact that it is necessary for classes to be ranged into 'higher' and 'lower' would supply the basis for regarding the one or the other as being, in a certain instance, less extensive than the other.‡ If it be asked—"What would be that instance?"—we reply, even if we are unable to fix upon such an instance, that does not vitiate our argument; just as in the case of the inference of the existence of fire in the mountain, even though we may be unable to locate the fire exactly within a few inches of its actual position, that does not invalidate the inferential cognition of fire.

(403) "There may or may not be a comprehensive notion of 'Unity,' what have we to do with the consi-

* Just as 'Being' is found to be a 'class' extending over all things that *are*,—so, exactly in the same manner, 'Unity' is found to extend over all single things. Even in face of this sameness of character you speak of a difference, in accordance with the figments of the Vaishēṣikā system.

†That is to say all that this argument may prove is that both cannot be *classes*. So it may be that 'Unity' is a *class*, and 'Being' a mere *quality*; or that both are only *qualities*.

‡ The said fact would justify us in regarding either 'Being' or 'Unity' as less extensive than the other.

deration of that question? (our business is to define Sensuous Cognition, and) Sensuous Cognition is that in which the numbers 'two' and the rest do not subsist in their entirety, and where there are the three aforesaid negations (of character of being produced by Word etc.)" This we cannot allow; as in the three cognitions, inferential and the rest also, the numbers 'three' and the rest do not subsist *in their entirety*; if they did so, then these numbers could not subsist in anything else (*i.e.*, there could be nothing else to which those numbers would belong)! In answer to this it might be said that the number 'three' subsisting in other things, would be an individual 'three' other than that subsisting in the inferential and other cognitions. But this also is not right; because as a matter of fact, there is no particular 'three' that subsists *in its entirety* in the three cognitions, inferential and the rest.

(404) "We may define Sensuous Cognition as that wherein no individual 'three' subsists in its entirety." In that case, we reply, the definition would be 'too narrow' (*i.e.* failing to apply to Sensuous Cognition); as you, who have renounced the Vaishēṣhika theory (that sensuous cognition being a quality cannot have another quality in the shape of Number) must admit that the character of 'Sensuous Cognition' is co-existent with an individual 'three'; as otherwise we could never speak of '*three* sensuous cognitions'; for as a matter of fact that alone is called 'three' wherein the number 'three' resides in its entirety.

(405) [Page 343] And, apart from what we have just said, this last definition of yours would be open to the same objection that we have pointed out before—namely, that it would be 'too wide'. We have already shown (in para 397) that your definition is 'too wide' inasmuch as it includes the Inferential and other kinds of cognition, as in these

latter cognitions,* as characterised or qualified by the number 'three', there subsist the three negations which you intend to be the distinctive features of Sensuous Cognitions. Now in order to avoid this, you add the qualifying clause *that wherein the individual number 'three' does not subsist in its entirety.* But as a matter of fact even this qualification does not save the definition from being 'too wide'; as this condition also is fulfilled by the inferential and other cognitions; because in these, *as characterised by the number 'three'*, there does not subsist any individual number 'three in its entirety. And in these cognitions, *as characterised* by the number 'three' (and thus being made a *unified triad*), even though another number 'three' might come to subsist, †yet this latter would be only one that resides in other things also, and does not subsist *in its entirety* in these Cognitions alone. Even if we could find the number 'three' subsisting in its entirety, in the things of which it is a mere adventitious and temporary feature, this fact would serve to make the definition inapplicable to such things; and it would not have any such effect with regard to those things of which the number 'three' is an inseparable or permanent characteristic. Hence (inasmuch as the inferential and other cognitions belong to this latter class) the fact remains that the definition (applying to these Cognitions) is "too wide". This is specially so, as all the‡ three negations (mentioned in the definition) subsist

*The sense of this is that the cognitions *as thus characterised* are reduced to unity —a single entity having three constituent factors, a *unified triad.*

† Because if the same number subsisted there, it would mean that the number resides in itself, at least partially,—the number forming a necessary constituent of *the triad.*

‡ The sense is that if the inferential verbal and analogical cognitions are taken collectively, then we can affirm that the mutual negation of the three kinds of cognition resides in that group; as the three collectively is neither inferential, nor verbal, nor analogical; with regard to each *individually* however this could not be affirmed,—for instance, the negation of Inferential Cognition cannot be said to subsist in Inferential Cognition, and so on; and hence the three cognitions taken collectively become included in the definition

in the thing—the three kinds of cognition—when it is regarded as a group, by reason of its being characterised by the temporary mark of the number 'three'; and thus the three negations mentioned in the definition subsist in the thing when thus qualified (by the collective character), and not when it is not so qualified; for the simple reason that with regard to each of those three individually, the existence of the *three* negations could never be affirmed. [And thus these three cognitions collectively become included in your definition.]

(406) [Page 344] The Opponent says:—"The three cognitions *taken collectively* are precluded by the presence of the word 'pramiti (*valid cognition*) in the definition; for the character of 'valid cognition' belongs to the inferential and other kinds of cognition, *in their individual natural form*, and not when they are *qualified by the number 'three' along with the three negations*; and thus we would define Sensuous Cognition as *that which has the character of valid cognition, and wherein there subsist the three negations.*" This also we cannot accept. Because for you also, it will be necessary to accept the view that *the character of valid cognition* and the 'three negations' reside in the 'Sensuous Cognition' that you are defining, only in so far as this latter is characterised by some other property; *viz.* *that of being the right apprehension of things as they actually are; as if you do not affirm some such condition as accounting for the fact that only some—and not all—sensuous cognitions are 'valid', then either all these cognitions would be 'valid', or none would be so!

'For if the restriction (of a certain character) were not dependent upon—or regulated by—something else,

*The sense of the reply is this:—Only that Sensuous Cognition can be regarded as *valid* which apprehends things rightly. And as the same is the case with the inferential and all other cognitions also, and as the 'three negations' have also been shown to reside in these latter, they also are included in the definition.

then, either it should be accepted as existing everywhere or as not existing anywhere; because as a matter of fact, it is only on account of the presence or absence of 'some regulating or restrictive agency, that it is possible for things to exist in some places and not in all.' (42).

(407) Now then, (the presence of some such regulating and restrictive property in your Sensuous Cognition being absolutely necessary), does this restrictive property subsist in its substratum as an inseparable quality, or as a mere temporary mark? In the former case, if that which is the inseparable quality of the substratum of *the character 'valid cognition'* were also the inseparable quality of the 'three negations' also,—then, inasmuch as the 'three negations' have been shown to subsist in the inferential and other cognitions also, it would follow as a necessary corrollary that the '*character of valid cognition*' also subsists in that which is characterised by the 'three negations'; and thus the addition, to the definition, of the 'character of valid cognition' would fail to exclude the inferential and other cognitions. If however *the character of valid cognition* subsisted in a substratum characterised by a quality other than that which characterises that which is related to the 'three negations',—then, by your view also, *the character of valid cognition* would not be co-substrate with the 'three negations',—as one thing can be regarded as *cosubstrate* with another, only when both have for their substratum the same thing characterised by the same qualities. If, on the other hand, you were to assert that the *character of valid cognition* is 'cosubstrate' with the 'three negations' (even though the qualities of their substratum may differ), because that which subsists in a thing qualified by certain properties can be spoken of as subsisting in that thing,—then the aforesaid objection,—that the definition would apply to the inferential and other cognitions also—would remain in force.

Kh. 266.

(408) [Page 346] Nor again is the second alternative (noted in the above para.) possible. Because that same 'thing', which is characterised or marked by a certain property as its temporary or adventitious feature,* is also what is qualified by the number 'three'; specially because when a certain thing is qualified by a property,—even as qualified by that property it is connate (or identical) with itself (even as without that property); e.g. the 'man *with the stick*' is also a 'Man.' And thus *the character of valid cognition* comes to subsist in the Inferential and other Cognitions qualified by the number 'three,' these being non-different from that which is temporarily characterised by the adventitious property (of being a *right* apprehension); specially as these cognitions also are found to be characterised by the adventitious restrictive characteristic (of being the right apprehension of things),—being, as they have been shown to be, non-different from that which is characterised by this latter characteristic. And thus the taint of being 'too wide' becomes irrevocably fixed upon your definition.

(409) The opponent says:—†"But the thing in question (the inferential and other cognitions) is characterised by the adventitious characteristic (*of being right apprehension*), not as qualified by the number 'three,' but in its own pure form." This, we reply, is not satisfactory; as it has already been shown that that which is qualified (by the number 'three') is the same as that which is characterised by the characteristic (of being valid cognition). "Yet it is not *characterised*

* In the shape of being the right apprehension of things as they really are. The Inferential and other cognitions are qualified by the number 'three' and they are also right apprehensions very often. So even as qualified by the additional qualification of number 'three,' they may be regarded as non-different from *that which is characterised by the adventitious circumstance of being the right apprehension of things.*

† Inferential cognition is right apprehension, by itself—and not *as qualified by number 'three.'* And hence the three cognitions *conjointly* cannot be said to be characterised by that character, and hence included in the definition.

n its *qualified* form." That does not matter; because even in its *unqualified* form it is not characterised.* Otherwise (*i.e.*, if *the character of valid cognition* were to characterise a cognition *only in its unqualified form*) in the case in question also there would be no co-ordination (between the *character of valid cognition* and the *Sensuous cognition* sought to be defined) [because the Sensuous Cognition is represented in the definition in a *qualified* form,—that which is qualified by the 'three negations'; and from what the opponent has just said, such a qualified cognition could not be characterised by the character of being *valid cognition*].

(410) We desist here from further discussion. All the objections that we have urged against the above definitions of Sensuous Cognition may be applied also to any other definition that may be put forward. It was in view of this fact that Kumārila Bhatta has declared (in his *Shlokavārtika*, Sūtra 4, Shl. 2):—'Of what use would be the statement of the definition?' Though as a matter of fact he said this with regard to something entirely different,† yet it is found to be quite true even when taken as the statement of a general truth.

* That is to say, when we speak of an inferential cognition *as right apprehension* we do not speak of it as being *qualified* by certain qualities; nor do we necessarily speak of it as being so only in its *unqualified* form. The sense is that if the character of valid cognition were always found to subsist only in such substrata as are *never qualified by the number 'three,'* then, in that case, the contention of the Opponent would be right, that inferential and other cognitions being qualified by that number (in the definition) cannot fulfil the conditions therein laid down. As a matter of fact however, we have no such conception as that *that alone which is not qualified by the number 'three' is valid cognition.*

† Kumārila Bhatta has said this in objecting to the view that the fourth Mīmāṃsā Sūtra contains the definition of Sense-perception.

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पितुः श्रीतीर्थनाथस्य
प्रभोर्लक्ष्मीश्वरस्य च ।
मातुस्तीर्थलतादेव्याः
पादयोरिदमर्पितम् ॥

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LIST OF CONTENTS.

(The paging refers to the number at the bottom of each page.)

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CONTENTS.

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B—[Definitions of Pratyakṣa having been proved to be impossible, the Author proceeds to show that the definitions of Anumāna are equally untenable: Of the principal factors in the inferential process, the author begins with the *probans*, and shows that no adequate definition of this is available.]

(411) How again do you define 'Inference'? "Well, 'Inference', when regarded as the *instrument* (of inferential cognition), may be defined as the '*parāmarsha*' (the recognition of its concomitance with the Subject of the inferential cognition) of the '*liṅga*' or *probans* (the inferential mark, 'middle term')." In that case we ask—What is that 'liṅga' or 'inferential mark'? "The linga is that which being invariably concomitant (with the Probandum, 'Major Term),' resides in the 'pakṣa' ('Subject' or Minor Term')." But, inasmuch as according to you, the true 'pakṣa' is that wherein the residence of the *probandum* is suspected,* we ask—is this *suspicion* a mere accidental property or adjunct (of the *pakṣa*)? or is it its inherent] inseparable quality? In the former case, even after one had *ascertained* the presence of the *probandum* (fire), in the *pakṣa* (the mountain), if one were to recall to his mind the fact of the *probans* being invariably concomitant with the *probandum*, this would also constitute the right sort of 'parāmarsha' for you (in view of the suspicion that had existed before).† Nor can the 'suspicion' be held to be effective only *while it exists*; for the simple reason that it is an *accidental property*; because an accidental property, by its very nature, remains so, even when it has ceased to exist.‡ If on the other hand, the

* The Nyāya Definition of Pakṣa is सन्दिग्धसाध्यवान्—the suspicion must be there; or else no inference would be called for; it is the inference that confirms what was suspected.

† As the 'suspicion' is held to be a purely accidental property, it is not necessary that it should be always present. And thus as the *parāmarsha* would be appearing even after the inferential cognition had been got at,—there would be an endless series of inferences. In order to avoid this difficulty the Probans might be defined as that which resides in the *pakṣa* with regard to which the suspicion of the presence of the *probandum* is *present at the time*.

‡ For instance, a house continues to be called after its inhabitant even long

'suspicion' be regarded as an inherent quality inseparable from the *pakṣa*, then as the *qualifying* 'suspicion' would disappear after the inference (of fire) has been accomplished, the *qualified* (pakṣa) also would disappear (by the law that the *qualified* ceases on the cessation of the *qualification*) ; and then the inferring person would not have the place to which be could turn for the thing, fire, in his search of which, he had recourse to the inference).* In answer to the above it might be argued that—" It is in regard to the *qualified* factor of the *pakṣa* (and not to the *qualified* and the *qualification* combined) that the presence of the *probandum* is proved by the *probans* as residing in that *pakṣa* ; and as for the irregularity of 'diverse substrata' involved in this—i.e., in the fact that while the *probans* resides in the *Pakṣa as qualified by the 'suspicion'*, the *probandum* is proved to subsist in the *pakṣa* independently of the qualifying 'suspicion',—such an irregularity is one that is not undesirable, (for the simple reason that the *unqualified* thing is present in its own independent form, even when *qualified*)." This however we cannot admit. For when you accept the 'diverse substrata' with reference to the *pakṣa* in its unqualified form,—then you entirely give up your definition of 'Vyāpti' (Invariable Concomitance) between the *probans* and the *probandum*, as consisting in the fact that the two have always *one and the same* substrate. "Even in the case in question, the Invariable Concomitance as defined by us does not cease to exist ; inasmuch as the substrates are practically one and the same,

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after he has gone away. In the typical example of 'Upalakṣaṇa', the crow on Ḍēvadṭṭa's house continues to be spoken of as the distinguishing mark of the house, long after it has flown away.

* When the Ḍaṇḍa disappears, the Ḍaṇḍin loses his character, and may be said to disappear also. So when the Suspicion ceases, the Mountain qualified by it also ceases. And as the inference had led the fire-seeking man to infer the presence of fire in the mountain, when the mountain has disappeared, he has nowhere to turn to for his fire. So the inference proves useless.

so far as the *pakṣa* itself is concerned (the *probans* has the *pakṣa* for its substrate, and the substratum of the *probandum* also is the same *pakṣa*, but with a further qualifying 'suspicion')." This cannot be, we reply. If your reasoning be admitted, then the general statement of the invariable concomitance (in the Major Premiss) between the substrate of the *probans* in general, and that of the *probandum* in general, would also imply the presence of the *probandum* in a *particular* substrate of the *probans*,—as without the particular, the universal or general would not be possible;—and thus there would be no need for the statement (in the Minor Premiss) of the presence of the *probans* in the *pakṣa** ; as this statement would not help in the proving of either the general or the particular co-substrateness mentioned above. In fact the only useful purpose that this Minor Premiss could serve would be simply to show that the reasoning is not open to the fault of 'superfluity' (of proving what is already proved); and we know that this is not a 'fault' in the case of inferential reasonings for one's own purpose† ; and thus there would be no room for this premiss in any case of inferential reasoning ; and yet this is what you maintain. That 'Siḍḍhasāḍhana' in not a fault in the case of reasoning for one's own benefit is proved by the fact that those who desire Final Release always accomplish for themselves the direct knowledge of Self requisite for that purpose, by means of bringing about a commixture of the three means of knowledge, *viz.* 'studying of scriptural texts', 'reasoning' and 'reflection' [and as the 'study' points to the same Self as the

* The proposition 'all smoky places are fiery' cannot be true as a universal proposition, unless all particular smoky places are fiery. So this proposition also implies that the particular place—the mountain where smoke is—is also fiery ; and thus the conclusion proceeds directly from the Major Premiss, the Minor Premiss being superfluous.

† 'Siḍḍhasāḍhana' means the proving of what is already accepted by the other party. There being no *other party* in the case where one reasons for his own benefit, this fault is not possible.

'Reasoning' and 'Reflection', there is always be a 'siddhasadhana].

(412) The above reasonings also serve to set aside another definition of the '*Probans*'—namely, as that which, while invariably concomitant with the *probandum*, subsists in the *pakṣa which is capable of being suspected* as the substrate of the *probandum*. [This capability also lasting as long as the thing lasts, the possibility of *suspicion* would remain even after the inferential conclusion had been arrived at; and so on, all the aforesaid arguments would come in here also].

(413) "In order to avoid the above difficulties," says the opponent, "we shall define the *probans* simply *as that which is invariably concomitant* (with the *probandum*)." This also will not help you, we reply. For, we ask—does the inference consist in reflecting on that which you intend to be the concomitant *probans*, merely in its own simple fōrm, or *as concomitant with the probandum*? The former is not possible; as in that case whenever a man would think of the *smoke* and such other things (that might be concomitant with some *probandum*), even though he may not be cognisant of the fact of its being so concomitant, you would have to accept it as an inferential process! Nor is the second alternative possible; as in that case the cognition of the mere concomitance of the *probans* with the *probandum* would constitute *Inference* (which would be absurd, also according to the Logician); as it must be admitted that the cognition of the said 'invariable concomitance' apprehends the fact of the *probans* being concomitant (and this is all that your assertion makes the necessary factor in 'inference'). * For these same reasons we reject also the view that 'Inference consists in the *second* or the *third* cognition of the *probans*;' specially as in this latter case, the character of 'inference'

* The above difficulties are sought to be met by the assertion that while the *first* cognition of concomitance forms the *premiss*, its *second* or *third* cognition would be the inference following from that premiss.

would have to be admitted in the case of the mere *series* of cognitions of invariable concomitance (that we may have, without proceeding to the inferential conclusion); and further, when a person, having at first cognised the invariable concomitance, would again come to cognise the joint fact of the *probans* being concomitant, and the *probandum* being that with which it is concomitant,—this would contain the *second* cognition of concomitance, which, according to you, would be 'Inference'. Nor can this be truly regarded as 'Inference'; as in this case, as in the case of all Inferences open to the fault of 'Siḍḍhasaḍhana', the conclusion being free from doubt, the true character of the '*pakṣa*' is found wanting*; and hence the *probans* which would reside in, and qualify, such a *pakṣa,* could not be a true '*pakṣa-ḍharma*'. It might be argued that this does not matter in the case of an Inference for one's own benefit (as it has just been shown by the Vedantin himself that *siḍḍhasāḍhana* is no defect in such cases). But this also does not help to save you from difficulties of other kinds:—for instance, the cognition of invariable concomitance in question fulfilling all the conditions of the definition of 'Perception', if you regard it as 'Inference' you attribute to one and the same cognition the two incompatible characters of being 'direct' or 'immediate' (as Perception) and 'indirect' or 'mediate' (as Inference)!

(414) [Page 351] "With a view to avoid this difficulty, we shall define 'Inference' as that which, while *not having for its object that with which the probans is concomitant,* takes cognisance of that which is concomitant." This also will not help you, we reply. For, if the inference would not take any cognisance of that with which the probans is concomitant, it would fail to take cognizance also of that which is concomitant; as the latter is cognised always along with its correlative,—the cognition of concomitance being always in

* A true *pakṣa* is that with regard to whose relationship to the *probandum* there is at first a suspicion only.

the form '*this* is concomitant with *that*'; and thus in this, the cognition of both *this* and *that* being necessary, the cognition of that with which there is concomitance must be regarded as a necessary factor in the cognition of concomitance; as this is a necessary qualifying adjunct of that which is concomitant; and as such no cognition of this latter is possible without that of the former. In answer to this it might be urged that it is not intended that the Inference should not take cognizance of any and every thing with which the *probans* may be concomitant; but only that it should not take cognizance of that particular individual (with which the particular Inference may be concerned).* This also is not right, we reply; because even so, the character of 'Inference' would have to be applied to the cognition of the concomitant thing by a person whose cognition of concomitance has arisen either from the assertion of a trustworthy person —that 'Fire and smoke are concomitant,'— or from reflection, at the time that the smoke and fire are not perceived, over the previously frequently cognised concomitance of fire and smoke [because in both these cases the cognition of the *Fire* with which smoke is concomitant, does not pertain to any *particular* fire, but to fire *in general*; and thus your conditions are fulfilled]. "By the '*parāmarsha*' of the *probans* (as concomitant) we do not mean the mere knowledge of it—and it would be only thus that it could apply to the very first cognition of it that we may happen to have;— what we mean by it is the *recognition* of it (as concomitant)." This also is not right, we reply; as even so the character of 'Inference' would have to be admitted in the case where the concomitance having been cognised in the first instance, either through the assertion of a trustworthy person, or by a mere reflection the cogniser may happen to have the *recognition* also in the form that 'this is the concomitance that I had known

* This meets the above difficulty, inasmuch as Perception always pertains to *particular* things.

through trustworthy assertion, or through mere reflection. [So the objection remains in force.]

(415) The Opponent seeks to avoid the above difficulties by defining 'Inference' as consisting of that *parāmarsha*, or reflection of concomitance, which pertains to a particular individual *probans*; (*i.e.*, the reflection in the form 'this smoke is concomitant with fire,' and not in the general form 'smoke is concomitant with fire'). But in this case the definition would become too narrow; as the definition that pertains to one particular individual cannot apply to cases of other individuals. If, in order to avoid this, you add that it is not any *one* particular individual *probans* that you mean, but particular individuals *in general*,—then the definition becomes too wide (as shown before).

[The explanation of the character of the Probandum is as impossible as that of the Probans.]

(416) Then again, we ask—The presence of *fire* (the *probandum*) in the mountain that you cognise through the presence therein of *smoke* (the *probans*),—does this presence of fire refer to all time? or to the particular time (at which the presence of smoke is cognised)? The former is not possible; as in that case, just as the man seeking fire repairs to the mountain at the time that he sees smoke issuing from it, so would he also repair to it, at all times (even when he does not see the smoke: while as a matter of fact such is not found to be the case). Nor is the second alternative tenable; as the concomitance (of Smoke) upon which the inference is based is not with the particular fire existing at the time the smoke is seen (but with fire in general). "What we mean by the 'particular time' is the time at which smoke (any smoke in general) exists (and not that at which any particular smoke exists)." But in that case, in some place or other, at other times also, smoke would be existent; and this other time also would be 'the time at which smoke exists'; and thus even at this time the man

Kh. 275.

seeking fire would repair to the mountain. "But what we mean is the time of the existence of that particular smoke." This also cannot be right; as if by 'that particular' you mean the particular individual smoke one sees issuing from the mountain at the time, then, this would be a smoke with which the concomitance of fire has never been known; if, on the other hand, by 'that particular' you mean any and every particular smoke, then you become open to the objection just urged by us (that the man seeking fire would repair to the mountain at other times also, on account of the presence of some particular smoke at some place in the world). Even though it is true that you make it necessary for your Inference that the *probans* (smoke) should reside in the *pakṣa* (mountain) (and not anywhere in the world),—yet all that this does is to save you from the absurdity of the man seeking for fire in places other than the mountain; but how could that save you from the absurdity of the man seeking for it at other times (than the time at which the smoke is actually seen)? If, in order to escape from this, you insert the particular time also as a necessary element in your inferential '*pakṣa*' (defining it as that wherein the probans resides *at the time of inference*, thereby the presence of fire proved by the inference would be at the time of the presence of smoke),—after that particular moment of time would have passed, how could the man seek for fire in your '*pakṣa*' (which also would have ceased to exist, on the cessation of the point of time which was a necessary factor in that *pakṣa*)? If then you were to lay down the 'time of smoke' as an element in your '*pakṣa*' (thus avoiding the said difficulty by reason of the fact that the man would seek for fire in the mountain only so long as he sees the smoke issuing from it);—then, in that case, you would be open to all the objections that we have urged above (the 'time of smoke' being that of any smoke in the world, and so forth); If, to guard against this, you make it *the time of that particular smoke*,—then this involves the absurdity of a thing

Kh. 276.

subsisting partly in itself [the *pakṣa* is the mountain *as qualified by the time of the particular smoke*; and it is this particular smoke that, as *probans*, subsists in that *pakṣa.*]

[The defining of the Probans and the Probandum has been proved impossible; it is not possible for the Logician to supply an adequate explanation of the 'Invariable Concomitance' of these two upon which all Inference is based.]

(417) Then again, you have to explain the meaning of the word '*Vyāpti*' (Invariable Concomitance). "By *Vyāpti* we mean *avinābhāva*—that is to say, when two things are so related that one does not exist without the other, they are said to be *invariably concomitant.*" But what do you mean by this? Do you mean that the one exists when the other is not absent? or that the one is absent when the other is absent? * If the former, then, inasmuch as 'non-absence' is synonymous with 'presence', the relation would come to this that when one is present the other is also present;† and further, by this definition the relationship between 'Earth' and 'capability of being cut by iron' also would be 'Invariable Concomitance.' "But Invariable Concomitance is not only an *occasional, casual or accidental* relationship; it is meant to be a *universal* relationship (that holds good *at all times and places*)."‡ What do you mean by this 'universality' of the relation? "Well, it only means that the relation subsists in all individuals of that class." This character then can never be ascertained until there is a knowledge of *all* individuals of that class; and as a matter of fact, it is not possible for all these individuals to be known; for the simple reason that at any time there is no possibility of the presence of the right means of knowing

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* The latter alternative is taken up in para. 423 (page 358, 'Pandit' Edn.)

† And in this manner, you would give up Negative Concomitance completely.

‡ And the relation between 'Earth' and 'Capable of being cut by Iron' is not such a one. As Diamond which is 'Earth' cannot be cut by Iron.

all those individuals.* "At the time that one perceives certain individuals as being invariably concomitant with something else, all individuals of that class come into contact with the percipient organ—not indeed into direct contact, but into that contact to which we give the name of the 'contact of universality,' whereby the perception of one individual of a class brings along with it an idea of all individuals of that class.† Without accepting this theory, to seek to explain or understand 'Invariable Concomitance' is as futile and foolish as the longing for a child by a women who has married an impotent husband,—this is the taunt propounded by Vāchaspaṭi Mishra." This is not right, we reply. For, if at the time of cognising 'Invariable Concomitance' through the 'contact of universality' all individuals of a class, were cognised,—then a man, who would cognise the 'concomitance' of such universals as 'knowable' and the like (which include *all* things), would have to be regarded as omniscient. Nor is there available for you the counter-magical-formula, in the shape of the assertion that—"in thus putting forward 'Omniscience' you seem to imply as if nothing were unknown to you, and thus omniscience belongs to you also!"

(418) [Page 355] "But as a matter of fact, at the time that one cognises the Concomitance of 'knowability, he does cognise *all* things,—not indeed in their particular individual character, but merely as 'knowable'." This is not right, we reply; as if the particular thing is 'knowable' as endowed with its individual character (as indeed everything in the world is), then the thing along with its individual character is also a substratum of 'knowability'; and as such how could it fail to be cognised by the cognition of 'knowability'? If however it is not 'knowable' as endowed with its individual character, then it cannot have that

* The individual object is perceived through Sense-contact; and it is not possible for all individuals to be in contact with any sense-organ of the person.

† And thus the requisite knowledge of all individuals is always available.

Kh. 278.

character ! For certainly whatever individual character a thing has, it is always 'knowable' by that ; and hence when a thing is known as 'knowable', it would be known in all its existent individual character. And if you admit the possibility of this, then just please find out what is passing in my mind,—then only can I put faith in your assertion !

(419) In answer to the above, the Opponent urges the following :—"Just as among things, there are several kinds of Difference,—in the form of 'Mutual Negation', 'Diversity of Properties' and so forth—so is there also a 'one-ness' among things. And all such properties as 'knowability' and the like (that belong to all things are nothing more or less than what constitutes that *one-ness* among things. Consequently when a thing is known as 'knowable', what is known is only the particular individual thing (actually cognised) as one (identical) with all knowable things ; and as this does not involve the knowledge of all things, why should the cognition of 'knowability' imply omniscience ? Nor may it be argued against this, that the Diversity of individual things also is something 'knowable', and so, whenever a thing is cognised, this diversity also would be cognised as one of the things possessing that *knowability* (which constitutes the identity of the perceived thing with all things knowable). This does not matter ; inasmuch as this Diversity also, when known as 'knowable', is known only as 'one' with all things (and as such our aforesaid argument remains unshaken). Hence the declaration—'that man by whom any one *bhāva* or character has been perceived in its real form, by him have all things been perceived *taṭṭvaṭaḥ*'—that is to say *as one through that common character.*"

(420) This above reasoning, we reply, is not right ; as if what you say were true, then there would be the possibility of such a self-contradictory conception as that 'the many are one'. The contradiction might be sought to be explained by the fact that the 'diversity' is due to other characters,

and the 'oneness' to an altogether different character—of *knowability* for instance (that is to say, the jar is different from the cloth through its character of the jar, but is one with it, as both are 'knowable'). But in that case, inasmuch as the diversity among all individuals (knowable things,) is also a substratum of 'knowability', its cognition would certainly imply the ommiscience urged above. *

(421) Then again, we ask—Even granting that the particular individuals of a class are perceived by your 'contact of universality'; what is your proof for (means of knowing) the fact that there is a relationship (of Invariable Concomitance) among them? It might be held that, "just as the sense-organs are the means for perceiving the individuals, so in the same manner the said relationship is perceived by the sense-organs that apprehend Invariable Concomitance." But in that case, as the sense-organs would supply the right cognition of such concomitance, there would be no possibility of any discrepancy (or mistake) in the notion of concomitance thus obtained; ,—while as a matter of fact, we do meet with such discrepancies. "In these latter cases, the cognition of the relationship is regarded as *wrong*, only because of its subsequent sublation." This will not help you; as, all circumstances being similar, there can be no justification for regarding one cognition as 'right', and another as 'wrong'; specially as it is not easy to differentiate the intricacies of what is, and what is not, a deficiency (in the cognition, sufficient to make it sublated). It might be urged that—"from the very effects (in the shape of subsequent sublation and the like) we can infer the fact that there is a difference in the circumstances (of the two cognitions, whereby we would be justified in regarding one as 'right' and another as 'wrong')." You may infer this fact; but it becomes necessary for you to

* Diversity among things can be known only when they are all known with their distinctive characters. Hence the cognition of Diversity implies the cognition of all things.

explain what that 'difference' or 'diversity of circumstances' is. The 'peculiarity of circumstance' cannot be held to consist in the presence (in one case) and absence (in the other) of all universal relationships. For as at any one time, the *future* relationships are not present, the 'peculiarity of circumstance' would never be complete, and as such could not bring about the desired effect (of pointing out one cognition as right and another as wrong). If it be argued that even though the future relationships are not present, yet whenever the relationship is cognised, it is cognised as subsisting between any two individuals, in general, of the two classes concerned, and consequently (even though the particular *individuals*, now before the eyes, might not have been previously known as having the relationship), the previous existence of the relationship (cognised before, as subsisting between any two individuals) would be there to constitute the necessary 'peculiarity of circumstance,'—then we would reply that this previous existence of the relationship would be available in a case where the present cognition of relationship is *wrong*, as well as in that where it is *right*; for as a matter of fact, the wrong cognition (of concomitance) also never appears, unless there has been some sort of cognition in the past of that relationship.*

(422) The Opponent urges—"What of this? We shall assume some other peculiarity in the cause (of the cognition of concomitance) on the basis of the (well-recognised) difference in the effects produced (in the shape of right and wrong cognitions)." But in that case, you will have to explain if this peculiar cause is one that aids the sense-organ (in the perception of concomitance), or it is an altogether different (independent) cause. The former is not possible; as there is no ground for assuming that the sense-organs can

* The 'Earth' is wrongly cognised as concomitant with 'capable of being cut by iron,' only after many earthy substances have been found to be so capable.

have any agency in bringing about the valid cognition of *past* and *future* relations (the senses acting only upon things in the present); on the contrary, as a matter of fact, a due comprehension of concomitance between two things known before is found to appear only after the sense-contact (with those things) has ceased, and the man has had time to reflect upon the facts (in connection with his cognition of the things concerned). It might be argued that, even at this time there is a particular sense-organ, the Mind, functioning. That may be so; but there is no proof for the fact that the Mind is the *instrument* for bringing about the peculiar effect in question; specially in view of the fact that every contingency (for the explaining of which you postulate the instrumentality of the Mind) is explained on the basis of other assumptions which are found to be necessary on other grounds also. It may be that in the cognition in question also, as in the cognitions produced by the Eye and the other organs, the Mind is some sort of a cause (not necessarily the principal one, so as to be called the 'instrument' of that cognition); but just as in the case of the visual cognition (though the Mind is some sort of a cause) it is the Eye that is regarded as the 'instrument,' so in the case of the cognition of concomitance also, the 'instrument' must be something else (different from the Mind); and this would be either a seventh Sense-organ, or some other 'instrument of cognition.' If you do not admit this, then for visual cognition also the Eye could not be regarded as the 'instrument'; as in this case also the Mind may be regarded as the 'instrument,' just as it is in the case of the feeling of pleasure, etc; and the Eye would have to be regarded as a mere subordinate auxilliary. Nor again is the second alternative tenable (*viz.*, that the 'peculiar cause' of the cognition of concomitance is something altogether independent of the sense-organs); as in that case, this 'cause' would be either a 'seventh sense-organ,' or a 'means of valid cognition' distinct from those accepted (by you)!

Kh. 282.

(423) Nor can the second meaning suggested (in para. 417) of the word '*Avinābhāva*'—'Invariable Concomitance'—be accepted. That is to say, it cannot be defined as the negation of that '*vinābhāva*' which consists in the fact of the one being not absent while the other is absent. As by this definition, there would be Invariable Concomitance between 'Earth' and 'capability of being cut by iron,' in view of the fact that there are cases (*i.e.* that of Ākāsha) where there is absence of both 'Earth' and 'capability of being cut by iron.' [And thus in this case the one being absent while the other is not absent, we have *the negation of the fact of one being absent while the other is not absent*; and this fulfils the conditions of your definition]. "It is the universal simultaneity of the two things that is intended, and not mere occasional simultaneity (*i.e. in all cases* where the one is absent, the other must also be absent); it is for this reason that the expression '*avivābhāvaniyamāt*' is used (by which is meant the *necessity or certainty of* concomitance)." This is not possible, we reply; for the ascertainment of this *universal* absence (absence in all cases) will be as impossible as that of universal concomitance (as shown in para. 417). If such an ascertainment were possible, it would be easier to ascertain universal concomitance than universal absence; and under the circumstances, what would be the use of this roundabout method of explaining your position by means of 'universal absence.'?

(424) Some people offer the following definition of 'Invariable Concomitance':—"When the *probans* and the *probandum* are so related that it is absolutely impossible for the *probans* to be present in a substratum where the *probandum* can never subsist,—then, in that case, the concomitance of these two (*probans* and *probandum*) constitutes what is meant by 'Invariable Concomitance'." This also is not the right definition, we reply. By what, we ask, is the *impossibility* of the *probans* subsisting where the *probandum* cannot subsist

Kh. 288.

ascertained? By any of the means of right knowledge? Or by argumentation (reasoning)? If the former, then,—in the first place, it cannot be ascertained by means of the sense-organs; as that would be absolutely impossible (all the factors concerned not being in contact with them); and further because, if this were ascertainable by Sense-perception, then there would be no possibility of any doubts arising as to the validity of the *probans*—as to whether or not it is really invariably concomitant with the *probandum*. Nor, in the second place, could the afore-mentioned 'impossibility' be ascertained by means of Inference; as if it were, then there would be an endless series of Inferences (for each Inference). Thirdly, the impossibility cannot be ascertained by means of 'Presumption'; as Presumption (according to you, Logicians) does not differ from Inference; and further because, even if it were different, it would prove the said impossibility only by showing that there is no possibility of the *probans* subsisting without the *probandum*; and when this will have already been proved by 'Presumption', what would be the use of any further Inference (based upon that relation between the *probans* and the *probandum*)? And if the Presumption were not to prove the 'impossibility' in the said manner, what would it prove in regard to the *probans and the probandum*?*

(425) We grant, for the sake of argument, that 'Presumption' would somehow prove the required 'impossibility'; even then, it becomes necessary for us to ask what exactly is your view. (1) Do you mean that 'Invariable Concomitance' is that concomitance (of the two) *in some place and time or the other*, which is accompanied by the proof of the impossibility of the existence of the *probans* in a place where the *probandum* cannot exist? (2) Or that it is the concomitance *in all places and at all times*, as accompanied by that proof of impossibility? (3) Or that it is mere concomitance

* As in that case there could be no concomitance between them.

in *general* (vaguely), as thus accompanied,—and that you do not care to enter into particular details? (4) Or that it is the concomitance in all places and at all times, and that this concomitance is ascertained by the proof of the impossibility of the existence of the *probans* where the *probandum* cannot be present?

(426) The *first* of these is not tenable; as you cannot establish any of the alternatives that are possible under this view. For instance, does the proof of the impossibility of the existence of the *probans* where the *probandum* cannot exist pertain to all particular individuals (of the 'probans' and 'probandum')? Or only to a few individuals in a vague general sort of way? By the first alternative, wherever it would be necessary to bring forward the Inference, it would be necessary to bring up the 'Presumption' which would prove the impossibility of the contrary (that is to say, the impossibility of the *probans* existing where the *probandum* cannot exist); and as what is required to be proved by the Inference would have been already proved by this 'Presumption', there would be absolutely no use for the trouble of having recourse to the Inference. By the second alternative, even when in regard to some few individuals the concomitance of the two is not possible, if it is found in a few other individuals, these latter would suffice to afford scope for the proof of the impossibility of the contrary (i.e. of the impossibility of the *probans* where the *probandum* is absent); * because the 'contrary' (whose impossibility is sought to be proved) would, by this alternative be of this general form—'the presence of smoke is always apart from (not concomitant with) the presence of fire'; and what the proof of the impossibility of this 'contrary' establishes is the fact that the presence of the two (the *smoke* as the *probans* and the *fire* as the *probandum*) is not incompatible; and as this 'non-incompatibility' would be established

* And this could not establish *Invariable* concomitance.

Kh. 285.

even by the two being found together *in some cases* (and not necessarily in all cases),—the concomitance between 'Earth and 'capability of being cut by iron' will have to be regarded as 'Invariable Concomitance.'

(427) Nor is the *second* form of your view (mentioned in para. 425) tenable. As in that case the defining clause "accompanied &c." would be absolutely useless; you might simply say "concomitance at all times and in all places"; and we have already shown that even this will not be right. Nor can the third form of your view be maintained. As that is rejected by those same arguments that we have put forward above (in para. 426) in connection with the alternatives as to whether the proof of impossibility pertains to all individuals, or only to a few individuals in a general way. Nor lastly, can the fourth form of your view be accepted. For the universal character of the proposition, 'what is smoky is fiery', would be expressed only in the form—'All individual smokes are related to (concomitant with) fire'; and if this form of the proposition is comprehended at the time of the cognition of your 'Invariable Concomitance,' then, inasmuch as the smoke in the *pakṣa* (mountain) would also be only one *particular smoke*, the concomitance of this also with *fire* would have been already cognised (by the cognition of the said Invariable Concomitance); and thus the further cognition (in the inferential conclusion) of the same previously cognised presence of fire in the *pakṣa* would be a mere 'Remembrance'; and there would be no room for your 'Inference.'

(428) In answer to this it might be said that what has been cognised previously has been cognised only in a general way; while the Inference is in a particular form. But this also is not right. For what is this 'particular form' that is meant to be inferred? Is it the particular individual, which is the 'particular form' of 'firiness'? Or is it the connection of that individual with a particular point of time and place (at which the presence of fire is cognised)? It cannot mean

the former; as you yourself have admitted that *all individuals* have been cognised by the cognition of Invariable Concomitance (so that there can be no other individual left to be cognised for the first time by your Inferential Conclusion). Nor can it mean the latter; as that which is your '*pakṣa*', which is a particular thing *having smoke*, and which has been 'remembered' (in the manner shown above) as *having fire*, is distinctly cognised by means of the Eye, as being a Mountain *at a particular time and place* (the time and place also thus being cognised by the Eye). This fact of time and place being cognised by means of the Eye will be admitted by you, in the same manner as you admit the fact that the recognition of a certain thing, as 'this (what I see now) is the same as that (what I had seen in the past)', involves a 'recognition' also of the particular time and place at which the thing is seen now,—this 'recognition' being obtained by means of the Eye as aided by impressions left by the previous cognition. [And just as in this case you do not object to Recognition being obtained by the Sense-organs, so you can have no objection to the *Sensuous* character of the Recognition involved in your Inferential Conclusion]. And thus (your conclusion being only a matter of Sense-perception) there is no room for 'Inference.'

(429) *Nor can the 'impossibility of the *probans* subsisting where the *probandum* cannot subsist' be ascertained by Analogy; For all Analogies pertain to particular cases; and as such they cannot apply to cases like those under consideration (all of which pertain to universals, more or less).

(430) Nor can the said 'impossibility' be ascertained by Verbal Authority; as in cases where no trustworthy teacher is available, no comprehension of 'Invariable Concomitance' would be possible, (if such comprehension were dependent upon Verbal Authority).

*The author takes up the thread of argumentation from para 424.

(431) The sixth proof, 'Negation', might perhaps be available for you. But when we proceed to ascertain the character of that Negation, it is not found to be possible: For instance, the 'Negation' must be asserted in this form:—'If the *Smoke* ever existed apart from *fire*, it would certainly be so perceived;—as a matter of fact however, it is never so perceived;— hence from this non-perception it follows that it *never* exists apart from *fire*." But this proof is not right; we ask—does this 'Negation' proceed on the basis of the fact that its basic premiss is found to be not untrue only in a few cases? or on that it is never in any case found to be untrue? It cannot be the former; as in that case there would be an 'Invariable Concomitance' between 'Earth' and 'capability of being cut by iron'. Nor can it be the latter; as in that case, there arises the question—Is the 'non-perception in all cases' the non-perception *of only that which would be capable of being perceived*? or is it 'non-perception' pure and simple? It cannot be the former; as it is not possible for that which is *capable of being perceived* to be 'non-perceived' in all cases. Nor can it be the latter; as in that case 'invariable concomitance' becomes possible between 'Earth' and 'capability of being cut by iron' also. In answer to this it might be urged that the truth of this 'concomitance' is found to fail in the case of diamond (which, though 'Earth,' is not 'cut by iron'). But even this cannot help you; as at the time that the diamond is not seen, there is no idea of the failure of the truth of the said 'concomitance'. "True; but when the diamond *is* seen, the failure of the 'concomitance' becomes patent; and 'Invariable Concomitance' is possible only in cases where it is *never* found to fail." This cannot be right: for even in cases where we fail to perceive any failure of the truth of a proposition, there is no guarantee that *in the future* also its failure or falsity will never be perceived. [And thus there can be no surety with regard to any 'Invariable Concomitance'].

Kh. 288.

(432) [Thus then it has been proved that the ***impossibility of the probans subsisting where the probandum cannot subsist*** cannot be ascertained by any of the Means of Right Knowledge]. Nor can this 'impossibility' be ascertained by reasoning or argumentation (the second part of the question put by us in para. 424). For if you accept the theory that 'Reasoning' has its basis in 'Invariable Concomitance', then you land yourself in an infinite regress. If, on the other hand, you do not accept that theory, as in that case the very foundation of the 'Reasoning' would be unsound, the 'Reasoning' itself would come to be a mere semblance of itself—not a true Reasoning.

(433) In answer to this you might argue as follows:—"You cannot very well say what you have said: here is the 'Reasoning' that I put forward as proving the impossibility of any suspicion as regards the existence of *smoke* apart from *fire*:—'If *smoke* could exist without *fire*, it would either be without a cause, and as such, eternal, or not exist at all.' This 'Reasoning' is unanswerable, inasmuch as if you were to put forward a doubt as to its validity (you would do this by way of some other Reasoning whose validity you accept, and thus) you would be open to 'self-contradiction', or self-nullification. * It is a rule accepted by all men that one doubts or suspects only that, the doubting of which does not render him open to the faults of 'self-contradiction' or 'self-nullification.' Such unanswerable Reasonings then as we have just shown may be brought forward in all cases (of Inference)." This however is not right, we reply. For it is not necessary that the truth of the Reasoning you have put forward should be doubted in such a way as to deny the relation of Cause and Effect between the Fire and Smoke (and it would be only if this were doubted that your deduction with regard to Smoke being uncaused and eternal

* In seeking to set aside the validity of Reasoning, you accept the validity of Reasoning.

would be true); but certainly the doubt might be raised as to the possibility of Smoke arising from other causes also (which possibility would viviate your 'invariable concomitance').

(434) In answer to this it would not be right to argue that—"if Smoke proceeded from other causes, there would be no possibility of any such *one* genus as 'Smoke'." As such a single class or genus as 'Smoke' would be possible in that case also; just as you have the single genus 'Cognition,' even though some Cognitions are brought about by the Senses, and others by 'Inference' and other means of knowledge. "But in the case of Cognitions what makes them sub-classed, as 'Direct Perception' f.i. is the contact of the Sense-organs; they are classed as 'Direct Perception' &c, *not because they are 'cognition,'* but because they are due to the particular agencies of the Sense-organ &c." This also is not right; as with a view to avoid the undesirable contingency of the general character, or conception, 'Cognition' being something merely accidental (and not a conception based upon a uniform characteristic), it is necessary for you to point out some cause 'or origin' that might be common to all cognitions; and just as doubts might be raised as to any particular cognition proceeding from that source, so, in the same manner, in the case of a *particular smoke* also doubts might very well arise as to its originating from *fire*. Nor may it be argued that in the smoke produced by fire no particular feature is ever perceived (as in the particular kinds of cognitions produced by the Senses, by Inference and so forth,) (all smoke being equally produced by fire). Because this non-perception of the particular feature can be explained by the fact that it is only natural that we do not perceive it, inasmuch as, (in a hurry, without due reflection), any such particular feature is not capable of being perceived, on account of the non-perception, at that time,

Kh. 290.

of those other kinds of smoke that proceed from other sources (than fire). [And thus, the non-perception of what is not perceptible at the time cannot prove its non-existence; as according to the Logician also, we are justified in believing that a certain thing does not exist at the time, only when we make sure of the fact that if it had existed it would have been perceived]. And further you cannot stop the possibility of such surmises as—'when the particular kind of smoke produced by other causes will be perceived, then it may be possible for us to perceive particular features in the smoke produced by fire also.'

(435) "In the case of cognitions we find a common source (or cause) in the shape of *the contact of the Mind and the Self*." This is not right. For, if anything that proceeds from the contact of the Mind and Self were 'Cognition,' then Desire, Effort &c. would also have to be regarded as 'Cognition'! If then, as the cause common to all cognitions, you were to assume—either (1) some peculiar Unseen Agency, or (2) a certain peculiar force, or (3) the universal class 'Cognition,' or (4) the previous Negation or non-existence of Cognition,—then, some such (unseen) cause could also be assumed as pertaining in common to *all* smokes, even such as are not produced by fire. It might be argued that a single class can be assumed on the basis of an *Unseen* Cause, only in a case where the *seen* cause is found to fail (to apply to all the individuals concerned) (while in the case in question the Causality of fire is not found to fail in regard to any smoke). This also cannot be right. As, even granting that it can be assumed only in a case where the seen cause is found to fail,—what guarantee have you that in any given case (of fire and smoke for instance) (even though you may not have found it to fail in the past,) that it will not fail in the future?

(436) The following argument may be brought forward by the Opponent:—"For you who would thus be casting suspicion on all inferential processes, no inference would

Kh. 291.

be possible; inasmuch as, without admitting the existence of the inferences with regard to the nature of the Self held by your adversary, it would not be possible for you to engage in any discussion (as to the nature of the Self); and as these inferences that you yourself would accept (in this discussion) would be open to the same suspicions (that you put forward against our inferences), you would (in putting forward such inferences) become open to the charge of 'self-contradiction'."

This is not right, we reply. For (if you do not admit the possibility of such suspicions), just as you accept as valid the inference of *fire*, on the ground of its being the cause of *smoke*, —so in the same manner, you would have to accept as valid the inference, from the presence of *fire*, of the presence of a certain source of fire (from which you might have seen fire being produced in certain cases) [and you would have no justification for suspecting and enquiring into the character of the relationship between fire and that particular cause]; specially, as all attendant circumstances being similar in the two cases, there can be no ground for regarding one as valid and the other as invalid. And further, if you hold that no suspicion can arise (with regard to the smoke being due to causes other than fire) even when we actually perceive properties (*i.e.*, those to which the production of smoke is due) common to the two (sources of smoke), then it comes to this that even when the *Cause* is present in full force, the effect may not appear; and under the circumstances, when for the purpose of bringing about the effect, in the shape of the conviction of other people, you would attempt to put forth such causes as Verbal Assertion, Inferential Reasonings, and so forth,—you also would be open to the charge of 'self-contradiction.' "But our case is different: the 'self-contradiction' that we have shown in your case, would itself be one of the 'peculiar features' (proving the fact of Smoke issuing from no other cause save fire); and when this 'peculiar feature'

Kh. 292.

will have been duly cognised, there would be no 'non-cognition of peculiar features' which is the necessary condition for the appearance of suspicion; and thus no suspicion being possible, how could there be any similar *self-contradiction* in our case?" This cannot be, we reply. As the cognition of this 'self-contradiction' cannot be held to be due to mere fancy or conjecture and such other causes; because inasmuch as such fancy &c. would always pertain to things that have no real existence, if the 'self-contradiction' due to snch causes were to be effective, their operation would extend too far—(*i. e.* such fanciful 'self-contradictions' could be put forward in all cases). Nor can it be urged that it is the 'self-contradiction' that pertains to things other than those having no real existence, which would prove the rightly cognised (absence of failure in the premiss put forward). This we shall refute later on, when dealing with 'Ṭarka' or Reasoning [page 369].

(437) Thus then (the 'self-contradiction' not being merely 'fanciful'), we ask—the 'cognition of peculiarity' in the shape 'self-contradiction,' that you put forward as the bar to any suspicion (with regard to the validity of your premiss)—this 'cognition' must be held to proceed either from some Means of right Knowledge, or from mere Reasoning; if it proceeds from some Means of right Knowledge, then the presence of the suspicion also would be cognised by that same means of knowledge; as it is only when a certain suspicion is present that any 'self-contradiction' can be noticed in it; if there can be 'self-contradiction' even without the 'suspicion', then it is evident that the 'self-contradiction' is equally possible in both cases of likely suspicion (the one that you put forward against us, and the other brought forward by us against you).

(438) "We grant that the Means of right Knowledge that would afford the cognition of 'self-contradiction', would

Kh. 293.

also bring about the cognition of suspicion. What does this matter? The 'self-contradiction' would come about on the basis of the 'suspicion' appearing in the first instance; and when this 'self-contradiction', which would be a 'peculiar feature' in the case, is cognised, it will not allow any further suspicion to appear." It is not so, we reply. For (this 'self-contradiction' cannot prove the absence of failure in your premiss,—either while the 'Contradiction' exists, or after it has itself ceased; as) at the time that the 'self-contradiction' exists, the 'failure' (or discrepancy) of that which is *suspected* is proved by the very suspicion that forms the basis of that suspicion; and after that 'suspicion' has ceased, the 'self-contradiction' based thereupon, which is the 'peculiar feature' you rely upon, also ceases; and thus what would be there to bar further suspicion?

(439) "Granted that the 'peculiar feature' of the 'Self-contradiction' is not present at that time;—there is certainly present the *Cognition* of that Contradiction, or the *Impression* left by its Cognition; and in all cases it is the *Cognition* of the 'peculiar feature', as well as the *Impression* left by that cognition, that are obstacles to further suspicion; and in no case is suspicion barred by the actual presence of the 'peculiar feature' itself." This is not right, we reply. For when the 'peculiar feature' is such as is not coeval with its substrate (being only temporary) (as for instance, the dark colour of the unbaked jar),—if the mere fact of this feature having been once perceived, or that of its impression being left on the mind, were to put a stop to all suspicion with regard to the future appearance of all similar 'peculiar features' in that same substrate,—then, in the case of the unbaked jar, as the *dark colour* will have been perceived, either in the *jar as a whole* (according to the view that the *baking* applies to the jar as one composite whole), or in its component atoms (in accordance with the view that the baking applies to the component particles of the thing), there

Kh. 294.

could be no suspicion in regard to the likelihood of there appearing in that jar, in the future, of the other peculiar feature (the red colour), through the *baking*.

(440) Then again, if the 'self-contradiction' appears only after the suspicion has arisen, then it may be that, by reason of the perception of this 'self-contradiction', which would be a 'peculiar feature' residing in suspicion, there can be no further suspicion with regard to that suspicion (but it could not stop the appearance of the previous suspicion itself). If, on the other hand, the 'self-contradiction' resided in (depended upon) the 'failure' (of your premiss, my suspicion with regard to which would, as you say, involve the 'self-contradiction'),—then, in that case, this 'failure' itself would be firmly established; inasmuch as in that case, the 'failure', being the substratum of the 'self-contradiction' (which, according to you, is *rightly* cognised), would be something that is *rightly* cognised. Nor may it be held that the Reasonings are based upon the invariable concomitances known from times immemorial. For, it cannot be said that those concomitances have been rightly cognised; specially as we find in many cases—*e. g.* in the case of the notion of 'Self' with regard to the body,—that even though the cognition has continued from time immemorial, it is wrong all the same; and as for the cognition having come down from times immemorial, this would be common to both (the cognition of your invariable concomitances, and the ordinary notion *of self* with regard to the body). Nor will it be right for you to make us open to 'self-contradiction' by means of the Reasoning that if we suspected 'failure' in your argument, we should be involved in 'self-contradiction.' As the very foundation of this Reasoning being unsound the Reasoning would be a false one; and if even a false Reasoning could succeed in making the opponent open to 'self-contradiction', then, the possibility of such 'self-contradiction' would be common to both parties; inasmuch as

it is quite possible to make you open to 'self-contradiction' by means of some sort of false Reasoning. If (in order to escape from this difficulty) you were to hold that the Reasoning has its basis in Invariable Concomitance, there would be suspicion of 'failure' with regard to that concomitance also, and so on *ad infinitum.* If 'self-contradiction' were to be urged against that suspicion also, then too, there would be no end to these (Reasonings, Suspicions and Self-contradictions).

'And thus it will not be difficult for us to quote (against you) your own couplet with a few letters altered :' (43).

*'If there is *self-contradiction*, then there must be *suspicion* (on which that contradition is based); if there is no *self-contradiction*, then the *suspicion* remains in force all the more; and thus how could the *suspicion* be put an end to by *self-contradiction*? and how too could any Reasoning stop the suspicion ?' (44).

(441) It might be argued that (the †mere 'suspicion of failure' can not stop all Inference, as in all suspicion or doubt there are always two sides of the question, and) the 'absence of failure' (with regard to any Invariable Concomitance) consists in the abandoning of one side and accepting of the other (and on the basis of this *accepted* concomitance the Inference could rightly proceed). But against this some people might put forward the fact that in a case where we see a certain thing as appearing (*produced*) and disappearing (*destroyed*) simultaneously, it is not possible to perceive any such 'absence of failure', [either as to its appearance (*being born*) or to its disappearance (*being destroyed*) which are the only two factors in the doubt as to the thing being present or not present].

* This is a parody of one of Udayanāchārya's Kārikās.

† The suspicion is always in the form—is this (1) *true* or (2) not *true* ? This is always followed by the rejecting of either (1) or (2) and the acceptance of the other. In a case where the *concomitance* would be accepted as true, the Inference could rightly proceed on the basis of that.

(442) Another definition of Invariable Concomitance is next tackled:—*Some people define 'Invariable Concomitance' as a *natural relation.* To these we put the question—*Whose* 'natural relation' is it? Of the two members related? or of something else? It cannot be the latter; as in that case Invariable Concomitance would come to be something quite contrary to what it is intended to be [as by this hypothesis it would be a relationship between things *not* concomitant with each other]. Nor could it be the former; as in that case we would ask—What is the meaning of the word 'natural'? (1) Does it mean 'based upon, or subsisting in, the nature of the things related'?—(2) or, 'produced by the nature of the things related'?—(3) or, 'that which is not-different from the nature of the things intended to be related'?—(4) or, 'that which is invariably concomitant with the nature of the things related'?—(5) or, 'not due to anything other than the nature of the things related'?—(6) or something different from these five?

(443) If it meant the (1)—*i.e.* 'subsisting in the related things'—then there would be 'invariable concomitance' between 'Earth' and 'capability of being cut by iron' (as there *is* such a relation subsisting in these two). Nor can it mean the (2); as that would make your definition 'too wide' as well as 'too narrow' ['too wide' as including the relation of the 'smoke' and the 'ass' that might be visible at the time; and 'too narrow' as not including the relation between 'Colour' and 'Taste,' in which no relation is *produced*]. For the same reasons, the *third* meaning also cannot be accepted. [The definition being 'too wide' as including the relation between the 'Earth-surface' and the 'absence of the jar', where the relation is brought about by neither of the two relatives; and 'too narrow' as not including the relation between 'smoke' and 'fire,' where the relation is due to the

*See Vāchaspati Mishra's *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā* (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares) pp. 109-110.

contact of wet fuel]. Nor can the *fourth* meaning be accepted; for until you have explained what 'invariable concomitance' is, it cannot be ascertained what is so *concomitant*; further, if the *relation* were so 'concomitant' then the *things related*, with which it would be concomitant, would, in virtue of this very fact, have a wider extension than the *relation*; and thus (there being no 'invariable concomitance' between the things themselves) the perception of one of these could not necessarily lead to the inference of the other. Nor can the *fifth* meaning be accepted; as if by 'being *due*' you mean 'being *produced*,' then the phrase 'to anything other than the things related' would be entirely superfluous, in case the relation in question be held to be *everlasting*; as in that case, by its very nature, the relation would be *not produced*, either by the nature of the things themselves (or by any other thing); and in the case of the *relation* being held to be non-eternal, something transient (produced by something),—then, in that case, there would be no possibility of any such *relation*; as (there can be no such relation as is produced by the two related things only), the causes available for the production of such relation being possible every where; in fact in the last resort, it cannot but be admitted that such relation as the one in question is brought about by such (universally efficient) causes as Time, Space, Unseen Agency, and so forth. Nor can the *sixth* meaning be accepted, for the simple reason that it cannot be explained what that 'something else' is; specially as in this case, this view can be refuted by putting forth all possible alternatives and showing each of them to be unacceptable; as any other procedure would show the weakness of the disputant.

(444) Others again define 'Invariable Concomitance' as *the relationship that is not due to any accidental circumstances.* To these people we put the following question—What is

the *upāḍhi* (accidental circumstance or condition) freedom from which constitutes your '*anupāḍhikatva*' ?

(445) "*Upāḍhi*", says the Logician, "is that with which the *probandum* is *invariably concomitant,* but with which the *probans* is not so concomitant.* This definition is derived from the following verse† :—'When of two terms—not related to each other (by the relation of invariable concomitance)—one is found to be invariably concomitant with the *probandum,* if the other happens to be such as has its negation (or absence) invariably concomitant with the negation (or absence) of the *probandum,* this other is what is called *Upāḍhi*'; this verse being construed through negation as—'that is the *Upāḍhi* whose *negation* is concomitant with the negation of the *probandum*' (the affirmative form of which would be 'that which is concomitant with the *probandum*).' ‡ This has been called *Upāḍhi* (*that which imposes*) in view of the fact that one of its properties (*i. e.* its concomitance) appears (is imposed upon, is cognised) in that which is intended to be the *probans,*—in the same manner as the *redness* of the red *Japā* flower appears in the piece of rock-crystal. This is what has been thus declared (by Kumārila Bhatta)§ :—'Of an invariable concomitance that is perceived, there is only a certain character that can be regarded as the basis of (leading up to) that concomitance,—this character being one with regard to which

* This definition is the one given by Udayanāchārya in his *Kusumāñjali,* page 395 (Bibl. Ind).

† This quotation is spoken of by the Shānkarī as a 'Vārṭika' ; and by the Viḍyā-sāgarī as '*Vīmāṇa-shloka*'. 'That which has its negation concomitant with the negation of the probandum' is the same as 'that which is concomitant with the probandum' (of the above definition) ; and the qualification 'not related to each other' signifies 'that which is not concomitant with the *probans.*'

‡ The whole of this sentence, from here down to the end of the para, is from the *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* pp. 412-13 (Bib. Ind.).

§ *Shloka-vārṭika,* Anumāna 13-15. According to the Shānkarī this quotation contains only the second shloka. But the Viḍyā-sāgarī reads two. We adopt the latter reading. The Bibl Ind. edition of the *Nyāyakusumāñjali* however contains only one *shloka* (the second).

Kh. 299.

it is ascertained that if it exists, the other must exist;* there are however many other characters which man lend support to invariable concomitances based upon entirely different characters,—but which even though perceived cannot rightly lead up to the notion of that with which the thing concerned may be concomitant'. This *Upādhi* may be one with regard to which we are quite certain (as to its being an '*upādhi*), as also one which may be merely suspected (as being one) [*i. e.* the merest suspicion of the presence of such a character is enough to vitiate the validity of the inference.] With regard to this we have the following declaration †:—'So long as there is even an hundredth part of a suspicion as to the presence of the *probans* in a substratum where the *probandum* can never subsist,—how can such a *probans* ever have any inferential force (how can it ever lead to any inference)."

(446) The above definition of '*Upādhi*' cannot be accepted. As it would apply to the character of '*pakṣētaratva*' (the character of being something other than the *pakṣa*.')‡

* That is to say, there may be some characters which even though belonging to the Pakṣa, for instance,—which Pakṣa may be the substratum of the concomitance of some other property,—cannot prove the presence of the other character.

† The Vidyāsagarī speaks of this quotation as '*abhiyukta-vachana*, and the *Kusumāñjaliprakāsha* as' *vriddhasammati*' (page 395, Bilb. Indica)

‡ In the inference—the 'Mountain is fiery, because there is smoke', the *character of being other than the mountain* (which is the pakṣa) is something that resides where ever *fire* exists. Though this may not be true with regard to the *mountain* itself, —yet as the presence of fire *in the mountain* is still doubtful (depending for ascertainment upon the inference itself), it cannot be taken into account Thus then, the said character is one with whom *fire* (the *probandum*) is invariably concomitant. So this fulfills the first condition of '*upādhi*.' The second condition is that the *probans* should *not* be invariably concomitant with it; in the case in question we find that *smoke* (the probans) is *not* invariably concomitant with the *character of being other than the mountain*; as the two (smoke and this character) are not found together in the *mountain* itself. As the presence of smoke in the mountain is not doubtful, (like the presence of fire),—being actually perceived by the eye,—it has to be taken into account. Thus then we find a term—in the shape of the said character—which fulfills both conditions of the *upādhi*. Thus your definition of *upādhi* is one that vitiates even such valid inferences as 'the mountain has fire because it smokes.'

Nor will it be right for you to add a further qualification to your 'upāḍhi'—*viz.*, that of being 'something other than *pakṣē-ṭaraṭva.*' As in that case, the definition will cease to apply even to such '*pakṣeṭaraṭva*' as is indicated by the sub-lation or denial (of the inferential conclusion) *. In answer to this, it may be argued that in such cases, *Sublation* is not an *upāḍhi*, but only something indicating the invalidity of the cognition (and as such it is only right that this subla-tion is not included in the definition of '*Upādhi*'). But in that case, if *Sublation* had no connection with 'Upāḍhi' or 'invalidating condition',—there would be no 'sublation' at all. [As there is real 'sublation' only where there is an invalidat-ing condition]. It is in view of this fact that it has been declared (by Udayana) that, "whether the 'Upāḍhi' be in-dicated either by *sublation* or by something else,—it does not make any difference." In order to avoid this you will perhaps add a further qualification to your definition of 'Upāḍhi' (defining it as that which is other than 'pakṣēṭaraṭ-va' *and also other than that indicated by sublation.* But this also will not help you; as (even though this may save you from the difficulty now pointed out by us), it does not save you from the difficulty that until you have ascertained what 'invariable concomitance' is, you cannot ascertain what it is with which the *probans is not 'invariably concomitant'*; nor can you ascertain with what the *probandum* is 'invari-ably concomitant.' And thus there is mutual inter-depen-dence between your '*vyāpṭi*' and *upāḍhi.*'

* For instance, in the invalid inference—'Fire is a not-hot substance,—be-cause it has colour—like the jar,'—this reasoning is invalidated by 'pakṣēṭaraṭva', which is a real Upāḍhi. As *the character of being other than fire* is such that *non-heat* is invariably concomitant with it, and *colour* is not so concomitant with it (as fire also has colour). That such is the fact is indicated by the sublation or denial of the conclusion by actual perception. If then 'pakṣēṭaraṭva' were excluded from the definition of *upāḍhi* this definition would not include the 'pakṣēṭaraṭva in the case cited.

(447) You may explain that what you mean by the *probandum being 'invariably concomitant' with a certain thing* is that the *probandum* is never seen apart from that thing (and for recognising this it is not necessary to ascertain what 'invariable concomitance' is, and thus there is no mutual interdependence). But this also cannot be right; for it may so happen that even though a particular *probandum* may *actually* be such as exists apart from the thing in question, yet it may be *seen* (or conceived of) as being one that does not exist apart from it (*i. e.*, in cases of mistaken conceptions); and your definition of 'Upāḍhi' would thus become applicable to such a thing also. Nor can it be ascertained that the *probandum* will never, *at any future time*, be found to be apart from the thing concerned [hence you cannot, with a view to escape from the difficulty just put forward, define *the invariable concomitance of the probandum with a certain thing* as lying in the fact that the *probandum* neither was, nor is, nor ever will be apart from that thing]. And further, at the time that the invariable concomitance itself is being cognised (and hence the Major premiss is still in the formation), the other (minor) term has not yet acquired the character of the true '*probandum*' (which it can acquire only after the conclusion has been arrived at and formulated*); and hence how can you ascertain (at the time of the cognition of invariable concomitance) the fact of any term being *such as does not exist apart from the 'Sāḍhya' or 'probandum'*? It may be said in answer to this that "what is meant by the 'probandum' is (not that which is *proved*, but) that with which the other term is invariably concomitant. But this also will be not right; until you have ascertained the 'invariable concomitance', you cannot ascertain the meaning of *that with which something else is invariably concomitant* (thus the ascertainment of this latter character depending upon that of 'invariable concomitance,' which in its turn is dependent

* A term becomes a *probandum*, *sāḍhya* only after it has been *proved* or सिद्ध

Kh. 302.

upon the former, there results a mutual inter-dependence). You will perhaps say that what you mean by your '*vyāpaka*' (that with which another thing is invariably concomitant) is that which is known to have the possibility of such a character (and it is not necessary for it to be recognised as actually possessed of that character). But this also will not help you ; as until you have ascertained what the 'vyāpaka' really is, of what character would you cognise the 'possibility'? You will perhaps find it better now to declare that what you mean is that the *Upāḍhi* is to be *such that the probandum in invariably concomitant with it,*—and that even though what you intend to be the 'probandum' may not actually have the character of the true 'probandum', yet all that is meant is that it should be *capable of being the probandum.* This also is not right, we reply. For how is it to be known that *this* is *capable of being the probandum* and *that* is not; specially as it cannot yet be asserted that this can be ascertained by the fact of its being found to be such that something is 'invariably concomitant' with it.

(448) Having thus shown that it cannot be explained what is meant by the *Upāḍhi* being such that the *probandum* is invariably concomitant with it, we now proceed to show that in all cases of *Upāḍhi* it is impossible to ascertain that the *Upāḍhi* is such that the *probans* is *not* invariably concomitant with it (this latter being the second differentium of the *Upādhi* according to the Logician). For in the stock-example of the *Inference with Upāḍhi* or the *Vitiated Inference*—'he is dark because he is the son of Maiṭra' (where *the character of being due to the eating of leaves and herbs* is said to be the *Upāḍhi* or 'Vitiating Condition'),—it is extremely difficult to make sure that *the action of the eating of leaves and herbs* is not present in the particular son of Maiṭra (and yet it is only when this is ascertained that the said character can be held to be such that the probans, *the being Maiṭra's son,* is not invariably concomitant with it).

Kh. 303.

(449) In answer to the above the Opponent says :—"We have a case of *certain* Upāḍhi when we have valid means of ascertaining the aforesaid character ; while in cases where no such means is available, the *Upāḍhi* is regarded as only *doubtful.* (And the case of Maiṭra's son comes within this latter category) inasmuch as there is nothing to show that it is absolutely necessary that there should be in every case that *effect of herb-eating* with which *the being Maiṭra's son* is invariably concomitant." This is not right, we reply. As the fact of the case being one of the result of herb-eating can also be proved by means of the same *probans—viz., that of being Maiṭra's son* ; and hence it is quite possible, on the strength of this, to cast off all *doubt* even as to its being an *Upāḍhi* (inasmuch it would be shown to be one with which the probans *is* invariably concomitant). If, in order to meet this difficulty, you were to argue that, in the case of the inference ('this is a case of the result of herb-eating, because it is a case of Maiṭra's son') also, there would be an *Upāḍhi* in the shape of the *accessory circumstances attendant upon the herb-eating* (and thus that inference itself being vitiated, the doubtful character of the original *upāḍhi* remains intact), —then the actual presence of each of these accessory circumstances also could be inferred from the same *probans*, that of its being a case of Maiṭra's child (and thus there would be no *Upāḍhi* in any of these cases). "But in this manner there would be an infinite regress of Upāḍhis and Inferences." But, we ask, wherefore could not there be the same *infinite regress* in the putting forward of one *upāḍhi* after the other ? Then again, if 'accessory circumstances' were to be regarded as a vitiating *upāḍhi*, then, such *upāḍhis* would be present even in the case of correct inferences, as that of the presence of fire from smoke—(And as this would vitiate all inferences), it will be necessary for you to add to your definition of *upāḍhi* some such qualifying clause as would exclude the said 'accessory circumstances.'

Kh. 304.

(450) The Opponent puts the following question—"When you would be proving the *darkness* of the child by the fact of its being Maiṭra's child, there would be the possibility of an *upādhi* in the shape of the *result of herb-eating*; and when you would proceed to prove this latter fact of its being a case of herb-eating by the same reasoning (that of the child being Maiṭra's), there again would be the possibility of an *upāḍhi* in the shape of 'darkness', and thus as in all such cases there would be a possibility of *Upāḍhi*, how could you ever succeed in proving with absolute certainty the presence of that which we put forward as the *upāḍhi* (setting aside by this proof its character of 'Upāḍhi')?" This is not right, we reply. For, inasmuch as we could prove with absolute certainty each of the two ('darkness' and 'being a case of herb-eating') by the same *probans*, of 'being Maiṭra's child',—there would be no possibility even of suspecting any of the two to be such that the *probans* is not invariably concomitant with it. [And thus neither would have the character of your 'Upāḍhi']. If what we say is not right, and if in such cases, any of the two were a true *upāḍhi*, then you would have many undesirable contingencies, like the following, which would strike at the root of all inferential reasoning :—(1) When you would prove the fact of the World having a Creator, you would have an *upāḍhi* in the *character of being produced by the Unseen Force* (of Destiny); and when you would seek to prove the fact of Earth being produced by the Unseen Force, you would have an *Upāḍhi* in the shape of *the character of having a creator*;—(2) similarly when proving the World to be the creation of an intelligent person, you would have an *Upāḍhi* in the shape of the *character of being produced* by effort; and when proving this latter you would have the *character of being produced by an intelligent person* as the *Upāḍhi*;—(3) so also, when proving the presence of something possessing the general character of 'fire', you would have for the *Upāḍhi*,

Kh. 305.

the *character of containing heat or brightness produced by fuel*; and when proving this latter, there would be an *Upāḍhi* in the shape of the *presence of something possessed of the generic character of fire.*

(451) [Page 377] Some Logicians have held that in the definition of '*Upāḍhi*' what is meant by the *Upāḍhi* 'being such that the *probandum* is invariably concomitant with it' is, that the relation holding between the *probans* and the *probandum* is so concomitant. The reasonings we have put forward above serve to demolish this view also [as even this character cannot be ascertained until it is known what is meant by the character of the 'probandum' and by that of 'having something as invariable concomitant']. [Having thus shown that these two characters cannot be ascertained in the case of the *doubtful Upāḍhi*] we now proceed to show that in the case of the *certain Upāḍhi* also, if the *Upāḍhi* happens to be one that is not perceptible by the senses, the negation of this *Upāḍhi* also (a knowledge whereof will be necessary for ascertaining that the *probans* is not invariably concomitant with this *Upāḍhi*) will be one that cannot be perceived by the senses ; hence in any case it will have to be *inferred*; and this inference of the negation or absence of the *upāḍhi* could very well be met by the counter-inference of its *presence*,—this inference being based upon the *probans* having for its *probandum* that same *upāḍhi*.* You will perhaps retort that—" even so, this shall be a case of *doubtful upāḍhi*." True ; by saying so you have won a victory certainly, but only over *shame*; as the position that you had taken up was that the case cited by you was one of

* In the case of the inference 'he is Maiṭra's son' the *character of being due to eating* is brought forward as the *upāḍhi*. This *upāḍhi* cannot be known by the senses; hence its absence also can be only inferred the inference, being in the form—'There is no effect of herb-eating in his case, because he is of fair complexion'. This inference can be met by the counter-inference—'This is a case of the effect of herb-eating (the original upāḍhi being the probandum here),—because he is Maiṭra's son' (the same *probans* as the one in the original inference).

certain upādhi, and yet when it has been shown to you that it is at best only a case of *doubtful upādhi*, you rejoice at it and consider it quite favourable to yourself; well, who could do so except one who had completely conquered all idea of shame!

(452) [We have brought forward the above objections after having taken it for granted that there *is* some suspicion as to the presence of the *upādhi*]. As matter of fact, however, when no *certain upādhi* is accepted, there can be no suspicion even, with regard to its presence (as it is only when a thing is known to exist that there can be any suspicion as to its presence). The Opponent will perhaps say in answer to this that—there would be a case of the due perception of a *certain upādhi*, where the presence of the *upādhi* is distinctly and surely cognised by Sense-perception [for instance, such *upādhis* as the *contact of wet fuel*, as vitiating the inference 'it is smoking, because there is fire'—in which case it is clearly perceived that the *probandum*, 'smoke', is invariably concomitant with the *wet-fuel-contact*, but the *probans* 'fire', is not so]. This also is not right, we reply; as in such cases, the denial of the presence of the *upādhi* (wet-fuel-contact) being based upon the Senses, the super-sensuous presence of that same *upādhi* (*contact of wet fuel* in the *red-hot iron*) could be inferred or proved by means of the same *probans* (*presence of fire*) which had been sought (by means of the *upādhi*) to be rendered incapable (of proving the *probandum*) * [and thus the *upādhi* would cease to be an *upādhi*; at any rate its character would become open to doubt]. Specially because as a matter of fact, we find that even though a certain thing

* That is is to say, all that the sense-perception of the absence of wet-fuel-contact proves is the absence of such contact as could be perceived by the senses; it cannot prove anything as to the presence or absence of such wet-fuel-contact as may be imperceptible by the senses; and it would be possible to prove the presence of this supersensuous contact by means of the following inference:—'In this red-hot iron there *is* contact of wet fuel,—because it contains fire—like the culinary hearth.'

(fire f.i.) may in one place (in the culinary hearth f.i.), be perceptible by the senses, yet, in another place, there is nothing to prevent its having its existence proved in the imperceptible form by means of the same *probans*; *e g.* the digestive *fire* in the stomach (though imperceptible) is proved by the fact of digestion. [That is to say, though in the case of the culinary hearth, on finding that cooking is done we infer the presence of fire which is perceptible,—yet finding the same 'cooking', digesting, being done to the food in the stomach, we infer the presence of fire in the stomach, where it is *not* perceptible].

(453) Then again, your definition of '*upāḍhi*'—as that which, while being such that the *probans* is *not* invariably concomitant with it, is yet one with which the *probandum is* so concomitant'—is open to another objection:—the *being the effect of the eating of herbs and such other things* (which the Logician cites as the stock-example of his *upāḍhi*) is *not* one with which the *probandum* (*being of dark complexion*) is invariably concomitant; for as a matter of fact, there is no such *single* substance as '*Shākāḍitva*' (*i.e.* the term 'herbs and such other things' being indefinite, it cannot give rise to any one definite conception); and as such the *probandum* could not be invariably concomitant with it.* But even granting the possibility of concomitance with such an indefinite term; we find that the *dark complexion* is not invariably concomitant with the said *eating of herbs, &c.*; as for instance, the *darkness* of such substances as the blue stone is not the effect of any *eating* at all. You will perhaps say that your *probandum* is the 'darkness *of the human body*,' and this certainly is invariably concomitant with the *eating of herbs &c.* This also is not right, we reply. As the '*upāḍhi*' is put forward as against the invariable concomitance (as expressed in the

* The *dark complexion* may be concomitant with the eating of herbs, or of the eating of some definite substance, it could not be held to be concomitant with 'the eating of herbs and *such other things*.'

premiss) upon which the inferences (ought to be vitiated by the *upādhi* is based): and the concomitance that we find to be expressed in the inference in question is not with 'the darkness *of the human body*' (the basic major premiss being in the form '*darkness* is invariably concomitant with the eating of herbs &c.'); specially as the 'darkness' mentioned in the premiss formulating the invariable concomitance is 'darkness' in its most general form, and not that particular form of it which is found in human beings; because that *the darkness* referred to herein is that which resides in a human being (the particular child in question) is proved, not indeed by the aforesaid premiss, but by that other premiss wherein the *probans* is spoken of as residing in the Minor term (this child). [Hence 'the darkness of human beings' cannot be accepted as figuring in the premiss formulating the invariable concomitance]. For if the general statement in the premiss referred to the 'darkness of a human being', then (the conclusion would be in the form 'the human child of Maiṭra is dark', where) the word 'human' would be absolutely incapable of precluding anything (more than what is already precluded by the word 'Maiṭra's child'); and as such it would lose its qualifying character. If the word 'human' were regarded as serving the useful purpose of excluding the darkness acquired indirectly through the besmearing of soot and such other causes,—then whereby would you have an exclusion of that *darkness* which belongs to a *human being* darkened (by the besmearing of soot) who may be in contact with Maiṭra's son,—where also the darkness of Maiṭra's son comes to him indirectly (and is yet belonging to a human body, and as such not capable of being excluded by the qualification 'human')?

(454) Nor will it be right for you to declare that what you mean by the *upādhi being such that the probandum is invariably concomitant with it* is that it never fails to be present wherever the *probans* and the *probandum* are found

Kh. 309.

to be related (that is to say, the *being the result of the eating of herbs* &c. never fails to be present wherever *darkness* is found to be related with *the child of Maiṭra*). This will not be right, we say; as if such were the character of 'Upāḍhi', then, in the case of the inference that 'a certain organ (of vision) is of the nature of *ṭējas* (light) because it is the organ which affords the perception of colour' (which is valid, and as such ought to be free from *upāḍhi*), you would have such an *Upāḍhi* in the shape of '*uḍbhūṭarūpaṭva*' (the character of manifested colour) [which would be something which never fails to be present wherever 'the nature of *ṭējas*' is found to be related to 'the perception of colour'; as there can be no perception of colour except when it is *manifested*]. Similarly if you were to insert the *probans* as a qualification to the 'probandum' (*i. e.*, if you were to declare your *upāḍhi* to be *Sāḍhanāvachchhinnasāḍhyavyāpaka*, 'that with which the *probandum*, as determined or qualified by the *probans*, is invariably concomitant'],—then, there should be something for the exclusion of which you add this qualification; now if what you intend to exclude is that with which the *unqualified probandum* is invariably concomitant,—then this character of *upāḍhi* could not belong to that which is capable of giving rise to a doubt as to the truth of the invariable concomitance on which the inference in based.* If, on the other hand, the qualification you add (*sāḍhanāvachchhinna*) is not intended to exclude anything,—then it fails to be a true qualification for certainly a qualification does not become useful (and hence a true qualification) simply because there is necessity for it; it becomes so only when it serves the purpose of

* Where the Upāḍhi is साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक there the logician has the निरवच्छिन्नउपाधि. But at the same time he accepts that also as the उपाधि (though only शुद्ध) that which is only साध्यव्यापक. Hence if the definition of the Upāḍhi were restricted to the साधनावच्छिन्नसाध्यव्यापक it would not include the aforesaid शुद्ध उपाधि.

Kh. 310.

excluding something (which could not be otherwise excluded). And thus your 'qualification' being altogether useless, your definition would be open to the fallacy of '*asiḍḍhi*' (*i. e.*, the *asiḍḍhi*, or non-accomplishment, of the *vishēṣaṇa*); just as we have in the case of the argument—'the world is without a creator, because it is not produced by a *bodied* being'—(where we have the *Vishēṣaṇāsiḍḍhi* in view of the utter uselessness of the qualification 'bodied').

(455) *Then again, how could you make your definition of *upāḍhi* applicable to such cases as that of a negative inference which is invalid (and as such must have a vitiating *upāḍhi*), specially where the *probans* is really present (as a qualification) in the *Subject* (Minor Term),—*e. g.*, in the inference—'the living body is made up of more than one substance, all of which are other than Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ākāsha, Time, Space and Soul, because it is endowed with breathing &c.'—(where though breathing &c. are actually present in the living body, yet the inference is not valid)? Because, as a matter of fact, we find that in the invalid negative inference, that which is the *probandum* is not invariably concomitant with the *upāḍhi*; for (if it were so) that which is intended by the opponent to be the *probandum* would be present somewhere (and totally non-existent, as the *probandum* of the universal negative inference should be). Then again, if there were an *upāḍhi* in the negative premiss, then that term in the negation which is the *invariable* concomitant (*viz.* the absence or negation of the *probandum*) would have to be such that the *upāḍhi* is invariably concomitant with it † (and thus the *probandum* could not be invariably

* Having shown the impossibility of the definition of Upāḍhi in regard to affirmative inferences, the author proceeds to show the same in regard to negative inferences.

† That is to say—it would be absolutely necessary that wherever the Upāḍhi exists, there cannot be anything made up of more than one substance, all of which are other than Earth and Water &c. If this were not so,—*i. e.*, if the Upāḍhi were not so concomitant with the negation of the *probandum*,—then it would be possible for the Upāḍhi to be present even in cases where we have the negation of the negation of the *probandum*; that is to say, where the Upāḍhi is, there the *probandum* also is.

concomitant with the *upādhi*; and yet this is a necessary qualification in your definition of *upādhi*). If it were not so then, wherever there is presence of the *upādhi* there would be the presence of the *probandum* also [and thus instead of *disproving* the *probandum* the *upādhi* would prove it]. Thus it is absolutely necessary for you (in order to escape from the aforesaid difficulty) to accept the fact that in such cases it is the *upādhi* which is invariably concomitant with the negative *probandum*; and from this it will follow that the negation of that with which the *upādhi* is concomitant must itself be regarded as concomitant with the negation of the *upādhi*; and this leads to a most undesirable contingency.* [*Viz*: inasmuch as it is the negation of the *probandum* with which the negation of the *upādhi* is concomitant, and not *vice versa*, this would only show that wherever we have the negation of the *probandum* there would be negation of *upādhi*,—and not *vice versa*; and from this it would follow that there may be cases where though the negation of the *probandum* is present, we cannot be sure of the presence of the negation of the *upādhi*]. [Though in the case of premisses where both terms are omnipresent or all-pervading, the relation of concomitance remains the same even if the negations of the terms are taken, yet] in cases of unequal concomitance (where one term is always more extensive than the other) it cannot be denied that the relation of concomitance becomes reversed when the terms are taken in their negative forms.†

* The translation follows the reading परत्वा व्याप्ति ; which appears to be the one favoured by the Viḍyāsāgarī; the reading of the Pandit edition is not intelligible.

† That is, though in the case of the proposition 'all things are nameable', in the affirmative form 'things' are concomitant with 'nameablity', so also in the negative form 'all non-things' are non-nameable', *non-thing* remains concomitant with *non-nameability*. But in the case of the ordinary proposition 'all men are mortal' we have 'man' concomitant with 'mortal', but when we take the terms 'non-man' and 'non-mortal', the relation becomes 'reversed,' as it is the circle 'non-mortal'. In the affirmative form the fact of one being 'man' would prove his his 'mortality,' while in the latter it would be 'non-mortality' that would prove 'non-manly character.' This is what the text means by the [illegible].

Kh. 312.

(456) Nor will it be right for you to assert that, "in the case of negative inferences (if no *upāḍhi* is possible) other discrepancies would be pointed out." For [there are only two discrepancies possible in Inference—(1) Either the *probans* may be not present in the 'Subject' (Minor term), this condition vitiating the Minor premiss, (2) or there may be no invariable concomitance between the *probans* and the *probandum*, this vitiating the Major premiss;] the presence of the *probans* in the 'subject' (minor term) being admitted, the only other discrepancy that you can assert is the absence of the invariable concomitance (on which the inference is based); and for the purpose of demolishing the invariable concomitance, it is absolutely necessary for you to show that there is an *upāḍhi* (which alone, by your theory, can vitiate the concomitance).

[Having refuted the Upāḍhi, the author resumes the thread of his refutation of 'Vyāpṭi', from para. 441, bottom of p. 371, 'Pandit' edition.]

(457) We shall accept, for the sake of argument, some sort of a definition of *Vyāpṭi.* Even then, the Inference would be possible only when the *Vyāpṭi* is present; and thus there would have to be a *Vyāpṭi* (invariable concomitance) between Inference and the *Vyāpṭi* (without which according to you, no Inference is possible). And thus there would be 'Self-dependence' of the *Vyāpṭi*, (*i. e.*, a 'vicious circle). If, in order to escape from this, the 'invariable concomitance' subsisting between the Inference and the 'invariable concomitance' upon which it is based, were held to be totally different from this latter 'Invariable Concomitance',—then there would be no possibility of any such single comprehensive conception as 'Invariable Concomitance' (every concomitance being distinct by itself); and further, there would be quite an endless series (of Concomitances) [and under the circumstances, it would not be possible for you to make any such comprehensive declaration as that 'all Inference is based upon *Invariable Concomitance*'].

Kh. 313.

[The author proceeds to refute the definition of the *Pakṣa-ḍharmaṭā i. e.*, Minor Premiss, wherein the relation between the *probans* and the 'Subject' or Minor Term is asserted.—Having discarded this, he proceeds to refute the definitions of the *Pakṣa* itself.]

*(458) The Logicians declare that Inference is brought about by *vyāpṭi* and *pakṣa-ḍharmaṭā*. What, we ask,—do you mean by *pakṣa-ḍharmaṭā*',—*i. e.*, by the *probans being the ḍharma of the pakṣa* ? Does it mean that the *probans subsists in the pakṣa* ? If so, then, we reply that this is not possible as in that case, for the Logician and his followers, such terms as 'Knowable' and the like (which denote characters that can be asserted of all things) could never serve as *probans* ; as according to them the relationships between the Cognition and its object (called the *viṣayaviṣayibhāva-sambanḍha*) is *not* anything different from the very forms of the cognition and the object themselves ; and hence it is not possible for these forms to *subsist* in the object of cognition ; † (consequently by this view it is not possible for the relationship to subsist in the thing *cognised*, which would be the *pakṣa* in such inferences).

(459) Then again, what is that '*pakṣa*' the subsistence wherein of the *probans* would constitute your '*pakṣaḍharmaṭā*' ? (A) "Well," says the Logician, "the *pakṣa*, or Minor Term, is that wherein the presence of the *sāḍhya* (Major Term) is intended to be proved (by means of the inference)."

* The whole of para. 458 according to the विद्यासागरी should come after para. 461.

† In the inference—'the jar is predicable, because it is knowable',—the *knowability* of the jar, according to the Logician, is not anything different from the *svarūpa* of the jar and its cognition ; thus 'knowability' is the same as the jar ; and as a thing cannot subsist in itself the *knowability* (which is the probans in the inference) cannot subsist in the *jar* (which is the *pakṣa*). Thus there being no *pakṣa-ḍharmaṭā*, all such inferences will have to be regarded as invalid.

According to the other view on the other hand, the *knowability* of a thing consists in its being related to its own cognition by a peculiar relationship called the विषयविषयिभावसम्बन्ध ; and this is something entirely different from the thing and its cognition.

This definition cannot be accepted, we reply. As this 'intention to prove the sāḍhya' must be either a desire to make it comprehensible (and acceptable) to others, or a desire to comprehend it for oneself. If it were the former, then, there would be no possibility of any inference for one's own sake. In the latter case also, there would be no possibility of any one inferring for himself the 'execrable taste' (of something, rotten meat, for instance), from the fact of its bad smell [as in this case there is no *desire to comprehend* the 'execrable taste' and consequent *inedibility*, the desire of the man himself being to eat the meat ; as it is this desire that urges him to take up the meat ; when he picks it up and finds it stinking, he *infers*, for himself, the fact that the meat must taste bad ; this inference being quite valid ; the definition of the *pakṣa* however fails to apply to this *piece of meat*]. (B) Nor may the *pakṣa* be defined as *that which has a certain ḍharma* (*character*) *which is not ascertained.* For, we ask in this case, would the presence of the *probans* also in the intended *pakṣa* be *not-ascertained* ? Or would it be *ascertained* ? . If it were *not-ascertained*, then the resultant inferential cognition could not come about. If, on the other hand, it were *ascertained*, then, the *pakṣa* would cease to be *that which has its ḍharma not ascertained* (as the *probans* is a *ḍharma* of it, and it *is* ascertained). (C) Nor again, may the *pakṣa* be defined as one having that particular *ḍharma* not-ascertained *which is the object* (*viṣaya*) *of the probans.* * As in this connection we ask—by whom is the ḍharma *not ascertained* ? Clearly not by the person propounding the inference ; as what he himself does not know for certain, he cannot put forward for convincing other people. Nor can the non-ascertainment be held to be by the *Opponent* (to whom the

* Such a *ḍharma* is the साध्य or the Major Term. So this definition would mean that the *pakṣa* is that the presence in which of the major term is not ascertained.

inference is addressed); for we often find that even in connection with the views of the opponent, two persons enter into a discussion, not indeed as 'opponents' seeking victory over each other, but only for the purpose of showing off learning [and as in this case there in no *opponent*, there can be no 'non-ascertainment *by the opponent*', and so the definition of *pakṣa* would fail to apply in this case].

(460) Then again, we ask— is the 'non-ascertainment' of *any* such ḍharma as is the *viṣaya* of the *probans*? Or of only that *probans* which is to be propounded by the opponent? It cannot be the former, surely; as in that case, even when the presence of *fire* in the *mountain* is definitely known, the *mountain* would be regarded as the 'pakṣa' with reference to the smoke, in virtue of the non-ascertainment of the presence therein of many other such *ḍharmas*. [While as a matter of fact, the mountain can be regarded as the 'pakṣa,' when *smoke* is the probans, only so long as the presence of fire, with which smoke is invariably concomitant, is *not* known for certain, but is only suspected]. Nor can the second alternative be maintained; as in that case also, the same undesirable contingency would arise; inasmuch as those other *probanses* also would be such as could be propounded by the opponent. If, in order to escape from this difficulty, you restrict the 'non-ascertainment' to any one specific probans—the *smoke* for instance—then it would be impossible for you to form any comprehensive idea of the '*pakṣa*' (every definition suiting one specific case only). And further, your definitions involve a most objectionable mutual inter-dependence:—*viz.* your idea of the *probans* depending on the idea of the *pakṣa*, as, according to you, the *probans* is only that which, while being invariably concomitant (with the *probandum*), is present in the *pakṣa*;—and that of the *pakṣa* in its turn depending upon the idea of the *probans*! Then again, in the case

Kh. 316.

SHIVA-SŪṬRA-VIMARṢINĪ.

Preliminary Note.

The Shiva-Sūṭras "discovered" by Vasugupṭa is the last of a series of many anonymous works on the Shaiva Ṭanṭra known to us only by sundry quotations, *e. g.*, Vijñāna-bhairava, Mālinīvijaya, Svachhanḍa, Ṭimiroḍghāṭa, etc. It is also the first of the series of works which expound the Kashmiri Shaiva School which was founded in the tenth century A. D., and which is yet alive. The first faint adumbrations of the Shaiva Ṭanṭra are found in the Taiṭṭirīya Yajur-Veda, but it developed into an organized system of beliefs and practices in South India in the earlier centuries of the Christian era, when the Shaiva as well as the Vaiṣṇava ṭanṭras became formidable rivals of the prevailing Bauḍḍha, which had lost its pristine purity of an ethical code, and degenerated into an elaborate ṭanṭra. The Shaiva ṭanṭra travelled North and became the Lakulīsha Pāshupaṭa of Gujerat and the Praṭyabhijñā of Kashmir. Bhatta Kallata and Abhinava-Gupṭa were the most famous of the successors of Vasugupṭa Kṣēmarāja, the pupil of Abhinava-Gupṭa, wrote the commentaries—Shiva-Sūṭra-Vimarṣinī, here translated. For a fuller account of the Kashmiri Shaiva and of its literature, *vide* my Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Chapter II.

P. T. Shrinivas Iyengar.

SHIVA-SŪṬRA-VIMARṢINĪ.

UNMĒṢA I, SHĀMBHAVOPĀYA.

Whence the hosts of individual souls (Kṣēṭrajñas) rise veiled (in ignorance), where they obtain rest, what is truth, with whose activity the universe is filled, the principle of Spanḍa * which rises self-determined and blissful, is immortal and unsurpassed, that consciousness of Shaṅkara (which becomes) differentiated into two by cognition of relativity, is supreme.

Seeing that the existing commentaries have been vitiated by ignorance of tradition, I now comment correctly on the Shiva-Sūṭras. There lived on Mahāḍēvagiri (Kailāsha ?), the teacher, by name, Vasugupṭa, a great Māheshvara†, who rejected the teachings of Nāgaboḍhi ‡ and other teachers of inferior schools (Ḍarshanas); for, by the grace of Shivashakṭi, he possessed great devotion to Mahēshvara and always worshipped Shiva ; and his heart was purified by following the paths of those who have mastered the Yoginis § of Paramēshvara. Once in a dream, he was illuminated with right knowledge by the grace of Parama Shiva, who was solicitous that the secret path should not be lost to the world of men, enveloped in the cognition of duality ||, and

* Spanḍa is the ultimate principle of the universe according to this system. It is otherwise Shiva, the unlimited Pure *Ego*, the one and only substratum of the universe, whose motion or activity is the cause of the differentiation of the knower and the known, of cognition and action, which are the ultimate factors of the world-process.

† Māhēshvara is the name given to the followers of the schools which accept the Shaiva Āgamas as revelation, and worship Shiva as the supreme Deity. They are more popularly called Shaivas.

‡ Nāgaboḍhi was a popular teacher of later Buddhism, when it became overladen with the practices of the Ṭānṭrikās, and the Shaiva and Vaiṣṇava Ṭanṭras became its great competitors for popular favour. He is mentioned in Hall's *Catalogue*, 196.

§ Yoginīs are troops of goddesses, who, among other things, preside over the whirls of occult energy, called chakras,in the subtle body.

|| So long as men are enveloped in a cognition of duality they cannot gain true knowledge and hence cannot attain to a release from rebirth.

revealed to him: "On a huge slab on this mountain, there is a secret (engraved). Take it and make it known to those who are fit for grace." On awakening, he searched for the stone and found one that turned upside down as soon as he touched it; (he, thereupon, knew that it was the stone that Shiva spoke of in his dream). The dream proved true and thence he got these Shivasūṭras, which are the epitome of the Shivopanisaḍ*. Having obtained them, he published them to Bhatta Kallata and others of his disciples. He also embodied (the same teachings) in his Spanḍakārikā.† The Spanḍa Sūṭras thus traditionally handed down have been explained by us in the Spanḍanirṇaya‡. Here the Shiva Sūṭras are explained.

In the first Sūṭra it is taught that consciousness is, in reality, but Shiva, the soul of the universe, in opposition to the theory that man and Īshvara are different beings.

I. CHAIṬANYAM ĀṬMĀ. CHAIṬANYAM IS ĀṬMĀ.

Since what is not cognized has no existence, the common characteristic of all objects is that of being manifested (chiṭikriyā) by the person that cognizes it. Chēṭana is he who makes manifest (chēṭayatē) §, the master of all cognitive activity (jñānakriyā). His nature is chaiṭanya, which thus denotes complete independence in the matter of cognitive activity. Such independence exists only in the lord

* Shivopaniṣaḍ may mean either an Upaniṣaḍ of that name of which we know nothing, or merely Shiva's secret teachings.

† Published with the commentary called Spanḍapradīpikā of Uṭpala, by Pandit Vāman Shāsṭri Islampurkar, vol. XII of the Viziayanagaram Sanskrit series. It is noteworthy that in different recensions, as also by different commentators, this work is ascribed both to Vasugupta and to Kallata.

‡ No. 511 of the MSS. purchased by Buhler in Kashmir, p. xxxiii, Tour in search of Sanskrit MSS., etc.

§ The commentator explains the word chaiṭanya with reference to its formation from chiṭi through chēṭana. A thing can be properly said to exist only when it is cognized by some conscious being. Cognition endows it with Saṭṭva, existential value, as it were; because it manifests what was unmanifested before. Hence cognition is a self-determined activity, not being limited by anything outside itself. In other words chaiṭanya is characterised by svāṭanṭrya, svachchhanḍa, independence, self-determinedness. This self-determined, cognizing Being is called Spanḍa in this school.

Parama-Shiva; for the activities of all beings down to those that do not seek Him, depend upon Him. Though He possesses endless characteristics, * *viz.*, Eternity of existence, Omnipresence, Formlessness, etc., yet these characteristics belong also to other beings; hence Independence, which alone is not found in others, has to be spoken of as His special characteristic. Hence this Independence is described, to the exclusion of other characteristics, by the abstract noun, *chaitanya*. This Independence is Āṭmā; not any other category accepted by individualists, † one possessing a differentiated nature. If this individual soul conceived by the individualist to be different from the supreme soul, be other than Chaiṭanya, it would be characterised by unconsciousness and hence cannot be Āṭmā. If it is of the nature of consciousness, it cannot be conceived as differentiated, for one consciousness cannot be cognized as separated from another consciousness on account of difference of space, time, or form. Though the ignorant do cognize such differences, wise men cannot accept (the theory) that consciousness can be differentiated. As the āṭmā is thus pure consciousness, multiplicity cannot be ascribed to it. Differentiation cannot be predicated of it even when the defects (malas) which we are going to describe and which are opposed in nature to the āṭmā, attach themselves to it. Though at first the defects (malas) exist, they are extinguished on the attainment of liberation, and hence the doctrine of the multiplicity of souls cannot be maintained, for if the seeds of defects continue to exist at that stage, or if there is the least difference between the liberated Shiva and the beginningless Shiva,‡ they would

* Though all the Āgama schools teach the Aḍvaiṭa, the non-difference, of the individual and supreme souls, they differ from what is popularly called the Aḍvaiṭa school in attributing characteristics, guṇas, in the loose sense of the word, to the supreme soul

† Bhēḍavāḍī, one that thinks that each individual Puruṣa is a unit different (bhinna) from the supreme and other Puruṣas. "Separatist" is the nearest English equivalent.

‡ In the Shaiva schools, all Puruṣas, liberated or not, are called Shivas. Thus there are the Shivas in samsāra, the mukṭa Shivas, and the anāḍi Shiva.

still be unliberated (samsāris). Thus it has been proved that the theory of the multiplicity of āṭmās it untenable, as said (in the sūtra under comment).

(*Another explanation of the sūṭra*).

For teaching those disciples who desire to enquire what is āṭmā, he says that the āṭmā is not what the Chārvāka, who does not accept the authority of the Vedas (Laukika), the Veḍānṭi*, who accepts the authority of the Vedas, the Yogāchāra, the Māḍhyamika, etc., describe it to be,—*viz.*, body, prāṇa, buḍḍhi, shūnya (void), respectively, but it is chaitanya, as said in the sūṭra. For even when a man falsely conceives himself to be identical with his body, etc., that conception is illuminated (manifested) by the true one—the "consciousness† of I." As is said in the Mṛiṭyujiḍbhattāraka: "It is taught in all the Shāstras that the essential nature of Paramāṭmā is devoid of all limiting conditions (upāḍhis), such consciousness is the nature of Āṭmā." Also in Vijñānabhairava: "Consciousness is in all bodies, not special anywhere. Hence a man should conceive all beings as filled with it and thus become victor of samsāra (*i. e.* liberated)." This same teaching is contained in the two Kārikās (6,7), of the Spanḍa, beginning with: "From whence this group of organs" and taught by the teacher (Vasugupṭa) to his disciples with reference to this sūṭra.

(*Third explanation.*) That which is called chaiṭanya is āṭmā *i.e.*, svabhāva, Being, and as no adjective is used to qualify the word āṭmā in the sūṭra, the āṭmā of the whole universe

* It is noteworthy that Kṣēmarāja defines the Veḍanṭa, or as he calls it the Vaiḍika, conception of the āṭmā to be identical with the prāṇa This is quite in keeping with the ideas of the earlier Upaniṣaḍs. Later Veḍānṭa defines the āṭmā as sacchiḍānanḍa, as is well-known.

† A datum of consciousness is an ultimate fact that has to be accepted. The Chārvāka argues: "The āṭmā is the body, because I am conscious that I am my body." The Shaiva replies: "When I am conscious that I am my body, the consciousness of I is the validating factor whose presence gives a semblance of truth to what the Chārvāka takes to be an ultimate fact. The real datum of consciousness is the consciousness of I (aham-vimarsha), and not the identification of 'I' with the body, prāṇa, etc; this ahamvimarsha can be extended to many more objects than the body, *viz*, prāṇa, buḍḍhi, etc.

which consists of real and unreal forms, is referred to. Now nothing which is never cognized can be said to have being. What is known is identical with the chiṭ that is self-luminous; hence chaiṭanya is the same as āṭmā. It is said in the Sūkṣma-bhairava: "So long as knowers do not exist, how can there be the known, O dear one? The known and the knower are one substance. Hence matter does not exist as a separate principle (*lit.*, there is nothing impure)." This same teaching is contained in the Kārikās (28,29), beginning with: "Because the Jīva is the all." As chaiṭanya is the nature of all beings, proofs are quite unfit to establish it, for they themselves have to be proved by self-luminous consciousness, and consciousness cannot be disproved (*lit.*, concealed) by any one, as it is always shining. It is said in the Ṭrikahṛiḍaya: "Just as when a man tries to jump so as to get his feet where the shadow of his head lies, the shadow of his head moves off before his feet arrive there, similarly with the ray of the moon."*

With the same view, in the long passage of the Spanḍa, starting with: "Where established" and ending with "That is truly" (2-5), it is proved that consciousness, the principle of spanḍa, which is the nature of Shaṅkara, always self-luminous, is the Supreme Truth.

If the essence of the universe, which is made up of conscious and unconscious beings, be the consciousness of Paramashiva how can bondage arise? To answer this question, is composed the next sūṭra which is susceptible of two readings, according as 'a' is prefixed or not, as it is joined to the previous sūṭra or not†:

*The "ray of the moon", *i.e.*, consciousness, asserts itself in the very attempt to disprove it. It is an ultimate fact.

† Sūṭras 1 and 2 run as follows. Chaiṭanyamāṭmājñānambanḍhaḥ. This may be (1) chaiṭanyam āṭmā, jñānam banḍhaḥ; or, chaiṭanyam āṭmā, ajñānam banḍhaḥ. The sūṭra has been so commented on that the meanings of both readings have been woven into one. This has been indicated in the translation by the words ajñāna and jñāna being inserted in appropriate places. This double reading has also been utilised to make the sūṭra refer to the two kinds of āṇava-mala, leading to two forms of bondage explained later.

II. JNĀNAM BANDHAḤ. KNOWLEDGE IS BONDAGE.

Now as already said nothing more than the light of consciousness has existence; if so how can defect (mala) exist, or how can its suppression be possible? Thus the individualists question. In answer to this it is said in the Mālinīvijaya: "The ignorance (ajñāna) that causes the sprouting of samsāra is called mala"; and in the Sarvāchāra: "From ignorance is the world bound; thence creation and destruction." As said in these quotations there is caused by Paramēshvara, by means of his wonder-working power (mahāmāyāshakti), in his own self, which is all-pervasive like the ākāsha, a limitation which extends to all beings, from those who have not turned to him for refuge up to those who have understood the nature of māyā; this limitation conceals his real nature which is illuminated by independence. It is the ignorance due to the want of the knowledge of identity of one's self with Shiva. It is the same as the āṇava, *which makes one think, "I am finite", the bondage whose nature is limited knowledge (jñāna). That nothing else can be taken as bondage is discussed fully by us in the Svacchandoḍyota† at the end of the fifth chapter in the discussion of Shrīḍīkṣa. The meaning of this sūtra is referred to in the part of the Kārikā (9): "To him who has lost his independence by his own impurity." Now this jñāna, consciousness of limitation, which is also ajñāna of the nature of akhyāṭi, consisting of the attribution of materiality to the āṭmā, is not alone bondage; but the ajñāna which consists in the ascription of the characteristics of āṭmā to what is not āṭmā, *viz.*, body &c. is the root-ignorance and is also bondage. This is referred to in Kārikā (46), beginning with: "The loss of the supreme essence of immortality." Thus have been described by means of this sūtra the two kinds of aṇava-mala.

* Āṇava-mala, *lit.*, atomic defect, (āṇava, from aṇu, atom), is the consciousness of being a limited being.

† No. 521 in Buhler's list, p. xxxiv, clxviii Tour, etc.

(1) What has been called chaitanya is characterized by independence; and though a conscious being, he does not exercise his independence and hence loses his wisdom and thinks: "I am finite." (This is the bondage of jñāna).

(2) Though characterized by independence, yet, while in the body, etc., he conceives what is not aṭma to be āṭmā, this is the bondage of ajñāna. It is said in the Praṭyabhijña (xiv. 3) *: "The loss of independence by the knower, and the loss of knowledge by the independent being, this is the double form of āṇava-mala, due to the suppression of his real nature."

Now is this aṇava-mala alone bondage? No. For it is said in the next sūṭra:

III. YONIVARGAḤ KALĀSHARĪRAM. THE CLASS OF YONI AND KALĀ-BODIED.

The sentence is to be completed by supplying 'are bondage' from the previous sūṭra. Yoni is māyā, the cause of the universe. Its class (varga) is the group of principles from kalā† to the earth, which have māyā as their ‡ cause, directly or indirectly, which originate bodies and worlds, and which are of limited activity. Such is māyā-mala.

*By Abhinava-Gupṭa, the teacher of our commentator.

† "Kalā to kṣiṭi," "Kalā, etc." are phrases which frequently occur in Shaiva books meaning "throughout the manifested universe." Kalā, Viḍyā, Rāga, Kāla, Niyaṭi, Puruṣa, Praḍhāna, Guṇa, and the Sāṅkhya ṭaṭṭvas from Buḍḍhi to the Earth, are included in the phrase, "Kalā to the earth." For a description of the functions of these ṭaṭṭvas, the reader is referred to my Outlines of Indian Philosophy, pp. 290-292. It is to be noted that the word kalā that immediately succeeds in the sūṭra and is explained in the next paragraph by the commentator has nothing to do with this kalā.

‡ According to Hindu philosophy ideas are phenomena of matter just as pictures and words are. The.e is besides an intir ... s and the words that name them. Words are made up ... ṭras and the names of the goddesses consist

iv. 7.

That activity which manifests (kalayaṭi) the specific form of each object is Kalā function; "kalā-bodied," means that which has activity as its nature, *i.e.*, karma. This is the bondage of Kārma-mala.

This also is referred to in (Kārika 9), "To him who is attached to action, having lost his independence through his impurity." This can be understood from our Spanḍa-nirṇaya. That these, *i.e.*, Kalā, etc., which are characterized by limited activity and which inhere in the same substratum as Āṇava-mala and envelope man constitute the (māyā) mala is stated in Svachchhanḍa: "Consciousness is obscured by (Aṇava) mala, surrounded by Kalā and Viḍyā, coloured by Rāga, affected by Kāla, controlled again by Niyati, strengthened by the notion of being a Puruṣa, having Praḍhāna as a dependent, connected with the three Guṇas, seated on Buḍḍhi, surrounded by Ahamkāra, Manas, Jñānēnḍriyas, Karmēnḍriyas, Ṭanmāṭras and gross elements." That kārma-mala also surrounds man is stated in *Mālinīvijaya*: "Karma, both good and bad, is associated with pleasure and pain." That Māyā-mala and Kārma-mala have Āṇava-mala as their substratum and are due to the limitation of knowledge is said in Praṭyabhijñā (xiv, 3): "In (the āṇava mala) the individual consciousness, the Māyā-mala gives birth and experience and Kārma-mala, due to the ignorance of the actor."

Now it is considered how this triple mala, (1) Jñāna that is really ajñāna, (2) class of Yoni, (3) Kalā-bodied, causes bondage.

IV. JÑĀNĀḌHIṢṬHĀNAM MĀṬṚIKĀ

MĀṬṚIKĀ IS THE BASIS OF KNOWLEDGE.

This triple mala has been defined to be three states of consciousness: (1) consciousness of finiteness; (2) cognition of the differentiated knowable; (3) deposits (vāsanā) of pleasure and pain, (*i.e.*, Karma). Its mother, the creatrix of the world is Māṭṛikā, the unknown, of the form of letters

from A to Kṣa. She associates the feelings of sorrow, astonishment, joy, desire, etc., with cognitions of the limited knowable, (*i.e.*, material objects), steady and unsteady states of consciousness, like " I am finite " (āṇava-mala), " " I am thin or fat " (māyā-mala), " I am an Agniṣtoma-sacrificer " (kārma-mala), by endowing those cognitions with words that describe them. It is said in Ṭimiroḍghāṭa : " Those Shaktis that are between Brahmarandhra and the Chiti, that hold the rope of Brahma,* the mistresses of the stations (pīthas,) most dreadful, again and again deceive men." She manifests the series of Shaktis, beginning from Brāhmī, which preside over varga, kalā, etc. She is described in the Āgamas like Sarvavīra, as the maker of mantras, *i.e.*, one who arranges sounds in the proper order which makes them efficacious. She is embraced by the Shaktichakra, the totality of the energies of the universe, made up of Ambā, Jyēṣthā, Raudrī, and Vāmā.† She is the head of the Shaktis. On account of her influence the recognition of the interval between two consecutive states of consciousness becomes impossible and there is not even a momentary cessation of objective cognitions. Hence it is right

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* The rope of Brahma, also the rod of Brahma, is the spinal cord, or rather what corresponds to it in the subtle body. It extends from the Brahma-randhra, the hole of Brahma, anterior fontaneile, to the Chiti. Chiti, lit., pile of wood for burning, is perhaps the Mūlāḍhāra, the sacral plexus(?) where the fire called Kuṇḍalinī is first kindled by processes of Yoga. Between these two extremities of the rod of Brahma there are several stations here called pīthas, but more usually chakras. Each is presided over by a goddess, a Shakti who has to be mastered to escape being deceived by her. There are other goddesses presiding over other principles also. The power of mantras over these is great. Mātṛikā is the queen of all these and also represents the power of the mantras. Corresponding to the chakras of the body of a man (microcosm) there is the Shakti-Chakra of the universe, driven by the same series of goddesses.

† " Vāmā and Ichchhā are Brahma and Bhāratī ; Jyēṣthā and Jñāna are Hari and Kṣiti ; Raudrī and Kriyā are Shiva and Aparṇā. Thus is this pair of trinities. The name of the synthesis of each trinity is respectively Shāntā and Ambikā." (Varivasyārahasya, ii. 11-12). Thus the mother of the universe is the synthesis of the three elemental powers, the force of desire, the force of thought, and the force of action (ichchhā-shakti, jñāna-shakti, and kriya-shākti).

to call this knowledge based on Mātṛikā, *i.e.*, cognitions which could be formulated in words, bondage.* This is referred to in Karikā (45), beginning with "To what is born of collections of sounds," and in Karikā (47), beginning with "The Shaktis are always bent on obscuring his nature."

Now the means of ending this bondage and the nature of the repose that is the goal is described.

V. UḌYAMO BHAIRAVAḤ.

UḌYAMA IS BHAIRAVA.

Uḍyama is the flash of the Supreme Light† (Pratibhā), the sudden rise of pure consciousness which flows as unbroken meditation. It is the same as Shivashakti. It is Bhairava, because it fills (bhṛi) all the universe and because it swallows all faults due to the disturbance of illusions. It is taught in this sūtra that as it developes the true nature of man which is Bhairava (universal consciousness), it is produced in those that are entirely devoted to introspective meditation.‡ It is said in Mālinīvijaya,—"That state which is produced even in those that have not cultivated thought, when enlightened by the Guru, is called Shāmbhava" In this quotation, 'enlightened by the Guru' has been explained by teachers to mean 'enlightened by the Guru, *i.e.*, himself'. It is also said in Svachchhanda ;" O fair one, in the case of the man that meditates on

* If there should be an interval without objective cognitions, experienced or remembered, the pure consciousness without the limitation of the objective world will rise; but the Shaktis determine the man so stealthily towards the world outside, that it is not possible for such an interval to exist and for the chaitanya to shine in its true light.

† Pratibhā, knowledge rising without any instrumental cause, Vide Yog. Sut. ii 34.

‡ In the case of those that steadily practise introspective meditation, there suddenly rises a flash of pure consciousness, during the interval mentioned in the previous sūtra, when the ātmā shines in its own light. This has to be experienced by each individual for himself. Hence with reference to this experience, each man has to be his own Guru and to enlighten himself, as has been explained by the commentator. Once the experience has been gained, one has to stick to it with uḍyama (effort). Hence Uḍyama is Bhairava.

the bhairava form of himself and is steady therein, his mantras become efficacious." 'Meditation' referred to in this quotation is the continual determination of the mind inward. This is alluded to in Kārikā (4): "Unmēṣa is known to be that whence another thought arises when the mind is concentrated on one thought. This is to be understood from one's own experience."

Thus has been explained the means of becoming fixed in the suddenly risen supreme light and of thus becoming a Bhairava, which is the one means of ending the bondage of ignorance; now he says that on account of the strength of this meditation, even during Vyuṭṭhāna there continues the ceasing of duality. (Vyuṭṭhāna, Vyavahāra, ordinary action, the usual worldly activities; even when engaged in these his consciousness of universality is not destroyed. In the ordinary phrase, he is jīvanmukṭa).

VI. SHAKṬICHAKRASANḌHĀNĒ VISHVASAMHĀRAḤ.

ON UNION WITH SHAKṬICHAKRA, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UNIVERSE.

Bhairava has been explained to be characterized by the rise of supreme light. As he retains hold of the introspective attitude (meditation on the āṭmā), he attains the unsurpassed supreme Shakṭi of independence; this power prevades the shakṭi-chakra of the universe, both gradually and all at once. Though this independence is described to transcend the gradual and simultaneous manifestation of the worlds, to be void, to be full, and to be both void and full, yet it is none of these things. It has already been shown that the manifestation of shakṭi-chakra in all stages of creation, *i.e.*, in all psychical experiences, from the ordinary cognition of objects, up to the final stage of the Supreme Knower, is but her sport with herself as the playground. On the regular meditation on the shakṭi-chakra which manifests as above, in the manner prescribed in the secret scriptures, is produced the destruction

of the universe from Kālāgni to Rasakalā*. The universe composed of bodies and objects is burnt up in the fire of supreme consciousness. It is said in Bhārgashikhā: "He then swallows all these, death, time, the totality of kalās, all phenomena, all cognitions, all differences of one āṭma and many āṭmās." In Virāvalī, too: "Behold the funeral pyre in the body, which shines like the Kālānala, where all go to pralaya, all ṭaṭtvas." In Mālinīvijaya, too, the same is described in a roundabout way: "This thing that cannot be described in words, has to be realized only by the mind. That state which all ultimately reach is called the Shākṭa." This has to be developed by devotion to the feet of the true guru and cannot be described fully. This same is referred to in the first as well as in the last Karikā, viz., those beginning with "From whose waking and sleeping", and "When seated on unity", respectively.

Now it is said that to him whose universe is destroyed there exists no difference between Vyuṭṭhāna† and Samāḍhi.

VII. JĀGRAṬSVAPNASUṢUPṬABHEḌE ṬURYĀBHOGASAMBHAVAḤ.

THE BLISS OF THE FOURTH STATE IS PRODUCED IN THE DIFFERENCES OF JĀGRAṬ, SVĀPNA, AND SUṢUPṬI.

In the various states of consciousness—Jāgraṭ, Svapna, and Suṣupṭi—which manifest themselves as different from

*"Kālāgni (or Kālānala) to Rasakala" means the whole of the Brahmāṇda, the Cosmos. The first world (bhuvana) in the Brahmāṇda is where Kālāgni, the fire which destroys the worlds at the beginning of Pralaya, resides. It thus corresponds to the mūlāḍhāra in the microcosm, where resides the fire which burns up the man's mala, and which is hence the chiṭi, the funeral pyre of his individuality. The last bhuvana in the Macrocosm is pure Kalā, here called Rasakalā, the ray of pure Ānaṇḍa (Ṭaiṭ. Up. ii. 7.) also called Shākṭāṭīṭa Kala, the final stage when liberation is reached. This is the world of Shiva-ṭaṭṭva and corresponds to Brahmaranḍhra in man.

† Vyuṭṭhāna is "the activity of the mind" (Vyāsa on Yoga-Sūṭra III. 38). It is of "three states, kṣipṭa, mūdha, vikṣipṭa", (ib. III. 9). Kṣipṭa is the mind "being engaged with objects on account of rajas. Mūdha is being engaged in sleep on account of ṭamas." Vikṣipṭa is "being now and then engaged with objects on account of the influence of a little rajas, while being in samāḍhi on account of excess of saṭṭva. (Vijñāna Bhikṣu on Yoga-Suṭra I. 1). Samāḍhi is the beginning of one-pointedness (Yoga-Sūṭra III. 11).

each other and which are presently to be described, is born the bliss of the Fourth (Ṭurya) state, described as Uḍyamo bhairavaḥ, which is of the nature of the illumination of all those states. The great Yogi who is spoken of as Bhairava, is eternally filled with the bliss of the Fourth state. Some read samviṭ in this sūṭra for sambhava and then the meaning is clear. This prevalence of the bliss of Ṭurya in Jāgrat, etc., in the case of the great Yogi is described in Chanḍra-jñāna: "Just as when the moon, like a flower, shines everywhere, it instantly rejoices the world with delightful things, so, O Ḍēvī, when the great Yogi wanders over the world, he everywhere causes joy to the world-picture from Avīchi to Shiva, by means of the moon of his jñāna." In the Spanḍā, this is referred to in Karika (3). "In the differences of Jāgraṭ, etc."

The three, Jāgraṭ, etc., are described in three sūtras.

VIII. JÑĀNAṂ JĀGRAṬ.

IX. SVAPNO VIKALPAḤ.

X. AVIVĒKO MĀYĀ SAUṢUPṬAM.

KNOWLEDGE IS JĀGRAṬ. FANCY IS SVAPNA. IGNORANCE, MĀYĀ, IS SUṢUPṬI.

Jāgraṭ is the experience a man gets, by means of the outer organs, *i.e.*, the organs of sensation, of objects which all people sense in common. Vikalpa, fancy, is born of mind alone (and deals with objects which other human beings do not sense). This is the state of Svapna; for it is chiefly concerned with these fancies. Avivēka, absence of distinction of one object from another, is ignorance. It is of the nature of Māyā, unconsciousness, the state of Suṣupṭi. In describing Suṣupṭi, the author has also described Māyā, which is to be abandoned. Thus by this description it is implied that there are three forms of

each of the three states of Jāgraṭ, etc. Thus therein, i.e., in Svapna, Jāgraṭ is the previous real experience that can generate a dream. The fancies connected with it constitute the Svapna. Want of discrimination of ṭaṭṭvas in the dream is the Suṣupṭi therein. In Suṣupṭi, these changes cannot be (easily) cognized; but when a desire to enter sleep is born, some state corresponding to Jāgraṭ previous to it is produced; its subsequent change into a state resembling a samskāra (unconscious mental modification) is the Svapna pertaining to Suṣupṭi.*

(*Another interpretation.*)

According to the Yogīs, Jāgraṭ is the first consciousness of the concentration of the mind on an object; the conceptions flowing from thence, the various images (vikalpa) constitute Svapna; Samāḍhi, the non-cognition of the difference of the knower and the known is Suṣupṭi. This is taught by the words of this suṭra. Hence in the old shāsṭras, the states due to the interconnexion of Jāgraṭ, etc., according to the Yogis are described as "Abuḍḍha, Buḍḍha, Prabuḍḍha, Suprabuḍḍha.†

The three states, Jāgraṭ, etc., have thus been explained according to the ordinary and the yoga explanations. Now

* Thus there are three times three states of mental experience; (1) jāgraṭ-jāgraṭ, (2) jāgraṭ-svapna, (3) jagraṭ-suṣupṭi, (4) svapna-jāgraṭ, (5) svapna-svapna, (6) svapna-suṣupṭi, (7) suṣupṭi-jāgraṭ, (8) suṣupti-svapna, (9) suṣupṭi-suṣupṭi. Of these, the first three are well-known. Kṣēmarāja illustrates the next five in his commentary. Dreams start from a real experience on which the subsequent baseless fabric is woven. This real experience is the jāgraṭ of svapna. When they end there is a fusion of the cognition and the cognizer, an absence of the distinction of the knower and the known. This is the suṣupṭi of svapna. The psychological analysis of suṣupṭi into three stages is, though subtle, not difficult of comprehension. They are the desire to "enter sleep" the beginnings of the obliteration of the sense of the distinction of self and not-self and the utter abolition of cognition during deep sleep when the man is completely enveloped in māyā. It must be remembered that jāgraṭ, svapna and suṣupṭi are states of the *Chiṭṭa*, mind, and not of the āṭmā, which is the changeless, blissful light of consciousness.

† These four words respectively mean unenlightened, enlightened, developed, well-developed. It is not possible to find out from what "old shāsṭras" they are taken. The latter three seem to correspond to jāgraṭ, svapna, and suṣupṭi of the second of the above interpretations, "according to the Yogis."

one who has destroyed his universe by union with shaktichakra, experiences the Turya filled with bliss and characterized by the consciousness of unity. He ascends the thread of Turya, enters the Turyātīta, the state beyond the fourth, already described as Chaitanya and becomes a

XI. TRITAYABHOKTĀ VĪRESHAH.

VĪRESHA, THE ENJOYER OF THE THREE.

The three states of Jāgrat, etc., become filled with the bliss of the Fourth by reason of the union with shaktichakra. He who experiences the lesse. ' g .f the samskāras (effects of the form of mental deposits) of the ordinary relative cognitions (the ordinary limited human consciousness) by the force of the new experience of the three states associated with the unceasing flow of bliss, is the Trityabhoktā. It is said: "He who knows both what is to be enjoyed in the three places (states), and who is called the enjoyer is not stained with mala though he enjoys." Hence he is the lord of the vīras, *i.e.*, the senses, which are capable of destroying the blissful, full, consciousness of a duality accompanying self-sovereignty. In the Scriptures he is called one who has acquired Shrīmanthānubhairava.*

Thus it is taught that he who does not become a Vīrēsha but is the slave of the ordinary Jāgrat, etc., is but a pashu, a worldly man; and that even the Yogī who does not ascend this stream of bliss is not a Vīrēsha but a fool. This is also described in detail in Svachchhanda and other Shāstras. "The Yogī is one who by means of the yoga of svachchhanda (independence) and by treading the path of svachchhanda, reaches the state of svachchhanda and becomes equal to Svachchhanda (Shiva)." In the Spanda this is explained in Kārikā (17): "To him there is knowledge always fixed in the three states, etc."

*In the Chhāndogya Upanisad, Shrīmantha (the churning of wealth) is described as a rite (V. ii. 4-8) and Shankarāchārya considers it as preliminary to Putramantha (described in Brih. Up. VI. iv).

Are there any subsidiary stages * to be reached by Yogis when rising above the ṭaṭṭvas, by means of which the state above the ṭaṭṭvas can be seen? Yes, says the next sūṭra.

XII. VISMAYO YOGABHŪMIKAḤ.

WONDER (CHARACTERISES) THE STAGES OF YOGA.

When a man sees a new and peculiar thing he feels a sense of surprise. Similarly when a great Yogi cognizes, contemplates or enjoys the strange, excellent, and novel experiences† which flow into his consciousness, according as his mystic faculties are just opened, or staid, or fully expanded, he experiences a sense of surprise. This is frequently caused by his want of satisfaction in unbroken bliss. These are the stages leading to the union with supreme principle. They are the stages of rest in the ascent of the Yogi; they are regions of limited consciousness and not states when kanḍa, binḍu, etc., are experienced. It is said in the Kulayukṭi: "When the Āṭmā is born of itself by means of mystic practices, then the Āṭmā in itself experiences wonder." This is referred to in Kārikā (11): "Who sees his own nature as the ruler and remains as if surprised, to him, how can this false show of the world exist."‡

*These stages are said to be seven in Yog Sūṭ. II 27.

†Every novel experience is as it were a challenge to the Āṭmā and brings about a flash of its light (Vide Sūṭra V). This occurs also in the course of the mystic experiences of the Yogi, but of course in a greater degree than during the experiences of the ordinary worldly life. When the Yogi has reached the unending bliss of union with his Āṭmā he may not be able to retain hold of that state. When he drops down from this exalted state, he again feels wonder. All these are stages of yoga. Kanḍa, (lit. bulb is the root of the nādis, tubes through which prāṇa, the life-wind circulates. The chief of these nādis is the suṣumṇā, through which travels the fire of kuṇḍalinī when roused "Like a gem pierced by a thread the kanḍa is pierced by suṣumṇa. This chakra in the region of the navel is called maṇipūraka." (Yogachūdāmaṇi Up xii) From the kanḍa rise fourteen nādis like the spokes of a wheel. It is in the region of the solar plexus. Binḍu is the chakra between the eyebrows, called also Binḍu-paḍma, and Ājnā (vide Bhāskara Rāya's Laliṭāsahasranāma Bhāṣya, nos. 521 & 905). Brahmaranḍhra is called by some Binḍu-manḍalam (Ib, No. 380) and is perhaps what is referred to here by the commentator. When the fire of Kuṇḍalinī burns in these chakras all limitations are removed and a state higher than the stages above referred to results.

‡The commentary on this sūṭra is rather obscure. Kṛiṣṇaḍāsa who has versified the Shiva-sūṭra-vimarshinī into a vārṭṭika, omits the greater part of it.

Of the Yoga who has reached this stage of yoga—

XIII. ICHCHHĀÇAKTIRUMĀKUMĀRĪ.

ICHCHHĀSHAKTI IS UMĀ KUMĀRĪ.

The desire of the Yogi who has reached the stage of the supreme Bhairava, is Shakṭi, Umā, the Supreme, the highest Goddess, whose nature is Independence. She is Kumārī, *i.e.*, devoted to the sport of creation and destruction of the universe. Kumāra means to sport, according to the Ḍhāṭupātha of Pāṇini, (Kaṇḍvāḍi). (Another interpretation). Ku, the state of māyā, the awakener of duality, mārayaṭi, chokes its manifestation; Kumārī is one who has that characteristic. (Third interpretation.) Kumārī, a virgin, hence unfit to be an object of enjoyment; Umā manifests only as the enjoyer and not as an object of enjoyment. (Fourth interpretation). When Umā was a virgin she was not attached to anything and was always devoted to the worship of Mahēshvara which is the means of union with Him; so, too, is the Yogī's desire. The reading and explanation of my Guru is as above. Others read shakṭiṭama for shakṭirumā and explain that this Ichchhā is superior to Jñānā and Kriyā. This desire of the Yogī is not so gross as the desires of the worldly; but as it is of the same nature as Parā shakṭi, it is unobstructed. It is said in Svachchhanda: "That goddess has the names and forms of all other goddesses, is yet concealed by Yogamāyā; she is Kumārī, the author of the world." Also in Mriṭyuñjayabhattāraka: "She, my Icchā, Parāhsakṭi, potent, born of herself, is to be known as heat in fire, as the rays in the sun; that shakṭi is the cause of all the worlds." This same is otherwise referred to in Karikā (8): "He is not the inspirer of the prompting of desire; but by the force of his own Āṭmā a person becomes itself."

To one who has developed this Ichchha shakṭi,

XIV. ḌṚISHYAM SHARĪRAM.

THE VISIBLE WORLD IS THE BODY.

Whatever is seen outside and inside, (*i.e.*, the objective world of material bodies and so-called subjective world of mental images, which together constitute the world of matter), all that is spoken of as 'This' and 'I', appears to him as his body and not as different from him, on account of his great power, just as (the world appears) to Saḍāshiva. His body, namely, the gross body, buḍḍhi, prāṇa, and shūnya, is cognized by him as being as outside his real self as blue, etc., but does not as in the case of pashus,* manifest as the seer. Both in his body and outside, everywhere, his consciousness appears undifferentiated as the yolk of the pea-fowl. As said in Vijñānabhairava: "As waves of water, flames of fire, rays of the sun, these world-waves have started from me, the Bhairava." This is referred to in Kārikā (29): "Being enjoyer, he is always, everywhere, of the nature of the enjoyed."

It has been said that all the world is sensed by him as his body and all his bodies ending with the shūnya appear objective to him. This is not impossible; for,

XIV. HṚIḌAYĒ CHIṬTASAṄGHATTĀḌ ḌṚSHYASVĀPAḌARSHANAM.

FROM THE GATHERING TOGETHER OF THE MIND IN THE HEART, THE SIGHT OF THE WORLD AND THE DREAM.

The heart is the light of consciousness, the world is located there. "From the gathering of the mind" therein, means, imagining the mind to be one-pointed there. Thence one sees the world which consists of blue, gross body, †

* The ordinary unenlightened man (pashu), takes his body to be himself and when his body experiences pain and pleasure, he says: "I feel pain, I feel pleasure." Not so the Mahāyogī. He knows his real self to be other than his gross body, buḍḍhi, etc. And yet his consciousness pervades the whole universe. Shūnya is the imaginary body in which one feels himself to be in dreams., "Blue etc." means the world of objects.

† The ordinary man perceives objects by means of his body; during that perception he identifies himself with his body and regards the object as being other than himself. The yogi's perception extends throughout the world; all the world is his body, and hence to his perception nothing is outside him; yet he does not mistake his body to be his real self.

buḍḍhi, prāṇa, and dream-world which contains none of these, but the shūnya body. The 'sight' spoken of here is the sensing of an object as one senses his body, and without the distinction of the perceiver and the perceived (which characterizes ordinary perception. The mind (chiṭṭa) which has entered the light of the Āṭma sees the universe as clothed with it. It is said in Vijñānabhairava: "O fair one, he whose senses are concentrated in the ākāsha of his heart, who has reached the centre of the lotus-casket, whose mind is one-pointed (lit., engaged with no other), attains supreme bliss." Supreme bliss is the attainment of the lordship of the universe. With regard to the great Yogī who has attained the functioning of all the ṭaṭṭvas, it is said in Svachchhanḍa: "He is seated equally in all bhūṭas, bhāvas, ṭaṭṭvas and inḍriyas; he is in all moveable and immoveable, conscious and unconscious beings; he pervades all paths."* In the Spanḍa, too, (39), this is alluded to: "Thence, established in himself, is thus everywhere."

Now another means is explained.

XVI. SHUḌḌHAṬAṬṬVASANḌHĀNĀḌ VĀ APASHUSHAKṬIḤ.

OR THE BECOMING DEVOID OF PASHUSHAKṬI BY MEDITATION ON SHUḌḌHAṬAṬṬVA.

Shuḍḍhaṭaṭṭva is the one called Paramashiva. When one meditates on the universe as being filled with Him, he transcends pashushakṭi, the source of bondage, and becomes the lord of the universe like Saḍāshiva. It is said in Lakṣmī-kaulārṇava: "The experiences of steadiness (sṭhobha), etc., said to result from successful mystic initiation (ḍīkṣā), O Ḍēvī, are not equal to the sixteenth part of the results of meditation." Also in Vijñānabhairava: "One should meditate on all the body or the universe as filled with consciousness, at the same time, without interruption; then a supreme state is produced."

* The quotation from Svachchhanḍa is obscure. It is difficult to guess what are the bhūṭas, bhāvas, ṭaṭṭvas and inḍriyas referred to. Perhaps they mean respectively elements, objects, gross elements, and sense-organs.

This same is referred to in Kārikā (30): "He who has this cognition, who sees all the world to be a sport and is always in mystic contemplation (yukta), is certainly a jīvanmukta."

To him who has attained true knowledge (lit., is of the nature of knowledge),

XVII. VITARKA ĀTMAJÑĀNAM.

VITARKA IS KNOWLEDGE OF SELF.

Vitarka is vichāra, the constant dwelling on the thought, "I am the ātmā of the universe, Shiva." This is ātmajñāna. It is said in Vijñānabhairava: "One that is firmly fixed in the idea 'I am omniscient, I am the actor in all actions, the Pervader, the Supreme Lord', becomes Shiva." This is said in the Spanda (32): "This alone is the understanding of the Self (ātmano grahaḥ)." Here 'graha' is grahaṇa, apprehension, knowledge, of the Ātmā. This is but the sense of identity with Shiva, the ātmā of the universe. This meaning too is implied.

And to him,

XVIII. LOKĀNANDAH SAMĀDHISUKHAM.

THE BLISS OF LOKA IS THE ECSTASY OF SAMĀDHI.

Loka is that which is seen, the totality of the Object. Or loka is that which sees, the class of seers. It is said in Vijñānabhattāraka: "The cognition of the seer and the seen is common to all embodied beings; the speciality of Yogīs, however, is intentness on the connexion between the two." From intentness on the state where the difference between the cognizer and the cognized disappears, is born a bliss filled with wonder; this is the ecstasy of samādhi. It is said again therein: "Let one think of all the world or all the body as filled with the bliss of Self. At once he becomes filled with supreme bliss, by means of his own ātmā." This is taught in (Kārikā; 32): "This is the reaching of immortality*."

*Amṛita is both immortality in the abstract and the concrete elixir vitæ.

(Another interpretation).

The ecstasy of samādhi experienced by a man who is concentrated on his own self and looks on it as it is, developes not only bliss in himself, but also adds to the total bliss of the world.* This interpretation agrees with the quotation from Chandrajñana (in commentary on sūtra 7).

Now is described the wonderful power (vibhūti yoga) of this Yogī.

XIX. Shaktisandhāne sharīrotpattih.

On the meditation on shakti, the production of the body.

His shakti has been described in the Sūtra (13): "Ichchhāshaktir-umā kumārī." When he meditates on it he becomes steadily one with it. Then by means of its power whatever body he desires, that is produced. This is described in the passage of Mrityuñjaya-bhattāraka, beginning with—"Thence is produced the shakti devoid of objectivity (lakṣyahīna), without differentiations; she is called Ichchhā of the form of Jñāna, of the nature of Kriyā,"—and ending with "She is the womb of all the dēvas and all shaktis, manifold ; the womb is of the nature of Agni and Soma; in it are all produced." The glory of meditation on shakti† is described in Lakṣmīkaularnava in—"There is no mystic initiation (dīkṣā) without meditation, nor the acquisition of powers (siddhi), nor mantras, nor the power of mantras, nor again success in yoga," and in other shlokas. This is explained in Kārikā (33): "When the creator at the instance of desire provides for the

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*Kṛṣṇadāsa apparently understands the second differently from how it has been translated above. His vārtika on this passage, literally translated would run thus: "What is bliss of samādhi of him who is a yogī concentrated on his Self, that in the worlds (macrocosm) is the bliss of the worlds which are being contemplated on within (the mind)". In other words, the bliss of the lokas and the bliss of the self are ultimately the same.

† Shakti in the macrocosm corresponds to the kundalini in the human body; Agni and Soma, more usually the sun and the moon, correspond to Idā and Pingala, two tenuous tubes (nādis) associated with suṣumṇā.

sake of embodied beings in the jāgrat state, things which are their heart's desire, by causing Soma and Sūrya to rise." (Commentary on this quotation.) "Embodied beings: Yogis who have risen above the attractions of the body. "Things which are their heart's desire": Forms newly created. "Creator (Dhāṭṛ)": Mahēshvara." "Soma and Surya to rise": The shaktis are of the nature of prakāsha and ānanḍa, *i.e.*, light of consciousness and bliss, and make Soma and Sūrya flow. "Causing" that shakṭi or power which harmonises Soma and Sūrya, making them manifest objectively. The Independence in the state of Svapna, described in the shloka, that starts with 'Similarly in svapna too he attains desired objects" is illustrated (in Kārikā 34). This is explained by me in Spanḍanirṇaya.

Now it is said that others of the siḍḍhis, as desired by him, are developed by the power of meditaition on shakṭi.

XX. BHŪṬASANḌHĀNABHŪṬAPṚṬHAKṬVAVISHVASAṄGHAṬṬĀḤ.

UNION WITH BHŪṬAS, DISSOCIATION FROM OBJECTS, CONJUNCTION WITH THE UNIVERSE.

Bhūṭas are objects like the body, prāṇa, bhāva, etc. Gratification in connection with them is bhūṭasanḍhāna. Separation from the body, etc, in the cure of disease, etc., is bhūṭapṛṭhakṭva. Attaining to a true knowledge of the universe which is limited by space and time is vishvasaṅghatta. These powers are produced on the attainment of shakṭi already described. This is also described in the sections on sāḍhanas (practice) in all the Āgamas. This is explained in the Spanḍa (Kārikā 38): "One who attains it, though weak, engages himself in great actions; even so, though very hungry, he controls his hunger." (Illustration of bhūṭasanḍhana). In Kārikā (40): "Disease is the thief of the body; its spread is due to ignorance. When that ignorance is destroyed by the rise of knowledge, how can that disease continue to exist, its cause being gone?"

(Illustration of bhūtapṛthaktva). In Kārikā (36, 37); "Just as an indistinctly apprehended object appears more distinct when the mind is concentrated on it by the power of mind, so on the attainment of shakti, is soon manifested the truth in its own form and in its own place." (Illustration of vishvasaṅghatta). Thus in the Vibhūtispanda* this is described with illustrations.

Now when without desiring the ordinary siddhis, he desires to experience universal consciousness, to him,

XXI. SHUDDHAVIDYODAYĀT CAHKRESHATVASIDDHIḤ.

BY THE RISE OF SHUDDHAVIDYĀ, THE SIDDHI OF THE LORDSHIP OF THE CHAKRAS.

When one meditates on shakti (*Cf.* sūtra 19) with a desire to experience universal consciousness, Shuddavidyā *i. e.*, the consciousness, "I am all," rises and he becomes the lord of the shaktichakra of the universe, *i. e.*, becomes Mahēshvara. It is said in Svachchhanda; "It is the supreme knowledge, because there is none other; when he gets it he at once gets the supreme characteristics of omniscience, etc. It is the knowledge of the beginningless dharma, of paramātmā; it leads to the state of paramātmā, where the supreme light is manifested and he becomes fixed in it and reaches the state of Shiva." This is explained in Kārikā (43): "When with the desire of seeing all objects he pervades all of them, when there is no need of many words, he knows everything himself."

When he desires the bliss of Self alone,

XXII. MAHĀHRADĀNUSANDHĀNĀNMANTRAVĪRYĀNUBHAVAḤ.

ON ATTAINING MAHĀHRADA, HE OBTAINS MANTRAVĪRYA.

When the light of consciousness (samvit), called Parā Bhattārikā, fills all the universe from Ichchhā-shakti (the

*Vibhūtispanda is apparently the part of the kārikā where phenomenal powers are described.

beginning of the world) to the gross cognizable world, *i.e.*, when the Yogī senses all these at the same time, from it follows energy through Khēcharī and other chakras; it becomes clear, infinite, deep, etc., and is hence called mahāhrada (the great lake). By meditating on it, *i. e.*, thinking uninterruptedly, with inturned vision, of identity with it, is produced the efficacy of mantra, which consists of combination of sounds as will be described later.* This is † Parāhantā, manifesting as one's own self. This is described in Mālinīvijaya, in the shlokas beginning with "She, the shakti of the creator of the world", in which passage the shakti which fills the universe is shown to be of the form of Mātrikāmālinī (one who has the mātrikās as garland), because the world is of fifty different forms‡ from Ichchhā downwards; and after this passage the formation of mantras is described. Hence Mahāhrada is the supreme shakti. Hence it is right that the meditation on it should produce the efficacy of the mantras made of letters. This same is indirectly referred to in (the words), 'approaching that strength", (in Kārikā 26).

Beginning with defining chaitanya to be ātma, it was pointed out that bondage was due to ignorance of the independence of consciousness. Attainment of the state of bhairava which is udyama, puts a stop to bondage and fills the universe with bliss and gives all siddhis up to mantravīrya. Thus has been taught the first Unmesa (part), which gives an account of Shāmbhavopāya. Therein has also been described the nature of Shakti to indicate that Shakti exists in the nature of Shambhu. Blessed be it.

This is the description of Shāmbhavōpāya, the first chapter of the vrtti, called Shiva-sūtra-vimarshnī.

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* Vide ii. 5.

† Vide ii. 7.

‡ The letters 'A' to Ksa' are fifty. The shaktis of the universe from Ichchhā downwards are also fifty. Hence the chain of shaktis corresponds to the alphabet.

THE KĀVYĀLANKĀRA SŪṬRAS OF VĀMANA.

WITH HIS OWN GLOSS, THE *Kavipriyā.*

(*Translated into English.*)

PRELIMINARY NOTE.

The Kāvyālaṅkāra Sūṭras here translated are by Vāmana, who also wrote the Vṛiṭṭi or short commentary on the Sūṭras. He is believed to have flourished in Kashmir between the second half of the Seventh Century and the second half of the Ninth Century A. C. This work is one of the oldest of the systematic treatises on Poetics; its opinions receiving very careful attention in all great works on rhetoric, including the Ḍhvanyāloka and the Kāvyaprakāsha. This Vāmana is not the same as the author of the '*Kāshikā*' on Pāṇini's Sūṭras; as this latter flourished before Hiouen-Thsang came to India, in the beginning of the Seventh Century; while our Vāmana makes quotations from the work of Bhavabhūṭi who flourished in the latter half of that Century.

The text and gloss have been published in the 'Kāvyamālā' 15, Nirṇayasāgara Press, Bombay; and also in the Benares Sanskrit Series, along with a commentary.

CHAPTER I.

The Constituents of 'Poetry.'

Section (I).

The uses of Poetry.

Having bowed down to the Supreme Light, Vāmana proceeds to prepare a brief Commentary upon his own *Kāvyālankārā-Sūṭras.*

Sūṭra (1)—Poetry becomes acceptable by reason of embellishments.

'Poetry' becomes acceptable by reason of Embellishments.—

The word 'poetry' in reality applies to such 'word' and 'subject-matter' *as are adorned or beautified by 'Diction' (or Qualities of Style) and Embellishments*; but in the present context it is used in its secondary and much wider sense, denoting 'word' and 'subject-matter' without any qualification.

Note.—Vāmana here defines Poetry *primarily* as 'such word and subject-matter as are beautified by diction and figures of speech' ;—and secondarily as mere 'word and subject-matter.' By older writers it has been declared that Poetry has the 'word' for its *body* and the 'subject-matter' for its *soul* ; but, the author of the *Dhvani* adds, the 'subject-matter should be such as is relished by people with poetic instincts.' Later writers, among others the author of the *Praṭāparudrīya*, have 'described Poetry as a person having the 'word' and 'subject-matter' for his *body*, 'excellences of suggestion or implication' for his *soul*, and the 'Figures for his ornaments*. The author of the Kāvyapakāsha defines Poetry as 'such word and subject-matter as are free from all defects, and adorned by diction,' and he does not find the presence of 'Figures ot Speech' a necessary element; in this he has the support of the Agnipurāṇa, which declares—'Even when adorned by Figures Poetry would not be poetry if it had no diction or Quality of style.' The 'absence of defects' comes in only as a negative property. Poetry, thus, according to these writers, must have some excellent subject-matter expressed in words fit for conveying the desired meaning; that the meaning should be only such as is *suggested*—and not directly expressed,—is not (at least according to many writers) a necessary condition; it has been made the condition of Poetry of the *first class* only. It is in view of all this that the *Rasagangāḍhara* has defined Poetry as 'that word

which expresses an elegant subject-matter'; and this coincides with what the *Dhvani* has said with regard to *word* being the *body* and a *sahṛidayashlāghy* subject-matter the *Soul* of poetry.'

What is an 'Embellishment' ?

Sūṭra (2):—Beauty or Charm is 'Embellishment.'

'Embellishment' primarily is synonymous in the present context with *charm*; and it is only in the secondary (instrumental) sense of *that which charms*—that the term is applied to Simile and the other 'Figures of Speech'.

NOTE.—From this sūṭra it is clear that with Mammata, Vāmana does not make the presence of 'Figures' a necessary condition; as reading the two *sūṭras* together, it is clear that what makes Poetry acceptable is only the *presence of charm* or *elegance*, Diction coming in only as a *sine qua non*.

Sūṭra (3):—Charm or elegance proceeds from the avoiding of *defects* and the adopting of *qualities of style* and *figures of speech*.

Sūṭra (4):—And these are possible only through the Science.

It is only when one has learnt from the Science of Poetics what the *defects* are, and what the *qualities* and *figures* are, that he can avoid the one and adopt the other.

What is the desirable result to be accomplished by means of Poetry, that one should put forth such efforts towards its accomplishment ?

Sūṭra (5):—Poetry, when excellent, accomplishes perceptible as well as imperceptible results,—bringing about, as it does, pleasure and fame.

When Poetry is good it accomplishes a perceptible result, in the form of the 'pleasure' that it gives; it also brings about an imperceptible result in the shape of 'fame'.

To this end we have the following verses:—

'They have declared the composition of good Poetry to be the road to fame; and similarly the composition of

bad poetry, the ridiculous attempt of unqualified poets, the road to disrepute.'

'The learned have declared that Fame leads to Heaven lasting as long as the world lasts; and that Disrepute leads to such places (in hell) as are totally devoid of light'.

'It is thus for the purposes of obtaining fame and avoiding disrepute that great poets should study the science of Poetics.'

NOTE—Cf Kāvyaprakāsha :—

'Poetry tends to bring fame, wealth, knowledge of world-usage, removal of evils, immediate highest pleasure, and advice in the most agreeable manner.'

Section (2).

[A] WHO IS ENTITLED TO STUDY THE SCIENCE.

Sūṭra (1)—Poets are—(*a*) 'Discontented,' and (*b*) 'Feeding on grass.'

The words 'discontented' and 'feeding on grass' are used figuratively. The two kinds of Poets are—(1) The hypercritical sceptic who is possessed of discriminative intelligence (and requires only to be guided properly); and (2) the vulgar person who is absolutely devoid of the faculty of discrimination.

Sūṭra (2)—It is the former of these who, by reason of their being possessed of discrimination, are to be taught;—

Sūṭra (3)—And not the latter who are of the contrary character (possessed of no intelligence).

Being by their nature absolutely devoid of discriminating intelligence, the vulgar cannot be taught; as what is inherent in one's very nature cannot be removed.

It may be objected that the Science of Poetics being thus intended for the few, and thus not benefitting all persons,

wherefore should it be sought after at all. In answer to this we have the next sūtra.

Sūtra (4)—The Science could be of no use to the insignificant (non-intelligent vulgar persons).

A corroborative instance is cited—

Sūtra (5)—The *Kaṭaka* seed (though capable of cleaning the water) cannot clean the mud.

NOTE—The Kāvyaprakāsha thus enumerates the characteristic qualities necessary in the 'poet:'—(1) Power—Genius, (2) Cleverness acquired by a careful observation of the world and the study of poetry and the sciences, (3) Practice under the guidance of a teacher well-versed in the Science of Poetics

[B] RĪṬI—DICTION.

Having described the persons entitled to the study of the Science of Poetics, the sūtra proceeds next to explain what is meant by *Rīṭi*, Diction.

Sūtra (6)—Diction is the very soul of Poetry,—just as the Soul is to the Body so is Diction to Poetry.

What is this 'Diction'?

Sūtra (7)—It is the particular arrangement of words that constitutes 'Diction.'

What is this 'particular arrangement'?

Sūtra (8)—The 'particularity' of arrangement consists in the 'qualities of style' (to be described later on).

Sūtra (9)—Diction has been classed under three heads: (a) 'Vaidarbhī,' 'Gauḍīyā' and 'Pañchālī.'

A question is raised—Do the 'Qualities of Style' in Poetry proceed from different countries, like so many

material products—that they should derive their names from the names of countries (Viḍarbha, Gauḍa and Pāñchāla)? It is not so; because—

Sūṭra (10)—The names are due to the fact of particular 'qualities of style' being met with in particular countries.

The 'Vaiḍarbhī' diction is so called, not because the country of Viḍarbha has any effect upon poetry, but simply by reason of the fact that this particular diction in its true form is found to be most in use among the poets of that country.

The author proceeds to define these 'Dictions' in terms of the 'Qualities of Style'—

Sūṭra (11)—The 'Vaiḍarbhī' is replete with all the 'Qualities of Style.'

That Diction which abounds in all the 'Qualities of Style' —Floridity, Lucidity and the like,—is called 'Vaiḍarbhī.' In connection with this we have the following verses:— 'That Diction is called *Vaiḍarbhī* which is untouched by even the slightest Defect, which is replete with all Qualities and which is sweet like the notes of the lute.'

'Even when the speaker be present, the subject-matter near at hand, and the science of words and their usage also well known,—that, in the absence whereof, sentences do not flow in honeyed accents, is that Diction (which is called the *Vaiḍarbhī*).'

As an example of this we have the following from Shakunṭalā Act I—

'Gāhanṭām mahiṣā nipānasalilam shṛṅgair muhusṭāḍiṭam,

'Chhāyābaḍḍhakaḍambakam mṛgakulam romanṭhamabhyasyaṭu,

Visrabḍhaiḥ kriyaṭām varāhapaṭibhirmusṭākṣaṭiḥ palvalē,

Kāv. 5.

'Vishrāntim labhatāmiḍañcha shiṭhilajyābanḍhamasmaḍḍhanuḥ.'

['Let the buffaloes wallow in the water, frequently striking it with their horns; let the flock of deer ruminate in groups settled under the shades of the tree; may the huge boars fearlessly uproot the grass in the pools; may my bow also with its string loosened rest in peace!']

NOTE.—The *Vaiḍarbhī* is that which contains words and letters suggestive of all the Qualities of Style—Sweetness, Floridity and Lucidity. (*See* Kāvyaprakāsha—Com. Balabodhinī, p. 528 Old Ed.)

Sūṭra (12)—The 'Gauḍīyā' abounds in the Qualities of Floridity and Brilliancy.

The 'Gauḍīyā' diction is that which abounds in long compounds and harsh-sounding words, which are suggestive of the qualities of 'Floridity' and 'Brilliancy' (to be described later on) ; it is totally devoid of the qualities of 'Sweetness' and 'Softness' (see below).

On this we have the following verse—

'People learned in the Science of Diction call that Diction *Gauḍīyā* which consists of long compounds and high-sounding words, and which abounds in the qualities of Floridity and Brilliancy.'

Example—

Ḍorḍanḍāñchiṭachanḍrashēkharaḍhanurḍanḍāvabhaṅgōḍyaṭa-'ṣṭānkāraḍhvanirāryābālachariṭaprasṭāvanāḍinḍimaḥ.
'Ḍrākparyasṭakapālasamputamilaḍbrahmānḍabhānḍoḍara-
'bhrāmyaṭpinḍiṭachanḍimā kaṭhamaho nāḍyāpi vishrāmyaṭi.' (Mahāviracharita I.)

['The twanging sound that emanates from the broken stick of Shiva's bow, wielded in his long arms, is the trumpet-sound introducing into the world the boyish feats of my brother ; even now it does not cease, having its reverberation enhanced by its rumblings through the interstices of

the pieces of the Universe rent asunder by the terrific explosion.']

Sūtra (13)—The Pāñchālī is endowed with the qualities of Sweetness and Softness.

Being totally devoid of Floridity and Brilliancy, this has no harsh-sounding words, and is rather tame. Says the verse :—

'The wise ones have named that Diction *Pāñchālī* which sounds rather tame, resembling the style of the Purāṇas, and is soft and sweet'.

Example—

'Grāmē'smin paṭhikāya pānṭhavasaṭirnaivāḍhnā ḍīyaṭē.'

'Rāṭrāvaṭra vihāramaṇḍapaṭalē pānṭhaḥ prasupṭo yuvā;

'Ṭēnoṭṭhāya khalēna garjaṭi ghanē smṛṭvā priyānṭaṭ kṛitam.'

'Yēnāḍyāpi karaṅkaḍaṇḍapaṭanāshaṅkī janasṭiṣṭhaṭi.'

['O Traveller, now in this village no wayfarer is allowed to have lodgings : A youthful traveller, once, was sleeping at night under the roof of this pavilion ; and when the clouds thundered, that wicked youth woke up, and happening to remember his beloved, did something, by reason whereof the people, even now, continue to remain under the dread of the falling of the skeleton.']

It is on these three Dictions that 'Poetry' takes its stand; just as the painting has its substratum in the lines drawn on the canvas.

Sūtra (14)—From among these three it is the first (the Vaiḍarbhī) that deserves to be adopted; as it has all the qualities;

Sūtra (15)—and not the other two (Gauḍīyā and Pāñchālī): as they have only a few qualities.

Sūtra (16)—Some writers have held that these latter two also have to be practised, as they serve the purpose of steps leading up to the *Vaidarbhī*.

Sūtra (17)—But this is not right; for the *real* thing (the proper Diction) cannot be attained by one who practices with the *unreal* (the improper Diction).

[When one does not practise what he wants, he cannot attain it.]

Sūtra (18)—[As for example] if the weaver practices weaving with jute, he does not attain expertness in the weaving of silk.

Sūtra (19)—The Vaidarbhī is called '*pure* Vaidarbhī' when there are no compound words.

Sūtra (20)—It is in this pure Vaidarbhī that the fullness of the excellence of subject-matter becomes clearly appreciable.

Sūtra (21)—In fact by becoming related to this diction, even the slightest excellence of subject-matter becomes appreciable [to say nothing of the *fulness* of excellence].

On this point we have the following verses:—

'There is an excellent arrangement of words (Diction) in which even when there is nothing, there appears to be something; reaching the ears of good men it gives pleasure, entering their hearts like a flow of nectar.

'That attaining which in speech the excellence of the words shines forth,—wherein even the unreal thing acquires a reality,—is that Vaidarbhī Diction which produces a peculiar exhilarating effect on the hearts of all men with poetic sensibility.'

Kāv. 8.

Sūṭra (22)—The said 'excellence of subject-matter' also has been called 'Vaiḍarbhī'; it rests upon the Vaiḍarbhī Diction.

To the subject-matter the name, which primarily belongs to the Diction, is applied only secondarily (or figuratively).

For 'Guṇas' or 'Qualities of Style' refer to Chapter III, Sections 1 and 2.

Section (3).

THE AUXILLIARIES OF POETRY.

Having explained Diction, the Sūṭra proceeds to describe the 'Auxillaries' of Poetry.

Sūṭra (1)—The Auxilliaries of Poetry are—(*a*) the *World*, (*b*) *the Science*, and (*c*) *Miscellanies.*

Sūṭra (2)—By 'world' is meant the operation or action of the world [of animate and inanimate beings].

Sūṭra (3)—By 'Science' is meant that (Science of Poetry) which is preceded by the Science of Words, the Koshas, Prosody, the Arts, the Science of Erotics, and the Science of Politics.

The Science of Poetry is said to be 'preceded by' these sciences, as the knowledge of every one of these is needed in the writing of poetry.

In what manner each of these become an 'auxilliary' is now shown—

Sūṭra (4)—Purity or Correctness of Words proceeds from (the knowledge of) the Science of Words.

By the aid of the Science of Words, *i. e.*, Grammar, we assure ourselves of the correct forms of words; as it is only the correct form of words that is used by poets fearlessly.

Sūṭra (5)—From *Koshas* proceeds the Knowledge of the Meanings of Words.

Coming across a word capable of being used in the piece he is composing, if the poet were not quite sure of what it meant, he could not make up his mind as to whether he should use that word or give it up; and this uncertainty would hamper the work of composition. Consequently it becomes necessary for the poet to make himself sure of the exact meanings of words, with the help of lexicons. It is not right to utilise these Thesauruses for the purpose of making use of extraordinary words never before used; such words and expressions as are seldom used should never be used in poetry.

Question: "If one is to use only such words as are in use already, whence could there be any 'uncertainty' as to the meaning of words mentioned above?"

Answer:—It is just possible that of a word that is in use already, the writer may have only a vague idea; *e. g.*, in the case of the word '*nīvī*' it may be that he knows that it is the name of the *cloth-knot over the thigh*, and he may be in doubt as to whether this referred to the cloth-knot of the woman or the man; this doubt could be set aside only by the help of such declarations as—'nīvī is the name of the cloth-knot over the thigh *of the woman*'—occurring in the *Nāmamālā* for instance.

"Well, if the word *nīvī* can apply to the *woman's cloth* only, how do you explain the following use of the word (where it applies to the man's clothing):—

'The cloth-knot mentioned before by some one was loosened by the enlargement of the stomach by excellent and variegated feeding'—?"

Such use must be regarded either as wrong, or as only figurative.

Sūṭra (6)—The Science of Prosody helps in removing all doubts with regard to metre.

Though as a matter of fact, the knowledge of metres comes by practice at poetical composition, yet doubts very often arise with regard to the correctness or otherwise of those metres that are arranged in accordance with the number and place of the vowel-sounds; and these doubts can be set aside only by the study of the Science of Prosody.

Sūtra (7)—By the study of the Science of Arts follows the knowledge of the essence of the Arts.

The 'Arts' here meant are those of *singing, dancing, painting* and the like; scientific treatises on these have been written by Vishākhila and others; from the proper study of these treatises comes the knowledge of the arts; unless one knows the arts, it is not possible for him to compose anything *artistic*.

Sūṭra (8)—From the Science of Erotics follows the knowledge of the ways of love.

It is the 'Ways of Love' that form the subject-matter of most poetical compositions.

Sūṭra (9)—From the Science of Politics proceeds the knowledge of proper (expedient) and improper (or inexpedient) conduct.

'Proper or Expedient Conduct' consists in the due employment of the six 'methods' (of Peace and Quarrel, Marching and Halting, Separation and Association); and conduct other than this is 'improper' or 'inexpedient'; unless one knows these he cannot rightly describe the actions of the hero and the counter-hero.

Sūtra (10)—From the Science of Politics again follow the intricacies of the plot.

The 'plot' or 'story' forms the body of Poetry; and it is only when the poet is versed in the Science of Politics that he can weave out an intricate plot, consisting as this does of the more or less powerful and effective employment of the 'methods' of action.

In the manner shown above, the uses of other Sciences may also be pointed out.

Sūtra (11)—The 'Miscellanies' consist of—(*a*) Knowledge of what is to be done; (*b*) Application; (*c*) Attending upon superiors; (6) Deliberation or Circumspection; (3) Imagination; and (*f*) Attention.

Sūtra (12)—'Knowledge of what is to be done' consists in being acquainted with poetical works [of others]; as it is thus alone that one can acquire the power of comprehension.

Sūtra (13)—'Application' consists in engaging oneself in the composing of poetical pieces.

By this means one acquires proficiency in the art of composition.

Sūtra (14)—'Attending on superiors' consists of attendance upon a teacher capable of imparting instruction in the art of poetic composition.

By this means the superior knowledge of the teacher comes over to the pupil.

Sūtra (15)—'Deliberation' consists in the insertion and deletion of words.

On this point we have the following verses:—

'As long as there is uncertainty in the mind, the process of insertion and deletion of words should continue; when,

on this, a word becomes ultimately fixed upon, the composition is complete.'

'When the proper words are so carefully chosen that not one of them can be altered,—then alone we have what the composition-experts have called the *Perfect Composition*'.

Sūṭra (16)—In Imagination lies the very seed of Poetry.

The 'Seed of Poetry' is an ante-natal capacity of the Mind, without which no poetry is possible; or even if possible, it is only ridiculous.

Sūṭra (17)—'Attention' consists of the one-pointedness or fixity of the mind.

It is only when the mind is drawn in, away from all external things, that it can grasp the innermost essence of things.

Sūṭra (18)—This fixity of mind depends upon time and place.

Sūṭra (19)—The *place* must be solitary [away from crowds].

Sūṭra (20)—The *time* is the last or fourth quarter of the night.

It is in a solitary place and at the time of the early dawn that the mind is calm and peaceful, free from all other things.

NOTE.—Among the requisites of Poetry, the Kāvyaprakāsha (Kārikā 3) enumerates the following, remarking that it is all these combined—and not each one independently of the rest—that makes the successful Poet—(1) Poetic Power (Genius), (2) Wide Knowledge born of a careful study of Objects, of Sciences and of Poems, (3) the practice of the teachings of men practised in writing Poetry.

Having described the 'auxilliaries' of Poetry, the Sūṭra proceeds to describe the particular forms of Poetry :—

Sūṭra (21)—Poetry is in *Prose* and in *Verse*.

It is the Prose that is mentioned first: as it is extremely difficult to compose Poetry in *prose*, chiefly on

account of its indefinite and strictly undefinable character; it has been declared that 'Prose constitutes the touchstone of poets.'

Sūtra (22)—Prose is of three kinds—(*a*) *Vṛitta-gandhi*, (*b*) *Chūrṇa* (*c*) *Utkalikāprāya.*

The definition of each of these follows:—

Sūtra (23)—The *Vṛittagandhi* Prose is that which bears parts of verse or metrical composition.

Example—Pātālatālutalavāsiṣu ḍānavēṣu' ["among the Dānavas inhabiting the innermost recesses of the nether world"]; in this phrase we recognise a complete part of a verse in the *Vasantatilaka* metre.

Sūtra (24)—The *Chūrṇa* Prose is that in which the compounds are not very long, and which contains soft and sweet words.

Example—

'*Abhyāso hi karmaṇī kaushalamāvahati. Na hi sakṛinnipātamātrēṇo lābin lur api grāvaṇi nimnatāmadadhāti.*

['Practice lends perfection to actions: even a drop of water falling but once cannot produce any impression on the stone'.]

Sūtra (25)—The *Utkalikāprāya* is the opposite of the *Chūrṇa*.

It contains long compounds and abounds in harsh-sounding words.

Example—

'*Kulishashikharakharanakharapracheyapracha ṇḍach ipēṭ-upāṭitamatt mātaṅgakumbhasthalajalanm ḍachchhatāchchhuritachārukēsarabhārabhāsuramukhē kēsariṇi.*'

['The lion having its face brightened by the beautiful mass of hair on its neck, which is besmeared with the ichor flowing from the temple of infuriated elephants felled by a stroke of the claw, as powerful and terrible with nails as the points of the thunderbolt'.]

NOTE.—The *Sāhityadarpaṇa* (chap. VII, shl. 506), mentions a fourth Prose, called the 'Muktaka' or 'Free Prose' or 'Prose in which each word occurs distinct from another, like so many pearls strung on to a necklace.' This would appear to be that Prose in which there are absolutely no compounds. Vāmana is right in not mentioning this kind; as this form of composition has a more or less theoretical existence only.

Sūtra (26)—The Verse is of many kinds.

There are many kinds of verse, the diversity being based upon the diversity of metres; some of these, called the 'Regular', have all the four feet similar; others called the 'Semi-regular'; have the first and third feet similar, and so also the second and the fourth; while the rest called the 'Irregular', have all the feet dissimilar.

Sūtra (27)—Poetry again is (*a*) Stray or Sporadic and (*b*) Connected or Cumulative.

Sūtra (28)—Of these the latter is possible only after the former has been accomplished; just as the 'crest of flower-garlands' can be made only after the garlands have been prepared.

It is only after one has acquired efficiency in the composing of stray verses that he can write continuous poems of many verses.

The Sūtra proceeds to show that it is not right to restrict oneself to stray verses only, as some people are prone to do.

Sūtra (29)—The Stray Verse never shines,—resembling a single atom of fire.

In this connection we have the following declaration :—

'There is no charm attaching to verses which are not connected ; just as a fire-atom by itself is never brilliant.'

Sūtra (30)—Among 'Connected Poems' again, the ten kinds of Dramatic Poem are superior ;

Sūṭra (31)—as the Dramatic Poem is possessed of varied interests, presenting a combination of many peculiar charms; just like the cloth of variegated colour, which is specially beautiful by reason of the combination of many colours.

Sūṭra (32)—The other forms (of Poetry in Verse) proceed from this (Dramatic Poem).

All forms of Verse are the product of the Dramatic Poem. As for those other kinds of Poetry that are known as the 'Kathā' and the 'Ākhyāyikā' (in Prose) and the 'Mahākāvya' (in Verse), the author has not given definitions of these, as the mere definition of these in detail is not very pleasant; these definitions must be learnt from other works.

NOTE—The *Sāhityadarpaṇa* supplies the definitions herein omitted See Chap VI 'Kaṭha' (Sh. 567), 'Ākhyayika (Sh 568), 'Mahakāvya' (559)

CHAPTER II.

DEFECTS.

Section (1).

DEFECTS OF WORDS.

The form and constituents of Poetry having been described, it becomes necessary to know what are the 'Defects' of poetry, which mar its beauty, in order to be able to avoid them; hence the *Sūṭra* now proceeds to describe the defects—

Sūṭra (1)—Defects are the opposite of Qualities. [described later on, in Chap. III].

Sūṭra (2) -And they are known by implication.

That is, when we know the Qualities, we know, by implication, also the Defects which are only the opposites of Qualities.

"Then, why are they treated of separately?"

Sūṭra (3)—The separate treatment is for the sake of clearness.

The Defects are treated of and described and defined separately, and not left to be inferred by implication; as it is only thus that they can be rightly understood, and avoided.

The Sūṭra proceeds to describe the Defects of Words—

Sūṭra (4)—The defective word is—(*a*) Grammatically Wrong; (*b*) Unmelodious; (*c*) Vulgar; (*d*) Unknown; and (*c*) Meaningless, or Superfluous.

Each of these is severally explained—

Sūṭra (5)—The 'grammatically wrong' is that which is contrary to rules of grammar.

Example—Such words as, '*anyakārakavaiyarṭhyam*'; where the correct form should have been '*anyaṭkārakvaiyarṭh-*

yam', the '*ṭ*' coming in by Pānini's Sūtra—'*aṣasṭhyaṭri-ṭīyāsṭhasyānyasya duyā, &c., &c.*'

Sūtra (6)—The 'unmelodious' word is that which is unpleasant to the ear.

Such a word is not only unpleasant to the ear; it also disturbs the proper flow of the sentence.

Example—

'*Achūchurachchandi kapolayos'ē kāntiḍiavandrāg vishaḍah shashāṅkaḥ.*'

['O angry one! the clear moon has stolen the lustre of your cheeks.']

[Here the words 'achūchurat' and 'ḍrāg' are 'unmelodious'.]

Sūtra (7)—The 'vulgar' word is that which is used by the common people only [and not by the learned or in learned works].

Example—

'*Kaṣṭaṅkatham ruḍiṭi phūṭkriṭēyam*'. ['Oh! how puffingly she cries.']

[Here the word 'phūtkṛitā' is 'vulgar.']

To the same category belong such words as '*ṭalla*' (tank), '*gallo*' (cheek), and the like.

Sūtra (8)—The 'unknown' word is that which is used only in learned (technical) treatises [and not in common usage].

Example—

Kimbhāṣiṭēna bahunā rūpaskanḍhasya santi mē na guṇāḥ.

'*Guṇānanṭarīyakañcha prēmēṭi na mē' sṭyupālambhaḥ*'.

['What is the use of my saying much? I know I am wanting in the excellence of the beauty-aspect of IDEA; and

as love also is the invariable concomitant of that excellence, I do not complain (of that want of love).']

The word 'rūpaskandha' (Beauty-aspect of Idea) is a technicality of the Buddhistic philosophy; and the word '*nānṭarīyaka* (invariably concomitant), is a technicality of the *Nyāya* philosophy;—and neither of these is used in ordinary parlance (in the sense in which they are here used).

Sūṭra (9)—The 'Meaningless or Superfluous' word is that which is added only for the sake of filling up gaps of sentences.

There are many indeclinable particles that are inserted in sentences (specially in verse) simply for the sake of filling up the gaps in the metre; it is not only the indeclinable, but other words also that come under this category; by the maxim of the 'cake and the stick' (by which it is meant that when two things are in the same predicament they are to be treated alike).

Example—

'*Uḍiṭasṭu hāsṭikavinīlamayanṭimirannipīya kiraṇaiḥ saviṭā.*'

[' The Sun has risen, after having drunk up, with his rays, the darkness which was as densely black as the elephant.']

Here the particle 'ṭu' has been added only for the sake of filling up the requisite number of syllables in the metre; and it does not serve the purpose of lending a graceful form to the sentence; a word that does serve to give a graceful form to the sentence cannot be regarded as 'superfluous'; this is the exception that has to be borne in mind. We have an instance of this in the following :—

'*Na khalviha gaṭāgaṭā nayanagocharam mē gaṭā.*'

[' While she was passing this way and that, she did not come within the range of my vision.']

[Here the phrase 'na khalu' lends grace to the sentence.]

NOTE—Our author has very rightly distinguished the defects of the *word*, from the defects of the *meanings of words*, which follow in Sūṭra 10 *et. seq.* The Kavyaprakāsha and the Sahityadarpaṇa have dealt with both kinds together.

The Sūṭra proceeds to describe the Defects of the meaning or denotation of words.

Sūṭra (10)—[The Defective words are also]—(*a*) having a different meaning, (*b*) having a fanciful meaning, (*c*) difficult of comprehension, (*d*) indecorous and (*e*) obscure.

The words—'the Defective Word'—have to be supplied from Sūtra 4; the singular number of the word 'paḍam' of the former Sūṭra being made to undergo the change into the plural in view of the plural number in the present Sūtra; the construction thus being—'the Defective *words are* &c., &c.'

The Sūṭra proceeds to define each of these defects severally.

Sūṭra (11)—A word is said to 'have a different meaning' when it is used in a sense entirely different from its accepted denotation. [The sense intended to be conveyed being that which is deducible only from the etymology of the word].

The ordinary misuse of a word—of the word *ghata* (jar) for the word '*pata*' (cloth) is not what is meant by the Sūṭra; as such usage is too manifestly wrong to be mentioned.

Example—

'*Ṭē duḥkhamuchchāvachamāvahanṭi yē prasmaranti priyasaṅgamānām.*'

Kāv. 20.

['Those people experience great pain who recall to their minds the meeting of dear ones.']

Here the word *āvahanti*', which is used generally in the sense of 'doing,' has been used in the sense of 'carrying' (experiencing), which has to be deduced from the etymology of the word; and secondly the word '*prasmaranti*', which means to 'forget', has been used in the sense of 'remember' or to 'recall to the mind'; which latter meaning can be deduced from the etymology of the word which consists of the prefix '*pra*' (excellent) and *smri*' (to remember).

Sūtra (12)—That word is said to 'have a fanciful meaning' which is used in a sense that is only assumed (and thus can be guessed out with great difficulty).

That is to say, the meaning desired to be conveyed is such as the word is never known to bear.

Example—

'*Sapadi pañktivihaṅgamanāmabtrittanayasamvalitambalashālinā.*

'*Vipulaparvatavarṣishitaiḥ shuraiḥ plavagasainyamulūkajita jitam.*'

['The army of monkeys led by the sons of Dasharatha was defeated by the Conqueror of Indra by means of sharp arrows showering thousands of mountains.']

Here the word '*pañktivihaṅgamanāmabhrittanaya*' can, be made to signify the 'Sons of Dasharatha' in the following manner.

(1) '*Pañkti*' means 'ten', for which another Sanskrit word is *dasha*.

(2) '*Vihaṅgama*' means 'bird', the '*nāma*' or name of a particular bird is '*chakravāka*' which contains the word '*chakra*' which means 'wheel'; the '*bhrit*' or 'bearer' of that

is the *chariot* which is expressed by the word 'raṭha'. Thus then the word '*paṅkṭi*' meaning 'ḍasha' and the rest of the compound 'raṭha', we get the name 'Ḍasharaṭha, whose 'ṭanayas' (sons) are Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa, by whom the army of monkeys was guided.

Then again, the word '*ulūkajiṭā*' can be applied to the 'Conqueror of Indra', Mēghanāḍa in the following, manner:—The word 'Kaushika' denotes the *ulūka* (owl) as well as Inḍra; and thus the words 'Uluka' and 'Inḍra' being regarded as synonymous '*Inḍrajiṭ*' is spoken of as *Ulūkajiṭ*.

It may be objected that if such use of words is defective, we should have to reject the use of such words also as '*raṭhāṅganāman*' (which is applied to the Chakravāka bird by reason of its name containing the word '*chakra*' which is a '*limb*', '*aṅga*', of the Chariot *raṭha*).

The use of such words however is not objectionable, as there are some words which though originally perhaps employed in the required sense only indirectly, have yet come to be so far accepted in common usage that they are regarded as having their remote and indirect indications ('*lakṣaṇā*') well recognised ('*nirūdha*').

Sūṭra (13)—That word is said to be 'difficult of comprehension' which is used in such a meaning as is not generally known.

A word that has more than one signification, only one of which is generally known,—if such a word be used with a signification other than this last one, then it is said to be difficult of comprehension'.

Example—

'*Sahasragorivānīkam dussahambhavaṭaḥ paraiḥ.*'

['Your army is as insufferable by your enemies as the army of Indra'].

Here the word 'Sahasragu' is used to denote Indra; and this meaning can be got at by taking the word '*go*' occurring at the end of the compound in the sense of 'Eye'—Indra having a 'thousand' (*sahasra*) 'Eyes' ('*gāvaḥ*'); and though the word 'go' does signify the Eye also, yet this is not the signification that is generally attached to it in the ordinary usage of poets.

Sūṭra (14)—The 'indecorous' word is that—(a) which has, among other significations, one that is coarse or vulgar; and (b) which brings to the mind something indecent.

(a) If often happens that though the word is used in a harmless sense, yet it has other significations which are vulgar; the use of such a word is regarded as 'indecorous'; E. g. the word '*varchas*' signifies *glory* or *effulgence*, and also the *human excreta*.

(b) There are words which, though in their form quite harmless, are found, when taken by parts, to be indicative of something indecent; E. g. the word '*Kṛkātikā*.'

Sūṭra (15)—(a) The *concealed* or (b) the *indicated* or (c) the *entirely shrouded*,—are not regarded as 'indecorous.'

Sūṭra (16)—That word is 'concealed' whose vulgar signification is not generally known.

E. g. the word '*Sambādha*'; the only signification of this word that is generally known is that referring to 'difficulty' or 'obstacle'; while that referring to the bodily organ is not generally know.

Sūṭra (17)—The *indicated* word is that which has its indirect (vulgar) signification only remotely indicated.

E.g., the word '*Janmabhūmi*' which signifies the *land of birth*, and thereby only very *remotely indicates* the organ of generation ; such words cannot be regarded as 'indecorous.'

Sūtra (18)—The 'shrouded' word is that whose vulgar signification is entirely veiled by the ordinary usage of men.

E. g., Such words as 'subhagā' [which literally means 'One whose...is excellent' has become accepted in usage as signifying 'beautiful'];—'*bhaginī*' [lit. 'one who has......" but accepted as meaning 'sister'];—'*Upasthāna*' [means......, but is generally accepted as signifying 'worship']; —'*Abhipreta* [signifies some connection with ghosts, but is used in the sense of 'desired' or 'intended'];—'*Kumārī*' [lit. 'one whose sexual instincts are low', is used in the sense of 'Virgin']·—'*Dohada*' [originally meaning 'desires of a pregnant woman', but generally used in the sense of 'Desire']. In this connection we have the following verse—

'It is not proper to hunt out the improper signification of words that are accepted in ordinary usage with such significations entirely shrouded from view ; for instance, what man can have any notion of vulgarity or impropriety with regard to the word *Shivalinga*?'

Sūtra (19)—The 'Indecorous' is of three kinds as giving rise to—(*a*) shame, (*b*) disgust, or (*c*) forebodings of evil.

Some words by their indecorous significations produce shame; *e. g.*, '*vālchūtava*' '*hiranyaretāḥ*' [where the last word of the compound has a vulgar meaning] and so forth ; some produce disgust, *e. g.*, '*kapardakaḥ*' [the last word having a vulgar signification] ; while others bring to the superstitions mind forebodings of evil ; *e. g.*, '*samsthitaḥ*' [which means *established*, and also *dead*].

Kāv. 24.

Sūtra (20)—The 'Obscure' word is that whose signification is got at only remotely, or in an indirect round-about manner.

That is to say, that word which is used in a sense that does not proceed from it directly, but is only connected with it (and hence indicated by it) in a very remote or indirect manner.

Example—

'*Dakṣātmajādayitavallabhavēdikānām.*

'*Jyotsnājuṣāñjalalavāstaralam patanti.*'

['Drops of water are falling upon platforms of silver shining in moon-light'.

The fact that the first line signifies the 'silver platform' can be known only in a very round-about manner :—(1) '*Dakṣātmajā*' = 'daughters of Dakṣa' = 'stars'; (2) the '*dayita*' or 'beloved' of the stars is the Moon; (3) 'vallabha' (=*beloved*) is synonymous with '*kānta*'; and the compound thus comes to indicate the word '*Chandrakānta*', which is one of the many names of *silver*.

Sūtra (21)—Such words also are called 'obscure' as are used in a sense not their own by usage.

As the meaning of such words cannot be easily comprehended.

Example—

'*Kāñchīguṇasthānamaninditāyāḥ.*'

['The *waist* of the irreproachable one.']

That the word '*Kāñchīguṇaasthānam*,' which is literally means *the place of the girdle-zone*, means 'waist' cannot be found out easily.

Sūtra (22)—The last two defects (Indecorous and Obscure) pertain to sentences also.

Example—(a) of the Indecorous Sentence.—

(1) *'Na sā-dhanonnaṭiryā syāṭ kalaṭrasukhaḍāyinī* [*'sā-ḍhana'* is the male organ of generation.]

(2) *'Parārṭhabaḍḍhakakṣāṇām yaṭsoṭyam pēlavanḍha-nam'* [*'Pēlava'* has a very vulgar implication.]

(3) *' Sopānapaṭhamuṭsrijya vāyuvēgasamuḍḍhaṭam.*

'Mahāpaṭhēna gaṭavān kīrṭyamānaguṇo janaiḥ [*'Apāna-paṭha'* is the *anus*, and *'mahāpaṭha'* is the *path of death*.]

(b) The Obscure Sentence.—

'Dhammillasya na prēkṣya nikāmaṅkuraṇgashāvākṣyāḥ.

'Rajyaṭyapūrvabanḍhavyuṭpaṭṭērmānasam shobhām.'

[On seeing the beautifully knotted hair of the fawn-eyed one, whose mind is not filled with love?']

[Here the syntactical connection between *'ḍhammillasya'* and *'shobhām'* is too remote to be easily grasped.]

The above defects have been enumerated and explained with the purpose that the poet should avoid them in his composition.

Section (2).

THE DEFECTS OF SENTENCE.

Sūṭra (1)—(Faulty) Sentences are—(*a*) Deficient in metre; (*b*) with Misplaced hiatus; and (*c*) Cacophonous (of Unharmonious-Euphony).

Sūṭra (2)—That which does not fulfil the conditions of the particular metre is 'Deficient in metre.'

Example—

Ayi pashyasi sauḍhamāshriṭām

Aviralasumanomālābhāriṇīm.

['Do you see the woman on the house-top, adorned with a garland of thickly-studded flowers'.]

Here the intended metre is the *Vaiṭālīya*, in the second foot of which there should not be a collocation of six short letters, as we have here. Hence this is 'Deficient in metre.'

Sūṭra (3)—That in which the hiatus is so misplaced as to make the sentence awkward, unmelodious and unpleasant, is said to be 'with misplaced hiatus.'

Sūṭra (4)—E. g., there is misplacement of the hiatus when a verb root or a noun is broken up or disjoined (by the hiatus occurring in the middle of the word); but mostly in such cases alone where this disjunction or disruption is not due to the collusion of vowel-sounds.

Example—

(*a*) *Caused by the disjunction of the Verb-root*—as in the following line of the Manḍākrānṭā metre—

'*Ēṭāsām rājaṭi sumanasāmḍāma kaṇṭhāvalambi.*

['The garland of flowers hanging by the neck of these women looks beautiful.']

[Here in the proper intonation of the line, in pronouncing the verb 'rājaṭi', we have to put the hiatus on 'rā',—as by the laws of Prosody, the Manḍākrānṭā metre must have its hiatus on the fourth syllable of the foot; and this leads to the breaking up of the verb-root '*rāja*' in *rājaṭi*.']

(*b*) *Breaking up of the noun*—as in the following foot of the *Shikariṇī*—

'*Kuraṅgākṣīṇāṅgaṇḍaṭalaphalakē svēḍavisaraḥ.*'

['Perspiration is break-up over the cheeks of the fawn-eyed women.']

By the laws of Prosody, the Shikharinī must have its hiatus on the sixth syllable; this syllable in the present case happens to be '*ga*', and the placing of the hiatus on this leads to the breaking up of the noun 'Ganda'.

A similar disjunction of the noun is found in the following foot the 'Mandākrāntā'—'*Durdarshashchakrashikhika pishah sharngino bāhudandah*,——where the hiatused fourth-syllable is the 'cha' of 'chakra.'

Inasmuch as the Sūtra specially mentions the 'verb-root' and 'noun', it follows that the breaking up of other words is not regarded as objectionable. *E.g.*, in the following *Mandākrāntā*'—

'*Shobhām pusyatyayamabhinavah sundarīnām prabodhah.*'

['This fresh awakening of beautiful damsels enhances the charm.']

[Here the hiatus on the fourth syllable '*sya*' disjoins only the conjugational affix 'ti', and leaves the root intact.]

Similarly in the *Shikarinī* foot—

'*Vinidrah shyāmāntesvadharaputasītkāravirutaih.*'

['At the close of night the spell of sleep is broken by the sound emitted from the lips.']

[Here the hiatus is on the sixth syllable '*ntē*'; and this leaves the noun 'anta' intact, separating it only from the locative ending '*su*' which follows.]

Inasmuch as the Sūtra adds the qualification—'where the disjunction is not due to the collusion of vowel-sounds'—it follows that disjunctions caused by the collusion of vowel-sounds are not objectionable. *E. g.*,

'*Kiñchidbhāvālasamasaralam prēksitam sundarīnām.*'

['The glances of beautiful women is extremely sweet by reason of the lingering langour of emotion.']

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

I. *A Short History of Indian Literature.* By E. Honartz, with an Introduction by Pro. T. W. Rhys Davids. (T. Fisher Unwin, London. *s.*2/6*d.* nett.)

The Introduction points out the 'unique importance and value, for the historian and the philosopher, of Indian Literature,' and then goes on to show the place that the book should occupy in the ranks of books dealing with this important subject; and what is claimed is that it adequately provides for the needs of the 'average general reader.' The book is written in simple language, and deals with the vast range of subjects with a studied regard to the needs of such a reader. There are no learned discussions it is true; but no salient feature is omitted that could appeal to the 'popular taste.'

The first three chapters deal with the Aryan Migration; wherein some account is given of the mode of living of those ancient people; a parallel is also drawn between the ancient Aryans who migrated into the Punjab and the Homeric Greeks; at least so far as can be gleaned from the Homeric poems and the Vedas,—these latter being described as 'a miscellany of psalms, hymns and prayers', having for the 'historical back-ground' 'the Dasyu War in the Panjab.'

Chapters IV, V and VI deal with the Mahābhārața and the Rāmāyaṇa; and in a foot note (on p. 11) we are told that 'none of the epical or legal literature of the Hindus was composed before Buddha,'—a statement which is open to question. In face of this statement too, we fail to understand why the account of the 'Brāhmanas and Upanishads' and that of 'Sutra Literature' come after the sections on the Epics. Most of the 'Sutras' are certainly anterior to the time usually assigned to Buddha Shauḍḍhoḍani.

Then follow Chapters on Vedanta (where a parallel is drawn between this and the philosophy of Christianity, the doctrine of Maya being regarded as coming 'very near the

Christian conception of original sin);—Buddhism,—Institutes of Manu (a distinction being drawn between the 'original texts' and the 'revised version');—Later Phases of Buddhism,—the Huns and the Rise of Ujjain;—Puranas and Tantras;—Hindu Legends and Festivals;—More poetry. The book closes with a few general observations on 'Languages and Nations'; an useful Index, and a list of dates of important events in the West woven into those of certain striking facts pertaining to Indian Literature.

II.—The *Devanāgara*—the monthly organ of the Ekalipivistāraparisad, 83 Grey Street, Calcutta—(Annual subscription, Rs. 3-8).

A journal calculated to popularise the idea of 'Ekalipi'—the adoption of one script throughout India. It contains well-written and well-chosen articles by well-known writers. The three numbers to hand contain articles in the *Hindi, Bengali, Marathi, Urdu, Canarese, Nepali, Tamil, Telugu, Panjabi, Uriya, Gujrati, and Malayalam* languages. One contribution that is of special interest, and which is likely to prove of permanent interest, is the Hindi-Marathi Dictionary. The cover has been artistically designed: the title page represents the alphabets of all the Indian scripts as drawing their life waters from the Devanagara, which has its source directly in the feet of Mother Sarasvati; on the back we have an instructive Language-map of India, shewing how about nearly three-fourths of the Indian Vernaculars are closely related to one another.

III. *A Vedic Concordance*: Being an alphabetic index to every line of every stanza of the published Vedic literature, and to the liturgical formulas thereof; that is, an index to the Vedic Mantras, together with an account of their variations in the different Vedic books. (*Harvard Oriental Series*, Vol. X. Published by Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America, $6·60) by Maurice Bloomfield, Professor of Sanskrit and Comparative Philology in the John Hopkins University, Baltimore,

This valuable work is to hand. The great value of the book to all students of Sanskrit Literature will be apparent when we mention that, it will enable the student to trace (and verify) many of those quotations that he meets with in course of his studies. It is not seldom that the whole argument turns upon a single word or expression in a passage quoted as 'shruti.' And in many such places, the reader feels embarrassed as to whether or not he has the right words of the original. The vast extent of the field of literature dealt with here practically exhausts the list of works out of which quotations are generally made; they are—(1) Veda-Samhitas, (2) Brāhmaṇas, (3) Āraṇyakas, (4) Upaniṣads, (5) Shrauta-Sutras, (6) Gṛihya-Sutras, (7) Dharma-Sutras and Smṛitis, (8) Viḍhāna Texts, (9) Nirukta, Brihaddevata, Daivata Brāhmaṇa and Nakṣatra Kalpa, (10) Mahābhārata, Bhagavaḍgitā, Suparṇakhyāna and Mahābhāṣya.

IV. *The Sacred Books of the Hindus.*—We congratulate the enterprising publishers of this series, on having planned and carried into execution a series that promises to be a continuation of the *Sacred Books of the East.* Its scope is restricted to Hindu literature; but the addition of the original Sanskrit adds special value to the translation. The first two numbers to hand contain translations of a few of the Upaniṣads—along with the Commentary of Madhva Āchārya. Hitherto the entire field of Upaniṣad scholarship has been monopolised by the Advaita Philosophy of Shankarāchārya, which has come to be identified with what has been called the Philosophy of the Upaniṣads. It will be interesting to see what effect on philosophically-interested minds is produced by the translations of a Commentary on the Upaniṣads which is much more 'heterodox' from the Advaita point of view than even the tenets of Ramanuja. It has to be confessed however that some of Madhva's interpretations are more fanciful than those of Shankara. As for instance, in the Chhāndogya Upaniṣad, II—20.1, 'agni' of the text is interpreted as 'Praḍyumna' and so forth. This is reading one's own ideas into old texts, with a vengeance.

V. Gāyatṛi—by P. T. Srinivas Iyengar [Higgin-botham & Co., Madras ; Price, 4 annas.]

The interesting brochure represents the first attempt at a historical study of the 'Gāyatṛi,' the most ancient religious formula of the Hindus, and one that has continued to exercise immense influence over Hinduism in all its phases. The gifted writer has brought to bear upon the subject that keen intelligence and acute thinking power of which he has given ample proof in his 'Out-lines of Indian Philosophy', a book that deserves a longer notice than we can give on the present occasion.

On pp. 4—9 ' the four distinct applications ' of the mantra are explained, and a brief account of *Dīkṣā*, chiefly histori-cal is given ; and on p. 16 we have an interesting explana-tion of ' the correspondence of the macrocosm and the mi-crocosm ' which forms, according to the writer, ' the basis of all Vedic meditations.'

The pamphlet should be welcomed by all students of religion and comparative mythology ; though the orthodox Hindu will feel shocked at the way in which his most sacred possession is, not only revealed to the public eye, but severe-ly analysed.

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CONTENTS.

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[Here the hiatus placed on the fourth syllable 'vā' separates the '*a*' of the rest of the following noun '*alasa*'; but as this is due to the collusion of the vowel 'a' at the end of '*bhāva*' and the vowel '*a*' at the beginning of '*alasa*' —the disruption of the noun '*alasa*' is not regarded as objec tionable.]

Sūtra (5)—Some people hold that the 'misplacement of the hiatus' is nothing apart from the 'Deficiency in the metre'; as 'metre' consists of hiatuses.

Metre consists only in the arrangement of hiatuses; and hence the 'misplaced hiatus' is included in the 'Deficient metre.'

Sūtra (6)—This however is not right; as the distinctive features of the two are totally different.

The characteristics of 'metre' are entirely different from those of 'hiatus', the 'metre' consisting in the arrangement of long and short syllables, while the 'hiatus' consists in the resting of the voice on a certain syllable.

Sūtra (7)—The 'cacophonous' is that where the collusion of words is unmelodious or unharmonious.

The Collusion by words is of two kinds—(1) the collusion of vowel-sounds and (2) mere juxtaposition, the drawing together, of words, without actual Collusion. This is objectionable when it gives rise to an unharmonious euphony.

Sūtra (8)—The 'Unharmonious Euphony' is of three kinds—(1) Disjoined, (2) Indecorous, and (3) Discordant.

Kāv. 29.

(a) *Virēchakamiḍam vṛiṭṭam āchāryābhāsayojiṭam.'*

[This dancing is extremely disgusting, having been propounded by an inferior dancing master.']

[Here the word 'vi-rēchaka' and '*yābha*' meaning as they do 'purgative' and 'pairing' respectively are indecorous.]

(b) *Chakāsē panasaprāyaiḥ puri ṣhandhamahāḍrumaiḥ'*

['The city shone with eunuchs who resembled so many jack fruit trees.'

[Here by a collusion of sounds we have the word '*purīṣa*' 'excreta', which is 'indecorous.']

(c) *Vinā shapaṭhaḍānābhyām paḍavāḍasamuṭsukam.'*

[The collusion of words gives the words '*vināsha*' 'destruction', which is inauspicious and indecent.]

(3) Example of the 'Discordant Collusion'—

Mañjaryuḍgamagarbhāsṭē gurvābhogā ḍrumā vabhuḥ.'

['The trees looked beautiful with large trunks and budding blossoms.']

[The syllables 'ryu'—formed by the collusion of 'ṛi' and 'u',—and '*rvā*'—formed by the collusion of 'ru' and 'ā'—are very discordant and unpleasant to the ear.]

Having described the Defects of Sentence, the Sūṭra proceeds to describe those of the Meanings of Sentences—

Sūṭra (9)—(a)'Incompatible' or 'Contradictory', (b) 'Redundant', (c) 'Dubious'; (d) 'Regardless of Usage'; (e) 'Irregular' or Unsymmetric'; (f) 'Opposed to Ordinary Conceptions'; and (g) 'Opposed to Scientific Conceptions',—[such sentences are 'faulty'].

Sūṭra (10)—That in which one word contradicts that which follows, or *vice versa*, is called the 'Incompatible' or 'Contradictory.'

Kāv. 31.

Example—

Aḍyāpi smaraṭi rasālasam mano mē.
mugḍhāyāḥ smarachaṭurāṇi cheṣtiṭāni.'

['My unctuous mind still recalls the amorous sportings of the little guileless and unreserved girl.']

It is impossible for the sportings of an innocent little girl to be 'amorous.' What is 'amorous' cannot belong to the 'little girl', and what pertains to the 'little girl' cannot be 'amorous.' Thus there is an 'incompatibility' between the two words '*smarachesṭiṭāni*' (amorous sportings) and '*mugḍhā*' (the ingenuous or candid girl).

Sūṭra (11)—When a word expresses what has already been expressed by another word, it is 'Redundant.'

Example—

' *Chinṭāmohamanaṅgamaṅga ṭanuṭē viprēkṣiṭam subhruvaḥ.'*

[' O Friend, the glances of the charming-eyed girl produces in my mind thoughts of love giving rise to anxiety and stupefaction.']

It being a well-known fact that 'anxiety' caused by love is always in the form of 'stupefaction',—the mention of both 'chinṭā' and 'moha' becomes superfluous ; and containing such superfluous words, the sentence itself is said to be 'redundant.'

Sūṭra (12)—This redundancy is not a defect, when the additional word has an additional signification.

In case the word, supposed to be 'redundant', helps to signify something over and above that signified by the former word, it cannot be regarded as 'redundant.'

Sūṭra (13)—[As for example] In the word '*ḍhanurjyāḍhvaniḥ*' (the twanging of the bow-

string of the bow) the addition of the word 'ḍhanuḥ', 'bow' [even though the word 'jyā', itself means the *bowstring*] serves to afford the idea of the string being strung on tightly to the bow.

If the word 'ḍhanuḥ' were omitted, there would be nothing to show that the sound proceeded from the string as *strung on to the bow.* We find the use of such words common, *e.g.*—

'*Ḍhanurjyākiṇachihnēna doṣṇā vīsphuriṭanṭava.*'

Sūṭra (14)—Similarly in the case of the words—'*karṇāv aṭamsa*', '*shravaṇakuṇḍala*', '*shiraḥshēkhara,*' and the like, the mention of the words 'karṇa' and the rest denotes proximity.

The word '*avaṭamsa*' by itself signifies 'ornament of the ear'; similarly '*kuṇḍala*' means the 'ear-ring', and *shēkhara*' the 'head-ornament'; and thus the idea of 'ear' and 'head' is already present in the denotation of the words 'avaṭamsa' and 'shēkhara'; but in the absence of the words 'karṇa' and 'shiras', there would be nothing to denote the fact that what is meant is the 'ornament' as *worn in the ear or on the head.*

Examples—

Ḍolāvilāsēṣu vilāsinīnām karṇāvaṭamsāḥ kalayanṭi kampam.

['During the joyous swingings of sportive girls, the ear-ornaments in the ear remain quivering.']

'*Līlāchalachchhravaṇakuṇḍalamūpaṭanṭi.*'

['They fall upon the gracefully-shaking earrings.'

Āyayurbhṛṅgamukharashiraḥshēkharashālinaḥ.'

['There came people wearing crest-ornaments humming with bees.']

Sūtra (15)—In the case of the word 'muktāhāra,' the word '*muktā*' serves to signify purity or unmixed character (of the pearls in the necklace).

The word '*hāra*' itself denotes the necklace containing pearls ; but without the addition of the word '*muktā*' there would be nothing to show that the necklace contained *only* pearls, and *no other* gems.

Example—

Prāṇēshvaraparisvaṅgavibhramapratipattibhiḥ.

Muktārhārēṇa lasatā hasatīva stanadvayam.'

['The breasts adorned with the pearl-necklace appear as if they were smiling at the joyous experience of the charms of the lover's embrace.']

Sūtra (16)—In the word 'puṣpamālā', 'flower-garland', the word 'flower' serves to denote the *excellence* of the flowers contained in the garland.

The word '*puṣpamalā*' means 'the garland of *excellent* flowers.'

Example—

Prāyashaḥ puṣpamālēva kanyā sā kanna lobhayēt.

['Whom would not the girl, resembling as she does the garland of excellent flowers, inspire with a longing to possess her.']

It may be urged that the word 'mālā' does not necessarily signify the *flower* ; inasmuch as the word is used in connection with *gems* also,—such expressions as '*ratnamālā*', '*shabdamālā*' and the like being very common. But the fact is that in all such expressions the word 'mālā' is used only figuratively ; as in reality the word 'mālā' by itself, without any appendage, is found to denote only the 'garland of *flowers*.'

Sūṭra (17)—In *'karikalabha'* the addition of the word *'kari'* serves to denote Similarity to the 'Karin' (grown-up elephant).

The word 'kalabha' denoting the *Elephant Cub*, the addition of the word *'Kari'*, 'Elephant,' would appear to be superfluous. But this addition serves to express the idea that the 'Cub' resembles in strength, &c., the 'kari' or grown-up elephant.

Example—

'Ṭyaja karikalabha tvam prīṭibanḍhaṅkariṇyāḥ.'

['O powerful young elephant cub, renounce the love-entanglings of the mighty she-elephant.']

Sūṭra (18)—Words are also added for the purpose of the adding of qualifications.

E. g. ' Jagāḍa maḍhurām vācham vishaḍākṣarashālinīm.'

['He spoke sweet words containing clear-sounding letters;]—the 'word' *jagāḍa'* itself contains the idea of the 'word' (as it is only words that are spoken); and yet the word vācham 'word'is added for the purpose of the addition of the qualifying epithets *' maḍhurām'* and *'vishaḍākṣarashālinīm.'*

Sūṭra (19)—All these exceptions however apply only to such words and expressions as are already in accepted usage.

And their justification cannot be extended to newly coined words and expressions ; *e. g.*, the Analogy of 'shravaṇakuṇdala' cannot be extended to 'jaghanakañchī'; nor that of 'karikalabha' to 'uṣtrakalabha.'

On this point we have the following verse—

'In such words as *karṇavaṭamsa* and the like, the use of the words *karṇa* and the rest serve the purpose of denoting *proximity* and such other conceptions; but this justification

can apply only to such words and expressions as are already in accepted usage.' *

Sūtra (20)—The 'Dubious' is that which creates doubt in the mind.

That sentence, in which,—either through the mention of common properties or through the non-mention of distinctive characters—doubts arise, is called the 'Dubious'. As for example in the line—

'*Sa mahātmābhāgyavashānmahāpadamupāgataḥ.*'—it is *doubtful* whether it means that the high-minded person 'fell into trouble' (*āpadamupāgataḥ,*) 'through ill-luck (*abhāgyavāshāt*'), or that he 'reached a high position' (*mahāpadam upāgataḥ*) 'through good luck' (*bhāgyavashāt*); such doubts are especially liable to arise when for the comprehension of the real meaning, we have no such aids as those of context and the like.

Sūtra (21)—The 'regardless of usage' is that sentence, the signification attached to which is purely imaginary or illusory.

Examples of this are rare.

Sūtra (22)—The 'unsymmetric' is that in which the idea expressed is not in the proper order.

There is always a definite order and relationship in the 'subjects' and 'predicates' of sentences; the sentence in which this order is not observed is called 'unsymmetric.' As for example, in the line—

('*Kīrtipratāpau bhavataḥ sūryāchandramasoḥ samau*')

'Thy fame and glory are like the sun and the moon';,—the 'fame' is intended to resemble the 'moon' and the 'glory'

*This verse occurs as Kārikā 58 of chapter VII of the Kāvyaprakāsha. This would show that the Kārikās of the Kāvyaprakāsha are not by the author of the Kāvyaprakāsha; but by an older writer As one of these Karikās is found here quoted by Vamana who is older than Mammata. Thus this quotation here lends support to the idea that the *Kārikās* of the *Kāvyaprakāsha* are by Bharata.

the 'sun'; and with this view the 'moon' (*chandra*) should have preceded the 'sun' (*sūrya*) in the compound.

The 'Krama' (order or symmetry) may also be regarded as consisting in the prior mention of the more important factors; and the absence of this would, in that case, constitute the 'unsymmetric.' As for example, in the line—

'*Turaṅgamaṭha māṭaṅgam prayachahhāsmai madālasam.*

['Give him a horse or a gigantic elephant rolling in intoxication'];—[the natural 'order' should have been—'give him a gigantic *elephant*, or (if not that, then,) a *horse*].

Sūṭra (23)—That is 'opposed to ordinary conceptions' which expresses ideas contrary to (incompatible with) place, time and nature.

It is through the incompatibility of the idea expressed by the sentence that the latter is regarded as 'incompatible.'

Example of 'incompatibility with place'—

'In the country of the Sauvīra, there is the well-known town of Maṭhurā, the lands in the vicinity whereof are teeming with walnut and coco-nut trees.'

[Mathurā is not situated in the Sauvira district; nor does the walnut or the coco-nut grow in lands adjacent to Maṭhurā.]

Example of 'incompatibility with time'—

'During the Spring, the forest shone with Kaḍamba flowers.'

[The Kaḍamba blooms during the rains, and not during Spring.]

Example of 'incompatibility with nature'—

'The beauty of the Sharaṭ (Autumn) is floating as it were in the blossoms of the Sapṭachchhaḍa plant among which the intoxicated bees are humming.'

Kāv. 37.

The flowers of the Saptachchhada appear in *bunches*, and not in the form of 'blossoms.'

Again in the verse—

'The flower-bud was pressed by the bee in such a manner that it rained honey enough to fill a hole as large as the hoof of the cow.'

There is no flower-bud in existence which can ever produce such a large quantity of honey.

Sūtra 24—That is 'Opposed to Scientific Conceptions' which expresses such ideas as are incompatible with the established principles of Arts and Sciences.

Example of ideas opposed to the principles of Arts :—

'O friend this is a *Kālinga* letter having its corner not turned down.'

According to the laws of the letter-writing art, in all 'Kālinga' letters, the corners have to be turned down ; while the above line represents it as not having the corner turned down. Similarly with the contradiction of the laws of other Arts.

Examples of the Contradiction and the principles of other Sciences—

'For Kings, the conquest of the world follows from the fulfilment of their sexual desires.'

The law of all scriptures is that the successful conquest of the world is possible only if the King is virtuous and performs sacrifices ; it is this law of Righteousness that the line contradicts.

Again—

'Enemies are conquered by means of pride,—what then is the need of policy ?'

Kāv. 38.

It is a law of the science of Politics that it is by policy that enemies are conquered ; and the line is a direct contradiction of this.

Again—

'I remember the face languid through embraces, the upper lip sanctified with the mark of teeth.'

This contradicts the law of the science of Erotics, whereby kissing marks may appear anywhere in the body except in the upper lip, the inside of the mouth and the eyes.

Lastly—

'Deliverance proceeds, not from true knowledge, but from devotion to God.'

This is contrary to the Science of Deliverance whereby it is to be gained by knowledge alone. *

The defects described above have to be known for the purpose of avoiding them. As for the other subtle defects of words or word-meanings, we shall describe them in course of our explanation of the 'Qualities' ; and the Defects of Similarity also will be treated of in the Section on 'Simile.'

* The line however is quite in keeping with the principles of the *Bhakti Shāstra* propounded by Shāṇḍilya.

CHAPTER III.

QUALITIES.

Section (1).

(*a*) *Difference between 'Quality, and 'Ornament, or Figure*

(*b*) *Verbal Qualities (of Style)*

'Defect' principally consists in the absence of 'Qualities'; hence the Sūṭra proceeds to describe the Qualities of Style. In this connection it has to be noted that 'Florridity,' 'Lucidity &c., have been called 'Qualities' and 'Alliteration, 'Simile' and the rest are called 'Ornaments or Figures of Speech'; and it is necessary at the outset to explain the basis of this differentiation of Qualities and Ornaments.

Sūṭra (1)—'Qualities' are those characteristics that create or constitute the charm of poetry.

Those characters of Words and Ideas that constitute the Charm of Poetry are called 'Qualities'; such are the characters of 'Florridity,' 'Lucidity' and the like. This cannot be said of 'Alliteration,' 'Simile' and the rest; as by themselves alone, these do not bring about the charm to poetry; as is done by Florridity' and the rest.

Sūṭra (2)—The Ornaments on the other hand are such characters as serve to enhance the charm (already produced by the Qualities).

Such are 'Alliteration, 'Simile' and other Figures of Speech.

On this point we have the following verses—

'Just as a young woman endowed with beauty looks charming, and the wearing of ornaments enhances this natural charm,—so in the case of Poetry also if it is endowed with pure qualities, it acquires a peculiar charm; and the presence of the Ornaments or Figures of Speech serves to enhance this charm.'

'On the other hand, if the woman happens to be devoid of youth (and beauty) the addition of ornaments, even though excellent in themselves, only serves to accentuate the ugliness; so in the case of Poetry also, if the words are devoid of the qualities of style, the presence of Figures of Speech becomes a source of inelegance only.'

Sūṭra (3)—The former (*i.e.* the Qualities) are permanent.

The Qualities form permanent features in Poetry ; as without them there is no charm (and without charm there is no Poetry).

[The Figures of Speech on the other hand are evanescent, being mere accidental embellishments.]

Having explained the difference between Qualities and Ornaments, the Sūtra proceeds to describe the Verbal Qualities.

Sūṭra (4)—The Qualities of Style are—(*a*) Florridity (Ojas), (*b*) Plainness or Simplicity (Prasāḍa), (*c*) Coalescence (of Words) (Shleṣa), (*d*) Uniformity (of Diction) (Samaṭā), (*e*) Symmetry (Samāḍhi), (*f*) Sweetness (Māḍhurya), (*g*) Softness (Saukumārya), (*h*) Raciness (Uḍāraṭā), (*i*) Explicitness or Lucidity (Arṭhavyakṭi), (*j*) Brilliancy (Kānṭi).

By 'Style' is meant the composition of words.

Sūṭra (5)—(*a*) 'Florridity' consists in ornateness (high-sounding words and sentences).

Example—'*Viluliṭamakaranḍāmañjarīrnarṭayanṭi*'—['They are shaking the blossoms bespattered with pollen.']

This would lose its 'florridity' if we read it as—*Viluliṭamaḍhuḍhārā mañjarīrlolayanṭi*'.

NOTE—The Kāvyaprakāsha enumerates the high-sounding letters as follows—'*kk, kkh, kr, khr, rk, rkh.*

gg, gh, gr, ghr, rg, rgh.

chch, chchh, chr, chhr,—jj, jjh, jr, jhr, rch, rchh, rj. rjh,

tt, tth, tr, thr,—dd, ddh, dr, dhr, rt, rth, rd, rdh,

ṭṭ, ṭṭh, ṭr, ṭhr,—ḍḍ, ḍḍh, ḍr, ḍhr, rṭ, rṭh, rḍ, rḍh,

pp, pph, pr, phr,—bb, bbh, br, bhr, rp, rph, rb, rbh.

ṭ, ṭh, ḍ, ḍh, ṇ ;—ś, sh.

Long Compounds.

Bombastic style in general.'—Kārikā VIII, 75.

Thus we find that while the line cited in example contains the letters *ka* and *rṭ* these are absent in the amended form.

Sūtra 6.—'Simplicity' consists in lucidity or plainness.

It might be objected that 'Simplicity' is only absence of florridity; and as such being the negation of a 'Quality', it should be regarded as a 'Defect'; why then, should it be mentioned among 'Qualities'?

In answer to this we have the next *Sūtra*.

Sutra (7)—'Simplicity' is a *Quality*, when appearing along with 'Florridity';

Sūtra (8)—and not by itself alone.

When it appears alone by itself, it becomes a *Defect.*

Question—'How can there be a combination of two such contradictory characters as *Florridity* and *Simplicity* ?

Answer—

Sūtra (9)—That there is such combination is a fact of common experience.

Such a combination is often met with ; and it resembles the combination of various tunes of diverse kinds.

On this point we have the following verse——

'Just as in the case of all pathetic exhibitions (dramatic performances) there appears mixture of pain and pleasure as we find in ordinary experience,—so in the same manner, we find in experience the mixture of *Florridity* and *Simplicity*.

Kāv. 42.

Sūtra (10)—[In some cases of such combination] there is equality between the two; and [in others] superiority (of one over the other).

We find the two *equal* in the lines—

Atha sa viṣayavyāvṛittatmā yathāvidhi sūnavē—[*Simplicity*].

Nṛpatikakudandattvā yunē sitatapavāraṇam—[*Florridity*].

'The old king having his mind turned away from the objects of enjoyment, he duly made over to his young son the white umbrella.'

In some cases we have Florridity supervening over Simplicity; *e.g.*

'*Vrajati gaganam bhallātakyāḥ phalēna sahopamām.*

'The sky bears resemblance to the fruit of the Bhallātaka.'

[Here we have Florridity down to the word '*bhallātakyāḥ*,' simplicity appearing only in the last two words.]

In some cases again Simplicity supervenes over Florridity; *e.g.*

'*Kusumashayanam na pratyagranna chandramarīchyaḥ nacha malayajam sarvāngīṇam na vā maṇiyaṣtayaḥ*; 'neither the bedding of fresh flowers, nor the rays of the moon nor sandal-wood painting over the body, nor jewelled sticks &c., &c.'

[Here we have only the letters *pra* and *gra* (in *pratyagra* *dr* (in '*chandra*'), the whole word '*sarvāngīṇam*' and the letter '*ṣt*' (in '*maṇiyaṣtayaḥ*') savouring of the 'Florrid'; the rest is all 'simple'.]

NOTES.—The *Kāvyapaksha* defines 'Simplicity' thus—
Lucidity or Simplicity is that Quality by virtue of which the whole idea intended to be expressed is grasped at the first hearing of the words? (VIII—76).

Sūtra (11)—(c) 'Coalescence' consists of smoothness.

By 'smoothness' is meant that quality whereby a number of words coalescing sound as one word. As for example, in the line—

Astyuttarasyāndishi dēvatātmā himālayo nāma nāgādhirajaḥ'.

'Towards the north, there lies the King of Mountains, Himālaya, the abode of the gods',—

['*Astyuttarasyām* appears as one word, though consisting of the two words '*asti*' and '*uttarasyām*'.]

Such 'coalescence' is not found in the line—

(1) '*Sūtram brāhmanmurahsthale*';
or in—(2) '*Bhramarivalgugītyaḥ*'
or in—(3) '*Taditkalitamākāsham*'.

Though we would have 'coalescence' if they were amended respectively as follows—

(1) '*Brāhmam sūtramuraḥ sthalē*' ('*Sūtramurahsthale*' appearing as one word).

(2) '*Brahmarīmanjuugitayah*' and (3) '*Tadijjatilamākāsham*'.

NOTES—The *Kāyaprakāsha* (pp 535-36) does not accept 'Coalescence' as an independent 'quality', it holds it to be only a particular form of 'Floridity' (Vritti on kārika 72).

Sūtra (12)—'Uniformity' consists in the non-difference or homogenity of diction.

That is to say, when the style of diction employed in the beginning of a verse or of a complete poetical work, is continued to the end, we have what is called 'Uniformity'.

As an example we have the line quoted above—('*astyuttarasyām &c.*')

As an instance of absence of uniformity we have the following verse—

'*Prasīḍa chaṇḍi ṭyaja manyumañjasā*
janasṭavāyampuraṭaḥ kriṭāñjaliḥ
kimarṭhamuṭkampiṭapīvarṣṭana-
ḍvayam ṭvayā lupṭavilāsamāsyaṭe.

'Be appeased, O angry one! give up your anger; here I am (beseeching your pardon) with joined hands; why are you sitting with heaving breasts and dejected spirits?'

[Here in the first half we have the simplest diction, entirely free from compounds; while the second half abounds in compounds.]

Sūṭra (13)—(*e*) 'Symmetry' consists in the orderly sequence of 'ascent' and 'descent'.

A line or verse is said to have the quality of 'Symmetry' when it is found to be so worded that the heightening effect of the 'forcible' style is toned down by a judicious sprinkling of words of the 'softer' kind; or when the softening effect of the less vigorous style is heightened by the introduction of words of the 'forcible' kind.

As an example of the former we have—'*Nirānanḍaḥ kaunḍē maḍhuni paribhukṭojjhiṭarasē*'.

[Where the 'high' tone of 'nirānanḍaḥ' and 'ujjhiṭarasē' is softened by 'kaunḍē' and 'maḍhuni']

As an example of the latter kind we have the line—

'*Narāḥ shīlabhrasṭā vyasana iva majjanṭi ṭaravaḥ*'.

[Where the softening effect of '*narāḥ*' and '*ṭaravaḥ*' is heightened by the words '*shilabhrasṭāḥ*' and '*majjanṭi*'.]

According to some writers 'symmetry' is that quality by virtue of which there is a gradual decline from the 'vigorous' to the 'feeble' style, or a gradual rise from the 'feeble' to the 'vigorous.' As an example of this we have the line,—

'*Nivēshaḥ svaḥsinḍhosṭuhinagirivīṭhīṣu jayaṭi*'.

***Kāv.* 45.**

[Where we have a gradual decline from the forcible and vigorous '*svaḥsindhoḥ*' to the 'soft' in '*jayaṭi*'

Sūtra (14)—[Some writers have held that] This 'Symmetry' is not a separate 'quality' by itself, as the 'ascent' and 'descent' (of the previous *Sūtra*) are the same as 'florridity' and 'simplicity' respectively.

Sūtra (15)—This is not right; because of the two (Florridity and Simplicity) being interwoven.

It is not right to assert that 'ascent' consists in 'Florridity' and 'descent' in 'Simplicity'; because 'Florridity' and 'Simplicity' are interwoven together, and exist like the (two) currents of a single river (while 'ascent' and 'descent' can never co-exist).

Sūtra (16)—And also because it is not absolutely and universally true [that in 'Florridity' there is 'ascent', or in 'Simplicity,' 'descent'].

Sūtra (17)—If however, it be held that 'ascent' and 'descent' occur in the heightened or acute stages of 'Florridity' and 'Simplicity',—we accept this view.

We do not object to the view that in the 'Florrid' or the 'Simple' style, when they appear in their acute forms, there are 'ascent' and 'descent' respectively.

Sūtra (18)—Because in this case 'ascent' and 'descent' become dependent upon other peculiarities (and not entirely upon Florridity and Simplicity).

And it is this other 'peculiarity' that constitutes an entirely different 'quality' (which we have called 'Symmetry').

Sūtra (19)—It is on the basis of this 'ascent and descent' that it is regarded as a distinct quality named 'Symmetry'.

Thus the definition propounded above in Sūtra 13 has to be regarded as figurative; [the Quality is dependent upon 'ascent and descent' and does not exactly *consist in them.*]

Sūtra (20)—The Sūtra (13) may be regarded as propounding a distinct definition of 'Symmetry', only for the purpose of indicating the fact that there should be orderly sequence (in the ascent and descent).

That the 'ascent' and 'descent' do not refer to the way or tone in which a certain line is read, we shall show below under Sūtra 28.

Sūtra (21)—'Sweetness' lies in the distinctness of words.

When in a piece of composition the words are quite distinct from one another, it is said to abound in the quality of 'Sweetness'. That is to say, 'Sweetness' consists in the absence of long compounds. Examples of this have already been cited above (for instance under 1—II—13—'*grāme'smin paṭhikāya pīnṭha &c.*' As an example of the absence of this quality we have—

'*Chaliṭashabarasēnāḍaṭṭagoshṛingachanḍa—*

Ḍhvanichakiṭavarāhavyākulā vinḍhyapāḍāḥ'.

'The outskirts of the Vinḍhya range teem with boars frightened by the sound of the horn-trumpets blown by the hosts of Shabaras'.

NOTES.—The *Kāvyaprakāsha* (VIII. 74) enumerates the following letters &c as favouring the quality of Sweetness—

ṅka, ṅkha, ṅga, ṅgha,—ñcha, ñchha, ñja, ñjha,—ṇta, ṇtha, ṇda, ṇdha,—nṭa, nṭha, nḍa, nḍha,—mpa, mpha, mba, mbha,—ra and *ṇa* (both short),—no compounds, or, at best, short compounds of not more than four words,—and the softer conjunct

letters proceeding from the combination of two words, for instance, when the word '*anangarangapratimān*' is followed by '*ṭaḍangam*', the resultant conjunction gives rise to the soft conjunct letter '*nṭa*'. The commentators add that as regards the restriction of the short *ra* and *ṇa*, it does not follow from this that Sweetness would be spoilt by a single long *rā* or *ṇā* ; it is only when such long *rā* and *ṇā* are repeated that they interefere with the quality of Sweetness.

Sūtra (22) —'Softness' consists in the non-harshness of composition.

The example cited above '*grāmē' smin paṭhikāya &c.*' As an example of the absence of this 'Softness' we have—

'*Niḍānannirḍvaiṭampriyajanasadṛkṭvavyavasiṭiḥ.*'

'*Sūḍhāsēkaploṣamphalamapi viruḍḍham mama hriḍi*'.

NOTE.—According to the *Kāvyaprakāsha*, 'Softness' is not an independent 'quality,' being only the negation of the 'defect' of 'Harshness.'

Sūtra (23)—'Raciness' lies in piquancy of style.

It is that quality by virtue of which, in regard to a piece of composition, people speak of the words as if 'dancing'; that is to say, where the whole piece is enlivened by the peculiar swing of the words taken together.

Example—

'*Svācharaṇaviniviṣtairnūpurairnarṭakīnām—*

'*Jhatiṭi raṇiṭamāsīṭṭaṭra chiṭrankalañcha*'

'The tingling of the anklets attached to the ankles of the dancing girls gives rise to a variegated and sweet sound'.

NOTE.—The Kāvyaprakāsha regards this as a form of 'Floridity'. But in Raciness it is not necessary that there should be any particular set of letters, as those enumerated by the Kāvyaprakāsha in connection with Floridity. All that is necessary here is a peculiar arrangement of the words (irrespective of the letter-sounds), whereby the whole line acquires a 'swing' that gives the name to the quality.

Sūtra (24)—'Explicitness' is that quality by which the meaning is easily comprehended.

Examples cited above. Examples of Inexplicitness are numerous and can be easily collected.

NOTE.—The Kāvyaprakāsha regards this explicitness as only a form of 'Simplicity'.

Sūtra (25)—'Brilliancy' is that richness or ornateness of style [in the absence of which a piece of composition is called an 'imitation of the Purāṇas'].

Example—

'*Kuraṅgīnētrālīstavakitavanālīparisaraḥ*'.

'The outskirts of the forest is made, by means of the eyes of the deer, to appear as adorned with so many bunches of flowers.'

Examples of the opposite kind are many and easily found.

NOTE.—The Kāvyaprakāsha holds that this is nothing more or less than the absence of the defect of 'Vulgarity.'

With regard to the Qualities described above, we have the following verse :—

'The poets give the name of *Florridity* to the ornate style; words abounding in this quality are very pleasant to the ear.'

'When *Florridity* is accompanied by *plainness*, it is called *Simplicity*; without this quality there is no delectation in a poetical work.'

'*Coalescence* is that excellent quality by which more words than one coalescing, appear as but one word, the letter-conjunctions being (so smooth and natural) as not to be noticed.'

'*Uniformity* is the quality consisting in the using of the same style of diction in each foot or verse; this is difficult of composition and can be distinguished with difficulty.'

'That wherein the hiatuses ascend in a uniform manner is called the quality of *Symmetry*; by this quality Speech is rendered pure.'

'When in a piece of composition each word appears clear and distinct, we have the quality of *Sweetness*; endowed

with this the composition becomes a veritable stream of honey.'

'Just as lines are variously cut and arranged by expert painters, in the same manner is speech (words) arranged by intelligent writers, in accordance with various qualities.'

'*Softness* consists in the absence of harsh letters; speech devoid of this quality becomes harsh and unpleasant to the ear.'

'Piquancy of words they call *Raciness*; in the absence of this, composition remains devoid of variegation (and beauty).'

'When the idea of the thing expressed comes before the apprehension of the words themselves,—the meaning being readily comprehended—we have the quality of *Explicitness*.'

'People learned in the qualities have declared *Brilliancy* to consist in ornateness or richness; devoid of this the work of the poet becomes an imitation of the Purāṇa.'

Sūṭra (26)—The existence of these qualities cannot be denied; because they are actually cognised as existing.

It may be objected that though the qualities may be known as entities by people learned in them, it is quite possible that people may be mistaken about them. In answer to this we have the next Sūṭra.

Sūṭra (27)—There is no mistake in the qualities because of unflinching character [of the of use made of them].

Sūṭra (28)—These qualities are not mere peculiarities of the way of reading (recitation); because they are not found present in all cases (of recitation).

If these qualities consisted only in the peculiarities of recitation, they would be found equally in all pieces of composition; irrespective of any other peculiarities (of letter-sounds &c.). As a matter of fact however, these are not found everywhere; the presence or absence of particular qualities being found to be dependent upon the presence or absence of certain well-defined characteristics (described above).

Section (2).

IDEAL QUALITIES.

The Sūtra proceeds to describe the Ideal Qualities or Qualities of Meaning :—

Sūtra (1)—Those described above [Florridity, &c.] are the Ideal Qualities also.

The following Sūtras proceed to point out the differences in the two sets of qualities (Verbal and Ideal), as due to the fact that the *word* is the *denoter* and the *idea* the *denoted*.

Sūtra (2)—Florridity (Ideal) consists in the boldness or sententiousness of conceptions.

This Ideal Florridity is of five kinds :—(1) Where a whole sentence is used to express what is expressible by a single word; (2) where a single word is used to express what is expressible by a sentence; (3) where there is brevity (one sentence serving the purpose of many sentences); (4) where there is diffuseness (many sentences being used to express what could be expressed by a single sentence); and (5) where qualifications are added with a purpose.

Example of (1)—'*Nayanasamuṭṭham jyoṭiradrēriva*' (the light born of the eye of Aṭri') for the single word '*chandraḥ*' (Moon); and so on. What is meant by a 'sentence' here is only a collection of a number of words (and not necessarily

one that expresses a complete idea, containing a finite verb and such other syntactical accessories).

In the following verse also we find that what could have been expressed by the single word—the plums are *dry*—is expressed by a whole verse—

'In the beginning it becomes slightly pale ; after that it becomes whitish ; then through excessive ripeness its body becomes tainted with the quality of redness ; and finally when the process of drying sets in, it becomes contracted in its circumference ; and becoming devoid of its exuberance, it becomes insipid.'

Nor would it be right to carry this process to an undue excess ; because we have the definition of 'quality' as that which adds charm to poetry ; and such dilatory style adds this charm, only within certain limits.

(2) As an example of expressing by means of a word what is expressible by a sentence, we have the word 'winks' mentioned with reference to a lady, with a view to declare that '*She is human, and not divine*' [divine beings being known to have no winking of the eyes].

(3) Diffuseness of Sentences—many sentences being used where a single one would have served the purpose—we have in the following—

'The rotation of happiness and unhappiness proceeds variously. Either Happiness or Unhappiness comes about ; and then both cease entirely ; again after this there follows happiness and unhappiness ; and after this there is neither happiness nor unhappiness.'

[The whole of this expresses the single idea that there is rotation in the appearance of Happiness and Unhappiness.]

(4) Brevity (a single sentence serving for many) we have in the following—

Kāv. 52.

'Having taken leave of Himālaya, seeing Shiva and declaring to him the success of their mission, and being dismissed by him, they flew away into the skies.'

[Here we have a single sentence in place of the following sentences—'they took leave of Himālaya,—they saw Shiva,—they declared to him the success of their mission,—they were dismissed by Shiva,—they flew away to the skies.']

(5) The insertion of qualifications with a purpose, we have in the line—

'This young son of Chandragupta, effulgent as the moon, has, by good luck, become the *supporter of the learned.*' Here the qualification 'supporter of the learned' has been added for the definite purpose of indicating the fact that the prince had Subandhu for his counsellor.

Similarly in the line—

'On the loosening of the hair of the lady *with beautiful hair.*'—

The qualification 'with beautiful hair'—has been added with a purpose.

Sūtra (3).—'Simplicity' consists in the clearness of meaning.

By 'Clearness' is meant the mention of that alone which is absolutely necessary. Example—

'*Savarṇā kanyakā rūpayauvanārambhashālinī*

'A girl of the same caste, and endowed with beauty and budding youth.'

As an example of non-simplicity, we have—

'*Upāsṭām hasto mē vimalamaṇikāñchīpadamidam.*'

'May my hand approach the girdle-zone of beautiful gems.'

Here what is necessary is the mention of the 'girdle-zone' only; and the addition of the epithet '*vimalamaṇi*' is absolutely superfluous.

Kāv. 53.

Sūṭra (4).—'Coalescence' consists in the commingling (of many ideas).

By 'commingling' is meant the mention of more than one action partaking of cunning not perceived (by the person concerned), and indicative of reasons (for the commingling of the acts and the non-perception of the cunning).

Example—

'The lover saw two of his most beloved girls seated upon the same seat; coming up from behind, he, under the pretence of sportive dalliance, closed with his hands the eyes of one of them, and then twisting his neck a little, the clever man kissed the other whose heart was overflowing with love and whose cheeks were blooming with suppressed smiles.'

[Here we have a number of actions, coming from behind, &c., partaking of cunning on the part of the lover; and the cunning is not perceived by one of the ladies, by reason of her eyes being closed &c.]

We find this quality abounding in the works of Shūḍraka and other poets of that kind.

Suṭra (5)—'Uniformity' consists in the non-relinquishment of proper sequence or contiguity.

In some cases this contiguity is relinquished; *e.g.* in the following verse,—

'The kunḍa plants have shed their flowers; trees have become slow in bringing out their blossoms; *sweet breezes shaking the patience of separated lovers, are proceeding from the Malaya mountains*; the rays of the sun are removing the effects of cold; and yet they do not attain that sharpness which brings about perspiration.'

This verse is intended to be a description of the junction-point of the two seasons of Spring and Summer; and yet in the second line we have the mention of the blowing of the Mala-

ya breeze, which is a distinctive feature of the Spring only; and cannot pertain to the point where Spring is lapsing into Summer.

In view of this break in the contiguity of ideas, the second line should be read as—

'*Manusi cha girambadhnanṭīmē kiranṭi na kokilāḥ.*'

'The koil birds think in their minds of their sweet voice, and do not sing out.'

Sutra (6).—We may also regard the 'non-relinquishment of sequence or contiguity' to consist in the ease of comprehension.

That is to say, that which is *easy of comprehension* may be called 'uniform.' *E. g.* the line—' Asṭyuṭṭarasyanḍishi etc.

'The Himalaya is in the north.'

Examples to the contrary are easily found.

Sutra (7).—Samāḍhi (Orderly Sequence) consists in the character by which the meaning is easily grasped.

This quality is called 'Samāḍhi' as it leads to *Samāḍhāna* or concentration of mind, which helps us to grasp the real meaning.

Sutra (8).—The Meaning is of two kinds—that which is absolutely *original*, and that which is borrowed from others.

That meaning, the grasping of which constitutes 'Samāḍhi', is of two kinds. The 'original' one is that which has its source in the collected mind (of the poet and his audience) solely; the other kind is that which has its source in the work of other poets.

As examples we have the following:—

(*a*) 'O moon, quickly move away from my wine-cup, before thou art bitten by my teeth; or else bearing the marks of

my teeth thou wilt not go to the sky, for fear of Rohiṇī (your wife).' [This is absolutely *original.*]

(*b*) 'Do not thou fear, O Moon; Rāhu is not present in my wine; as for Rohiṇí (thy wife) she is in the sky,—why then shouldst thou be afraid of her? As a rule, whenever young men meet clever women for the first time, their minds are fickle; what wonder then that thou art behaving thus?'

The main ideas of this have clearly been borrowed from the preceding verse.

Sutra (9).—The Meaning again is *explicit* and *subtle.*

The *explicit* meaning has already been described and exemplified; the *Sutra* proceeds to describe the *Subtle* meaning—

Sutra (10).—The *Subtle* meaning is of two kinds—that which is comprehended by a little thought, and that which can be comprehended only by deep thought.

As an example of the form kind we have—

'The pair of lovers lie in the pleasure-house,—having the brightness of their teeth enhanced by mutual contact, and the pupils of the eyes mingling together; and their eyes are indicative of a mixture of anger, tears and fear.'

An example of the second kind—

'She cast her glances on me; while her thighs were trembling under strong emotion, her breasts pointed towards me; and she fondled her necklace with her right hand.

The lady invites embrace

Sutra (11).—'Sweetness' consists in the impressiveness of the conception.

Where what is said is exceptionally impressive we have the quality of 'sweetness.'

Example :—

'Nectar is sweet, without doubt; honey also is not otherwise; sweet also is the juicy fruit of the mango; yet, for once, it has to be declared without partiality, by the man efficient in discriminating flavour, if there is anything more delectable than the lips of the beloved!'

Sutra (12).—'Softness' is freedom from harshness or disagreeableness.

E. g., When we speak of the *dead* person as 'one whose sole remnant is his good name'; or of the *solitary* person as 'having god alone for his companion'; or when instead of saying 'go' '*gachhcha*', we say 'accomplish your business, (*sādhaya*).

Sutra (13).—'Delicacy' (*Udāraṭā*) is absence of vulgarity.

Example—

'You are full of beauty,—he also is not devoid of charm; both of you are well-versed in the arts; the pair of you is quite in keeping with each of you; if what remains to be done under the circumstances, does come about, all victory and success then to the presence of good qualities!'

[The meeting of the lovers is hinted at very delicately].

As an example of the *Vulgar* we have—

"While this person is sleeping here, I am also lying down,—saying this when I touched her girdle-zone, she removed my hands."

[This is extremely vulgar.]

Sūṭra (14)—When the characteristic features of things are made manifest, it is 'Explicitness.'

Example—

'In the water of the lake, the lily is blooming; on the back of its leaves resembling a piece of conchshell, it bears

the mark of red lines; and its outer leaves are reddish-tawny like the *Gorochanā*.'

And again—

'The fading (long-blooming) lotus passes through painful experiences during the daily process of drooping (in the evening): At the beginning of the process, the heavy filaments have their ends thrown about on all sides; then the inner petals lying all apart come together; after this, all that the outer petals can do is to become only slightly curved.'

Sūṭra (15)—'Brilliancy' is that by which the Emotions [of the Erotic &c.] are made conspicuously prominent.

Example—

'In the evening, when the lover had fallen down upon her feet (in repentance) she had, with an oath, rejected him; upon this, when he, in a dejected mood, proceeded to move away, as soon as he had moved two or three steps, she ran forward, holding with her hands her loosened clothes, and caught him up in her arms and fell upon his feet,—really wonderful is the way of love!'

[Here we have the Erotic.] Similarly with the other emotions.

In connection with this subject we have the following *verses*:—

'It is only when all the qualities are fully manifest that poetry is said to be fully *ripe* or *developed*; and then alone is this ripening of poetry likened to the ripening of the mango.'

'That poetry, on the other hand, where we have only the grammatically correct forms of nouns and verbs, and where the subject-matter is obscene and the qualities not happily mixed,—such poetry is disliked by the people, resembling

as it does, the ripened brinjal fruit (which on ripening is not fit for eating).'

'That piece of composition, the meaning whereof is entirely devoid of all qualities, is absolutely worthless; such sentences for instance, as *ten pomegranates* and the like; such pieces do not deserve the slightest consideration.'

NOTE—The *Kāvyaprakāsha* does not admit of the division of qualities into *Verbal* and *Ideal*; the ideal 'qualities' being entirely rejected. 'Floridity' (Ideal) according to the Kāvyaprākasha is not a quality, being nothing more than a fanciful blending of ideas; the Floridity that consists in the adding of qualifications for a purpose is nothing more or less than the negation of such defects as 'incompleteness of meaning. Similarly 'Simplicity' is only the negation of the defect of 'Redundant word'; 'Sweetness' consists in the negation of the defect of 'monotony'; 'Softness' the negation of 'Indecency', and 'Delicacy' the Negation of 'Vulgarity'; the Explicitness of Meaning' is only another name for the figure 'Svabhāvokti' or 'Natural Description'; Brilliancy' is only one form of subordinate suggestion; 'Coalescence' consists in a mere fanciful grouping of ideas, indicative of the poet's powers of imagination; and lending grace to the sentiments delineated; 'Uniformity' is negation of the fault of relinquishing the subject; and 'Samādhi' is not a quality; it has been regarded as consisting in the comprehensibility of the original meaning; this happens, as a matter of fact, in all compositions; there can be no composition of which the meaning is not comprehended.

(*Kāvyapakāsha*, pages 537-41).

CHAPTER IV.

FIGURES OF SPEECH.

Section (1).

VERBAL FIGURES.

It has been explained above that the charm of poetry is due to the Qualities and that charm is enhanced by the Ornaments or Figures of Speech. Thus then, having described the Qualities, the Sūṭra proceeds to describe the Figures of Speech. Of these again the two Verbal Figures, *Yamaka* (Chime or Reverberation) and *Anuprāsa* (Alliteration),—are dealt with first:—

Sūṭra (1)—When the same word is repeated in its different significations,—or when the same letter is repeated,—in well-defined places,—we have Chime.

When one or more words are repeated—with different significations,—and similarly when one or more letters are repeated, in the same places,—it is Chime;—that is to say, when either the same or similar words,—either in part or in entirety—are repeated in more than one foot of the verse,—and in the same part of the feet. We meet with instances of Chime wherein we have the repetitions in the same foot; and in these cases the 'restriction of place' spoken of in the above definition is taken as in reference to other verses; the sense being that the repetitions are (for instance) in that place which would be the *first place* in another verse.

The 'places' spoken of above are next described—

Sūṭra (2)—The 'places' are—the entire foot, the beginning, the middle, and the end of the foot; and the beginning, the middle, and the end of more than one foot.

Example of the 'chiming' of the entire foot.

Kāv. 60.

'*Asajjanavacho yasya kalikāmadhugarhitam.*

'*Tasya na syād viṣataroḥ kalikāmadhu garhitam.*

'That person who listens (treats) with respect to the words of the wicked, productive as they are of ill-feeling (*kalikā-madhuk*),—for such a person even the honey from the blossoms of the poisonous tree would not be something to be disregarded.'

[Here the entire foot '*kalikāmadhugarhitam*' is repeated, and the meaning is different in the two cases.]

[This repetition of the *second* in the *fourth* foot has been called 'Sandaṣṭaka.']

Example of 'Chiming' at the *beginning* of the feet—

Hanta hantararātīnām dhīra dhīrarchitā tava.

'*Kāmankāmandakī nītirasyā rasyā divānisham.*'

'O brave destroyer of enemies! your intelligence is ever respected; and verily the science of polity propounded by Kāmandaka is being tasted (studied) day and night by this intellect of yours.'

'Chiming' at the *end* of the feet :—

'*Vasuparāsu parāsumivojjhatīṣvavikalam vikalankasha-shiprabham*

'*Priyatamam yatamamtamanīshvaram rāsikatā sikatā sviva tāsu kā.*'

'What affection is there among women who are addicted to wealth alone;—being as they are as dry as sand? They abandon their lover, as if he were dead, even though he be as beautiful as the stainless moon, and ever ready to please her,—only if he happens to be without wealth.'

'Chiming' at the *end* of the feet :—

Sudṛsho'vasarē chakitañchakitam—bhavatīkṣitamastimi-tam stimitam.

Kāv. 61.

Api hāsalavastuva kastavakastulayēnnatu kāmadhurām madhurām.

'Of the beautiful one the glances are at times most tremulously mobile, and at times most steady and fixed! What smiles too! There is nothing—not even the sweet blossom of flowers—that can equal the sweet girl overflowing with love!'

'Chiming' at the *beginning* of consecutive feet—

'*Bhramara drumapuṣpāṇi bhrama ratyai piban madhu.*

Kā kundakusumē prītiḥ kākundattvā virauṣi yat.'

'O black bee, if you seek real happiness, wander among the flowers of trees, sucking their honey; what pleasure do you expect to derive from the kunda flower—that you are weeping in pitiable accents?'

'Chiming' in the middle of consecutive feet—

Apyashakyantvayā duttanduḥkham shakyantārātmani.

Vāṣpo vāhīkanārīṇām vegavāhī kapolayoḥ.'

'Thou hast inflicted unbearable pain on the innermost soul of the woman of the Shaka country (Shakī); and along the cheeks of the ploughmen's wives, tears are flowing copiously.

'Chiming' at the end of consecutive feet—

'*Sapadi kṛtapadastvadīkṣitēna.*

'*Smitashuchinā smaratattvadīkṣitēna.*

'*Bhavati vata janaḥ sachittadāho.*

'*Na khalu mṛiṣā kuta ēva chittadāho.*'

'When a man becomes the object of your glances, beaming with smiles, and well-equipped with the guiles of love,—his heart becomes heated with passion. There is no untruth in this. Or else, how is it that you deprive people of their minds?"

'Chiming' at the end of two alternate feet—

'*Udvējayati bhūtāni yasya rājñaḥ kushāsanam.*

Kāv. 62.

'*Simhāsanaviyuktasya tasya ksiprankushāsanam.*'

'The King whose bad rule causes trouble to his people is very soon deprived of his throne and reduced to beggary.' 'Chimings' in the middle and at the end of alternate feet may be similarly shown.

'Chiming' at the end of all the four feet:—

'*Natonnatabhrūgatibaddhalāsyām* [*lāsya*-grace, charm.]

'*Vilokya tanvīm shashipeshalāsyām*-[whose face 'āsya is soft and beautiful, '*pēshala.*']

'*Manah kimuttāmyasi chanchalāsyām* ['*chanchala*' fickle (heart) '*asyam*' over her.]

'*Krti smarājñā yadi puskalāsyām* ['*pushakalā* influential (commands), '*syām*', I should be.]

'O my fickle heart why are you pained at seeing that beautiful young girl with gracefully curved eyebrows and face as sweet and beautiful as the moon? I shall certainly gain my wishes, if the commands of Cupid have real influence over her.'

Similar examples may be cited of 'Chiming' in the middle and at the beginning of all the feet. Many other mixed forms of Chiming can be found out by the learned.

The 'Chiming' of letters.

'*Nānākārēna kāntābhrūrārādhitamanobhuvā.*

Viviktēna vilāsena tataksa hrdayannrinām.

'The eyebrow of the beloved which has learnt its graces from the god of love, impressed the hearts of men with its variegated excellent charms'.

Similarly may be found the chiming at other points of the verse.

This 'Chiming' of letters has its effectiveness enhanced when there is close juxtaposition of the same or similar letters (of the same class). An example of this effectiveness we find in the following verse of the *Hariprabodha*—

Kāv. 63.

'Vividhadhavavanānāgagardhardhanānā.'

'Vivaṭaṭagaganānāmamajjajjanānā.'

'Burushashalalanānā vavandhundhunānā.'

'Mamahihiṭaṭanānānanasvasvanānā.'

Kṛishṇa says to his brother, Baladēva—"The land along the sea is covered with jungle consisting of various kinds of the *ḍhava* tree; having the sky filled with handsome birds seeking after snakes; in which people entering cannot (by reason of the density of the forest) bend their body; it is entirely devoid of human beings; with the deer and hare flitting about; capable of destroying our ememy; and thereby accomplishing my purpose; it has no outlet; whose rustling constitutes its sole breathing."

Similar to this excessive 'Chiming' of letters is the 'Chiming' of words.

Sūṭra (3)—'Chime' becomes more effective by breaks (or caesura).

Sūṭra (4)—There are three kinds of this 'break' called—*'Shrinkhalā'*, *'Parivarṭaka'* and *'Chūrṇa.'*

Sūṭra (5)—When we have the transference of the cæsura caused by the separation of an entire letter we have the *'shriṅkhalā'*.

As for instance, in the verse cited under Sūṭra 2, in the second line the words are 'Kalikā-madhu,' there being a caesura between 'kā' and 'ma'; whereas in the first line the words being 'Kalikāmadhuk,' the caesura is transferred to 'between 'dhuk' and 'arh.' Similarly, in the first line the words are 'kali—kāma......', there being a caesura between li' and 'ka'; whereas in the second line, in the words 'kalikā—madhu' the aforesaid caesura is absent.

Sūṭra 6—Where on the cessation of the conjunction (of another letter), a letter resumes its own form, we have the *'Parivarṭaka.'*

For instance, in the same verse the letter '*a*' of the word 'arhiṭa' resumes its own form only after the cessation of its conjunction with the letter '*k*'—which conjunction gave it the form of the letter '*ga*'. In such cases a word ('arhiṭa' *f. i.*) which, through the conjunction of certain letters, has been transformed into another word '*garhiṭa*',—resumes its own form, on the cessation of that conjunction. Similarly may other instances be found.

Sūṭra 7—Where on the disruption of a conjunct letter, a word disappears completely we have the '*Chūrṇaka*'.

As for example—

'*Yo'—chalakulamavaṭi chalanḍūrasamunmukṭashuktimīnaṅkānṭaḥ.*

'*Sāgni vibharṭi cha salilam ḍūrasamunmukṭashukṭimīnaṅkānṭaḥ.*'

'The lord of the Ṭimi-fish (the Ocean) protects the family of mountains, having removed all their grief ; he bears within himself water along with fiṛe,—throwing on all sides the signs of shells and fishes.'

In this verse we have the conjunct letter '*kṭi*' in 'shukṭi' ; the disruption of this, gives rise to the two words '*samunmukṭashuk*' and '*ṭimīnām*', and the word '*shukṭi*' becomes entirely obliterated.

In connection with this subject we have the following Verses—

'Where we have the transference of the unbroken (entire) letter or syllable, we have the *Shṛiṅkhalā* ; by this break the Chime becomes very effective.' (1)

'In a case where a syllable renounces its conjunction with one syllable and joins itself to another, and thereby gives shape to another word—like the actor renouncing one part and taking another—that is the *Parivarṭaka*.' (2).

Kāv. 65.

'When of a conjunct letter each of the constituent letters becomes joined to the words preceding and following it respectively,— leading to the complete disappearance of the previous word;—it is the *Chūrṇaka.*' (3)

'Even when the Chimes are in their proper places, if they are not beautified by this last *Chūrṇaka* break, they are not quite beautiful; in the same manner as the hair, even though in its place, does not appear charming until it is beautified by curls.' (4)

'When the break is brought about by the transformation of case-endings, it is not regarded as *Chime* by people learned in the excellences of Chimes.' (5)

'When a word has been often made the object of Chime, it is not right to further make it an object of Alliteration.' (6)

'The wonders of Chime consist in the separation of case-endings, both as regards *number* and *case*, and also in the repetition of nouns and verbs.' (7)

Sūṭra 8.—[Similar words and letters] other [than those specified under Chime] constitute Alliteration.

Other than those, &c.—That is to say, words and letters with the same or different meanings, at the same or at any points in the verse.

'Similar'—to what has been used once.

Objection:—"Why was not the definition in the Suṭra given in the form—'Others constitute Alliteration'? This definition could have been explained to mean that Alliteration consists in the other kinds of repetition."

Reply:—True; the definition would have been quite comprehensible as that 'consisting in other kinds of repetition; but such a definition would be too wide. [As the repetition of dissimilar words and letters also would become 'alliteration'

as this also would be a kind of repetition other than those enumerated under 'Chime']. It is with a view to specify the particular kind of repetition intended that the *Sūṭra* has added the word 'similar'; this 'similarity' consisting either in the entire word or both in entirety and in parts.

NOTE.—The *Kāvyaprakāsha* (IX. 83-48) defines Chime as that where the same letters are repeated,—but they should not be used in the same meaning in both places; if they have a meaning, they should have different meanings in the different places The *Uḍyoṭa* adds that in some cases Chiming is allowed in the case of different letters also ; when the sounds of the letters are similar ; *e. g.* between 'da' and 'la', 'ra' and 'la', 'sa' and 'sha', 'na' and 'ṇa', and also between a letter with the *visarga* and the same without it ; a letter with the *anusvāra* and the same without it As regards chiming in a verse, it is laid down that there should be chming either in all four feet, or in two feet only ; it should never be in three feet ; in fact the presence of Chime in three feet is regarded as a *defect.* In the case of the Chiming of more than one letter, they should occur in the same order in both cases. Herein lies the difference between 'Chime' and Alliteration.' In the latter, it is not necessary that the letters should appear in the same order ; nor is it necessary for the words to have different meanings.

Sūṭra 9.—That Alliteration of letters is of the superior kind which is not too glaringly conspicuous.

'Not too glaringly conspicuous'—*i. e.* as if hidden, not easily noticeable.

Example—

'*Kvachinmasṛiṇamāmsalam, kvachiḍaṭīva ṭārāspaḍam,*
'*Prasannasubhagam muhuḥ svarataraṇgalīlāṅkiṭam*
'*Iḍam hi ṭava vallakīraṇiṭanirgamairgumphiṭam*
'*Mano maḍayaṭīva mē kimapi saḍhu saṅgīṭakam*'

'An excellent music is exhilarating my mind ; at times this music is at one time soft and sweet, and at another it is extremely loud ; often delightfully beautiful, marked by the harmonious blending of note-waves ; mixed up with the jinglings of your lute.'

The Alliteration that is too glaringly conspicuous is not regarded as good.

E. g. '*Vallībaḍḍhorḍhvajūtoḍbhatamataṭi rataṭkotikoḍaṇḍaḍaṇdaḥ.*'

Sūṭra 10.—The 'feet Alliteration' is similar to the 'feet Chime.'

That is to say, the different kinds of the Alliteration of the verse-feet are to be classed and enumerated on the same lines as the Chime of the verse-feet.

Examples—

(1) '*Kavirājamavijñāya kuṭaḥ kāvyakriyāḍaraḥ.*

'*Kavirājañcha vijñāya kuṭah kāvyakriyāḍaraḥ.*

'Unless one knows Kavirāja whence could he have any regard for the composition of poetry? and when one knows Kavirāja, how could be have any regard (or desire) for compositing poetry?'

(2) '*Ākhaṇdayanṭi muhurāmalakīphalāni.*

Bāṭāni bālakapilochanapiṅgalāni.'

'They eat the fresh *āmalakī* fruits, yellow like the eyes of the young monkey.'

(3) '*Vasṭrāyanṭēnaḍīnām siṭakusumaḍharāḥ shakrasaṅkāshakāshāḥ,*

Kāshābhā bhānṭi ṭāsām navapulinagaṭāḥ shrīnaḍīhaṁsa haṁsāḥ.

Haṁsābhambhodamukṭaḥ sphuraḍamalaruchirmēḍinīchanḍrachanḍraḥ,

Chanḍraṅkaḥ shāraḍasṭē jayakriḍupanaṭo viḍviṣāṅkāla kālaḥ.'

'O King, who art equal to Inḍra! the Kāsha grass with white flowers appears like clothing over the rivers; O King, who art like a swan in the river of Prosperity! on the banks of the rivers, swans are seen which ressemble the Kāsha grass; O King, who art like Moon on the Earth! the

Moon emerging from the swan-like white clouds is shining with flawless sheen ; O King, who art like Deathgod to your enemies ! the season of autumn beautified by the moon has arrived, which will bring victory to you.'

(3) '*Kuvalayadalashyāmā meghā vihāya divangatāh.*
Kuvalayadalashyāmo nidrām vimuñchati kēshavaḥ
Kuvalayadalashyāmā shyāmalata—'dya vijrimbhatē.
Kuvalayadalashyāmañchandro nabhaḥ pravigāhatē.'

'The clouds dark like the petal of the blue lotus have gone away from the skies ; Viṣṇu, dark like the petals of the blue lotus, is abandoning his sleep ; the Shyama creeper dark like the petals of the lotus is now beginning to shoot forth ; and the moon is appearing in the sky which bears the colour of the petals of the blue lotus.'

And so on may the other varieties be exemplified.

NOTE.—The *Kāvyaprakāsha* divides Alliteration into two classes—(1) Alliteration of letters, in which there is repetition of letters, which have no meaning by themselves; and (2) Alliteration of words, where there is repetition of words with meanings. In the former, the mere similarity of the consonant is sufficient to establish Alliteraction, irrespective of the vowel sounds. This Alliteration of letters is of two kinds :— *Chhēkānuprāsa*—the repetition of a single consonant ; and (2) *Vrittyanuprāsa*—two or more repetitions of one or more consonants. In the Alliteration of Words the same word or words with the same meaning, is repeated in more than one place, though with different syntactical connections ; to this Alliteration has been given the name of *Lātānuprāsa*' in view of the fact that it is much in favour with writers of the Lāta country.

Section II.

THE IDEAL FIGURES OF SPEECH.

The Ideal Figures of Speech are next dealt with ; and as Simile lies at the root of all *ideal* figures, the Sūtra takes up Simile—

Sūtra (1)—'Simile' consists in the slightest resemblance of qualities between two things called the '*Upamāna*' and the '*Upamēya*'.

Kāv. 69.

The 'Upamāna' is that object possessed of superior qualities with which the ressemblance or similarity of another object is pointed out; and the '*Upamēya*' is that other object with inferior qualities which is pointed out as ressembling the former; and the ressemblance or similarity between those two objects,—even on the basis of even slight qualities,—constitutes the figure of 'Simile'.

An objection is raised:—"*Upamāna*' and '*Upamēya*' being relative terms, the mention of one would necessarily indicate the other; as for instance, in Paṇini's Sūṭra—'*Upamiṭam vyāghrāḍibhiḥ sāmānyaprayogē*'" [II-i-56], it is only the '*Upamiṭa*' (i.e. *Upameya*) that is mentioned, and not the '*Upamāna*' also (which is implied by the other). In the same manner, in the present Sūṭra also, both should not have been mentioned."

This is quite true; but both have been mentioned with a view to indicate what is well known among people; the sense being that the similarity meant is between two objects known among people as '*Upamāna*' and '*Upamēya*',—nothing except these; that is to say, we have only such Similes as 'the face is like the *lotus*', and not as 'the face is like the lily.'

Sūṭra (2)—That which is dependent upon a large number of qualities is 'imaginary' Simile.

The similarity that is assumed by poets on the basis of a large number of common qualities, is called 'imaginary Simile', as in contrast with what has been defined in the preceding *Sūṭra*, which is well-known among the people (and may be called 'real').

Objection:—"In the case of the imaginary *Simile*, inasmuch as the similarity is not known among ordinary people, how can there be any restriction as to the *Upamāna* and the *Upamēya*, (which have been described as names based upon similarities recognised by the common people)?"

Such restriction, we reply, is obtained through the excellence (preponderance) and inferiority (deficiency) of the multitude of qualities. As for example, in the following—

'The disc of the moon, which ressembles the breast of the *Hūṇa* woman pressed by her lover, lightens up the sky with the rays of light which are as white as the fullgrown smell of the lotus-plant',—

[The similarity between the breasts and the lunar disc, and that between the moon's rays and the lotus-smell, are not such as are known to the ordinary man; they are imagined or fancied by the poet on the basis of a large number of common qualities.]

Similarly in the following also the similarity is 'imagined' and not *real.*

(*a*) 'The orange ressembles the newly-shaven chin of the intoxicated Hūṇa'.

(*b*) 'The *shirīsha* flower in the ear ressembles the fresh sprout of kusha'.

(*c*) 'At the present moment the branches of the banyan tree with their root-offshoots having shed the red leaves, ressemble the beak of the parrot; and after a while there come out the red leaves which are capable of equalling the beauty of the lips of young women'.

Sūṭra (3)—Of Simile there are two kinds; one based upon the meaning of words, and another based upon the meaning of sentences.

Example of Simile based upon the meaning of words—

'Over whose bodies freed from the tawny skin, there appears horripilation due to feelings of love—the hairs standing erect *resembling so many dusts of gold.*"

Example of the Simile based upon the meaning of a sentence—'This Pāṇdya King has the necklace hanging

over his shoulders, and has his body besmeared with fresh sandal-paint; in this manner he resembles the Chief of Mountains with the waterfall rushing along its sides, and having its peaks reddened with the rays of the newly risen sun.'

Sūṭra 4—Simile again is—*Complete* and *Elliptical*.

Sūṭra 5—We have the Complete Simile when the sentence contains words denoting all the factors of comparison—*viz*., (*a*) the common property, (*b*) similitude, (*c*) the standard of comparison and (*d*) the object of comparison.

As for example :—

'Beautiful (*a*) like (*b*) the lotus (*c*) is the face (*d*).'

Sūṭra 6—It is '*elliptical*' when there is absence [of one or more of the aforesaid factors of comparison].

(*a*) absence of the word denoting the common property—
'The King is like the Moon.'

(*b*) Absence of the word denoting similitude—
'This is grass-green.'

(*c*) Absence of both of the above—
'The moon-faced.'

Examples of the absence of the standand of the object compared shall be found below, under the next section.

Sūṭra 7—Simile is employed in (*a*) praising, (*b*) dispraising and (*c*) describing the real state of things.

Examples—

(*a*) 'An affectionate wife is like nectar'—(Praise).

(*b*) 'A wife not possessed of good qualities is like poison'—(Dispraise).

(*c*) 'Among the groups of stars know that to be the asterism of Rohiṇi which appears in the shape of a cart.'—(describing the real state of things).

Sūtra 8—The defects of Simile are—(*a*) Deficiency (Incompleteness), (*b*) Excess, (*c*) Disparity of Gender, (*d*) Disparity of Number, (*e*) Non-similitude, and (*f*) Impossibility (Incongruity).

Each of these is next described :—

Sūtra 9—When the 'standard of comparison' is inferior (to the 'object compared') in *caste*, in *magnitude*, and in *details of qualsity*,—the Simile is said to be 'deficient.'

Examples :—

(*a*) *Inferiority of the 'standard of comparison' in caste*—
'This act of daring has been done by you, like a *Chāṇḍāla*.'

(*b*) *Inferiority in magnitude*—
'the sun is shining like a spark of fire.'

(*c*) *Inferiority in details of quality*—
'The sage, adorned by the girdle-string and wearing the black antelope-skin, shone like the sun surrounded by dark clouds.'

In this case, in the 'standard of comparison', the sun, we find no mention of the 'lightning' which would take the place of the 'girdle-string' in the 'object of comparison,' the sage. It will not be right to argue that it is only the *black antelope skin* that is intended to be the 'object compared', for in that case, the mention of the 'girdle-string' would be superfluous. Nor will it be right to argue that the mention of the 'dark clouds' implies the lightning ; for as a matter of fact, there is no such necessary connection between the two, as would make the one necessarily imply the other ; if there

were such connection, what would be there to prevent the idea of one being brought about by the idea of the other? It is with a view to this that we have the next Sūtra—

Sūtra 10—Of two things, the mention of one brings about the idea of (implies) the others when there is concomitance between them.

When two things are known to be concomitant with each other, the mention of one necessarily implies the other. As for example, in the following verse—

'Even though rain outside has ceased, there is no cessation of the drops of water falling from within the dilapidated house, passing as they do through spider's nets, and thereby becoming slightly yellow and resembling drops of honey; these drops falling upon the curly hair on the head of the sleeping child become broken into small sprays and making the child to throw about its limbs, they cause great mental agony to the house-wife whose sleep is disturbed;'—the *yellowness* and *roundness* are found to be concomitant with each other in all drops of honey; hence when the *yellowness* is expressed by the word '*piñja*' it brings about the idea of the *roundness* also.

Similarly in the case of the sentence—'The hips are as smooth as a sheet of gold',—inasmuch *smoothness* and *brightness* are found to be concomitant in the 'sheet of gold', *brightness* is implied by the mention of 'smoothness.'

An objection is raised—"If the fact of the 'standard of comparison' being wanting in certain details of quality is a defect of the Simile, how have we the following—

'like chaste women deprived of their husbands in their houses, the *kēkā* sound died in the mouths of those peacocks whose eyes were closed on account of the hot rays of the sun, who were in a sorry plight, having been deprived of joy by the wind flowing from among the lotuses';—

Kāv. 74.

where the 'object compared' (the kēkā sound) has many more qualities mentioned than the 'standard of comparison' ('chaste women')"?

This objection is not tenable,—because the large number of qualities are mentioned (not with a view to comparison) but only with a view to point out the special features of the mouths in which the sound ceased; it is only when the peacock's mouth has certain special characters, that the cessation of sound is possible.

Sūṭra—11—By the above definition of 'Deficiency,' the defect of 'Excess' has been explained.

That is to say, 'Excess' consists in the superiority of the 'standard of comparison' in caste, magnitude and quality.

Examples—

(*a*) 'Let the Vrīṣṇis enter like the mighty Ruḍras [The Ruḍras are very much higher beings than the Vrīṣṇi people.]

(*b*) 'Thy navel is like the nether world; like mountains thy breasts; and thy braided tresses resemble the fall of the Yamunā.'

[The nether world, mountain and the fall of the Yamunā are of very much larger magnitudes than the things to which they are compared.]

(*c*) 'The King holding the moving discus with its offshoots, resembled the ocean with the submarine fire and whirlpool.'

In the object compared, the King with the discus, there is nothing to resemble the presence of the submarine fire in the ocean, the 'standard of comparison.'

Some writers hold '*Viparyaya*' or 'contrariety' to be a defect of Simile; but in reality this is included in the two

defects 'Deficiency' and 'Excess' described above; it is for this reason that we hold the opinion that of Simile there are only *six* defects (mentioned above in Sūṭra 8).

Sūṭra 12—There is 'Diversity of Gender' when the gender of the object compared is different from that of the standard of comparison.

Example—

'*Sainyāni naḍya iva jagmuranargalāni*'

'The armies went along unimpeded like a river' ['*Nāḍyaḥ* is feminine, and '*sainyani*', neuter.]

Sūṭra 13—In many cases however comparison between the masculine and the neuter is allowable.

In many cases it is permissible to have the 'object compared' in the masculine and the 'standard of comparison' in the neuter gender, and *vice versa*. *E. g.* '*Chandramiva mukham pashyaṭi*'—'He sees the face which is like the moon.' [This is allowable only in cases where the forms of the two words in the two genders are similar, as in the instance cited 'Mukham' and 'Chanḍram.'] Such diversity of gender however (in which the forms are different) is not allowable; *E. g.* '*inḍuriva mukham bhāṭi*' (the face shines like the Moon).

Sūṭra 14—[Disparity of genders is allowable] also (a) in Similes employed in ordinary parlance, (b) in Similes expressed by means of compounds, and (c) in the various modifiations of the Simile.

Examples—

(a) In ordinary parlance people speak of one's constant companion as '*sa ṭasya chhāya iva*' 'he is like his shadow' ('*sa*' being masculine and *chhāyā*' feminine).

(b) Gender-disparity in compounds—'*bhujalaṭā nīloṭpalasadṛishī*', 'the creeper-like arm is like the blue lotus.'

Kāv. 76.

[Where a similarity is intended between '*bhuja*' masculine and '*laṭā*' feminine; and also between this latter and '*nīloṭpala*' neuter.]

(c) In the modifications of Simile: *e. g.* in the following verse (where the Simile is not directly asserted but indirectly implied)—

Shuḍḍhānṭaḍurlabhamiḍam vapurāshramavāsino yaḍi janasya.

'Dūrikriṭāḥ khalu guṇairuḍyānalaṭā vanalaṭābhiḥ.'

'If the body of this person living in the hermitage is such as cannot be found in the harem of Kings,—then verily has the well-tended creeper of the garden been surpassed in beauty by the wild creeper.'

[Here the similitude implied is between the *body* '*vapuḥ*' neuter and the *creeper*, '*laṭā*' feminine.]

Similarly may other usages be exemplified.

Sūṭra 15—(d) What has been said above with regard to disparity of Gender applies to disparity of Number also.

Example of Disparity of Number—

'*Pashyāmi lochanē ṭasyāḥ puṣpam maḍhuliho yaṭhā*'
'I look upon her *Eyes* as the black bee does upon the flower?

Sūṭra 16—(e) There is 'non-similitude' when the similarity of qualities intended to be expressed is not fully comprehended.

As for example, in the line—

'I am going to prepare the moon of poetry with its meaning expanding like the moon's rays'—it is not easily comprehensible what similarity is intended between Poetry and the Moon.

Kāv. 77.

"But it is easy to perceive that the *meaning* being similar to the rays, this would constitute the necessary similarity between the *Poetry* of the *Moon*."

Not so; for it is only after the similarity between *Poetry* and *Moon* has been established that any similarity is possible between the *meaning* and the *rays*; specially as there is no property in common between these latter, which would establish their similarity (independently of that between the Poetry and the Moon); and thus there would be an undesirable mutual interdependence (if the Similarity between *Poetry* and *Moon* were based upon that between the *meaning* and the *rays*).

Sūtra 17—By 'non-similitude' the Simile is entirely destroyed; as all poets depend (for effect) on that [similitude of the two factors].

Sūtra 18—Some people hold that in a case where there are a large number of standards of of comparison' available, the non-comprehension of the exact similitude is not faulty.

As for instance, in such sentences as 'your fame is like a camphor-necklet, and like the smiles of Shiva,' the similitude between the Fame and the Camphor, &c., becomes indicated on the basis of *excessive whiteness*.

Sūtra 19—This however is not right; as such use (of many standards) does not add strength (effectiveness) to the meaning.

When the required similitude has been indicated by means of the mention of one 'standard of comparison,' the mention of other such standards does not produce any additional effect. It is in view of this that we find fault with such lines as '*balasindhuḥ sindhuriva kṣubbitaḥ*,' 'the ocean of

strength is ruffled like the ocean' [where one and the same standard, 'ocean,' is retained]. It may be objected that the word '*sinḍhuḥ*' occurring twice involves a tautology. But in reality there is no tautology, as the word is used in two different senses : in '*balasinḍhuḥ*,' which means 'strength like the ocean,' the 'strength' is spoken of as 'ocean' in view of its *greatness* or *extensiveness* ; while in '*Sinḍhuriva kṣubhiṭaḥ*,' 'is ruffled like the ocean', the 'strength' is described as similar to the 'ocean' in point of *being ruffled* ; and thus there being distinct implications intended in the two cases, there is no tautology. But all the same, the second mention of the 'ocean' does not produce any additional effect ; for if we had only '*sinḍhuriva kṣubhitaḥ*', 'ruffled like the ocean' this would also imply the idea of *greatness* which is inseparable from that of the 'ocean': as it has been declared (above in Suṭra 10) that of two things, the mention of one implies the other when there is concomitance between them.'

Sūṭra 20—(*f*)There is 'Impossibility' or 'Incongruity' when something absolutely impossible is mentioned.

As for example, in the verse—

'within her shining mouth the faint smile appears as beautiful as the first moonlight within the blooming lotus'—

we find mentioned the *blooming of the lotus* along with *moonlight*; and this is a physical impossibility. It may be objected that this may be regarded only as an instance of *contrary meaning*, whereby the necessity of postulating this as a defect of the Simile becomes obviated. But this is not right; as in the Simile what is a particularly effective idea is what is actually intended to be implied by the Simile; [there is some sort of incongruity always present in Similes.] It may be asked—'Why then should

this (Incongruity) be regarded as a defect at all (when it is desirable in Similes)?'

To this we reply—

Sūtra 21—[Because] An effective implication that is contradictory should never [be used].

The poet knowing the above-mentioned six Defects of Simile should always avoid them.

Section (3)

Modifications of the Simile.

The various Modifications of Simile are next considered.

Sūtra (1)—Typical Comparison (Prativastū) and the rest constitute the 'Modifications of Simile.'

The next Sūtra points out the difference between Typical Comparison and the 'Simile in sentence.'

Sūtra (2)—It is Typical Comparison (Prativastu) when the similar thing (the object of comparison) is mentioned in one sentence, and the 'standard of comparison' in another.

Thus then difference between Simile and Typical Comparison is that in the former the complete Similitude is expressed by a single sentence, while in the latter there are two distinct sentences, one mentioning the object compared and another the object to which it is compared.

As an example of the Typical Comparison, we have—

'Having attained to the position of the queen how can she be lowered to the position of a common maid? Verily a jewel marked with the figure of Gods is not capable of being worn.'

[Here the former sentence mentions the *woman*, who is intended to be similar to the *gem* spoken of in the latter sentence.]

The next Sūṭra points out the difference between Typical comparison (*Praṭivasṭūpamā*)and Modal Metaphor (*Samāsokṭi*).

Sūṭra (3)—When the 'object of comparison' is not mentioned at all, we have the Modal Metaphor (Samāsokṭi).

That is to say, when the similar thing is mentioned, and the object which it is similar to is not mentioned, we have *Samāsokṭi* (Concise Assertion) so called on account of the brevity of form caused by the dropping of one sentence.

Example —

'The portion of the leafless Karīra plant in the desert is praiseworthy on account of its affording relief to the fatigued traveller; fie upon the glory of the Kalpa tree on the Mēru which does not afford any help to the needy.'

Here the direct mention of the rich *person* who does not help the poor is suppressed.

The next Sūṭra distinguishes *Samāṣokṭi* from *Aprasṭuṭa-prashamsā* (Indirect Description).

Sūṭra (4)—When there is just a slight mention of the object of comparison, it is *Aprasṭuṭa-prashamsā* (Indirect Description).

Example—

'She is a most peculiar Ocean of Beauty; herein are floating lotuses along with the Moon; out of this the temples of elephants are issuing forth; and herein are also found the stem of the plantain tree as well as lotus-stalks.'

[Here the object of comparison, the beautiful woman, is just slightly mentioned by the pronoun, the '*iyam*', *She* in the first line.]

This is called *Aprasṭuṭaprashamsā*—literally 'Praise (Description) of what is not directly mentioned'—because

Kāv. 81.

of the fact of the Object of description not being fully expressed.

This is distinct from *Apahnuṭi* or 'Concealment,'—as shown below—

Sūṭra (5)—The concealment of one thing by another similar thing is called *Apahnuṭi.*

Where one thing mentioned in a sentence is concealed or set aside or rejected by another thing also mentioned in (another) sentence,—with a view to impose the character of the latter upon the former,—we have 'Concealment.'

Example—

'What are seen in the Kēṭaka flower are not its shoots; they are the (taunting) smiles of Fate against people straying from home. What flashes yonder is not the lightning; it is the glittering gleam of the Love God.'

[Here the *kēṭaka shoots* are 'concealed' or set aside by the 'Smiles of fate', and the *lightning* by the 'Glitter of the Love God.']

Inasmuch as in this the similarity is indicated by two distinct sentences, this differs from the *Rūpaka,* Metaphor. The *Rūpaka* or Metaphor is next defined—

Sūṭra (6)—By reason of the similitude of qualities between the 'object compared' and the 'standard of comparison,' where the character of one is imposed upon the other,—it is *Rūpaka* or Metaphor.

That is to say, where the one is described as identical with the other. The Sūṭra mentions both—the object compared as well as the standard of comparison—with a view to show that Metaphor has for its base not only the fancied or *imaginary* Simile, but also one that is *real,* recognised in ordinary experience.

Example—

'She is Lakṣmī in my household, a streak of nectar to my eyes; this touch of hers is a copious flow of sandal-essence over my body; this arm round my neck is the cool and soft string of pearls;—what of hers is not loveable! but separation from her would be unbearable!'

In such expressions as the *moon-face*, we have *Simile*, and not Metaphor, even though the two words are compounded; because it expresses *similarity* and not *identity*.

The next Sūtra distinguishes Metaphor from Shlēṣa, (Coalescence or Paronomasia):—

Sūtra (7)—It is Shlēṣa or Paronomasia, when through coalescence of letter-sounds, there is an imposition of identity upon the properties of the object of comparison [by the object to which it is compared].

That is to say, when in virtue of the coalescence of letter sounds [even when there is similarity in the meaning], the object to which the object in question is compared imposes its identity upon the quality, action and name of the latter object,—we have what is called 'Shlēsha,' (Coalescence) or Paronomasia.

Example—

'*Ākriṣṭāmalamaṇḍalāgraruchayaḥ sannaddhavakṣahsthalāḥ.*

Soṣmāṇo vraṇitā vipakṣahṛidayapronmāthinaḥ karkashāḥ.

Udvṛittā guravashcha yasya shaminaḥ shyāmāyamānānanāḥ.

Yodhā vāravadhūstanāshcha na dadhuḥ kṣobham sa vo 'vyājjinaḥ.'

'May that great Jina protect you, whom, calm and collected, neither warriors nor the breasts of woman succeeded in disturbing,—the warriors and the breasts both being—(*a*) *āk-*

Kāv. 83.

rishtāmalamandalagraruchayaḥ [the *warriors* having taken upon themselves the glory of defeated armies, and the *breasts* having shining orbs and fronts], (*b*) *sannaddhavakṣaḥsthalāḥ* [the warriors with shining breast-plates, and the *breasts* tightening or adorning the chest], (*c*) *soṣmāṇaḥ* [the *warriors* endowed with ardour for battle, and the *breasts* glowing with the heat of passion], (*d*) *vraṇitāḥ* [the warriors covered with scars, and the breasts bearing the nailmarks], (*e*) *vipakṣahṛidayapronmāthinaḥ* [the *warriors* destroying the hearts of enemies, and the *breasts* causing pain to rivals], (*f*) *karkashāḥ* [the *warriors* hardened by battle, and the *breasts* thickset and hard], (*g*) *udvṛittāh* [the *warriors* proud and haughty, and the *breasts* over-flowing their bounds], (*h*) *guravaḥ* [*warriors* respectable, and the *breasts* heavy], and (*i*) *shyāmāyamānānanāḥ* [the *warriors* with darkened faces, and the *breasts* with blackened tips.]'

[In this *shloka*, the same set of epithets is applied to both the object of comparison, the breasts, and the object to which it is compared, the warriors; though the similarity rests only in sound; words with different meanings coalescing together are pronounced as one word; and this Coalescence indicates intended similarity.]

NOTE.—Under Kārikā 85, the Kāvyaprakāsha discusses the question as to whether *Shlēṣa* is a *verbal* or an *ideal* figure of speech. Vāinana makes it a purely ideal figure. The Kāvyaprakāsha, on the other hand, divides it into two distinct classes of the *Verbal* and the *Ideal*; the *Verbal* Shlēṣa is that when " where words, though with different meanings, coalesce in their letter-sounds" (*Kārikā* 84); and the *Ideal* Shlēṣa is that "where several meanings are got out of a single sentence." (*Kārikā* 96).

The next Sūtra proceeds to show that a Figure of Speech consists not only in the *secondary or implied* meaning, but also in the *indicated* meaning:—

Sūtra (8)—Where the Indication (of things) is based upon similarity, we have the *Vakrokti* (Homonym).

Kāg. 84.

UNMEṢA II.—SHĀKṬOPĀYA.

Now is explained the Shāktopāya. It was declared at the end of the first Unmēṣa that Shakṭi is the development of power of Manṭra. The author begins a new chapter with the nature of *manṭra.*

I. CHIṬṬAM MANṬRAḤ.

CHIṬṬAM IS MANṬRA.

Chiṭṭa is that by which the supreme truth is known (chēṭyaṭē), is meditated on (vimarshyaṭō). It is the knowledge consisting of the investigation of prāsāḍa*, praṇava, etc., accompanied by full consciousness.

Manṭra† is that by which the nature of Paramēshvara manṭryaṭō, *i.e.*, is meditated on by means of a secret manṭra. Hence manṭra is explained as 'man' and 'tra', as 'manana' meditation and 'ṭrāṇa', protection, the ending of samsāra due to limited knowledge.

Again, manṭra is not merely an aggregation of sounds, but the special chiṭṭam, the attainment of unity with the divinity behind a manṭra by means of meditation. It is said in Vijñānoṭṭara,: "The sounds that are uttered are not by themselves manṭras. The proud gods and ganḍharvas were deceived by this false notion." It is said in Manṭrasaḍbhāva: "The indestructible Shakṭi is regarded as the life of the manṭras. Devoid of it, O fair-hipped one, they are as fruitless as an autumn cloud." And also in Shrīkaṇtha-samhiṭā:" A manṭra separate from its manṭri (the shakṭi behind it), cannot exist. Both flow from knowledge. They cannot exist apart from each other." In the

*Prāsāḍa is a manṭra made of the letters 'Ha' and 'Sa'. It, therefore, along with praṇava, refers to the famous manṭra, 'om so-ham', and its reverse 'hamsa'. 'Om soham' leads to union with Shiva and 'Hamsa' with manifested universes.

† Manṭra is derived from "maṭri, gupṭabhāṣaṇē." Hence a manṭra is that which declares the secret. The text of the vriṭṭi translated above, refers the idea of 'secret' to the manṭra itself. But Kriṣṇaḍāsa defines a manṭra in the vārṭika of this passage, to be that by which the secret nature of Ishvara is meditated on, thus transferring the adjective to Īṣhvara's nature.

Spanḍa, also, it is indirectly referred to in (Kārikā 27): "Those are Shiva-ḍharmis, who with the chiṭṭa devoted to Him".

And of it,

II. PRAYAṬNAḤ SĀḌHAKAḤ.

EFFORT IS THE MEANS.

The natural effort to fix permanently the energy that first rises from the desire to mediate on a manṭra, defined as above, is the means that brings about the union of the practicer of the manṭra and the deity of the manṭra. It is said in Manṭrasaḍbhāva: "When a bird in the sky sees a bit of meat, it soon picks it up with great natural speed, O dear one; thus the Yogīnḍra attracts manas, the binḍu. Just as the arrow placed in the bow flies when shot with effort, so, O fair-hipped one, the binḍu flies when pronounced." In another place, "The being of a manṭra is the attraction of it." (Commentary on the quotations). Here 'Thus', *i.e.*, by force of the natural effort, 'The Yogīnḍra attracts', *i.e.*, he causes to attain supreme light, 'manas the binḍu', *i.e.*, the functioning mind. 'So the binḍu', *i.e.*, the supreme light, 'flies' *i.e.*, flows by means of the natural effort of the pronunciation of the manṭra.* In the Spanda (Kārikā 31): "This is the rise of the object of meditation in the mind of the meditator; this is the attainment of union with it by the practicer who desires it."

Now is described the manṭra-vīrya, the efficacy, already referred to, of the manṭra that is practised by the devoted.

* A manṭra has already been defined to be a goddess, as a shakṭi, embodied in a formula. The desire to meditate on it causes a flow of energy in the mind. The attempt not to let it go is the effort that ultimately leads to the union of the devotee and the object of his devotion. It is to be noted that 'binḍu' is explained in two ways, (1) mental functioning, (2) supreme light; for every time when the mind strives to fix itself on a manṭra, a flash of that supreme light of consciousness illuminates it. Binḍu is also the final, fifth part of praṇava, the last echoes of it when pronounced representing the supreme light in the hierarchy of gods. Hence it is said that the pronunciation, *i.e.*, the chanting of praṇava, is the effort that leads the devotee to the Supreme.

III. VIḌYĀ-SHARĪRA-SAṬṬĀ MANṬRA-RAHASYAM.

THE SECRET OF MANṬRA IS THE NATURE OF THE VIḌYĀ-BODIED.

Viḍyā is the consciousness of identity with the supreme. The viḍyā-bodied is one whose form is viḍyā, the lord who is the totality of sounds. His nature is the manifestation of the consciousness of being the Ego of, being identical with, the whole universe. This nature is the secret, the upaniṣad of the manṭras. It is said in Manṭrasaḍbhāva: "Manṭras are all made of letters; these are the same as Shakṭi, O dear one; Shakṭi is the same as māṭṛikā and she is the same as Shiva". In this book this subject, though very esoteric, is very fully expounded. The passage begins thus: "Those who delight in deceit and falsehood, and are unsteady and destitute of good deeds, do not know the Guru, the Ḍēva, nor the paths described in the Shāsṭras. Hence, O ḍēvī, I have rendered invisible the ways by which manṭras may be made efficacious; the ordinary letters are worthless, on account of the concealment of manṭra-vīrya". The passage about the manṭras thus starts: "O ḍēvī, this māṭṛika is possessed of supreme light; by her is all this universe filled, from Brahma down to the worlds. O ḍēvī worshipped of the gods, from there she spreads everywhere, as the letter 'A'* embraces every other letter. Thus will I explain to you clearly, so that you can understand it well." It then says: "This supreme, subtle Shakṭi is said to be nirāchāra (not functioning); she surrounds the binḍu (drop of supreme light, *vide* com. on II. 2.) in the heart, and is like a sleeping serpent within. Sleeping there, O happy Umā, she is unconscious (lit., she does not think). Though she has within her womb the fourteen worlds, the sun, fire, the moon and the stars, yet she is as one fainted on account of poison. O fair-complexioned

* Consonants are always pronounced joined to 'A', *e.g.*, 'Ka', 'Ga', etc., the relation between consonants and vowels being regarded as similar to that between the body and the life that animates it. Thus as vowels endow consonants with life, so māṭṛika endows manṭras with life.

one, when she is churned by the binḍu within, she awakes, with a great sound, and becomes conscious. O shakṭi-bodied, till then the churning is to be continued with forcible whirling. The sparks that are born first from this churning (bhēḍa) are excessively bright, when the subtle kalā, kuṇḍalinī, is risen. The lordly binḍu within the Shakṭi is of four rays (kalās). On account of the force of the churning, there is caused a straightening (the coiled one becomes straight), O dear one. She is called the jyēṣṭhā Shakṭi when she is between two binḍus. Stirred by the binḍu, the immortal coiled one becomes straight. She is then called rekhinī (the straight); known as the three-footed, she goes then by the name of Rauḍrī. She is (also, called) Roḍhinī, because she blocks (ruḍh) the path of mokṣa. Thus the one Parā Shakṭi becomes threefold, of the form of a fragment of the moon, ambikā, and of the form of the half moon. On account of the conjunction and disjunction of these are born the nine classes of letters. Being united with these nine she becomes ninefold. The dēvī then enters the five manṭras, saḍya, etc., in regular order. Hence she is known as fivefold, O mistress of the gods. She is said to be twelvefold, because the vowels are twelve. She is divided fiftyfold, because she enters the letters 'A' to 'Kṣa'. When seated in the heart, she is said to be one-atomed; in the throat she is said to be two atomed; so long as she is fixed in the root of the tongue, she is said to be three-atomed. The production of the letters is at the tip of the tongue, no doubt. This is the origin of sounds, with which all moveable and immoveable things are pervaded". *

* The passages above-quoted are very obscure. They deal with a subject about which little is known. Even in books intended to be kept concealed, the subject is dealt with in great reserve, because it is both sacred and dangerous.

Parā Shakṭi is the mother of the universe. She may be conceived as Shiva-shakṭi, the consciousness of Īshvara. She is Consciousness, Pure, Universal and Unlimited. Hence she is Independence (svachchhanḍa); she is the vibratory energy that drives the cosmos. Being consciousness, she is symbolized by Light; as the light of the sun makes the whole world visible, so she makes cognition

Thus the Māṭrikā Parā Vāk Shakṭi, belonging to the supreme Bhairava, flows in the forms of Jyēṣṭhā, Rauḍrī and Ambā, and thence all the sounds of the alphabet arise. This is the secret of the manṭras which are formed by the combinations of these sounds and form the body of the great Goddess, the Viḍyā-bodied being. Hence in all Āgamas the making of manṭras is described with the description of Māṭrikāmālinī. As the Shiva-sūṭras constitute the essence of the secret Āgamas, we have said so much here to reconcile its teachings to those of the secret Āgamas. Hence we ought not to be condemned for prolixity. If in this discussion the reader discovers anything more to be known he has to go to his Guru for its elucidation. The meaning of this sūṭra is found in the Spanḍa (Kar. 26, 27), beginning "Having obtained the strength, manṭras, &c."

This manṭra-vīrya is the means of the attainment of the Mahāhraḍa already described; yet, in the case of those whose hearts have not, by the will of Īshvara, reached it, the mind

desire and muscular action visible to the man that exercises these functions, *i.e.*, she makes him aware of them. Man in his own real nature is Shiva, but attached to a body and a mind. When these latter act, *i.e*, when cognition, etc., take place, she turns his attention on them and makes him identify himself with them. She is hence Mahā-Māyā, the great deceiver. She is also Mahā-Shakṭi, the driver of the cosmos; in this she is symbolised by Sound, the greatest manifestation of energy outside us. As Sound symbolizes this aspect of her, individual sounds are the bodies, physical manifestations of parts of her, viz., her attendant divinities, ḍēvīs, yoginīs, Shakṭis, etc. By themselves, these sounds that constitute the manṭras, are merely, as it were, dead sound; they become vitalized when one acquires manṭravīrya and makes the manṭras charged with mystic power (Shakṭi). This is done by the 'rousing' of Kuṇḍalinī. Kuṇḍalinī is Parā Shakṭi herself, or rather, a minified replica of her, residing in a man's body. In the case of ordinary men, Kuṇḍalinī is potential merely; she resides in the shape of a serpent coiled round his heart. By the word 'heart' is not meant the physiological organ, but the centre of the body imagined as a hollow and filled with ākāsha. Ākāca is sound conceived not as sensation within the brain, but as an objective entity. Such an ākāsha fills the inside of the body. In its centre, which is the heart, 'the buḍḍhi guhā,' there is a dot of Light. It is the Shiva, the representative of the supreme in the microcosm. As Shiva's Shakṭi surrounds Him in the cosmos, so in a man, this dot of Light (binḍu) is surrounded by the Shakṭi in the shape of the sleeping serpent. 'Churning' with the binḍu makes the coiled serpent straight. Thus arise Jyēṣṭhā, Rauḍrī, Ambā, corresponding respectively from various points of view to Pashyanṭī, Maḍhyamā and Vaikharī Vāk, the point, the straight line, and the semicircle, the one-atomed, the two-atomed, and the three-atomed, etc. By various combinations of these, the mystic correspondence of Shakṭis, manṭras, sounds, letters, and the states of consciousness referring to these have to be worked out.

attains ordinary acquisitions (miṭa-siḍḍhi) when there is an incidental development of binḍu, nāḍa, etc.

IV. GARBHĒ CHIṬṬAVIKĀSO VISHIṢTAVIḌYĀ SVAPNAḤ

IN THE WOMB THERE IS AN EXPANSION OF CHIṬṬA ORDINARY KNOWLEDGE, DREAM.

'Womb' means Ignorance (akhyāṭi), Mahā-māyā. 'In the womb' means while under the influence of Mahā-Māyā (before the rise of Kuṇḍalinī Shakṭi, and the consequent expansion of consciousness). Even in this state there occurs manṭra-siḍḍhi, a limited expansion of consciousness and a consequent satisfaction of the mind. This is limited, impure consciousness, common to all men. So, too, his dream-consciousness (though expanded), but hallucination, based on differentiated cognition, manifoldness. It is said in Pātañjala (Yoga Suṭras): "They are siḍḍhis in vyuṭṭhāna, obstacles in Samāḍhi". (III, 38). This is explained in Spanḍa Kārikā 42: "From hence tho binḍu, from hence the nāḍa,* from hence form, from hence enjoyment, flow fast, causing agitation to the man in the body."

When suppressing the above ordinary acquisitions (miṭa siḍḍhi) he sticks to the supreme state, the Yogi thence obtains,

V. VIḌYĀ-SAMUṬṬHĀNĒ SVĀBHĀVIKĒ KHĒCHARĪ SHIVĀVASṬHĀ.

ON THE NATURAL RISE OF KNOWLEDGE, KHĒCHARĪ, THE SHIVA-STATE.

On the natural rise of knowledge already described, which is caused by the will of Īshvara and which suppresses the ordinary siḍḍhis, is produced Khēcharī-muḍrā. Khēcharī is derived from 'Khē', in the ākāsha (of consciousness), 'Charati; (what) moves. What kind

* Binḍu and nāḍa are apparently here used as the names of stages of the growth of the Yogi. Binḍu represents the first stage when he has got glimpses of the binḍu, the dot of light in the heart, when he first begins to realise his real nature. Nāḍa is the first rise of Parā Shakṭi from her sleep and "awakes with a great sound and becomes conscious."

of Khēcharī? The manifestation, the uprising of the bliss of the self, which is the avasthā of Shiva, the Lord of Chiṭ. It is not that due to association with a body described in :— "The Yogi bound in paḍmāsana,* must place the lord of the senses in the (lotus of the) navel; it must be led in the form of a staff up to the three ākāshas in the head; having fixed the mind there he must fill it soon with the three ākāshas; binding it there, the great Yogi moves along the ākāsha." But (the true Khēcharī) is of the nature of supreme consciousness as described in Ṭanṭrasaḍbhāva: "He reaches the supreme path by moving in the path of kula of all beings and meditating on all objects. This is known as Khēcharī". Thus have been taught (the true) manṭra-vīrya and muḍrā-vīrya; they are but the absorption into universal consciousness by ending all agitation due to the māyā of differentiated consciousness. It is said in Kulachūḍāmaṇi: "There is bīja (seed) manṭra of all beings; there is one muḍrā, the Khēcharī; when these two are developed in a man he attains to the place of supreme peace." In the Spanḍa (Kārikā 9), too, muḍrā-virya is contained in the description of manṭra-vīrya. "When the agitation of the mind is quelled the supreme state is reached". Though this quotation refers to other subjects, it indirectly refers to the Khēcharī described in (Kula) Chūḍāmaṇi.

In the acquisition of muḍrā and manṭra vīrya,

VI. GURUR-UPĀYAḤ.

THE GURU IS THE MEANS.

The guru is the one that teaches, gṛiṇāṭi, the ultimate truth. He is the means, because he shows how they act. It is said in Mālinī-vijaya: "The guru who shows the manṭra-

*Paḍmāsana is a 'posture' in which the right foot is placed on the left thigh and the left foot on the right thigh, imitating the arrangement of the petals in a lotus. The meditation on the ākāshas and escape from the body riding on the ākāsha is a fairly frequent yogic practice, though condemned here as not leading to the enlightenment of the man. The three ākāshas mentioned above are those in the three nādis.

vīrya is equal to me (Shiva)". This is not referred to in Spanda as things like this are admitted by all. It can yet be obtained from the last kārikā (52): "I salute the words of the Guru, who is the boat with which we cross the deep ocean of doubt, full of wonderful meanings."

(Another interpretation). Or, the Guru is the Shakti of Paramēshvara, the root of grace. It is said in Mālinīvijaya: "The mouth of the Guru is said to be the Shakti-chakra". In Ṭrishirobhairava: "The Guru is the great shakti residing in the mouth of the Guru." It grants admittance to the disciple, hence it is the means.

Hence from the Guru full of grace,

VII. MĀṬṚIKĀ-CHAKRA-SAMBODHAḤ.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE MĀṬṚIKĀ-CHAKRA.

The sentence has to be completed by adding the words, "is secured to the disciple." It is indicated in Paratriṁshaka, etc. (The passage that follows is an exposition of the māṭṛikā-chakra, but the sentence so ingeniously constructed that a word describing a Shakti corresponding to a letter begins with the same letters: as this feat cannot be exhibited in English the substance of the passage is given in tabular form.)

1. a, is the first ray of aham-vimarsha, consciousness of Ego; anuttarā, (supreme). She is Jñāna-shakti (Kula-Svarūpā).

2 ā, Ānanda rūpā, of the nature of bliss.

3, 4. i, ī. She first illuminates the states of desire and lordship, ichchhā and īshāna.

5, 6. u, ū. She then exhibits the rise, unmēṣa, of knowledge and its obscuration, ūnaṭā, on account of the development of objective cognition.

7, 8. ṛ, ḷ. These letters indicate the two functions of ichchhā-shakṭi, viz., self-illumination and illuminating the world. Hence by illuminating the world with her own light she is immortal. But as the other seed-letters called sandhyakṣa (viz., ē,ai,o,au), cannot be produced by merely illuminating the world,

9, ē. The three-angled seed-letter is produced by the union of anuṭṭara, ānanḍa, and ichchhā.

10, o. Produced by the union of anuṭṭara, ānanḍa, and unmēṣa. It embraces the kriyā-shakṭi.

11, 12. ai, au. The six-angled seed-letter and the trident seed letter. By the union of two seed-letters already described.

Thus all these are due to the union of the three shakṭis, because in them kriyā-shakṭi is predominant, pervaded by jñāna-shakṭi and ichchhā-shakṭi.

13. ṅ. Bindu, indicates the knowledge of the oneness of the universe down to the physical world.

14. ḥ. Visarga, a double' binḍu, indicates the simultaneous inner and outer manifestation of the universe.

Thus the inner (subjective) states of consciousness, the (inner) world comes out of anuttara. This inner universe is that of the vowels; the outer, that of consonants.

In the outer creation, she evolves the whole universe ending with puruṣa (26 ṭaṭṭvas) corresponding to the 25 letters from ka to ma; ka-series from the shakṭi of a, cha-series from that of i, and so on from u, ṛ, ḷ; each shakṭi of the vowel becomes five-fold and produces the five lower shakṭis of the consonants.

The next four letters, ya, ra, la, va, are called anṭasṭha in Shikṣā, because they stand on puruṣa, within the kañchuka, niyaṭi, etc. These four (viz., niyaṭi, kalā, rāga, viḍyā) are

Shiv. 33.

called ḍhāraṇa, in the Vēḍas, because they support the universe, standing on puruṣa, the knower.

The next four, sha, ṣa, sa, ha, are called ūṣma because they rise (unmiṣita) when difference is destroyed and identity is felt. Shakṭi then manifests in the form of these letters, of which the last, ha, is the letter of immortality.

After this she manifests the letter that is the life-seed prāṇa-bīja, kṣa. It is filled with the shakṭi of anuṭṭara and with anāhaṭa. Anuṭṭara is a, hence its derivative, ka; anāhaṭa is ha, which is sa, hence ṣa. Thus kṣa is a, ha, *i.e.*, aham which is the meaning and name of all this world, filled as it is in the light of the six aḍhvas. These six aḍhvas are said by Kriṣṇaḍāsa to be māyā, kalā, viḍyā, rāga, kāla, niyaṭi. Thus by taking the first and last letters, a and ha, together, we get aham, the world formed by the shakṭis of Shiva, called anuṭṭara and anāhaṭa. This is the secret of ahamvimarsha, which is also manṭravīrya. As said by Paramēṣṭhī Shrī Uṭpala Ḍēva, the venerable: "When prakāsha, (pure consciousness) is tranquilized in the self, it is called ahambhāva consciousness of self; it is called tranquillity (vishrānṭi), because then all desires are known. Its characteristics are independence, activity, and lordship." The secret of the māṭṛikā so far explained has been shown to be the kūtabīji, kṣa, formed by the union of ka and ṣa, which proceed from the shakṭis derived from anuṭṭara. Thus has been expounded a very secret teaching.* (Now the translation is resumed).

The knowledge of the Māṭṛikā-chakra causes one to enter his own nature which is a mass of the bliss of consciousness. Chakra is the totality of the Shak is above described, anuṭṭara,

*Kriṣṇaḍāsa, quoting from Paraṭrimshikā, very clearly explains the māṭṛikāchakra: The 15 vowels are the 15 ṭiṭhis. The visarga is the sun and moon. Ka to ma are the 26 ṭaṭṭvas from the earth to puruṣa. Ya to va are Vāyu, Agni, Varuṇa, and Inḍra Sha to ha are the 5 Brahmas. He also quotes some other author and makes out ya to va to be the ṭaṭṭvas, māyā to niyaṭi and the 5 letters from cha to be the 5 faces of Shiva, corresponding to the 5 highest ṭaṭṭvas.

ānanda, icchā, etc. Matṛikā is that which is referred to in—"There is no knowledge superior to that of the mātṛikā" (probably quoted from some late Upaniṣaḍ). This knowledge has been but hinted at here. It is extensively described in Parātrimshikā-vivaraṇa Ṭanṭrāloka, etc., by my Guru (Abhinava Gupṭa). It is said in Siḍḍhāmṛita: "The Kuṇḍalinī who is of the nature of consciousness is the life of all the seed-letters. From her is born the three, called Ḍhruva (same as anuṭṭara), Ichchhā, Unmēṣa; then the letters from a, i, u, ṛ, ḷ, up to visarga. From visarga, ka to ma fivefold, outer and inner, in the heart, is sound, in the cosmos. The binḍu works from the heart to the head. Mantras without the letters a to ma are useless as the autumn cloud. The characteristics of a to ma should be learnt from the Guru who is learned, who is bhairava, who is godlike, and is to be reverenced like myself (Shiva). Then, knowing it, one sees everything as manṭra." In the Spanḍa this is indirectly shown in the passage beginning with "This Shakṭi of Shiva is tinged by Kriyā. It influences pashus. Left free it creates the bondage of Samsāra. Rightly understood it helps one to attain Siḍḍhi."

To the man who has acquired a knowledge of māṭṛkā-chakra,

VIII. SHARĪRAM HAVIḤ.

THE BODY IS THE SACRIFICIAL FOOD.

The body, gross, subtle, etc., which is wrongly regarded by all as the cognizer, is the sacrificial food which the great Yogis throw in the fire of consciousness; for when this wrong notion of the body is gone, they are always absorbed in pure consciousness. It is said in Vijñāna-bhairava: "When in the fire in the temple of the great Void, elements, organs and objects with the manas are sacrificed, that is homa (sacrifice); chēṭana (consciousness) is the sacrificial ladle (sruk)". In Ṭimiroḍghāṭa: "O Ḍēvī, one flies in the hall of the sky by eating the limbs of one who is dear, who

is a friend, a relative, a giver, who is most dear." This means that the function of the body in subserving cognition should be put an end to. In Gītā, too : "Others burn the functions of all sense-organs and the activities of prāṇa in the fire of the yoga of self-control, illuminated by the light of knowledge" (iv. 27). In Spanḍa, it is referred to in (Kārikā 9), "When the agitation is quelled, that is the final stage." Here 'agitation' is the identification of 'I' with the body, etc., as explained by Bhatta Kallata in the Vṛiṭṭi.

To him,

IX. JNĀNAM ANNAM.

KNOWLEDGE IS FOOD.

The knowledge that is described as bondage (l. 2) is the food of yogis, because it is eaten, swallowed, as discussed already (Comm. on i. 6)? "He then swallows all these, death, time, the totality of kalās, all phenomena, all cognitions, all differences of one āṭmā and many āṭmās." (Another interpretation). Or, the knowledge which consists in the meditation on one's own nature is his food, it being the cause of the peace of the self because it produces full satisfaction. In Vijñāna-bhairava, it is said : "What rises day after day, when fixed in one stage (yukṭi), is the consciousness of fulness, the bliss due to that fulness." 'Yukṭi' is here the knowledge of 112 stages. It is explained in Kārikā (44) : "He will stand everywhere enlightened."*

In the case of the man who is not always in equilibrium, and though wise, is proud of having reached the stage of equilibrium,

* Perhaps the seven stages of Yoga-suṭras, ii. 27, each subdivided into a possible sixteen subdivisions.

X. VIḌYĀSAMHĀRĒ ṬAḌUṬṬHASVAPNAḌARSHANAM.

WHEN KNOWLEDGE IS DESTROYED, THE VISION OF DREAM BORN THEREFROM.

On the destruction, *i. e.*, sinking of shuḍḍhaviḍyā, which is the extensive wisdom already described, all traces of that wisdom are gradually destroyed and there rise therefrom visions (svapna), *i.e.*, manifestations of illusory worlds filled with consciousness of differentiation. In Mālinīvijaya, in the passage beginning with : "When Shankara is not graceful the Guru does not teach this ; even if he should teach it, the teaching becomes fruitless", it is said that even if the fruit of the teaching is acquired the Vināyakas make one who is careless become addicted to evanescent pleasures. In Spanḍa (Kārikā, 35), the same is taught in : "Otherwise, from its own nature, creation starts of itself, as in the case of the worldly man do the states of jāgraṭ and svapna." It is thus taught that the Yogi should be always bent on Shuḍḍhaviḍyā. As said in Shrī Pūrva : "One should fix his desire on the Supreme and not be attached to these." Also, in Spanḍa (Karika, 21), "Hence, always endeavouring to discriminate the Spanḍa-ṭaṭṭva, being always careful, one soon reaches the truth."

Thus from beginning with 'Chiṭṭam manṭraḥ', he has discussed the Shākṭopāya, whose chief characteristic is the acquisition of Manṭra-vīrya and Muḍrā-vīrya, and which is described in the Āgamas thus : "Thinking of the thing that cannot be named one reaches the stage that is called Shākṭa", and has ended it with 'Viḍyāsamhārē ṭaḍuṭṭha-svapna-ḍarshanam,' with regard to one who is proud of having reached equilibrium, thus opening the way for the Āṇavopāya, which is related to it. May it be blessed.

This is the description of Shākṭopāya, the second chapter of the Vṛiṭṭi, called Shiva-sūṭra-vimarshinī.

UNMEṢA III.—ĀṆAVOPĀYA.

Now with a view to explain Āṇavopāya, he describes the nature of aṇu.

I. ĀṬMĀ CHIṬṬAM.

ĀṬMĀ IS CHIṬṬA.

Chiṭṭa includes buḍḍhi, ahaṅkāra, and manas, whose constant functions are aḍhyavasāya, etc., as it is filled with the deposits of the experience (vāsanā) of objects. It aṭaṭi *i.e.*, wanders in wombs, by taking up the activities of saṭṭva, etc., and by ignorance of its own nature as being pure consciousness; hence it is āṭmā, the aṇu. But aṭana, wandering, does not really belong to him, for he is of the sole nature of consciousness. Hence Āṭmā has already been described by 'Chaiṭanyam āṭmā' (*i.e.*), intended to describe his real nature. Now however it is defined so as to indicate its state as aṇu, characterized by decreased knowledge. Thus there is no contradiction between the earlier and later definitions.

Of this āṭmā who is chiṭṭa by nature and yet aṇu,

II. JNĀNAM BANḌHAḤ.

KNOWLEDGE IS BONDAGE.

That knowledge which is of the form of the experiences of pleasure, pain, indifference, illusion, certainty, etc., and of the nature of relative consciousness appropriate to them, is bondage. Bound by it he enters samsāra. It is said in Manṭrasaḍbhāva: "Those who are under the influence of saṭṭva, rajas, and ṭamas are knowers of guṇas. The embodied man wanders thus and goes from place to place." It is also said: "Imprisoned in puryaṣṭaka, which rises from the ṭanmāṭras and stays in buḍḍhi, ahaṅkāra and manas, the dependent one undergoes the experiences born from it and from objects. Thence he wanders in samsāra." Thus in Spanḍa (Karika, 49, 50), in reference to a previous

passage: "Now we explain the cause of samsāra and pralaya".*

Now it is said in Vijñāna-Bhairava: "All knowledge illuminates; the ātmā, too, is the illuminator; on account of the identity of these two, the knower shines with knowledge. "Since knowledge is illumination, how then can it be bondage? This is true, if by the grace of Paramashiva, we obtain Pratyabhijñā† (recognition of this fact); but when by His Māyāshakti, this knowledge is not born,

III. KALĀDĪNĀM TATTVĀNĀM AVIVĒKO MĀYĀ.

THE IGNORANCE WITH REGARD TO THE TATTVAS BEGINNING FROM KALĀ, IS MĀYĀ.

'The tat vas beginning from kalā are those from kalā to kṣiti, characterized by limited power and divided into kañchuka,‡ puryaṣṭaka, and sthūladēha. 'Ignorance with regard to' them is the notion that they are identical with the man though they are really distinct from him. This is Māyā, full of the ignorance of the tattvas, the (differentiated) universe. It is said in Mantrasadbhāva: "He whose consciousness is shaken by kalā, sees objects by vidyā, is coloured

* Puryaṣṭaka is the name of the liṅga-dēha in the Shaiva schools. It is eightfold, being composed of (1) Prakriti, (2) Guṇas, (3) Buddhi, (4) Ahaṅkāra, (5) Manas, (6) Organs, (7) Tanmātras, and (8) Bhūtas. Mādhava in chap. vii of Sarva-darshana-saṅgraha discusses this word and tries in a confused manner to reconcile different enumerations of the eight constituents by different writers.

† This word 'pratyabhijñā occurs casual'y here; but it has given the Kashmīr Shaiva school its distinctive designation. Utpala called his exposition of the tenets of this school 'Īshvara-Pratyabhijñā-Sūtra', the sutras that lead to a recognition of the fact that the individual man is identical with Īshvara; thence the author of Sarva-darshana-saṅgraha called this school 'Pratyabhijñādarshana' Buhler refers to a Spanda-shāstra different from Pratyabhijñāshāstra. Both shāstras are but one.

‡ Kañchuka, envelope, is the name of the five tattvas above Puruṣa which envelope man, viz., niyati, kalā, rāga, vidyā, and kāla (*vide*, my Outlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 289). Puryaṣṭaka, already enumerated, comprises the tattvas below Puruṣa, excluding the sthūladēha. Māyā is the tattva above the pañchakañchuka and is the source of all these.

by rāga, is associated with the buḍḍhi and other organs, is subjected to the bondage of māyā, ḍharma and aḍharma are attached to it. Fixed in these, the man that deserves bondage is bound." In the Spanḍa, too, this is indirectly referred to in (20): "These of unenlightened buḍḍhi endeavour to conceal their nature."

Hence for its ending,

IV. SHARĪRE SAMHĀRAḤ KALĀNĀM.

IN THE BODY, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE KALĀS.

'The body'* is (1) the gross body made of the gross elements, (2) the subtle body of Puryaṣṭaka, (3) the supreme body that ends with mokṣa. Therein reside the kālas, parts, *i.e.*, ṭaṭṭvas from the earth to Shiva. One should destroy them by meditating on each as being dissolved in its cause, or by thinking of them as forming the body (and as being objecting to the man). In Vijñāna-bhairava: "Let him think of all, in order, in the forms of the world, objects, etc., in the states of gross, subtle, and supreme till in the end they are dissolved in the manas'. Again: "Let him think of his city as burnt up in the kālāgni, born of kāla. In the end the illumination called shānṭa is born." Such and similar teaching is found in all Āgamas. Hence ḍhyāna, etc., have been called āṇava in the early shāsṭras, as in: "That state is well called āṇava, which is produced by the different kinds of uchchāra (breathing), karaṇa (muḍras), ḍhyāna (as defined in the Yoga-sūṭras, the sixth of the eight aṅgas of yoga), varṇa (manṭras), and sṭhāna (chakras)". As this deals with the gross (āṇavopāya), it is not explained in the Spanḍa, which deals with the shākṭopāya alone. What in this work

* The body is threefold, sthūla, sūkṣma, para. The last is the one made of the ṭaṭṭvas above māyā, the viḍyāṭaṭṭvas and the shivaṭaṭṭva. This body is dissolved on the final attainment of mokṣa.

leads ultimately to the Shāktopāya, we have tried and shall try to show its agreement with the Spanda.*.

Having thus described the āṇavopāya called ḍhyāna, he now describes prāṇāyāma, ḍhāraṇā, praṭyāhāra, and samāḍhi, which are allied to it.

V. NĀDISAMHĀRA-BHŪṬAJAYA-BHŪṬAKAIVALYA-BHŪṬAPṚIṬHAKṬVĀNI.

THE STOPPAGE OF THE NĀDĪS, THE CONQUEST OF THE ELEMENTS, THE SEPARATION FROM THE ELEMENTS, AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE ELEMENTS.

These have to be meditated on by the Yogis. The nāḍis are tubes which carry prāṇa, apāna, etc. Their stoppage (prāṇāyāma) causes their dissolution in one place, *i.e.*, the central tube of the fire of uḍāna, by joining prāṇa and apāna to it. It is said in Svachchhanḍa: "Fill by means of the right; empty by means of left. This is the purification of the nāḍis and the path that leads to mokṣa. Prāṇāyāma is said to be threefold, emptying, filling, and control. The outer prāṇāyāma (control of the breath) is common to all beings. The inner† again is threefold; fill by means of the inner; making kumbhaka by them (controlling the inner breath), without motion, the inner are done."

The conquest of the elements is the subjection of the elements, earth, etc., by ḍhāraṇā‡. It is said in Svachchhanḍa:

* It will be noticed that what is usually understood as yoga in India, is here treated as the lower viḍyā, not leading to illumination.

† The inner prāṇāyāma deals with the inner prāṇa. The outer prāṇa is vāyu, wind It is the breath in the lungs, the out-breathing being the action of prāṇa, and the in-breathing, of apāna. In the subtle body there is the inner prāṇa, whose upward flow is prāṇa and downward flow in apāna, which take in the nāḍīs called iḍā, piṅgalā and suṣumnā. When they are steadied, the fire of uḍāna rises and they are dissolved.

‡ In ḍhāraṇā, the elements are each confined as it were in their headquarters; the elements are the fundamental sensations, or rather the roots of sensations. It is not possible to find what ghaṭikā is, unless it is a mistake of some amanuensis for gaṇḍa, the cheek. It is not also possible why the commentator quotes a passage about prāṇāyama to illustrate ḍhāraṇā.

"The ḍhāraṇā (steadying) of air (vāyu) in the thumb and the toe, of fire in the middle of the navel, of the earth in the throat, of water in the ghatikā, of the ākāsha in the head is known to be the cause of all the siḍḍhis."

The separation from the elements is praṭyāharaṇa, the drawing away of the chiṭṭa from them. It is said: "When the prāṇa which moves in the heart and the manas which runs after sense-objects are confined in the navel, it is prāṇāyāma, the fourth, called suprashānṭa". By the independence of the elements is meant pure, independent consciousness, apart from them. It is said: "Having regularly broken up all that ends with unmana and given them up by the means already described, O ḍēvī, he attains independence". What has been previously described as "union with bhūṭas, dissociation from bhūṭas, conjunction with the universe" (i. 20), is acquired without effort by one who is engaged in Shāmbhavopāya, but this is acquired with effort by means of Āṇavopāya. This is the difference between them.

This siḍḍhi, which is called ṭaṭṭvarūpa, coming from purification of the body, purification of the elements, prāṇāyāma, praṭyāhāra, ḍhāraṇā, ḍhyāna, and samāḍhi, is due to being enveloped by illusion and not knowledge of truth. This is taught in the next sūṭra.

VII. MOHĀVARAṆĀṬ SIḌḌHIḤ.

SIḌḌHI IS FROM BEING SURROUNDED BY ILLUSION (MOHA).

Moha is māyā, what causes loss of knowledge. From being surrounded by it and from a gradual development of ḍhāraṇā, etc., already described, is produced the siḍḍhi which consists in the enjoyment of that māyā-ṭaṭṭva, but not the knowledge of the supreme ṭaṭṭva. It is said in Lakṣmīkaulārṇava: "The self-born lord is devoid of birth and samsāra; the deluded one does not see the changeless supreme

abodes without beginning and end, peaceful, revealed in all beings".

In the case of one whose moha is destroyed, "following the middle prāṇa, then the interior prāṇa and apāna, taking hold of jñāna-shakṭi, one should reach steadiness (āsana) in it." Uḍāna is jñāna-shakṭi, because all characteristics of life are drowned in it. "Giving up the characteristics of the gross (body), *i. e.*, prāṇa, etc., then the interior subtle (one), is reached the spanḍa, the supreme, that is beyond the subtle. Hence this is called prāṇāyama; thence one does not slip. Giving up the functions of guṇas, sound, etc., which are experienced by the mind, one should enter the supreme abode by his mind. This is called praṭyāhāra, which cuts off the noose of Samsāra. Transcending the qualities of buḍḍhi, meditating on that which is beyond meditation, the supreme, the pervading, one should meditate on the self-luminous; this the wise know to be ḍhyāna. That by which one is always steadied in the supreme āṭmā is called ḍharaṇā, that puts an end to the nooso of Samsāra. Regarding equally the elements in oneself, and in others, and in the world, the samāḍhi (fixity-in) the (thought): "I am Shiva, I am secondless,' is the supreme state. Thus as described in Mṛityujiḍbhattāraka, even by ḍhāraṇā, etc , is produced entry into the supreme ṭaṭṭva; but not partial siḍḍhi (miṭasiḍḍhi). This is said in the next sūṭra.

VII. MOHAJAYĀḌANANṬĀBHOGĀṬSAHAJAVIḌYĀ JAYAḤ.

BY ENDLESS EXTENSION OF THE CONQUEST OF MOHA, IS PRODUCED THE ACQUISITION OF SAHAJAVIḌYĀ.

Moha is māyā, the bondage which is ignorance and ends with the ending of samsāra. By its being thoroughly conquered, *i.e.*, till all the samskāras (deposits of karma) are entirely destroyed, is born the acquisition of sahajaviḍyā, described as "the knowledge of beginningless ḍharma,

etc., (*vide* comm. on i 21). As already said even āṇavopāya leads to shākṭopāya. Thus in Svachchhanḍa, in the passage which begins with: "O fair one, the web of bondage, endless, ending with shamana", and which closes with—" After transcending cognition caused by bondage, one cognizes the essence; this is ātmavyāpṭi; shivavyāpṭi is other than this; when one thinks of the objects possessing the qualities of omnipotence, etc., as operative, that is shivavyāpṭi, the cause of chaiṭanya", it is said that by the conquest of the moha that leads to āṭmavyāpṭi is attained the unmana, which is shivavyāpṭi, the sahajavidyā. It is said there—" Giving up thence the āṭmaṭaṭṭva, one should join the viḍyaṭaṭṭva. This is known as unmana, determined by the manas. From determination, the knowledge called unmana gradually rises and becomes established once for all. It is the supreme viḍyā because there is none better. When one gets it, he at once gets the supreme characteristics of omniscience, etc. It explains the beginningless ḍharma, teaches of the paramāṭmā, and leads to the state of paramāṭmā, hence it is viḍyā, and established in it, he manifests the light supreme the supreme cause."

Thus having attained the sahajaviḍyā, he becomes,

VIII. JĀGRAṬ ḌVIṬĪYAKARAḤ.

WAKEFUL, HAVING THE SECOND AS HIS RAYS.

If one who has attained the shuḍḍhaviḍyā takes care to keep steady in it, he becomes one who has as his rays the world, which is 'the second' to ahanṭā (I-ness), pūrṇavimarsha (unlimited consciousness), which is called iḍanṭā (this-ness), and which manifests itself as the known. It means the universe appears to him as his rays. As said in Vijñānabhairava: "Wherever through the senses the consciousness of the Lord manifests itself, that has the nature of ṭanmāṭra, hence it becomes dissolved in consciousness,

hence it becomes filled." Also in Sarvamangala: "Two things are mentioned, shakti and the possessor of shakti; shaktis are to Him all the world, and Mahēshvara is the possessor of shakti."*

Of him who is thus bent upon investigating his own nature,

IX. NARTAKA ĀTMĀ

THE ĀTMĀ IS AN ACTOR.

The ātmā is an actor, *i. e.*, manifests on himself as substratum, various disguises, *e. g.*, jāgrat, etc., his activity being a sport, rooted on his own real nature concealed within himself. It is said in Naishvāsadēvīmahēshvaranartaka, vii, in the stotra by Dēvī, "Thou art in one aspect the ātmā within, (in another) the actor, protector of kosha †". By Bhatta Nārāyana, too, "Hara, what other poet is capable of beginning and ending the drama of the three lokas, sown with so many central ideas and so many catastrophes". In Pratyabhijñā-sūtra, which is the Upaniṣad of the Āgamas, it is said—"He who carries on the drama of the Universe (samsāra), who is awake when the world sleeps (pralaya) is the one, Paramēshvara."

Of this actor in the world-drama, the stage where he puts on the disguise, *i. e.*, the seat of bondage, is next described.

X. RANGO-ANTARĀTMĀ.

THE STAGE IS THE ĀTMĀ WITHIN.

'Ranga' is the stage where he rajyatē, *i. e.*, paints or enjoys, playing the drama of the world. ‡ The place where

*The only entities in the world are Shiva and His Shakti. When this Shakti flows through one of the senses it manifests itself as a sensation. Tanmātra, the root of a sensation, lit., 'that merely', is pure consciousness showing itself in the limited conditioned form as a sensation. When consciousness manifests itself in the unconditioned form, "the world becomes filled" with its light. When it is withdrawn, the world is emptiness, unreality, non-entity.

† Evidently the 5 koshas of the Vedāntīs, representing the body.

‡ The acting to which the world-process is compared is the primitive "play of shadows" as it is called, which is still played in remote villages. There is only one

he puts on the disguise is the antarātmā, the ātmā within, which is characterized by contraction and manifestation, which depends on shūnya or prāṇa (in svapna or in jāgrat respectively), and is anterior to the body of puryaṣṭaka, and which is jīva. Remaining there, he shows the world-drama in accordance with the functions of his manas (his karaṇa, instrument). It is said in Svachchhanda: "Wandering in all wombs, on account of union with puryaṣṭaka, he is called antarātmā, this is the true doctrine.

Of him who plays on the stage of the antaratmā,

XI. PREKṢAKĀṆINDRIYĀṆI.

THE ORGANS OF SENSE ARE THE AUDIENCE.

The eyes and other sense-organs of the Yogi introspectively see his real nature, filled with the pleasure of manifesting the drama of the world. They attain, by the excellence of the play, the state where distinctions are abolished and they are filled with the appreciation of the wonderful play. It is said in the Shruti (Katha Up. iv. I) "The self-existent Lord pierced holes outwards; hence one sees outward, not at the ātmā within; some wise one sees the ātmā within with inturned eyes enjoying immortality."*

To him,

XII. DHIVASHĀT SATTVASIDDHIḤ.

BY CONTROL OF DHĪ, SATTVASIDDHI IS PRODUCED.

Dhī is intellect fit for investigating the nature of the tattvas. By its control is manifested the sattva, whose nature

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actor and he sits behind a screen (bhitti), placed on a lighted stage (raṅga) and places on the screen images cut out of leather. The audience sits in the dark place in front of the screen and witnesses the action of the shadows moved by the actor within. The Yogi who has become a muktashiva is hence an actor, the antarātmā, the ātmā within the screen. His karaṇa, instrument, is the antaḥkaraṇa; the audience, as explained in the next sūtra is formed by the sense-organs. The light within the screen is the light of consciousness which illuminates the scene and enables the senses to see the performance.

* The usual reading is 'desiring immortality'. Here 'ashnan' is substituted for 'ichchhan'. I have nowhere else met with this reading.

is light, which is subtle, internal activity. Even in a dramatic performance the appreciation of subtle gesture is attained by clearness of intellect.

By attaining this saṭṭva of illumination,

XIII. SIḌḌHAḤ SVATANṬRABHĀVAḤ.

INDEPENDENCE IS ATTAINED.

Independence is the conquest of all the universe and is characterized by spontaneous knowledge and power of action. It is said by Shrīnāṭha : "One should obtain the power of independence for oneself; she is Shrī, Kālī, Parāyalā." In the Svachchhanḍa : "All things known as ṭaṭṭvas, bhūṭas, and manṭravarṇas, are always under his control, by always contemplating on Shiva."

To him the power of independence is,

XIV. YAṬHĀ ṬAṬRA TAṬHĀNYAṬRA.

AS THERE, SO OTHERWHERE.

As in the body where the Yogi's self is manifested, so in all other places where he concentrates himself, that power is produced. It is said in Svachchhanḍa: "He lives always independent and independent and independent". In the Spanḍa, too, (Kārikā 7): "That ṭaṭṭva has to be examined with effort and earnestness, whence his independence, unopposed and omnipotent."

However, he should not be careless, but,

XV. BIJĀVAḌHĀNAM.

CONCENTRATION ON THE SEED.

Add, 'should be made.' Bīja, the seed, is the cause of the universe, of the nature of illumination, Parā shakṭi. It is said in Mṛiṭyujiḍbhattāraka : "She is the womb of the gods and of the manifold shakṭis, the womb of the nature of Agni and Soma; hence all things start." On the seed, that is the Parā Shakṭi, avaḍhāna, *i.e.*, frequent concentration of the chiṭṭa, should be made.

While he is thus,

XVI. ASANASṬHAḤ SUKHAM HRAḌĒ NIMAJJAṬI.

BEING STEADIED, HE EASILY BATHES IN THE TANK.

Established in āsana, *i. e.*, concentrated on āṭmā alone by the power of Shakṭi, after having given up the difficult practices of ḍhyāna and ḍhāraṇā, supreme and non-supreme, if one always meditates by means of introspection on It, he, easily, without difficulty (bathes in the tank of bliss). This tank is the supreme ocean of immortality, which is the source whence this universe flows like a flood, and which consists of svachchha and uchchhalaṭa. In it he bathes, sinks the limitation of knowledge due to his body, etc., and becomes one with it. It is said in Mṛityujiḍbhattāraka; "Do not direct contemplation above, nor below, nor again in the middle, nor at all, before or behind, nor in the two sides, nor again in what is inside the body, nor contemplate on any things outside. Do not direct your mind on the akāsha, nor look below. Let there be no closing of the eyelids, nor any binding of the eyes; do not concentrate on a support, or the unsupported or the supported; nor on the inḍriyās, nor on the bhūṭas, sound, touch, taste, etc. Having given up these, fixed in samāḍhi, he should be full of It. This is called the supreme state of Shiva, the paramātmā. That is the stage without ābhāsa (reflection, reflected consciousness); having reached this stage, one never returns." *

Thus by beginning the āṇavopāya, *i. e.*, nādīsamhāra, etc, conquest of illusion is attained; thence is produced

*Since the practices condemned in the above quotation are prevalent, the following notes on some of them may be interesting. 'Above' is in the ḍvāḍashānṭa (4th ventricle?); 'below', in the kanda, region of the navel; 'middle' in the heart; before', etc., the form Saḍyojāṭa and other faces of Shiva; 'ākāsha,' 'making an image of the sun in a part of the ākāsha; 'below', in a pit on the ground; 'closing the eyelids', bringing them together to reduce the sphere of vision; 'binding the eyelids', fixing them on a tree, a hill, a wall, etc,; 'a support', giving up one state of consciousness and being fixed in the next; 'the supported' being fixed between two states.

Shāktabala, whose nature is Shuddhavidyā. On attaining it the Yogī reaches the Shāmbhavī stage, whose nature is hrada, the supreme amrita, made by himself. Then he,

XVII. SVAMĀTRĀNIRMĀṆĀM ĀPĀDAYATI.

HE CREATES THE MANIFESTATION OF A PART OF HIMSELF.

Svamātrā is the part of his ātmā, engaged in meditation of the nature of chaitanya, chidrasa ; he manifests the illumination of knowledge and the known with the light of himself. It is said in Svachchhanda : "That is gross, O dear one, because it is under the gross upādhi ; the one is divided into gross and subtle." Also in the Pratyabhijñā : "Hence he makes himself the known, but not what is already the known". In the Āgama, too, the same is said : " Dear one, he who knows water and ice, by means of the Āgamas, from the mouth of the Guru, has nothing further to do ; to him there is no further rebirth." The same is explained in the Spanda " He whose consciousness sees thus all the world as a play and is always fixed in samādhi is certainly a jīvanmukta."

Now it is said that to him who possesses objects, qualities, and bodies created by his own power, there is no bondage of birth, etc., whatsoever.

XVIII. VIDYĀVINĀSHĒ JANMAVINĀSHAḤ.

WHEN VIDYĀ IS PERMANENT BIRTH CEASES.

When the sahajavidyā already described is manifested always, there results the destruction of birth, *i. e.*, union with bodies and organs, under the compulsion of karma and producing ignorance and full of pain. It is said in Shrīkantha : " Having given up the world, which is characterized by acquisition and abandonment, which is mobile, from Shiva to the earth, filled with formed and formless, *e. g.*, grass, leaf, stone, etc., and meditating on all as filled by Shiva, he never again attains birth." Also in Svachchhanda :

" Having known the supreme pure nirvāṇa that is got from the teaching of the Guru, one is released; then he is

not reborn after death." In Mṛityujit, too : "Having seen by the divine path of yoga the state beyond the three tattvas (ātmātattva, vidyātattva, and shivatattva), eternal, changeless, permanent, one is not again reborn."

When the characteristics of Shuddhavidya are drowned, of him,

XIX. KAVARGĀDISU MAHĒSHVARYĀDYAH PASHUMĀTARAH,

IN THE KA-CLASS ETC., MAHĒSHVARĪ AND OTHER MOTHERS OF THE PASHUS* BECOME THE RULING DEITIES, HAS TO BE ADDED TO COMPLETE THE SENTENCE.

It is said in Mālinī-vijaya: "O dēvī, she who is called Shakti and who inheres in the lord of the world, takes on the desire-nature of him who desires to create. Hear how she attains multiplicity, though one. That by which, in this universe, one knows for certain a thing to be this and not otherwise, is called jñānashakti. When the idea is born, 'Let this thing be thus', the power which makes it so at that moment is called kriyā-shākti. Though she is thus of two forms, Īshvarī, when conjoined to objects, becomes, like Chintāmani, of endless forms. Therein she attains motherhood (mātribhāva), becomes divided twofold, ninefold, and fiftyfold; she thus becomes mālinī (a series). Twofold, as bīja and yoni; bīja are the vowels; yoni from ka, etc., divided into nine classes (varga). The bīja mantra is Shiva, and Yoni is known to be Shakti. By division into eight classes (vargas), the eight shaktis (varga), Mahēshvari, etc., come. By division into 50 letters she is fiftyfold. She attains that number, being called by the names of Rudras." Thus she, Pāramēshvarī, Parā Vāk, the flowing Ichchhā-shakti, takes on the forms of jñāna-shakti.

* Ordinary cognition is bound with the expression thereof in words. Thus the pure cognition and its expression in words are manifestations of the same power. He who cannot exercise jñāna-shakti without the help of 'sound' i.e., who has not attained to pure consciousness, is a pashu.

kriyā-shakti, of bīja, yonivarga, and vargya, etc., becomes the māṭrikā, of the forms of the letters from 'a' to 'kṣa' and of the names, Shiva, Shakṭi, Mahēshvari, etc. In certain and uncertain cognition (avikalpaka-savikalpaka-saṃvēḍanam) of all knowers, she is in the form of the cognition within and in the forms of subtle and audible sounds makes that cognition known. By being the ruling goddesses of varga, vargya, etc., she manifests the feelings of wonder, joy, fear, desire, aversion, etc. She then conceals her real nature of chiḍghana (unlimited consciousness, massive sentiency), unlimited, independent, and attains a limited, dependent, embodied state. It is said in Ṭimiroḍghāṭa: "Seated between brahmaranḍhra and chiṭi, embracing the rope of Brahma, the mistresses of the pīthas, most terrible, again and again, deceive (men)". This has already been quoted. It has already been said that 'māṭrikā is based on knowledge' (i. 4). The special point brought out here is that though one has attained the ṭaṭṭvas, yet by ignorance he is deceived by Mahēshvarī and other mistresses of pashus by means of the knowledge of mere sounds.

Hence the Yogi should in all circumstances be careful to see that the Shuḍḍhaviḍyā attained by the means already described, should not be lost. This is said in the next Sūṭra.

XX. Trisu chaṭurṭham ṭailavaḍ āsēchyam.

In the three the fourth should be dropped like oil.

In the three states of jāgraṭ, etc., the fourth state, that wherein Shuḍḍhavīḍyā manifests and the bliss of turīya is experienced, should be dropped, drop by drop, like oil. Just as oil gradually spreads over a surface, so should the ṭurīya experience which is first had at the extreme points (the beginning and end of every state of consciousness) in jāgraṭ, etc., be extended to the middle, so that the state of consciousness might be immersed in it.

In the sūṭra, "The experience of ṭurīya in jāgraṭ, svapna, and suṣpuṭi" (i. 7), has been described the nature of ṭurīya as causing the flow of its own essence in jāgrat and other stages, when one is steady in uḍyama and union with shakṭi-chakra. In "Vīrēcha the enjoyer of the three" (i. 11), has been shown the ending of jāgraṭ, etc., by means of hathapāka following the shāmbhavopāya. In this sūṭra, it is taught that the essence of ṭurīya should be dropped on jāgraṭ and other states so as to spread like a leaf. This is how this sūṭra differs from the rest.

Now the means of securing this is explained.

XXI. MAGNAḤ SVACHIṬṬĒNA PRAVIṢHĒṬ.

BEING DROWNED, LET HIM ENTER BY MEANS OF HIS OWN CHIṬṬA.

In accordance with the passage in Mṛiṭyujiḍbhaṭṭāraka, which begins with "Whence, having given up the gross prāṇa, then the subtle, interior prāṇa, one attains the supreme that is above the subtle," and ends with, "He should enter with his mind," one should give up the gross methods of prāṇāyāma, ḍhyāna, ḍhāraṇā, etc., and enter (the supreme) by means of the certain knowledge born of introspective meditation with his mind. Then he should destroy his perception of his body, prāṇa, etc., by drowning himself in the bliss that flows from his consciousness. It is said in Svachchhanḍa: "Giving up the mental activities, direct yourself to pure consciousness. Then the pashu is released from the ocean of samsāra and becomes Shiva." Also in Vijñānabhairava: "When the four, viz., mental function, chēṭanā, shakṭi, āṭmā, O dear one, are weakened, the body becomes bhairava." This same (very obscure verse) is explained in the sṭoṭra, called Jñānagarbha: "O mother, having ended all mental functions from all sides, given up the dependence due to the functioning of the (sense and action) organs by your favour, one experiences that supreme state, which is devoid of stupor and spreads nectar-like and never-changing bliss." This is by my Mahāguru.

When a man who has entered paramapaḍa again deviates into worldly things, he will have,

XXII. PRĀṆASAMACHĀRĒ SAMAḌARSHANAM.

THE COGNITION OF SAMENESS ON THE SLOW MOTION OF PRAṆA.

When the prāṇa purified by shakṭi of pure consciousness, is in slow motion on account of the steadiness inside of the developed shakṭi, he experiences, in all states, the one bliss of pure consciousness. It is said in Ānanḍabhairava: "Giving up the worldly life, one should follow the aḍvaiṭa, the giver of mukṭi, common to all the gods, in all castes and āshramas." He who sees all objects alike is released from all bonds." Hence it is said in Praṭyabhijñā: "The real nature of the universe is attained by those who have risen above contracted knowledge of outside objects, even though buḍḍhi and prāṇa act in them."

He who having attained steadiness in the introspective ṭurīya state, does go on to the state beyond the ṭurīya (ṭurīyāṭīṭa), but remains satisfied with the wonderful experiences of the beginning and end of the ṭurīya state,

XXIII. MAḌHYĒ' VARAPRASAVAḤ.

IN THE MIDDLE IS BORN A NON-EXCELLENT STATE.

In the case of one who gives himself up to the enjoyment of the delight of the beginning and end of the ṭurīya state, is born in the middle a non-excellent, ignoble vyuṭṭhāna. In accordance with the sūṭra, "Viḍyāsamhārē ṭaḍuṭṭhasvapnaḍarshanam," (ii. 10), he is always deceived. It is said in Mālinī-vijaya "Although one has the vāsanā of the ṭurīya state yet if he is careless, Vināyakas make him have temporary enjoyments. Therefore he who wishes to rise high should not mingle with wordly things."

Even if such a state is born, if he again drops the middle state by fixity in ṭurīya,—

XXIV. MĀṬRĀSVAPRAṬYAYASANḌHĀNĒ NAṢṬASYA PUNARUṬṬHĀNAM.

ON THE NON-UNION OF COGNITION TO OBJECTS, THE LOSS IS RECOVERED.

Union of cognition to things is described in Malinivijaya: "What is seen by the eyes, what is manifested by speech, what the manas thinks on, what buḍḍhi knows, what are felt to be the actions of the Ego, what is the known, what is not, this has to be sought with effort." In the non-excellent state of mind already described, one meditates always on the pure consciousness' "I am all this universe." The lost steadiness in ṭurīya is recovered, and the Yogi gets unity with it. This is said in Svachchhanḍa, in the passage beginning with "The manes of Yogis is forcibly shaken," and ending with "If one is fixed in the consciousness of being the knower and is full all round, his manas is unshaken in all states wherever the manas goes, all that is to be taken as the knower; if all is filled with Shiva where will the manas go when it is shaken?"—and "In all things and objects of sense, whatever we perceive, there is nothing which is not Shiva."

The Yogi who has reached this supreme state,

XXV. SHIVAṬULYO JĀYAṬĒ.

BECOMES EQUAL TO SHIVA.

By force of meditation on ṭurīya, he reaches the state beyond ṭurīya, filled with pure, independent, bliss of consciousness, equal to Shiva. He is equal to Shiva because he has not yet lost his body. When he loses it he becomes Shiva himself. This is said in Kālikākrama: "Hence, having learnt from the Guru's lips the yoga, eternal and without doubt, one should by steady meditation imagine himself to be filled with Him. When he attains equality with Him, he becomes Lord Bhairava".

Yet, as it is said, "From whence this, that verily from experience," the body which exists for transcending the

experience already come (*i. e*, prārabḍha) cannot be discarded. This is said in

XXVI. SHARĪRAVṚITTIR VRATAM.

THE BODILY FUNCTIONS ARE WORSHIP.

Whatever bodily functions are exercised by the Yogi who has been said to be equal to Shiva, and who is meditating on the thought, 'I am Shiva', are acts of worship, consisting of a constant investigation of his own nature. This has to be done by him always. Thus in Svachchhanḍa: "As the flame of a burning fire* is seen (to end in empty) space, so the āṭmā has to be dissolved in the prāṇa of the body. It is said here that union with Shiva is possible only to him who is in a body and prāṇa. To him no other worship than being in a body is useful. It is said in Ṭrikasāra: "That wise man who keeps always in the muḍrās that arise from the body, is called the bearer of muḍrās; others are bearers of bones." Also, in Kulapañchāshikā: "The rays (shakṭis) speak to him who has an unmanifested linga; they do not approach one who has a (manifested) linga, for they are hidden."

Of such a man,

XXVI. KAṬHĀ JAPAH.

HIS TALK IS JAPA.

As he is filled with consciousness of Ego always, as explained in Svachchhanḍa: "I am verily the supreme Hamsa, Shiva, the supreme cause", if one should be filled with the great manṭra of the consciousness of Ego, described in Kālikākrama: "The consciousness of him, the god of gods, of the form of supreme knowledge, is Shakṭi, omniscient,

* Following the course of the flame from its origin in the fire, trace how it tapers off till it ends in empty space. So should the manifestation of the āṭmā in the body and prāṇa be traced from its grossest manifestations through subtler ones till it dissolves as it were in nothingness. This method of meditation is possible only in a body.

full of wisdom," his talk is japa, of the nature of the constant repetition of the consciousness of āṭmā. It is said in Vijñānabhairava: "What is again and again conceived in the supreme thought, that is japa, having its own sound; this is what is fit to be recited as manṭra." Again "By saying Sa he goes out (of his body in his breath); By saying Ha he re-enters; hence the jīva constantly repeats the mantra, 'hamsa' 'hamsa', always; six hundred times during the day and twenty-one thousand times during the night; this easy japa has been ordained by the Ḍēvī, difficult to fools."

Now is described the conduct of one who possesses this japa and vraṭa.

XXVIII. ḌĀNAM ĀṬMAJNĀNAM.

KNOWLEDGE OF ĀṬMĀ IS GIFT.

His realization of the āṭmā which has been said to be chaiṭanya, is his ḍāna (charitable gift ordained on all as a daily duty). (Now the commentator gives a few fanciful derivations and explanations of ḍānam).

Ḍīyaṭē' means 'khaṇḍyaṭē', 'there is cut off all cognition of difference'; 'ḍāyate', shoḍhyate, 'the nature of māya is made clear'; 'ḍīyaṭē' is rakṣyaṭē, and rakṣyaṭē means lakṣyaṭē, *i.e.* the characteristics of Shivāṭmā obtained by him are well described. Or, again, 'ḍīyate', 'what is given' is ḍānam; knowledge of self is given by him to his disciples. It is said: "The Yogīndras, who follow steadily the kulāchāra, save one from the wide ocean of samṣāra by their mere sight or touch."

When one becomes equal to Shiva, as said (in iii. 25) and masters the true Shakṭichakra by steady vraṭa (iii. 26), japa (iii. 27), and charyā (iii. 28), he alone becomes a fit teacher of disciples. This is explained in the next sūṭra.

XXIX. YO'VIPASṬHO JNĀHĒṬUSHCHA.

AND WHO IS AVIPA IS THE CAUSE OF KNOWLEDGE.

Avipa is what protects (pāti) pashus (avīn, pashūn), the Shakṭichakram, Mahēshvarī, etc., as described in the sūṭra,

"Kavargādiṣu māhēshvaryādyaḥ pashumāṭaraḥ" (iii. 19). He who is in the state of avipa, who manifests his independence on account of the knowledge of his own greatness, is the cause of knowledge. 'The cause of knowledge' means one that is able to teach others by means of jñānashakṭi. How can others, who are not masters of themselves being subject to shakṭichakra, teach disciples? The word 'who' (yaḥ) in the sūṭra requires the introduction of 'he' (saḥ) in it. 'Cha' in the sutra means 'hi' verily. As the person in avipa is the cause of the rise of knowledge in others, it has been well said, "Ḍānamāṭmajñānam" (iii. 28).

Others following the Nirukṭa rule (that by which each letter of a sūṭra is supposed to stand for the word of which it is the initial or final letter), interpret this sūṭra as follows:—'Yo' is yogīndra; 'vi' is vijñāna; 'pa' is paḍa; 'sṭha' is the last syllable of paḍasṭha; jñā is jñāṭā; 'hē' is hōyaḥ; 'ṭu' is ṭuchchhaṭā; visarga is the visargashakṭi; 'cha' represents what is not said, *i. e.*, the actor (karṭā); and explain this sūṭra to mean that the Yogīndra who has reached the stage of realization of the āṭmā by means of vimarshashakṭi (discriminating inquiry) is to be known as the knower and actor. To him all evil appears insipid, unfit to be pursued.

This interpretation does not appeal to us, as the making up of the meaning is not elegant, as if each sṭūra were to be interpreted thus, thousandfold interpretations could be made out.

To him,

XXX. SVASHAKṬIPRASHAYO'SYA VISHVAM.

THE WORLD IS FILLED WITH HIS OWN SHAKṬI.

Because he is said equal to Shiva, "His shakṭis (are) all the world", as described in the Vedas; the universe is filled with his own shakṭi. The world is the manifestation of the

kriyāshakti, which flows from his own pure consciousness. It is said in Mrityujit:" O, Devī, since the manifold knowable world is filled with knowledge and since this knowledge is the salvation (trāṇam) of the limited beings (niyantrita), it is called nētra." Also in Kālikākrama: "Knowledge manifests itself, inside and outside, in various forms; objects have no existential value (sattā) unless they are cognized; hence the world is of the nature of knowledge (has an ideal existence). No concept (bhāva, mental image) can be apprehended without cognition; hence it has been proved that the world is of the nature of consciousness. By the distinction of what is and what is not, joined to command and countermand (in the sphere of duty), by the power of conceiving images, the known has the same nature as knowledge. As cognition is simultaneous, the knower and the known are one."*

Not only is it at the time of creation the world is the manifestation of his own shakti, but also after (creation).

XXXI. STHITILAYAU.

MAINTENANCE AND DESTRUCTION ARE FILLED WITH HIS OWN SHAKTI.

"Maintenance" (sthiti) is the manifestation as object for a short time (the moment of cognition) of the world as the result of kriyāshakti, for the benefit of cognizers. "Destruction" (laya) is the cessation of cognition by the cognizer who is consciousness. Both are filled with his shakti. This cognized world is identical with consciousness both during cognition and during its cessation. Otherwise cognition would be impossible. Hence in Kālikākrama: "By the discrimination of what is and is not, etc." (quoted in the commentary on the last sūtra), sthiti and laya are described. So it is said: "He who sees all as pure, knowledge without

* The passage quoted is very obscure. But the idea is plain enough. Cognition endows objects with entity, for so long as an object is not cognized it cannot be held to exist—the fundamental idealist position.

(a separate) substratum, (but) identical with consciousness of self, is a mukṭa (liberated soul), though yet living in a body, no doubt."

Now it might be thought that in the different states of creation, maintenance, and destruction, the āṭmā becomes differentiated. In reply it is said,

XXXII. ṬATPRAVṚIṬṬĀVAPYANIRĀSAḤ SAMVṬIṚIBHĀVĀṬ.

EVEN WHEN THEY PREVAIL, HE WILL NOT SLIP FROM THE STATE OF KNOWER.

Even when the states of creation, etc., rise, this Yogi does not slip from being always engaged in the consciousness of the ṭurīya. For when there is a change from that state there is no light of consciousness. It is said there: "When the experience of knowledge is destroyed, the real nature of the Yogi is not lost, for it is without origin or destruction; therefore the ending of knowledge is not real. Origin and destruction are falsely attributed to knowledge; How can one say that is lost which by nature is indestructible?" This same is described in Spanda-Kārikā: "There are two states described, action and agent; action is finite, but agentship is deathless." Again, "Effort to do an action ceases, (but not the result of it); when the effort ends, the man thinks I am lost. That which is gained by introspective meditation is the basis of omniscience; that can never be lost, for if so all other things would be lost."

To this Yogi,

XXXIII. SUKHADUḤKHAYORBAHIRMĀNANAM.

THE CONTEMPLATION OF PLEASURE AND PAIN AS OUTSIDE.

He recognizes pleasure and pain born from contact with the world (lit., the known), as outside him, as objective to him, as blue, etc., and does not regard them as subjective experiences as the ordinary man of the world does. The latter cognizes everything as subjective experience (with the

light of egoism), as said in "Sashakṭiprachayo'sya vishvam" (iii. 30), not as predestined pleasure and pain, etc. How could the Yogi who has transcended the consciousness of puryaṣṭaka be affected by pleasure and pain? So it is said in Praṭyabhijñāsūṭra-vimarshinī: "Pleasure and pain (though due to true causes) do not exist for those who have transcended the stage of cognizers of relative consciousness and reached the the stage when they know the absolute truth; or (it may be) pleasure and pain do not rise in them, for the causes of pleasure, etc., do not exist for them. Then the birth of true knowledge takes place." Hence it is said in Spanḍa: "Where there is no pain, no pleasure, no cognized, no cognizer, no ignorance, That truly exists"

Because to the Yogi who has transcended the consciousness limited by puryaṣṭaka there is no connection with pleasure and pain.

XXXIV. ṬAḌVIMUKṬASṬU KĒVALĪ.

WHO HAS GIVEN IT UP IS 'ALONE'.

He who has absolutely transcended pleasure and pain, whose mind is not affected even by the relics (samskāra) of them is kēvalī, knower of pure consciousness. It is said in Kalikākrama: "The Yogi who has destroyed the great delusion of duality which is largely determined by the experience of pleasure and pain, gets the fruits of yoga." The word 'ṭu' shows his distinction from him who is going to be described in the next sutra.

Ṭu in the next sūtra indicates the same.

XXXV. MOHAPRAṬISAMHAṬASṬU KARMĀṬMĀ.

HE WHO IS OVERCOME BY DELUSION IS VERILY KARMĀTMĀ.

One who is weighted with moha, *i.e.*, ignorance, and is hence affected by pleasure and pain is karmāṭmā, always stained by good and evil. It is said there (Kālikākrama): 'Pleasant and painful things are experienced on account of

that which being surrounded by ignorance, and impelled by changes, soon creates all beings from Shiva downwards. From unhappy experiences supreme misery results".

When such a karmāṭmā gains his own independence, on account of the grace of the invincible Mahēshashakṭi, (he obtains)

XXXVI. BHĒḌAṬIRASKĀRĒ SARGĀNṬARAKARMAṬVAM.

WHEN DIFFERENCE IS ENDED, CREATORSHIP OF ANOTHER CREATION.

On the destruction of differentiated consciousness, which is characterized by love of body, prāṇa, etc., as himself, and is experienced by Sakalas, Pralayākalas, etc., *i.e.*, when limited consciousness is driven away by the rise of absolute consciousness, are gradually developed the powers of Manṭra, Manṭrēshvara, and Manṭramahēshvara, the ability to create another universe by mere desire. Thus in Svachchhanḍa: "By threefold japa, one becomes equal to svachchhanḍa" it is said that equality to svachchhanḍa is attributed to one who has transcended limitations. Then: "He becomes the terror and refuge of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Inḍra and other gods, the lords of Siḍḍhas, Ḍaityas and serpents, he also becomes the giver of blessings and curses. He destroys the pride of time, fells mountains."

This is not impossible, for

XXXVI. KĀRAṆASHAKṬIḤ SVAṬŌNUBHĀVĀṬ.

ON ACCOUNT OF HIS OWN PROWESS, KĀRAṆASHAKṬI.

By his prowess, both in the desire (of waking moments and of) dream, kāraṇashakṭi, the power of creating extraordinary things, is proved to exist in the āṭmā. With this in view it is said in Pratyabhijñā: "Hence from conception and illumination according to his desires, jñāna and kriyā are clearly proved to exist in all living beings". Just so; if he meditates with great fervour, then is born the power to

create all common things at will. It is said in the Taṭṭva-garbha: "When they shine self-manifested, skilful, weakness is banished when they are engaged in great deeds, and their desires become like kalpaka trees".

As has been said, the nature of the knower who is pure consciousness is Independence, kāraṇashakṭi, the fourth (state of) āṭmā, which relights its nature destroyed by māyāshakṭi.

XXXVIII. ṬRIPĀḌĀḌYĀNUPRĀṆANAM.

LIVING AT THE ROOTS OF THE THREE STATES.

The three states are called (1) creation, (2) maintenance, (3) destruction, which are respectively (1) preparation to birth, (2) embracing it, and (3) relapsation of it; their source, the ṭurīya, a mass of bliss, though enveloped by māyāshkṭi on account of the development of the three, during the moments of enjoyment, shines like lightning. Though it rises but for a moment during those moments, it has to be dwelt on, by following the differences of introspective meditation; by the living power the relighting of the living is to be done. It is said in the Vijnaññābhairava: "The state of the Bhairava has for its aim the following of the directions of the changes of bliss, it is experienced within, and is full; its pure and omni-present nature has to be truly known"; beginning with this passage, it is further said: "That bliss of brahmataṭtva, which is born on union with shakti and ends on being filled with shakṭi is called svārṭha. O Ḍēvēshi, from clear memory of the pleasures of woman, licking, churning, one is drowned in bliss, even in the absence of power. From the mere memory of the pleasure enjoyed when a great bliss befalls a man or when he sees a relative whom he has not seen for a long time, one becomes filled with bliss and is drowned in it. From the bliss arising from the pleasures of eating and drinking, one should infer the nature of Bhairava and become filled with bliss. To the Yogi who is filled with the bliss

other than that experienced from singing and other enjoyments and who is master of his mind, is born that nature (of Bhairava)". Thus have the means been shown. The same is also shown in the passage beginning, "Whether very angry or highly pleased, hesitating to move or running, whatever state a man is in, that state contains spanḍa" and ending with "The enlightened one is without limitation." This has been fully explained by me in Spanḍanirṇaya. In sūṭra, "Ṭrişu chaṭurṭham" (iii. 20), it was said that the ṭurīya has to be experienced in jāgraṭ, etc. In this sūṭra it is taught that it has to be experienced in the beginning, middle and end of all states, indirectly described as creation, maintenance and destruction.

One should not rest content with the interpenetration of the three states with the fourth, during introspective meditation alone; but

XXXIX. Chiṭṭasṭhiṭivachchharīrakaraṇabāhyēşu.

As in the fixed chiṭṭa, so in the body, organs and the object,

the accompaniment of the three states by the fourth should be practised. As when the chiṭṭa is fixed during introspective meditation, one should practise the interpenetration of the three states by the ṭurīya, so too during the (ordinary) conscious life of the body, organs and the object, though the mind is turned outward, one should be fixed in the inner consciousness and accompany it (the conscious life) with it (the fourth), gradually getting stronger in each stage. It is said in Vijñānabhairava: "One should think of all the universe or of his body as being filled with bliss; he is at once filled with supreme bliss on account of his immortality". Thus while the power of blissful Independence becomes manifest in all states he becomes able to create according to his desires.

When he does not experience this cognition accompanied by the interior fourth state, then on account of the ānavamala, which is the consciousness 'I am finite', due to his consciousness of the body,

XL. ABHILĀṢĀḌ BAHIRGAṬIḤ SAMVĀHYASYA.

HE GOES OUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIRE OF THE SAMVĀHYA (JIVA).

Samvāhya is one that is led from womb to womb with kañçhuka, inner organ, outer organs, ṭanmāṭras and bhūṭas, dominated by the shakṭichakra. He is the pashu, of the kind called karmāṭmā. Of him it is said in Svachchhanḍa, " Verily, desire is in his case mala" ; he is always intent on objects, because of desire, on account of the āṇavamala of the nature of the consciousness of finiteness, he never cares for the practice of introspective meditation. It is said in Kālikākrama : " Pleasant and painful things are experienced on account of that which, being surrounded by ignorance and impelled by changes, soon creates all beings from Shiva downwards. From unhappy experience supreme misery results. Imagining all sorts of unrealities they suffer in hell, etc ; their faults burn them as easily as bamboos in fire. They suffer from ignorance on account of thoughts full of māyā ; these men attain bodies full of māyā, the seat of sorrow."

When on account of being touched with the shakṭi of Paramēshvara, he is enlightened and recognizes his real nature then desire dies and his mind is not outward-turned, but is self-gratified.

XLI. ṬĀḌĀRŪDHAPRAMIṬĒSṬAṬKṢAYĀJJĪVASAMKṢAYAḤ.

FROM THE CONSCIOUSNESS BEING FIXED IN IT FROM THE DESTRUCTION OF IT (DESIRE), THE JĪVA IS DESTROYED.

" Fixed in it." It is the āṭmā, the knower, already described, the fourth state. One fixed on it " it, is one that

possesses the knowledge that rises from a cognition of it. "The destruction of it" is (the destruction of) desire; therefrom results the ending of the jīva, the samvāhya, who experiences the consciousness of puryaṣṭaka; he manifests the consciousness of chiṭ. As said there: "Just as the objects seen in a dream are not seen when one awakes from sleep, so by the yogi who is in meditation, is the world not seen." As also: "The Yogi who has put a stop to good and bad actions, reached the interior consciousness, destroyed the supreme and non-supreme series of mental images by the consciousness of unity, is eternally satisfied with himself, and is devoted to the destruction of time; he is the Yogi that is the experiencer of kaivalya and gets the state of nirvāṇa". The experiencer of kaivalya is one who is not overcome by the senses, ṭanmāṭras, etc.

Now when the jīva is destroyed, he loses his body; even when he awakes he is not always aware of his body. How then can he get any cognition through it? This is answered in the next sūṭra.

XLI. BHŪṬAKAÑCHUKĪ ṬAḌAVIMUKṬO BHŪYAḤ PAṬISAMAḤ PARAḤ.

ENVELOPED BY BHŪṬAS, THEN, RELEASED, FREQUENTLY BECOMES EQUAL TO PAṬI, SUPREME.

'Then', when desire is ended, when the love of the consciousness limited by puryaṣṭaka is dropped, he is 'enveloped by bhūṭas', i.e., the elements which produce the body are like an envelope, like a cover, separate from him, not touching the seat of ahaṅkāra. So he is released, he is an enjoyer of nirvāṇa; hence he becomes frequently filled with the nature of Paramēshvara, an absolute consciousness. Hence he is supreme, full. As said in the sūṭra, "Sharīravṛiṭṭir vraṭam" (iii. 26), though yet in a body, as (water) on a leaf, he is untouched by the bodily consciousness. It is said in

Kularaṭnamālā: "When the great guru teaches him well, there is no doubt left in him; that very moment he becomes free, just where he stands. What more need be said of the wise who are entirely devoted to the supreme Brahma? The yogi who remains free even for a moment liberates all men". Also in Mriṭyujiṭ: "What truth is seen even in the twinkling of the eye liberates a man from rebirth". In the Kulasāra, too: "Behold the greatness of truth, O fair one, from mere hearing it one becomes free".

Now it is said that this state of being loosely enveloped by bhūṭa is not ended all at once.

XLIII. NAISARGIKAḤ PRĀṆASAMBANḌHAḤ.

CONNECTION WITH THE PRĀṆA IS NATURAL.

'Naisargikaḥ', from nisarga, the nature of āṭmā, i. e. Independence. The blessed lady, Pure Consciousness, desiring to manifest the wonders of the universe, attains first the consciousness of limitation, then the state of knower, i.e., the consciousness of the limited Universe which is prāṇana, and then manifests as universe, the known. Hence her connection with Prāṇa is first produced from Independence and is natural. In Vājasanēya: "She, Shakṭi, supreme, subtle, pervasive, pure, auspicious, mother of Shakṭichakra, supreme bliss, of the nature of immortality, Mahāghorēshvari, Chaṇḍā, the author of creation, and destruction, forcibly drags time, the bearer of three, three-fold;" thus is Pure consciousness described as the bearer of threefold prāṇa, Soma, Sūrya and Agni; the manifester of threefold time, past, present, and future. It is said in Svachchhaṇḍa: "Prāṇa is the Being with prāṇa; prāṇa is for breathing in. She seated in the heart is of breathing beings and always fills them with prāṇa"; Prāṇa is said to be ha, flowing spontaneously, of the shape of a plough, hence it is of the nature of Svachchhaṇḍa Bhaṭṭāraka; hence it fills in (the

lungs) and empties and is said to be the author of creation and destruction. Thus it has been said that the connection with prāṇa is natural. The same has been called by Bhatta Kallata the power of the operative cause, called, prāṇa—"Being Consciousness at first, she then becomes prāṇa,"—in his Taṭṭvārthachinṭāmaṇi.

Now, the connection with prāṇa having been proved to be natural, it is going to be shown that one who controls it, and continues to meditate on its innermost part is the greatest in the world.

XLIV. NĀSIKĀNTARMADHYASAMYAMĀT KIMATRA SAVYĀPASAVYASAUṢUMNĒṢU.

AFTER CONTROL OF THE MIDDLE OF THE INTERIOR OF THE NĀSIKĀ IN THE RIGHT, LEFT AND MIDDLE NĀIDIS, WHAT MORE NEED BE DONE?

Of all the nādīs the three most important are savya, apasavya and sāuṣumṇa, otherwise termed right, left and middle nādīs. Nāsikā means the prāṇashakṭi which moves crookedly among these nādīs. Nāsikā is derived from "nasaṭē" meaning (it) moves crookedly. That which is in its (Nāsika's) middle is Samviṭ or the internal consciousness. There is nothing more to be said after fixing the internal sight on Vimarṣa' which is inside samviṭ, which is at the core of everything, and is therefore the most important, and which is described as follows in Kālikākrama: "Vimarṣa is the highest shakṭi of him who is above the Ḍēvās and who is the supreme knowledge in form. Vimarṣa is all knowing and is illuminated by "*jñāna*". This shines brilliantly in all states and is called Nirvyuṭṭhāna, the best samāḍhi. It is said in Vijñānabhairava: "The cognition of the seer and the seen is common to all embodied beings; the speciality of yogis, however, is intentness on the connection between the two."

Relating the fruits of yoga enjoyed by such a man (he the author) finishes the book.

XLV. BHŪYAḤ SYĀṬ PRAṬINIRYĀṆAM.

THERE WILL BE RELAPSATION AGAIN.

This universe which is derived from the form of chaiṭanya will completely relapse into chaiṭanya, since the consciousness of difference will be gone. That is to say, the yogi settled in the best yoga will assume again his own form of chaiṭanya. It is said in Svachchhanḍa, "Oh Ḍēvī, settling in 'unmana' one must fix the self there. If the āṭmā is thus fixed it becomes That." It is again said in it—"A stick set on fire when well burnt does not resume its former state of wood, so āṭmā is removed from Samsāra. He who is free from mala, karma, kalā etc. is released from misery and does not suffer though remaining in mala, &c., for he becomes supremely pure." What the author means by 'bhūyaḥ syāṭ' is that Shivaṭva is not a thing to be newly achieved by the yogi: it is nature. Māyāshakṭi creates vikalpa or consciousness of difference. On account of the evil effects of this he is not able to know the shining shivaṭva (in him). By following the methods described above he will have cognition of shivaṭvam. May it prosper!

This is the description of Āṇavopāya, the third chapter of the Vṛiṭṭi called Shivasūṭravimarṣinī.

(CLOSING VERSES.)

1. This Virṭṭi explains the secrets of Shaiva religion and is so written as to harmonise Agamas and Spanḍakārikās.

2. Good people in order to shake off samsāra should enjoy this Shivasūṭravimarṣinī which is filled with the sweet fresh nectar oozing from the explanation of the Secrets of Shiva.

3. It creates interest in the indifferent: it develops the mind well: by tasting this death, old age, birth and other dangers can be averted as by tasting nectar.

4. Man being surrounded by the body, prāṇa, pleasure, &c., cannot cognize his ātmā's chaitanya which is of the nature of Mahēshvara. He who knows this universe as the foam surrounding the milky ocean of knowledge is alone said to be Shiva himself.

5. Cross the ocean of Samsāra soon. Firmly step into paramapada, ever shining and full of felicity. Carefully think over the Shivasūtra full of secrets. It develops knowledge backed by sound reasonings.

Thus ends Shivasūtravimarshinī composed by Rajanaka Kṣemaraja serving under Mahamaheshvara Rajanaka Shrīmad Abhinavagupta

